Moral Certainty

[tjohnson]

That man needs ethics has of course nothing to do with giving him a means to attain happiness, that is typically a definition by non-essentials. The real origin of ethics is that it creates stability by the evolution of modes of cooperation, which is a useful evolutionary strategy for the social animal man. In simple terms: by creating rules that you just cannot bash the head in of anyone you don't like, nor can arbitrarily steal the fruit of his labor etc., man in general gets a better chance of survival, even if it isn't always advantageous for the individual. You'll find comparable rules, mostly if not exclusively hardwired, in other social animals. In modern societies many of those rules have become laws. No matter how complex such systems may have become, this is the basic reason for their existence. That also means that ethics is a typically social concept, it concerns the interaction of any person with any other persons and is irrelevant for a lone person on a desert island. What he wants or doesn't want to do is exclusively his own concern.

Congratulations! By failing to understand the difference between prescriptive and descriptive disciplines, you have managed, in one fell swoop, to define 2500 years of ethical theory out of existence.

Is it too much to ask that a person actually study a subject for a while before making oracular pronouncements about it?

Ghs

Yes, thanks DF, lets hope we can keep it snuffed out. It's not ethical theory it's just a "word salad". Who wants to read word salads?

[Daniel Barnes]

"Contextualism" can cover a lot of ground. I would compare it to the elastic clause (i.e., the "necessary and proper" clause) in the U.S. Constitution. ;)

Ok, seeing this is the title of this thread, I'm going to saddle up my standard hobby horse here.

We're talking about what we might more accurately call "contextual moral certainty" right?

This strikes me as having the same problem as Rand's epistemological "contextual certain knowledge". That is, it's simply an oxymoron. Even if we give it the most charitable interpretation, it amounts to a standard form of skepticism. The problem then being merely the fact that Rand damned skepticism to the lowest rungs of hell.

I think her "contextual moral certainty" is a similar oxymoron. To show this, I will start by borrowing Fred Seddon's simple formulation of Rand's epistemological theory:

We may know p, but p may be false.

(Incidentally, as to the question of whether Seddon is right to express it this way, it seems to me that anything much stronger is going to only emphasise the contradictions Rand's phrase threatens. Hence I think it is a charitable interpretation - for example it could easily entail a subjectivist and relativistic theory of knowledge, which would be the pits of hell themselves!).

Now, this AFAICS is indistinguishable from a radical skeptical theory such as Karl Popper's. Everything we know is actually hypothetical, as it may be proven false tomorrow.*

It seems to me we can simply make a transposition of the epistemological expression and the moral one:

We may know p is good, but p may be bad.

This seems to be a straightforward rendition of the actual consequences of her theory. The problem then is not so much a logical clash as a rhetorical one; this is clearly represents a fallible, tentative, indeed uncertain approach to ethics. Which is nothing like the swashbuckling, radiant "certainty" Rand projects.

Anyway that's it in a nutshell. No doubt I have missed many niceties. So have at it.

*Or as Scarlett O'Hara might have said: "Tomorrow is another context!"

Edited February 27, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Xray]

Something just occurred to me. I vaguely recall the argument that, according to Rand, all choices are moral choices. The problem is that I can't remember whether I read something to this effect that was written by Rand herself, or whether it came from some defective ARI clone, or whether some young Randian Crusader argued the point with me at a conference years ago.

Has anyone heard of this argument? If so, did it come directly from Rand?

Right now I'm sitting here chewing a handful of walnuts I have 'chosen' to eat. In case Rand did say all choices are moral (I don't recall she did, but will stand corrected if shown evidence), I'm interested in the 'moral' implication of my choice.

GHS: Even when it comes to some basic issues, I have some fairly substantial disagreements with Rand. For example, I don't care for her definition of value ("that which one acts to gain and/or keep"), and I care even less for her definition of virtue ("the act by which one acts to gain and/or keep" a value).

Questions:

- What precisely are your disagreements with Rand on these issues?

- Why precisely don't you care for her definition of "value"?

TIA for elaborating.

Edited February 27, 2010 by Xray

[George H. Smith]

"Contextualism" can cover a lot of ground. I would compare it to the elastic clause (i.e., the "necessary and proper" clause) in the U.S. Constitution. ;)

Ok, seeing this is the title of this thread, I'm going to saddle up my standard hobby horse here.

We're talking about what we might more accurately call "contextual moral certainty" right?

This strikes me as having the same problem as Rand's epistemological "contextual certain knowledge". That is, it's simply an oxymoron. Even if we give it the most charitable interpretation, it amounts to a standard form of skepticism. The problem then being merely the fact that Rand damned skepticism to the lowest rungs of hell.

I think her "contextual moral certainty" is a similar oxymoron. To show this, I will start by borrowing Fred Seddon's simple formulation of Rand's epistemological theory:

We may know p, but p may be false.

(Incidentally, as to the question of whether Seddon is right to express it this way, it seems to me that anything much stronger is going to only emphasise the contradictions Rand's phrase threatens. Hence I think it is a charitable interpretation - for example it could easily entail a subjectivist and relativistic theory of knowledge, which would be the pits of hell themselves!).

Now, this AFAICS is indistinguishable from a radical skeptical theory such as Karl Popper's. Everything we know is actually hypothetical, as it may be proven false tomorrow.

It seems to me we can simply make a transposition of the epistemological expression and the moral one:

We may know p is good, but p may be bad.

This seems to be a straightforward rendition of the actual consequences of her theory. The problem then is not so much a logical clash as a rhetorical one; this is clearly represents a fallible, tentative, indeed uncertain approach to ethics. Which is nothing like the swashbuckling, radiant "certainty" Rand projects.

Anyway that's it in a nutshell. No doubt I have missed many niceties. So have at it.

I published a lengthy critique of Rand's theory of contextual knowledge in Why Atheism? It makes some of the same points you do.

I'll see if I can dig up the file containing that section later on today and post it in the Articles section of OL. Unfortunately, I have a lot of different drafts of the chapters from that book, and after all this time it is not immediately clear to me which ones are final drafts. (I have files named "final," but these proliferated until I got final01, final02, and so forth. And when those got too confusing, I switched to "ultrafinal," only to eventually end up with ultrafinal01, ultrafinal02, etc. It's a mess.)

Btw, some people may wonder why I included all this stuff in a book on atheism. Well, that's because Prometheus will publish virtually anything I care to write, so long as the book has "atheism" somewhere in the title. So I filled up over half of that book with stuff about philosophy and the history of philosophy -- and called it a book on atheism.

Ghs

[Daniel Barnes]

I published a lengthy critique of Rand's theory of contextual knowledge in Why Atheism? It makes some of the same points you do.

Oh well we are on the same page for a lot of things then. Excellent. Shame I haven't read your book, it would have saved me a lot of work! Never mind, I will trawl Amazon for a copy forthwith.

[Brant Gaede]

I've made this statement, but don't remember where/when on here. I don't recall Rand saying this, but she might have.

In order to be a moral issue, choice must be involved. Alternatives. But the inverse? Ketchup vs. mustard on your burger?

Okay, wise guy, do you want to hang at 6 or 7?

--Brant

[9thdoctor]

Okay, wise guy, do you want to hang at 6 or 7?

Make your case, or if you've done so elsewhere, give a link.

I know a smart lawyer or three, and they'll get my hanging pushed back to 8. They'll get me leniency, then charge me extra for it.

Edited February 28, 2010 by Ninth Doctor

[jeffrey smith]

Would not a guy on a deserted island desire to be as happy as possible? I discuss this in a recent reply to Xray.

Well, first he'd want to survive. Then he'd want to be rescued. He wouldn't have much chance of happiness until some human companionship showed up, preferably in the form of a rescue. But more people screws up the example.

So here's what happens(?): Some war-like people visit including women and children. He dares not reveal himself. However a pretty young lady wanders off and he grabs her and takes her to his lair. Her relatives give up looking for her and sail away. Now he might be happy??!!

I think the whole island example is hogwash. The only questions are survival, rescue and how well one can tolerate loneliness. Without other people to interact with you aren't going to be happy. A dog might help a little.

--Brant

haven't seen the Xray discussion on this yet

edit: after reading the unread I'd only say that one can take actions that'd lead to happiness while on a deserted island, but happiness will not be achieved until one reattains a social existence

Check your premises, as our esteemed host would say!

While for most people, human companionship may be an essential, it isn't for everyone. I can't be completely happy with other present--or at least, people present with whom I need to or am expected to interact. I would have serious problems on a desert--food supply issues, for instance--but the only reason I would want another person around is to help solve those problems, and not for any companionship they may incidentally provide. Unless perhaps he/she stayed on the other side of the island unless called for.

Jeffrey S.

[jeffrey smith]

Something just occurred to me. I vaguely recall the argument that, according to Rand, all choices are moral choices. The problem is that I can't remember whether I read something to this effect that was written by Rand herself, or whether it came from some defective ARI clone, or whether some young Randian Crusader argued the point with me at a conference years ago.

Has anyone heard of this argument? If so, did it come directly from Rand?

Ghs

Perhaps it was something tied into Rand's contention that the fundamental choice is to think or not think (focus, I think, was the term she used in Objectivist Ethics), and that thinking is moral while not thinking is immoral (my choice of words, not hers): since all choices imply that fundamental choice--either you choose after thinking (in Rand's sense) or choose after not thinking--they include moral choices.

For instance, the pea-eating example: Joe, our hypothetical pea eater, may refrain from eating peas for one of three reasons (that I can think of at the moment--if more occur to you, please add them in): he sees everyone else does not eat them with a knife and therefore follows their example without asking himself why they do so (the non-thinking choice, and therefore immoral under Rand's classification); he has considered how to eat peas and finds that knives are not suitable tools for that task, and therefore won't use a knife no matter what other people are doing (the fully-thinking choice, and therefore moral under Rand's classification); he sees that other people don't use a knife, and therefore follows their example so as not to embarrass himself or scandalize the others (which I think Rand would call being a second hander, and therefore immoral, although perhaps it might be analyzed differently as an example of thinking but not fully so.)

Jeffrey "the other Smith"

Jeffrey S.

[George H. Smith]

I published a lengthy critique of Rand's theory of contextual knowledge in Why Atheism? It makes some of the same points you do.

Okay, the section is up. See: http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=8329

Some of the earlier drafts were longer and more detailed than the final draft, but I stayed with the latter.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

Okay, wise guy, do you want to hang at 6 or 7?

Make your case, or if you've done so elsewhere, give a link.

I know a smart lawyer or three, and they'll get my hanging pushed back to 8. They'll get me leniency, then charge me extra for it.

Well, it seems a little tautological, but the morality seems to reside in the choosing itself, not the choice, which is the result. The choosing is the foundation and the choice is either moral, immoral or amoral. Ketchup or mustard on one's burger is the amoral consequence of moral choosing. The morality seems to reside in the responsibility of quality of focus which is the exercise of free will. So, the morality lives in the choosing and it reaches out to the choices and then retires to the capacity to choose.

If this sounds nonsensical it's not a big issue with me as I'm a user of philosophy, not a philosopher.

--Brant

[jeffrey smith]

After posting earlier, the following occurred to me:

Moral certainty, in the most precise sense of the term, at least, is always a good thing when seen from the viewpoint of Objectivism, because of the identification of "thinking" with good/moral. If you are morally certain of something, it is because you have THOUGHT the matter through, and reached a conclusion using your mind (and no one else's!)

Against this must be couched the danger of only thinking that you are morally certain--that is, believing you have sufficiently thought a matter through even though you have instead rationalized, or chosen based on the assertions of some authority figure, or otherwise NOT THOUGHT.

Jeffrey S.

[Selene]

Gentlemen:

Excellent discussion.

Thank you all, I got a good opportunity to look at a number of Ayn's philosophical "clunkyness" statements with all of your fresh eyes.

I like the "choice" of choosing to think rationally as the foundational mechanism, then the categorization.

Seems simple and sensible.

Also works in the real world nicely.

Thank you all. Very well done discussion. Truly enjoyable.

Adam

[tjohnson]

After posting earlier, the following occurred to me:

Moral certainty, in the most precise sense of the term, at least, is always a good thing when seen from the viewpoint of Objectivism, because of the identification of "thinking" with good/moral. If you are morally certain of something, it is because you have THOUGHT the matter through, and reached a conclusion using your mind (and no one else's!)

Against this must be couched the danger of only thinking that you are morally certain--that is, believing you have sufficiently thought a matter through even though you have instead rationalized, or chosen based on the assertions of some authority figure, or otherwise NOT THOUGHT.

Jeffrey S.

Also, we are always getting new data and what may seem morally certain one day may not appear so the next day. So we must always be prepared to re-evaluate our beliefs.

[psychoanaleesis]

After posting earlier, the following occurred to me:

Moral certainty, in the most precise sense of the term, at least, is always a good thing when seen from the viewpoint of Objectivism, because of the identification of "thinking" with good/moral. If you are morally certain of something, it is because you have THOUGHT the matter through, and reached a conclusion using your mind (and no one else's!)

Against this must be couched the danger of only thinking that you are morally certain--that is, believing you have sufficiently thought a matter through even though you have instead rationalized, or chosen based on the assertions of some authority figure, or otherwise NOT THOUGHT.

Jeffrey S.

Excellent! Exactly! I morally assent to that statement!

Edited February 28, 2010 by David Lee

[9thdoctor]

The choosing is the foundation and the choice is either moral, immoral or amoral. Ketchup or mustard on one's burger is the amoral consequence of moral choosing.

You acknowledge that some choices are amoral (ie non-moral), so I think it’s case closed. I don’t know what to make of your formulation, particularly as applied to the earth shaking dilemna of ketchup vs. mustard. Is it like the Kevin Bacon game? You can figure some number of degrees of separation from any given choice to a moral choice? Maybe you can, so what?

<object width="425" height="344"><param name="movie" value="

name="allowFullScreen" value="true"></param><param name="allowscriptaccess" value="always"></param><embed src="

type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" width="425" height="344"></embed></object>

[Brant Gaede]

The choosing is the foundation and the choice is either moral, immoral or amoral. Ketchup or mustard on one's burger is the amoral consequence of moral choosing.

You acknowledge that some choices are amoral (ie non-moral), so I think it's case closed. I don't know what to make of your formulation, particularly as applied to the earth shaking dilemna of ketchup vs. mustard. Is it like the Kevin Bacon game? You can figure some number of degrees of separation from any given choice to a moral choice? Maybe you can, so what?

<object width="425" height="344"><param name="movie" value="

name="allowFullScreen" value="true"></param><param name="allowscriptaccess" value="always"></param><embed src="

type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" width="425" height="344"></embed></object>

The problem, dear doctor, is the rendering of choosing from the chosen is intellectual artificiality. The choosing makes the chosen ipso facto moral on the basic level and possibly amoral upstairs where the consequences reside. They're still connected.

--Brant

be reasonable, see it my way

[9thdoctor]

be reasonable, see it my way

I might if I could grok it. Maybe if you concretize your view? The ketchup and mustard have been out too long, they’ve dried up. Think of another way of demonstrating your point.

<object width="425" height="344"><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=59NNupminV8&hl=en_US&fs=1&"></param><param'>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=59NNupminV8&hl=en_US&fs=1&"></param><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"></param><param name="allowscriptaccess" value="always"></param><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=59NNupminV8&hl=en_US&fs=1&" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" width="425" height="344"></embed></object>

[Brant Gaede]

The Beatles were never better. They hit US shores in February 1964, an avalanche of joyous, positive clarity that washed over the whole country virtually instantaneously.

--Brant

[Brant Gaede]

be reasonable, see it my way

I might if I could grok it. Maybe if you concretize your view? The ketchup and mustard have been out too long, they've dried up. Think of another way of demonstrating your point.

I don't care if you grok it, Doc; I do. If you come up with something more complicated and interesting than mustard and red sauce on beef and bun I'll give it a go. What I won't do is be led on by a crypto-Socratic method demanding ever more particulars as if it were an argument in itself. I do recognize what I wrote isn't really adequate in and of itself, but it's only up there as food for thought and only represents my present state of understanding which may be shot down by someone who knows more about it than I do. But thanks for the stimulation.

--Brant

Edited February 28, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[Christopher]

As I pointed out earlier, the quotation you cited from Rand to make the same point was not her definition of "ethics." You have now repeated the same error: The quoted passage from Veatch is not his definition of ethics.

In "The Objectivist Ethics," Rand defines ethics (or morality) as "a code of values to guide man's choices and actions."

And here is a definition of "ethics" from Merriam-Webster: "a set of moral principles: a theory or system of moral values."

There is no substantial difference here.

Ghs

People tend to confound ethics with social intercourse. Perhaps one reason is that human "rights" appear to be applicable only within groups of people, and rights are founded on morals. Whatever, I don't precisely know why people err in assuming that ethics are only applicable in groups and therefore irrelevant on a desert island.

[tjohnson]

People tend to confound ethics with social intercourse. Perhaps one reason is that human "rights" appear to be applicable only within groups of people, and rights are founded on morals. Whatever, I don't precisely know why people err in assuming that ethics are only applicable in groups and therefore irrelevant on a desert island.

they do so because the most common meaning of the terms 'ethics' and 'morality' are strictly in a social setting. It isn't rocket science

[George H. Smith]

People tend to confound ethics with social intercourse. Perhaps one reason is that human "rights" appear to be applicable only within groups of people, and rights are founded on morals. Whatever, I don't precisely know why people err in assuming that ethics are only applicable in groups and therefore irrelevant on a desert island.

they do so because the most common meaning of the terms 'ethics' and 'morality' are strictly in a social setting. It isn't rocket science

Funny, but I can't find that stipulation in either the Merriam-Webster or Random House dictionaries. Instead, in the entry for "ethics" in MW, we find:

"the principles of conduct governing an individual or a group" (my emphasis).

Whatever happened to your reverence for dictionaries?

Ghs

[Selene]

GS:

they do so because the most common meaning of the terms 'ethics' and 'morality' are strictly in a social setting. It isn't rocket science

It sounds like you got yourself some North Korean rocket science there...

Adam

[George H. Smith]

GS:

they do so because the most common meaning of the terms 'ethics' and 'morality' are strictly in a social setting. It isn't rocket science

It sounds like you got yourself some North Korean rocket science there...

How do you come up with all those brief video clips on the spot? Do you search YouTube each time, or do you already have a collection of links to clips that you use as needed?

Ghs