Moral Certainty

[Xray]

Xray:

What can be verified by testing is whether the blade is sharp and cuts well.

More can be verified than this. The value judgment itself, which posits a relationship between a sharp knife and my purpose, can be verified as well.

You are right. I stand corrected, there's more to verify. So in the case of the knife, it can be verified whether it serves as suitable means to achieve a goal. If the goal is to cut, the means (knife with a sharp blade) can be objectvely verified as suited to purpose.

The verification has nothing to do with valuing the chosen goal itself; it makes no value judgment on the goal, which may range from mere slicing of onions to slicing a throat.

Xray:

It only becomes of value to an individual if this person uses it (or intends to use it) as an effective means to achieve a subjectively chosen end.

GHS: Yes, of course. But it serves no purpose to write "subjectively chosen end." The phrase is redundant.

I deliberatey used the term "subjective" for reasons of emphasis because Rand stresses the oppositon subjective - objective so often. This is also the reason why I often write "objective facts"; "objective" in connection with facts being redundant as well; so the purpose of the pleonasm here is emphasizing.

As for my use of "chosen" in "chosen end". Again, "chosen" was used for emphasis. For an end (in the meaning of 'goal') is always chosen.

Which is why life can be no an "end in itself". "Life" chooses nothing - it simply exists. Living entities can choose, depending on their mental capacity.

Life is no more an end in itself than a galaxy is an end in itself.

GHS: All "ends" are chosen by subjects. If, on the other hand, by "subjective" you mean something akin to "chosen on whim, for no good reason," then you are simply wrong. There are both good and bad reasons for choosing the goals we do.

I don't share Rand's personal interpretatioin of the term "subjective" at all. We are on the same page here.

Imo Rand's interpretation is biased in labeling "subjective" as 'negative'. This is another example of AR presenting her subjective connotation/associations with a term as if it were an established fact verified by objective analysis.

Her emotional disapproval of "subjective" reflects a thinking in black and white pattern which arbitrarily equates everything "objective" as 'positive' and everything "subjective" as 'negative'.

Xray:

To whom is it of value? WHO will call it 'good'? Certainly not those for whose deaths this thing has been constructed.

GHS: You sound very much like Ayn Rand here, who wrote: "The concept "value" is not a primary; it presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what?"

You have more in common with Rand than I imagined.

The truth contained in Rand's statement here is undeniable. The problem is that she contradicts herself in other parts of her work when she speaks of "value-seeking" plants. But a plant has neither the mental capacity to choose values nor does there exist an alternative for the plant - the possibility of an alternative which per Rand is the necessary precondition for values to be possible at all.

Rand never ceased to stress the importance of 'non-contradiction'. But did she fulfill her own requirement?

"Good" is a value judgement, you wrote. True. A personal value judgement. For valuing requires a valuer who then attributes value to something in step with a subjectively pursued goal."

GHS: There are both good and bad reasons for choosing the goals we do.

As outlined in prior posts (you did not object) "good" and "bad" mean suited or unsuited to purpose in regard to a chosen goal.

So what is a 'good' reason to person X can be a 'bad' reason to person Y.

For example, the powerholders in patriarchal societies will esteem the reason why they demand virginity of young female members as "good" because it serves their goal of staying in power over them.

So again it is "good/bad for whom?"

Imo the use of terms like "good" and "bad" alone (without examples to illustrate) creates more confusion than clarity in value discussions.

GHS: All judgments are "personal" in this sense, including cognitive judgments. If we examine the evidence for a knowledge claim before accepting it, this is because we personally value truth over falsehood, and we evaluate a claim as "true" when it satisfies the requirements of our subjectively pursued goal of attaining knowledge. Of course, those who don't value knowledge may have a different standard of belief, but so what? That doesn't make our knowledge claims any less justified.

Seeking to find out the truth about an issue is a value decision, yes. Deciding to discard a premise as false if it does not stand up to scrutiny is a value decision as well. I share both these values and have the impression you do as well.

Xray:

If you want to cook, heat is of value to you because of your goal. But this does not make heat per se an "objective value".

GHS: I don't believe in values "per se" -- and neither did Rand, for that matter.

I don't believe in them either. So there's another common ground we have in this discussion.

Given Rand's premise of values per se NOT existing, how does this mesh with her presenting a list of "cardinal values": "Reason, Purpose, Self-Esteem"?

If they are no values per se - and they can't be, because e. g. every dictator has a "purpose" too, and can declare it "reasonable" from his point of view to silence dissenters via censorship, torture or and whatever means he esteems as "good" (= suited to purpose) - then what are they?

"Rational" values? Imo the example with the dictator refutes this claim.

The problem with Rand's use of the term 'rational' is that it too becomes a rubber term, a fudge word. I have the impression that she believed her personal preferences to be "rational", implying that others "ought to" value them as well. Those who did not share her values were 'irrational subjectivists'.

Xray: It only becomes of value to an individual if this person uses it (or intends to use it) as an effective means to achieve a subjectively chosen end.

GHS: Yes, of course.

So would you agree that something can only become "a value" until and after individuals or groups have attributed value to it? Given the variety of personal preferences, doesn't this lay every value question right at the doorstep of subjectivity?

If there exist no values per se, then objective values can't exist either.

For example, Rand's own premise of no values per se existing would collapse her claim that e. g. money is an objective value.

Money is a means serving to engage in trading. It may be valued or not, depending on individual preferences.

So it is entirely subjective to claim that money as "objective" value "ought to" be valued by all.

Edited February 27, 2010 by Xray

[George H. Smith]

I figured you didn't read philosophy at all, since you learned from Korzybski that it is a futile enterprise.

You're right I haven't read any philosophy, except Korzybski I just use the dictionary and a few other sources;

1. Morality is an informal public system applying to all rational persons, governing behavior that affects others, and has the lessening of evil or harm as its goal

2. concern with the distinction between good and evil or right and wrong; right or good conduct

3. moral - concerned with principles of right and wrong or conforming to standards of behavior and character based on those principles

4. The quality of being in accord with standards of right or good conduct.

5. A system of ideas of right and wrong conduct

This is why the statement that one needs morality on a deserted island doesn't make sense to people who use English in the normal manner. If anything one needs survival skills, not morality. Is it possible Rand did not understand English very well?

The line you quoted from Rand -- "The task of ethics is to define man's proper code of values and thus to give him the means of attaining happiness" -- is not her definition of ethics, or morality. Rather, it specifies the reason why man needs ethics.

Ghs

So then the implication isthat we need principles about right and wrong, good and evil, etc. in order for mankind to achieve happiness? If so, how does this fit in with the guy on the deserted island? What have 'good' and 'evil' got to do with his happiness on the deserted island?

Would not a guy on a deserted island desire to be as happy as possible? I discuss this in a recent reply to Xray.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

Xray, you are still conflating value with choice. It's not necessarily true. That's why a plant's roots necessarily seek the value of moisture (and caused a lot of damage to my septic system).

--Brant

Edited February 27, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[Brant Gaede]

Would not a guy on a deserted island desire to be as happy as possible? I discuss this in a recent reply to Xray.

Well, first he'd want to survive. Then he'd want to be rescued. He wouldn't have much chance of happiness until some human companionship showed up, preferably in the form of a rescue. But more people screws up the example.

So here's what happens(?): Some war-like people visit including women and children. He dares not reveal himself. However a pretty young lady wanders off and he grabs her and takes her to his lair. Her relatives give up looking for her and sail away. Now he might be happy??!!

I think the whole island example is hogwash. The only questions are survival, rescue and how well one can tolerate loneliness. Without other people to interact with you aren't going to be happy. A dog might help a little.

--Brant

haven't seen the Xray discussion on this yet

edit: after reading the unread I'd only say that one can take actions that'd lead to happiness while on a deserted island, but happiness will not be achieved until one reattains a social existence

Edited February 27, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[George H. Smith]

[so would you agree that something can only become "a value" until and after individuals or groups have attributed value to it? Given the variety of personal preferences, doesn't this lay every value question right at the doorstep of subjectivity?

If there exist no values per se, then objective values can't exist either.

For example, Rand's own premise of no values per se existing would collapse her claim that e. g. money is an objective value.

Money is a means serving to engage in trading. It may be valued or not, depending on individual preferences.

So it is entirely subjective to claim that money as "objective" value "ought to" be valued by all.

1) Nope.

2) Nope.

3) Nope.

4) Not necessarily; it depends on what Rand means by "objective value" in that context.

5) Yup.

6) You are conflating at least two different issues.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

Brant:

Why are you selling NB's work to me? (Oh, please don't post in case any of you guys have seen/copied with the intent to quote me. I do not take back what I said. I take back merely my consent to saying that. It will no longer exist in this forum.)

You previously expressed some interest in his work and that is the best way to start. I don't particularly care if you read any of him or not, which is true for everybody.

--Brant

[Xray]

Selene: Alert!

Act I, Scene Two (2) - Ms. Xray takes George on a sailing trip and dumps him overboard with her desert island rant.

Take you seats! Dr. popcorn please!

Adam

What 'rant'? Is mistaking sand for clothing an error about facts on not?

Selene: Ms. Xray takes George on a sailing trip and dumps him overboard with her desert island rant.

I have no intenton of dumping anyone overboard; NIOF is one of my highest values.

If you absolutey want to use the sailing trip comparison, I regard this as a mental journey to find out the truth about claims made by Ayn Rand. If the participants in the trip are truth seekers, chances are they will find it. The more truth seekers come aboard, the faster we are likely to get there.

Great thread which GS has started here!

Speaking of intellectual chaos: What do you think of Ayn Rand's claim that man needed morality when living solitary on a desert island? Good luck!

Why wouldn't it?

An individual mistaking sand for clothing may be mentally impaired but is not behaving immorally in that he/she violates any code of moral values.

If you want to survive alone on a deserted island, you MUST do something to achieve it. If not, you will die.

There exists no "ought to" in nature.

According to Rand, "The task of ethics is to define man's proper code of values and thus to give him the means of attaining happiness."

This presents happiness as a one set for all, implying that what makes person X hapy will make person Y happy as well.

As for a proper code of values necessary for happiness, it implies that those not sharing the code will be unhappy. (?)

GHS: The problem of which actions will lead to greater happiness would apply as much to a solitary individual as it does to individuals in society.

What does the feeling of happiness have to do with morality?

GHS: It would be a serious mistake to suppose that this is an eccentric position, one peculiar to Rand. On the contrary, Rand's approach to ethics is fundamentally the same as the approach of many Aristotelian moral philosophers. For example, in Rational Man, an excellent presentation of an Aristotelian ethics, Henry Veatch writes: [M]oral rules are more in the nature of counsels of perfection or instructions as to what one ought or ought not to do in order to attain happiness."

Moral rules have many faces. Controlling the individual often comes into play.

Moreover, Veatch contends that "values are simply facts of nature."

It is a fact of that human individuals are valuing entities. As to what the values are, the variety is virtually limitless.

Many modern texts on moral philosophy ignore the Aristotelian tradition and claim that moral principles apply only when one interacts with other people. Why is this so? Because principles relating to self-interest are merely prudential maxims, not genuine moral principles. A genuine moral principle, we are told, requires that we sacrifice our own interests for the good of others, and one cannot engage in self-sacrifice by oneself. And this is why morality would be irrelevant to a solitary individual.

So goes the standard line. Given your sarcastic repudiation of Rand (and other Aristotelians), may I assume that you agree with this reasoning?

No, I don't. For there exists no human being not motivated by self-interest 100 per cent of the time. Self-interest is a natural condition. Altruism is a myth, a mere ideology. The purpose of demanding 'altruistic' actions from others is often about being served oneself by them, profiting from them.

My position is also that every so-called sacrifice is a trade, performed to achieve a higher value in return.

No one sacrifices anything in order to receive a lower value. Impossible. You can name any random example of what you think is a sacrifice - it can be traced back to the sacrificer's wish to gain a higher value from the act.

For example, sacrificing a queen in chess trades in a high value, but the higher value of the sacrificer (player) is winning the game.

Edited February 27, 2010 by Xray

[9thdoctor]

In a real fight, I don't intend to fight fairly. In philosophical arguments, this is the same principle that I uphold.

This may be an appropriate attitude for an attorney trying to sway a jury, or even a politician trying to win votes, but on a discussion forum I think the right approach was stated by Christopher Hitchens in his article about Holocaust denier David Irving: “a case has not been refuted until it has been stated at its strongest”.

Brant:

Why are you selling NB's work to me? (Oh, please don't post in case any of you guys have seen/copied with the intent to quote me. I do not take back what I said. I take back merely my consent to saying that. It will no longer exist in this forum.)

I don’t understand the last part, did you write something and then edit it out? It looks like Brant was just giving you a book recommendation, and you’re snapping back at him.

[tjohnson]

So then the implication isthat we need principles about right and wrong, good and evil, etc. in order for mankind to achieve happiness? If so, how does this fit in with the guy on the deserted island? What have 'good' and 'evil' got to do with his happiness on the deserted island?

Would not a guy on a deserted island desire to be as happy as possible? I discuss this in a recent reply to Xray.

Ghs

Yes, he would, but he will not achieve it with his knowledge of what's good or evil and right or wrong. For an example of a moral code see the 10 Commandments.

1.You shall have no other gods before me

2. You shall not make for yourself an idol

3. You shall not make wrongful use of the name of your God

4. Remember the Sabbath and keep it holy

5. Honor your father and your mother

6. You shall not murder

7. You shall not commit adultery

8. You shall not steal

9. You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor

10. You shall not covet your neighbor's house; you shall

not covet your neighbor's wife, nor his male servant, nor his female

servant, nor his ox, nor his donkey, nor anything that is your

neighbor's

1- 4 may be applicable to a guy on a deserted island and may effect his happiness but the other 6 are not applicable when someone is alone.

[George H. Smith]

Would not a guy on a deserted island desire to be as happy as possible? I discuss this in a recent reply to Xray.

Well, first he'd want to survive. Then he'd want to be rescued. He wouldn't have much chance of happiness until some human companionship showed up, preferably in the form of a rescue. But more people screws up the example.

So here's what happens(?): Some war-like people visit including women and children. He dares not reveal himself. However a pretty young lady wanders off and he grabs her and takes her to his lair. Her relatives give up looking for her and sail away. Now he might be happy??!!

I think the whole island example is hogwash. The only questions are survival, rescue and how well one can tolerate loneliness. Without other people to interact with you aren't going to be happy. A dog might help a little.

--Brant

Have you ever read Defoe's Robinson Crusoe? It raises some very interesting moral issues that a solitary individual might face. So, as I recall, does the movie "Cast Away," with Tom Hanks, but to a lesser degree.

Problems regarding bare survival are not necessarily nonmoral issues.

Even though a solitary individual might not be as happy as he would in society, he might experience it to some extent. This a matter of degree, not an either/or dichotomy.

Moral decisions differ from prudential decision in terms of fundamentality. Let me explain this by telling a story from my college days.

One day, while attending a graduate seminar on ethics at the University of Arizona, my professor gave a lecture on how moral choices differ from nonmoral choices. The example he used for a nonmoral choice was whether or not one "should" eat peas with a knife. He explained that this

was a matter of etiquette (table manners) and perhaps utility (it's difficult to do), but it was clearly not a moral choice.

In accord with my trouble-making proclivities, I brought up a counter-example. Suppose, I said, that this person is very religious, and suppose that a major commandment of his religion is "Thou shalt not eat peas with a knife." In this case, I argued, the decision whether or not to eat peas with a knife would be a moral decision, because that decision would directly relate to a fundamental moral principle, namely, that one should not disobey the will of God.

I used this example to argue that the moral/nonmoral distinction is not engraved in philosophical stone; rather, it is contextual, and depends how deep one must dig into one's principles in order to make the decision. If one must consult a fundamental principle, then the decision is moral, not merely prudential. (This can be a matter of degree in some cases.)

I ended up writing my term paper for that seminar on this topic. One of the examples I used in that paper had to do with guy (let's call him Joe) who is deliberating whether or not to see an X-rated movie with a friend. Suppose the friend says, "Come on, Joe, let's go. What's the big deal?" This would probably indicate that the friend can make the decision without consulting his basic moral principles. The problems confronting him would be relatively superficial, e.g., Is an X-rated movie worth the money? Do I have the time? Will I be embarrassed if someone I work with sees me go into the theater? In other words, the decision for this person would be a prudential one.

When I got to Joe, I filled in the same conditions that I had used earlier in the peas/knife example. Joe is very religious, and he believes that it would be sinful to watch an X-rated movie. I then developed the argument noted above in more detail.

The upshot of this is that whether a given choice is moral or nonmoral depends on whether the principles to which one refers to make the decision are moral principles or nonmoral (prudential) principles. This will depend on the particular person and the circumstances in which he finds himself.

I anticipate that some people will tag this approach as "subjectivism" -- a topic that I discussed in my paper as well -- but it's not. It's just good old Randian contextualism applied to a topic that she never discussed (so far as I know).

Ghs

[tjohnson]

It would be a serious mistake to suppose that this is an eccentric position, one peculiar to Rand. On the contrary, Rand's approach to ethics is fundamentally the same as the approach of many Aristotelian moral philosophers. For example, in Rational Man, an excellent presentation of an Aristotelian ethics, Henry Veatch writes: [M]oral rules are more in the nature of counsels of perfection or instructions as to what one ought or ought not to do in order to attain happiness."

Well, the views of the word 'ethics' that Veatch et al maintain have not made it into dictionaries and so they must be in the minority. If one wants to communicate with other people one should use words according to their standard meanings, otherwise it just cause confusion.

[George H. Smith]

So then the implication isthat we need principles about right and wrong, good and evil, etc. in order for mankind to achieve happiness? If so, how does this fit in with the guy on the deserted island? What have 'good' and 'evil' got to do with his happiness on the deserted island?

Would not a guy on a deserted island desire to be as happy as possible? I discuss this in a recent reply to Xray.

Ghs

Yes, he would, but he will not achieve it with his knowledge of what's good or evil and right or wrong.

Buzzzzz...Sorry, wrong again. But thanks for playing "Would you recognize a philosophical argument if it bit you in the ass?" -- and please accept our consolation prize, a concrete-bound copy of Alfred Korzybski's Science and Sanity.

Ghs

[9thdoctor]

The upshot of this is that whether a given choice is moral or nonmoral depends on whether the principles to which one refers to make the decision are moral principles or nonmoral (prudential) principles. This will depend on the particular person and the circumstances in which he finds himself.

I anticipate that some people will tag this approach as "subjectivism" -- a topic that I discussed in my paper as well -- but it's not. It's just good old Randian contextualism applied to a topic that she never discussed (so far as I know).

How does this square with Rand’s denial of the dichotomy between moral and practical? The distinction between prudential and moral reminds me of a book on Kant’s ethics I read, but it’s too hazy now. As presented I would call it relativism, though I suppose that's a subcategory of subjectivism.

[George H. Smith]

The upshot of this is that whether a given choice is moral or nonmoral depends on whether the principles to which one refers to make the decision are moral principles or nonmoral (prudential) principles. This will depend on the particular person and the circumstances in which he finds himself.

I anticipate that some people will tag this approach as "subjectivism" -- a topic that I discussed in my paper as well -- but it's not. It's just good old Randian contextualism applied to a topic that she never discussed (so far as I know).

How does this square with Rand’s denial of the dichotomy between moral and practical?

I'm not sure -- I would have to think about it -- but I suggested a gradation, not a dichotomy.

The distinction between prudential and moral reminds me of a book on Kant’s ethics I read, but it’s too hazy now.

You are probably thinking of Kant's Critique of Practical Reason. I think this book is well worth reading. It is full of interesting ideas, even if I happen to disagree with many of them.

There is nothing specifically Kantian about the distinction between the moral and the prudential. Similar distinctions go back to the ancient Greeks.

Moreover, according to Kant, a moral action is one that is commanded for its own sake. He argues at length that an action undertaken for a purpose it is expected to bring about (a hypothetical rather than a categorical imperative) is a matter of skill or prudence, not morality. This is about as far from my position as one can get.

As presented I would call it relativism, though I suppose that's a subcategory of subjectivism.

The views I expressed have nothing directly to do with either relativism or subjectivism. They could be applied to those theories, but there is no necessary relationship. This is so because the ideas I presented pertain to the personal level of decision-making -- the realm of practical ethics -- and have no direct bearing on the realm of theoretical ethics. (See my discussion of theoretical ethics from yesterday, in a reply I wrote to Daniel Barnes.)

One last thing. I have never been interested in defending Rand's ethical theory for its own sake. I think she presents an excellent foundation, the many gaps notwithstanding; and, over the past four decades, I have taken what I regard as her strongest points and attempted to flesh them out with ideas taken from other sources, as well as my own ideas.

Even when it comes to some basic issues, I have some fairly substantial disagreements with Rand. For example, I don't care for her definition of value ("that which one acts to gain and/or keep"), and I care even less for her definition of virtue ("the act by which one acts to gain and/or keep" a value).

I mention such disagreements because I don't want people to confuse the views I may defend with those defended by Rand. I have no doubt that Rand would have taken a dim view (to put it mildly) of some of my ideas on ethics. My distinction between moral and nonmoral decisions may be one of those ideas, but I'm not sure at this point -- and in the final analysis, I don't really care.

My anarchist views have already branded me a heretic of the first magnitude, and a heretic can be burned at the stake only once.

Ghs

[psychoanaleesis]

In a real fight, I don't intend to fight fairly. In philosophical arguments, this is the same principle that I uphold.

This may be an appropriate attitude for an attorney trying to sway a jury, or even a politician trying to win votes, but on a discussion forum I think the right approach was stated by Christopher Hitchens in his article about Holocaust denier David Irving: “a case has not been refuted until it has been stated at its strongest”.

Brant:

Why are you selling NB's work to me? (Oh, please don't post in case any of you guys have seen/copied with the intent to quote me. I do not take back what I said. I take back merely my consent to saying that. It will no longer exist in this forum.)

I don’t understand the last part, did you write something and then edit it out? It looks like Brant was just giving you a book recommendation, and you’re snapping back at him.

Yes. I did write something then decided to write it out. I answered so strongly that when Brant read it, he told me to calm down. I erased my response here when I realized GS' question, although answerable, does not merit further consideration from me other than my assent. If I kept what I wrote, I'll be led to a trap and the thread will mutate (quoting me will have the same effect).

I asked Brant why he thinks I need NB's books regarding my response (before I erased most of it) because I do not know how that will help me in this particular subject.

Edited February 27, 2010 by David Lee

[George H. Smith]

I mention such disagreements because I don't want people to confuse the views I may defend with those defended by Rand. I have no doubt that Rand would have taken a dim view (to put it mildly) of some of my ideas on ethics. My distinction between moral and nonmoral decisions may be one of those ideas, but I'm not sure at this point -- and in the final analysis, I don't really care.

Something just occurred to me. I vaguely recall the argument that, according to Rand, all choices are moral choices. The problem is that I can't remember whether I read something to this effect that was written by Rand herself, or whether it came from some defective ARI clone, or whether some young Randian Crusader argued the point with me at a conference years ago.

Has anyone heard of this argument? If so, did it come directly from Rand?

Ghs

[9thdoctor]

You are probably thinking of Kant's Critique of Practical Reason. I think this book is well worth reading.

It was a distillation by another author, written in the last 20 years. I find Kant too hard to read, I got through maybe 1/3 of Critique of Pure Reason, and couldn’t continue. I remember thinking his notion of prudence was similar to Rand’s selfishness, enough so that I felt you could toss Kant’s ethics and leave off at prudence. But he argued that the prudent was the non-moral (not necessarily immoral), which relates well to a comment about Objectivism by Christopher Hitchens, to the effect of: why do you need a philosopher to tell you its ok to be selfish? By that standard, Primacy of Existence should be all the more self evident. Reason vs. Faith a slam dunk. That's just not how it is.

I mention such disagreements because I don't want people to confuse the views I may defend with those defended by Rand.

Indeed, and in a college paper you have to be able to argue from points of view you disagree with (God vs. peas example). But you called it “good old Randian contextualism” however, and I don’t think that’s the same thing.

My anarchist views have already branded me a heretic of the first magnitude, and a heretic can be burned at the stake only once.

Ghs

Mmm, well we can keep you locked up for years first, with lots of slow torture like they did to Jacques de Molay, Giordano Bruno, and various other luminaries. You'll learn your lesson well.

Edited February 27, 2010 by Ninth Doctor

[Dragonfly]

That man needs ethics has of course nothing to do with giving him a means to attain happiness, that is typically a definition by non-essentials. The real origin of ethics is that it creates stability by the evolution of modes of cooperation, which is a useful evolutionary strategy for the social animal man. In simple terms: by creating rules that you just cannot bash the head in of anyone you don't like, nor can arbitrarily steal the fruit of his labor etc., man in general gets a better chance of survival, even if it isn't always advantageous for the individual. You'll find comparable rules, mostly if not exclusively hardwired, in other social animals. In modern societies many of those rules have become laws. No matter how complex such systems may have become, this is the basic reason for their existence. That also means that ethics is a typically social concept, it concerns the interaction of any person with any other persons and is irrelevant for a lone person on a desert island. What he wants or doesn't want to do is exclusively his own concern.

[George H. Smith]

It would be a serious mistake to suppose that this is an eccentric position, one peculiar to Rand. On the contrary, Rand's approach to ethics is fundamentally the same as the approach of many Aristotelian moral philosophers. For example, in Rational Man, an excellent presentation of an Aristotelian ethics, Henry Veatch writes: [M]oral rules are more in the nature of counsels of perfection or instructions as to what one ought or ought not to do in order to attain happiness."

Well, the views of the word 'ethics' that Veatch et al maintain have not made it into dictionaries and so they must be in the minority. If one wants to communicate with other people one should use words according to their standard meanings, otherwise it just cause confusion.

As I pointed out earlier, the quotation you cited from Rand to make the same point was not her definition of "ethics." You have now repeated the same error: The quoted passage from Veatch is not his definition of ethics.

In "The Objectivist Ethics," Rand defines ethics (or morality) as "a code of values to guide man's choices and actions."

And here is a definition of "ethics" from Merriam-Webster: "a set of moral principles: a theory or system of moral values."

There is no substantial difference here.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

That man needs ethics has of course nothing to do with giving him a means to attain happiness, that is typically a definition by non-essentials. The real origin of ethics is that it creates stability by the evolution of modes of cooperation, which is a useful evolutionary strategy for the social animal man. In simple terms: by creating rules that you just cannot bash the head in of anyone you don't like, nor can arbitrarily steal the fruit of his labor etc., man in general gets a better chance of survival, even if it isn't always advantageous for the individual. You'll find comparable rules, mostly if not exclusively hardwired, in other social animals. In modern societies many of those rules have become laws. No matter how complex such systems may have become, this is the basic reason for their existence. That also means that ethics is a typically social concept, it concerns the interaction of any person with any other persons and is irrelevant for a lone person on a desert island. What he wants or doesn't want to do is exclusively his own concern.

Congratulations! By failing to understand the difference between prescriptive and descriptive disciplines, you have managed, in one fell swoop, to define 2500 years of ethical theory out of existence.

Is it too much to ask that a person actually study a subject for a while before making oracular pronouncements about it?

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

But you called it “good old Randian contextualism” however, and I don’t think that’s the same thing.

"Contextualism" can cover a lot of ground. I would compare it to the elastic clause (i.e., the "necessary and proper" clause) in the U.S. Constitution. ;)

Ghs

[9thdoctor]

I vaguely recall the argument that, according to Rand, all choices are moral choices. The problem is that I can't remember whether I read something to this effect that was written by Rand herself, or whether it came from some defective ARI clone, or whether some young Randian Crusader argued the point with me at a conference years ago.

I don't recall that formulation, and it sounds too ripe for mockery. The Queen's pawn opening is a moral choice? Or playing Chess vs. Checkers?

"Contextualism" can cover a lot of ground. I would compare it to the elastic clause (i.e., the "necessary and proper" clause) in the U.S. Constitution. ;)

Ghs

It's just not specifically Randian, so it looks like we're on the same page now.

[Brant Gaede]

I mention such disagreements because I don't want people to confuse the views I may defend with those defended by Rand. I have no doubt that Rand would have taken a dim view (to put it mildly) of some of my ideas on ethics. My distinction between moral and nonmoral decisions may be one of those ideas, but I'm not sure at this point -- and in the final analysis, I don't really care.

Something just occurred to me. I vaguely recall the argument that, according to Rand, all choices are moral choices. The problem is that I can't remember whether I read something to this effect that was written by Rand herself, or whether it came from some defective ARI clone, or whether some young Randian Crusader argued the point with me at a conference years ago.

Has anyone heard of this argument? If so, did it come directly from Rand?

Ghs

I've made this statement, but don't remember where/when on here. I don't recall Rand saying this, but she might have.

--Brant

[9thdoctor]

I've made this statement, but don't remember where/when on here. I don't recall Rand saying this, but she might have.

In order to be a moral issue, choice must be involved. Alternatives. But the inverse? Ketchup vs. mustard on your burger?

[George H. Smith]

I vaguely recall the argument that, according to Rand, all choices are moral choices. The problem is that I can't remember whether I read something to this effect that was written by Rand herself, or whether it came from some defective ARI clone, or whether some young Randian Crusader argued the point with me at a conference years ago.

I don't recall that formulation, and it sounds too ripe for mockery.

.

Maybe you should discuss this with Brant. (See the post that follows yours.)

The Queen's pawn opening is a moral choice?

Have you not read Rand's "Open Letter to Boris Spassky," where she explains the metaphysical implications of chess?

Or playing Chess vs. Checkers?

To my knowledge, Rand never wrote anything about checkers, so I don't know how to answer that question.

Ghs