Moral Certainty

[merjet]

The means needed to achieve the subjective goal can be objectively assessed as suitable/not suitable.

If you want to cook, heat is of value to you because of your goal. But this does not make heat per se an "objective value".

George,

You are experiencing Xray's "linguistic jungle." She puts objective value in quotes because she believes there is no such thing. Ask her for criteria you might use to propose something as an "objective value"; I bet you will get none or criteria impossible to meet (e.g., anybody, at all times and places, would make the same value judgment). In other words, her position is held as an unfalsifiable premise. She might say a value is suitable or not (like she does here), but saying a value is "objective" is a priori prohibited in her religion, and she's the "pope."

I have pointed out a few times, like here, that Ayn Rand rarely used the phrase "objective value(s)". Most of those times was about gold as money. Rand mostly used "rational value(s)". This has had no effect on Xray; she is on a crusade against "objective value."

Edited February 25, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[George H. Smith]

I have pointed out a few times, like here that Ayn Rand rarely used the phrase "objective value(s)". Most of those times was about gold as money. Rand mostly used "rational value(s)". This has had no effect on Xray; she is on a crusade against "objective value."

Your point is a good one. "Objective" is a notorious rubber word. All that really matters in the final analysis is whether value judgments and ethics can be rationally justified, not whether they can fulfill someone's particular definition of "objective."

For example, if someone insists that "objective" means something that exists "out there," independently of consciousness, then of course value judgments cannot be "objective" -- for the simple reason that no judgment, of whatever kind, exists apart from consciousness. Indeed, knowledge itself does not exist "out there"; it is a product of consciousness. Hence, according to this definition, no knowledge claims can be "objective."

Similar problems attend the various meanings of "subjective." I have seen more than a few Objectivists recoil in philosophical horror when considering the claim that economic value judgments are "subjective." Their reaction is based on the simplistic belief, "objective=good, subjective=bad."

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

Nicely and well put, Merlin.

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

I was thinking of the argument that Heisenberg's uncertainly principle demonstrates causal indeterminancy in nature. As I recall, Heisenberg himself drew a conclusion similar to this, but it's been many years since I've read anything on this subject, and my memory is pretty vague on this particular.

But that is no unwarranted metaphysical conclusion, it is a scientifically demonstrated effect, there is a causal indeterminancy in nature. That philosophers who cannot think beyond their Newtonian billiard ball world view find that difficult to accept, because they don't understand the implications of physics is their problem. They think that causality is something self-evident. It is not. That we intuitively "feel" that it should be self-evident is because it corresponds to our experiences in daily life, which have for a long time been been confirmed in physical theories and empirical evidence. However, intuitions can lead us astray, which has been proven unequivocally when we were able to study atomic and subatomic particles, and therefore philosophers who don't understand physics nor the philosophy of physics should shut up about such things, as the metaphysics is derived from physics, not the other way around. They don't realize that their own ideas are not self-evident axioms, but hypotheses that are based on outdated scientific theories and fallible intuitions. They have no leg to stand on.

How did physicists prove causal indeterminacy?

Scientists rely on sophisticated instruments for precise measurements. If causal indeterminacy were true, those instruments wouldn't necessarily yield the same results in the same circumstances. Measurements would vary, and no reliable conclusions could be reached.

Scientists also rely on repeating experiments in controlled conditions. This method would make no sense, however, if the same causes operating in the same conditions could produce different effects.

For these and other reasons, science could never get off the ground without presupposing a deterministic approach to causation in the physical universe. Even accurate predictions would mean nothing, if events can "just happen" with no deterministic cause.

As for the remainder of your remarks, no philosopher I have ever read maintains that causation is "self-evident." And a defense of causation does not necessarily entail a "Newtonian billiard ball world view."

Ghs

[Dragonfly]

How did physicists prove causal indeterminacy?

Study quantum mechanics for a detailed answer. Heisenberg's relation is one of the corner stones of QM, the most successful physical theory ever. It has been confirmed experimentally, see for example http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0105061. The Casimir effect, that also has been confirmed experimentally, is also a result of the Heisenberg principle.

Scientists rely on sophisticated instruments for precise measurements. If causal indeterminacy were true, those instruments wouldn't necessarily yield the same results in the same circumstances. Measurements would vary, and no reliable conclusions could be reached.

In fact they don't yield the same results in the same circumstances. However, you shouldn't forget that the uncertainties due to the Heisenberg relation are extremely small, so in most practical cases other sources of uncertainty are many orders of magnitude larger.

Scientists also rely on repeating experiments in controlled conditions. This method would make no sense, however, if the same causes operating in the same conditions could produce different effects.

As I indicated above, the effects are so small that in most cases they would be undetectable. But take for example an atom of Uranium-238. If you watch it, it may decay to Thorium-234 by emitting an alpha particle within a second. Or in ten billion years. It is impossible to predict, as it is a fundamentally stochastic process, there is no reason that it will decay now or in billions of years. However, we can describe the statistical behavior of a very large number of Uranium-238 atoms, and it turns out that on the average half of the atoms will decay in 4.46 billions of years.

For these and other reasons, science could never get off the ground without presupposing a deterministic approach to causation in the physical universe. Even accurate predictions would mean nothing, if events can "just happen" with no deterministic cause.

You cannot give an accurate prediction when a single Uranium-238 atom will decay, it will "just happen" without deterministic cause. In most applications the acausal nature of subatomic systems will be undetected however, as we almost always have to do with enormous amounts of such systems and the statistical properties are extremely well predictable.

[Daniel Barnes]

The nature of value judgments is only one aspect of the problem -- much more would need to be done to vindicate ethics as an objective enterprise -- but it is the aspect that I am concentrating on here.

Well I confess I am not clear what you then mean by an "objective" enterprise. But perhaps you could take a moment to clearly lay out the problem you are proposing a solution for, so we don't end up in errors of interpretation in what is admittedly a confusing field. If it's not Hume's problem, of deriving ethics ("ought") from facts ("is"), what is it? For this is indeed the problem Rand liked to make out she had solved.

Hume was not an ethical subjectivist. He did not deny that ethics can be grounded in facts in some manner.

What Hume believed personally is basically irrelevant. What matters is the objective problem he uncovered. For example, Hume also pointed out what became known as the problem of induction, yet chose to to remain an inductivist even though he knew it to be an illogical belief. So too with this problem.

It also matters little whether ethics can be "grounded in facts in some manner." "Some manner"? If this is the problem under discussion I suggest it is beside the point . The perennial issue is, as I understand it, that of the logical relation between facts and ethics. If you're not solving that, you're not solving much. For example, when Rand says "So much for the issue of the relation between 'is' and 'ought'" the only "relation" that matters is the logical relation. If she means some unspecified other "relation", as her defenders often claim, who cares? This is merely playing philosophical bait-and-switch. I can think of dozens of "relations" between "is" and "ought" myself - for example, they are both words in the English language. Or they both occur in this post. And so forth. But of course I don't claim to have refuted Hume by having established these "relations"...;-)

So it would be helpful to get upfront what "manner" or "relation" your proposed solution uses. If it's not logic, what is it?

Again, I was simply addressing a claim made by Xray. Value judgments permeate every cognitive discipline, and a general theory of value -- known as "axiology" -- is an issue distinct from ethics per se.

Well and good. And I appreciate you are building up your proposed solution step by step. But again, unless I have missed it, before we get much further a quick summary of the problem you are ultimately aiming to solve will avoid much pointless misunderstanding.

Edited February 25, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[George H. Smith]

How did physicists prove causal indeterminacy?

Study quantum mechanics for a detailed answer.

Einstein made substantial contributions to quantum theory, and I think it's safe to say that he understood QM -- but he rejected your position.

I know enough about QM to know that metaphysical indeterminism does not follow from it. The question is not whether QM works as a scientific theory; the question is what philosophical conclusions can legitimately be drawn from it. You have simply ignored this problem and substituted assertions for arguments.

Ghs: Scientists rely on sophisticated instruments for precise measurements. If causal indeterminacy were true, those instruments wouldn't necessarily yield the same results in the same circumstances. Measurements would vary, and no reliable conclusions could be reached.

D: In fact they don't yield the same results in the same circumstances. However, you shouldn't forget that the uncertainties due to the Heisenberg relation are extremely small, so in most practical cases other sources of uncertainty are many orders of magnitude larger.

By "the same results," I didn't mean identical in every particular; no physical experiment can be that precise.

You refer to "uncertainties." This is an epistemological concept, not a metaphysical one. Nature is neither certain nor uncertain of anything; only human beings are. And from human uncertainty per se -- whether this results from insufficient knowledge, problems of measurement, or whatever -- you can infer absolutely nothing about the nature of reality. This is a basic point that you don't seem to grasp.

Ghs: Scientists also rely on repeating experiments in controlled conditions. This method would make no sense, however, if the same causes operating in the same conditions could produce different effects.

D: As I indicated above, the effects are so small that in most cases they would be undetectable."

This is a point if favor of physical determinism. No two events, or cluster of events, can be replicated exactly, so even in controlled conditions we would expect some minor variations. But if indeterminism is correct -- if things "just happen" with no causal regularity -- then we should see drastically different outcomes.

But take for example an atom of Uranium-238. If you watch it, it may decay to Thorium-234 by emitting an alpha particle within a second. Or in ten billion years. It is impossible to predict, as it is a fundamentally stochastic process, there is no reason that it will decay now or in billions of years."

From the fact that we cannot predict the rate of decay it does not follow that the rate of decay happens for "no reason" (i.e., without a cause). This is an elementary and egregious non sequitur.

However, we can describe the statistical behavior of a very large number of Uranium-238 atoms, and it turns out that on the average half of the atoms will decay in 4.46 billions of years.

Fine, but use of the statistical method, which is fundamental to QM, has nothing to do with metaphysical indeterminism. A physicist who believed in physical determinism would also use it, owing to its useful results.

Ghs

[Dragonfly]

Einstein made substantial contributions to quantum theory, and I think it's safe to say that he understood QM -- but he rejected your position.

The point is that Einstein was definitely proven wrong with regard to his view on quantum mechanics.

I know enough about QM to know that metaphysical indeterminism does not follow from it. The question is not whether QM works as a scientific theory; the question is what philosophical conclusions can legitimately be drawn from it. You have simply ignored this problem and substituted assertions for arguments.

Indeterminism is not just some practical problem, it is a fundamental property of nature at atomic scales. That is the only thing that counts, as physics is the fundamental science that studies nature, or in other words reality. Armchair fantasies by philosophers are not relevant.

Ghs: Scientists rely on sophisticated instruments for precise measurements. If causal indeterminacy were true, those instruments wouldn't necessarily yield the same results in the same circumstances. Measurements would vary, and no reliable conclusions could be reached.

D: In fact they don't yield the same results in the same circumstances. However, you shouldn't forget that the uncertainties due to the Heisenberg relation are extremely small, so in most practical cases other sources of uncertainty are many orders of magnitude larger.

By "the same results," I didn't mean identical in every particular; no physical experiment can be that precise.

In some experiments they can be precise enough to show the fundamental uncertainty inherent in QM.

You refer to "uncertainties." This is an epistemological concept, not a metaphysical one. Nature is neither certain nor uncertain of anything; only human beings are. And from human uncertainty per se -- whether this results from insufficient knowledge, problems of measurement, or whatever -- you can infer absolutely nothing about the nature of reality. This is a basic point that you don't seem to grasp.

No, this is a point that you don't grasp. It doesn't concern some "problems of measurement", it is the fact that this uncertainty is inherent in nature itself. It is for example in principle impossible to measure the position and the momentum of an electron with arbitrary accuracy at the same moment, therefore the notion of the exact orbit of an electron is meaningless. In philosophers' terms: in the atomic domain epistemology becomes metaphysics.

Ghs: Scientists also rely on repeating experiments in controlled conditions. This method would make no sense, however, if the same causes operating in the same conditions could produce different effects.

D: As I indicated above, the effects are so small that in most cases they would be undetectable."

This is a point if favor of physical determinism. No two events, or cluster of events, can be replicated exactly, so even in controlled conditions we would expect some minor variations. But if indeterminism is correct -- if things "just happen" with no causal regularity -- then we should see drastically different outcomes.

Not at all, we see exactly the outcomes that QM predicts. The fact that nature is fundamentally indeterministic does not mean that "anything can happen", that is a false dichotomy.

But take for example an atom of Uranium-238. If you watch it, it may decay to Thorium-234 by emitting an alpha particle within a second. Or in ten billion years. It is impossible to predict, as it is a fundamentally stochastic process, there is no reason that it will decay now or in billions of years."

From the fact that we cannot predict the rate of decay it does not follow that the rate of decay happens for "no reason" (i.e., without a cause). This is an elementary and egregious non sequitur.

No, it is elementary logic. There had never been found a cause for the decay of an atom at a specific moment (now or in 10 billion years). If you claim that there should be a cause, you'll have to show evidence supporting your statement. The theory that describes such decay doesn't allow for such a cause either, and it is an extremely successful theory. So why should there be a cause?

However, we can describe the statistical behavior of a very large number of Uranium-238 atoms, and it turns out that on the average half of the atoms will decay in 4.46 billions of years.

Fine, but use of the statistical method, which is fundamental to QM, has nothing to do with metaphysical indeterminism. A physicist who believed in physical determinism would also use it, owing to its useful results.

My point is that due to the predictable statistic behavior, we don't in general observe the indeterministic effects of small systems. That is not to say that they cannot be amplified with observable results in daily life. Ask Schrödinger's cat.

[tjohnson]

You refer to "uncertainties." This is an epistemological concept, not a metaphysical one. Nature is neither certain nor uncertain of anything; only human beings are. And from human uncertainty per se -- whether this results from insufficient knowledge, problems of measurement, or whatever -- you can infer absolutely nothing about the nature of reality. This is a basic point that you don't seem to grasp.

No, this is a point that you don't grasp. It doesn't concern some "problems of measurement", it is the fact that this uncertainty is inherent in nature itself. It is for example in principle impossible to measure the position and the momentum of an electron with arbitrary accuracy at the same moment, therefore the notion of the exact orbit of an electron is meaningless. In philosophers' terms: in the atomic domain epistemology becomes metaphysics.

Another way of looking at this is if one tries to "see" the position of an electron using light, which is how we see things normally, you will need at least one photon of light. This photon, upon hitting the electron, will cause it to scatter off in some direction. So the very act of trying to pin down it's position causes it to drastically change it's momentum. This is the basis of the position-momentum uncertainty relation. This effect is negligible with relatively large objects.

[jriggenbach]

So, George, are you enjoying the intellectual chaos that is typically unleashed by people who

(1) don't understand the difference between physics and metaphysics ("physics is the fundamental science that studies nature, or in other words reality")

and

(2) pay no heed to any potential difference between what they can observe and what's actually there?

Good luck!

JR

[Daniel Barnes]

So, George, are you enjoying the intellectual chaos that is typically unleashed by people who

(1) don't understand the difference between physics and metaphysics ("physics is the fundamental science that studies nature, or in other words reality")

and

(2) pay no heed to any potential difference between what they can observe and what's actually there?

Good luck!

It seems to me the "intellectual chaos" caused by Rand's bait-and-switch word-games is a far bigger problem. But perhaps we will get to the bottom of it yet...;-)

[9thdoctor]

So, George, are you enjoying the intellectual chaos

I think George is doing a great job. I just hope this doesn’t get bogged down by a rehash of QM.

[George H. Smith]

You refer to "uncertainties." This is an epistemological concept, not a metaphysical one. Nature is neither certain nor uncertain of anything; only human beings are. And from human uncertainty per se -- whether this results from insufficient knowledge, problems of measurement, or whatever -- you can infer absolutely nothing about the nature of reality. This is a basic point that you don't seem to grasp.

No, this is a point that you don't grasp. It doesn't concern some "problems of measurement", it is the fact that this uncertainty is inherent in nature itself. It is for example in principle impossible to measure the position and the momentum of an electron with arbitrary accuracy at the same moment, therefore the notion of the exact orbit of an electron is meaningless. In philosophers' terms: in the atomic domain epistemology becomes metaphysics.

Another way of looking at this is if one tries to "see" the position of an electron using light, which is how we see things normally, you will need at least one photon of light. This photon, upon hitting the electron, will cause it to scatter off in some direction. So the very act of trying to pin down it's position causes it to drastically change it's momentum. This is the basis of the position-momentum uncertainty relation. This effect is negligible with relatively large objects.

Exactly. The instrument of measurement (a photon) will necessarily interfere with the object that is being measured (the momentum of an electron). Therefore, according to QM, it is impossible, in principle, to ascertain both the position and momentum of an electron simultaneously.

I have no problem with this conclusion, but it has absolutely nothing to do with the metaphysical question of whether the movement of an electron has a cause.

The principle that every event has a cause should not be confused with the issue of complete predictability, which is associated with Newtonian mechanics. The latter was famously illustrated by Laplace's demon, a being sufficiently powerful to have simultaneous knowledge of the positions and velocities of all the particles in the universe. According to this model, this demon, using the equations of Newtonian mechanics, would be able to predict the future development of the universe down to the minutest detail.

I agree that QM has demolished this paradigm, and I have other objections to it as well. It is also the case that the lack of predictability on the subatomic level is what some philosophers of science mean by "indeterminism."

Again, however, none of this has anything to do with the metaphysical issue of whether events, including the behavior of subatomic particles, have causes. We are dealing here with two separate and distinct problems.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

So, George, are you enjoying the intellectual chaos

I think George is doing a great job.

I'm ready to bail on the QM debate and will probably do so after one more post. If you show a person an apple and an orange, and if he claims to see no difference, at a certain point there is nothing more you can say or do to convince him that they are in fact different.

In my experience, there are usually a few pro-Randian science wonks on a neo-Objectivist list like this -- people who could defend my position in greater detail than I have either the knowledge or inclination to do. They should be debating this subject, not I. So where the hell are they?

All I wanted to do was to discuss one aspect of the theory of value, and here I am debating the philosophical implications of quantum mechanics. To make matters worse, Daniel Barnes now wants me to solve the "is-ought" problem for him -- and in the process, I will need to explain his misunderstanding of both Hume and Rand. Before I get that far, however, I expect to get sidetracked into additional controversies.

But a funny thing didn't happen on my way to explaining the descriptive nature of instrumental value judgments. Although no one seemed to disagree with my fundamental point (which is very noncontroversial among philosophers), no one was willing to say, "Okay, that makes sense." Instead, I either get silence or I get statements to the effect that instrumental value judgments are not relevant to ethics, and that I would need to do a lot more to justify moral judgments.

Of course I would, and I have said so explicitly on several occasions. But why all the foot dragging and diversions? I guess some people feel that I am setting them up, and that if they concede even the most obvious of points, I will spring a trap. In truth, however, I am merely presenting a very basic idea that even overt defenders of ethical subjectivism have never denied. Instrumental value judgments are the sort of thing that a college student would probably learn about in an introductory course on ethics.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

George, I'm not aware of "science wonks" on this list. Dragonfly is a physicist, among other things, who has general contempt for philosophy, but he is not an Objectivist. What he actually is is an adult who has forgotten his childhood, so to say, by which I mean as the scientist he grew up into and who burned up the philosophic bridge that got him there while continuing to use the philosophy he learned which is common to the philosophy of science. He had to start somewhere, however, which is a reverence for reality and reason, but that is not exclusive to science but common to basic sanity.

--Brant

[Daniel Barnes]

To make matters worse, Daniel Barnes now wants me to solve the "is-ought" problem for him -- and in the process, I will need to explain his misunderstanding of both Hume and Rand.

Well I apologise for any of my misunderstandings.

But I thought your discussion of "one aspect of the theory of value" was the first step towards a vindication of ethics as an "objective enterprise". If that's not what you were aiming at, sorry.

And I didn't ask you to solve the "is-ought" problem for me. I merely asked you if you were willing to briefly explain the problem you were trying to solve, if not that one.

[George H. Smith]

George, I'm not aware of "science wonks" on this list. Dragonfly is a physicist, among other things, who has general contempt for philosophy, but he is not an Objectivist. What he actually is is an adult who has forgotten his childhood, so to say, by which I mean as the scientist he grew up into and who burned up the philosophic bridge that got him there while continuing to use the philosophy he learned which is common to the philosophy of science. He had to start somewhere, however, which is a reverence for reality and reason, but that is not exclusive to science but common to basic sanity.

--Brant

One of my best friends during my high school and college years was a prodigy in mathematics -- you know, one of those guys who had already earned a college degree at the age most people graduate high school. David (a distant relative of Bertrand Russell) went on to earn doctorates in both mathematics and physics, but he wasn't your stereotypical academic geek. He was a remarkable athlete who played semi-professional basketball for a while, won some kind of body-building contest in his 20s, earned a couple black belts in martial arts, and even completed the rigorous training for Navy SEALS. (He wasn't actually in the military; he accompanied SEALS on secret missions in a civilian capacity, while working for the government.)

As if this weren't enough, after teaching physics for a while at a major university, David went on to make millions in his own computer-related business, only to lose everything during the Dot Com crash. He then went back to teaching physics around five years ago.

David and I still keep in touch (he has visited me several times in recent years), and the last I heard, he has nearly completed a book on a new theory of gravitation. He has given talks on this subject at scientific conferences, and apparently his ideas have been well received. (He sent me an abstract of his book, but it might as well have been written in Greek.)I think he is also working on a college textbook on physics, for which he already has a publisher.

One thing I have always liked about David is that he doesn't follow the herd in matters of physics. For example, the last time David visited me around three years ago, he explained to me, in painstaking detail, why String Theory is bunk. (I think he plans on publishing something on that topic as well.) On many occasions David has complained that too many physicists accept received doctrines without critically examining matters for themselves.

I first argued about the philosophical implications of QM with David around 1965, while both of us were in high school. We must have had dozens of intense conversations for around a year. At first, I was foolish enough to challenge some of the scientific conclusions of QM, while David didn't grasp the distinction I was making between science and philosophy. Believe it or not, however, we eventually arrived at a mutual understanding. Although David didn't know much about the philosophy of science at that time, he educated himself and now sings its praises. Indeed, during his last visit, he insisted that I accompany him to a couple bookstores, where he bought around ten books on the philosophy of science and gave them to me as a gift.

Although I wouldn't describe David as an Objectivist or Neo-Objectivist, he takes Ayn Rand's ideas very seriously. He does so partly because he understands the importance of philosophy, partly because he finds Rand's ideas plausible, and partly because he knows that I don't suffer fools gladly. Rand may have been wrong about some things, but, contrary to what some people on OL seem to believe, she was no fool.

David and I no longer argue about QM. We now argue about global warming. We had a real barn burner of an argument, shouting and all, about that controversy during his last visit. At one point David pointed out that he knows a lot more about science than I do, to which I replied: "You know better than to pull that shit on me." He quickly agreed that his expertise wasn't relevant to the point we had been arguing about, so we moved on and shouted at each other about another aspect of that debate.

Ghs

[Daniel Barnes]

Rand may have been wrong about some things, but, contrary to what some people on OL seem to believe, she was no fool.

I don't regard Rand as a fool. On the contrary, I think she was a quite brilliant woman. Why would I waste my time criticising a fool?

On the other hand, quite brilliant people can sometimes hold very foolish ideas. And sometimes very much lesser people, such as myself, can do them a favour by pointing them out.

Edited February 26, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Brant Gaede]

Ah, "lesser people." Always wanted to meet some.

--Brant

[Daniel Barnes]

Ah, "lesser people." Always wanted to meet some.

I didn't say I was lesser than you...;-)

[George H. Smith]

To make matters worse, Daniel Barnes now wants me to solve the "is-ought" problem for him -- and in the process, I will need to explain his misunderstanding of both Hume and Rand.

Well I apologise for any of my misunderstandings.

But I thought your discussion of "one aspect of the theory of value" was the first step towards a vindication of ethics as an "objective enterprise". If that's not what you were aiming at, sorry.

And I didn't ask you to solve the "is-ought" problem for me. I merely asked you if you were willing to briefly explain the problem you were trying to solve, if not that one.

My ultimate aim was to show that moral judgments, like other value judgments, can be objective, in the sense that they can be rationally justified. Such judgments need not be mere expressions of personal preference (subjectivism), "emotive ejaculations" (emotivism), etc. But this is a far cry from vindicating the entire discipline of ethics.

I've decided to leave Hume aside for now, since that discussion would take us far afield.

I don't have the energy right now to discuss your previous post point by point. In fact, it would annoy me to read it again, so I'll just make a few brief comments in a shotgun manner and hope some of them are on target.

(1) The problem of the relationship between between facts and values is not the same as the traditional Is-Ought Problem. The latter pertains to deriving a normative conclusion from purely descriptive premises, whereas many value judgments don't carry normative implications. For example, I value the American Revolution and certain other historical events, but there is no action I can take regarding them, so it would be absurd to say that I "ought" to do something in regard to those past events.

(2) Over 35 years ago, in Atheism: The Case Against God, I characterized Rand's approach to facts and values in the following way:

"Rand does not consider the relation between facts and values to be a serious problem, because, for her, values represent a kind of fact (and, in this regard, she follows in the tradition of Aristotelian philosophers). The concept of value expresses the beneficial or harmful relationship of some aspect of reality to a living organism, and to say that something is of value to an organism is to say that it is conducive to the life of that organism. When we say that water is of value to a plant, for example, we mean that water is conducive to the life of that plant. The concept of value, in this instance, signifies the life-serving function of water in relation to the plant, and this relationship is objectively demonstrable. The value judgment involved here is true; i.e., it describes an actual relationship. The water will, in fact, further the life of the plant, so to say that water is of value to the plant is to describe a fact of reality. Therefore, in this case at least, there is no problem of "deriving" a value from a fact -- as if one is dealing with two separate realms -- because the value judgment expresses a fact; it is an estimate of a relationship, and this estimate is either accurate or inaccurate, true or false"

"If this basic view of values is correct, then any attempt to divorce the realm of values from the realm of facts is fundamentally misguided at the outset..." (pp. 283-84).

(3) Much of this chapter discusses the nature of ethics as a discipline and its method of reasoning. For example:

"Ethics deals with the facts of value as they apply to human action and the achievement of human goals. Like all normative sciences [i state earlier that I use "science" in the older sense of a systematic and organized body of knowledge -- today I would use the term "cognitive discipline" instead] ethics is concerned primarily with facts -- with what is objectively of value to man --and it seeks to apply this knowledge to the realm of human choices and goals. It is this application of values to human action that generates the normative character of ethics, thus giving rise to its various ought-judgments. If x is of value to man (a fact), then man ought to value and pursue x (a normative judgment) if he wants to further his life and well-being (a goal).

"Insofar as ethics seeks to discover and systematize factual knowledge of values, it is a science, Insofar as ethics seeks to apply this knowledge of values to human goals, it is a normative science. Insofar as ethics deals with fundamental values and goals -- those required by the nature of man as such, or by man qua man -- it is a branch of philosophy" (p. 286).

Although I might word things differently today, I still agree fundamentally with these passages. These are only snippets, so before you raise objections so obvious that even a college freshman would think of them after one week of Ethical Theory 101 -- problems regarding an "ultimate value," and so forth -- please do me the courtesy of reading Chapters 11 and 12 of ATCAG.

(4) In the classic Aristotelian tradition of "practical reasoning," Rand treats moral "ought" judgments as hypothetical imperatives (to use Kant's terminology). She makes this clear in "Causality Versus Duty":

"Reality confronts man with a great many "musts," but all of them are conditional; the formula of realistic necessity is: "You must, if—" and the "if" stands for man's choice: "- if you want to achieve a certain goal." You must eat, if you want to survive. You must work, if you want to eat. You must think, if you want to work. You must look at reality, if you want to think- if you want to know what to do- if you want to know what goals to choose—if you want to know how to achieve them."

Now I suppose you will tell me that hypothetical imperatives are not really "moral" in nature. Go ahead. I've read more versions of that argument than I can remember, so I suppose I can stand one more.

Or maybe you will ask the time-honored question, "Why should I be moral?" I'm ready for that one, too.

Or how about a really juicy hypothetical, such as: Suppose that I could eradicate cancer forever by pushing a button, but by pushing that button I will also kill one innocent person. Should I push the button?

There are many more possibilities, and I have complete confidence that you will come up with something.

Ghs

[anthony]

I for one am very pleased that Ghs hasn't bailed from this debate - yet.

He is bringing some much-needed clarity and perspective to a seeming dilemma that has confounded me.

And making a strong case for philosophy being the science behind all sciences.

It has always been frustrating to debate with QM physicists who seem to delight in showing that as much as we think we know, we don't know nothing. When one is an ignorant layman in these matters it is hard to challenge.

As someone mentioned (9th?) the distinction lies in the difference between physics and metaphysics.

In arguments, I have heard it put( over- simply ), that we can never understand the movement of particles; Man is composed of particles; ergo, Man is beyond understanding.

Self-direction and volition, notwithstanding.

George, rescue us from these 'concretists'!

Tony

[George H. Smith]

Rand may have been wrong about some things, but, contrary to what some people on OL seem to believe, she was no fool.

I don't regard Rand as a fool. On the contrary, I think she was a quite brilliant woman. Why would I waste my time criticising a fool?

On the other hand, quite brilliant people can sometimes hold very foolish ideas. And sometimes very much lesser people, such as myself, can do them a favour by pointing them out.

In an earlier post, you wrote: "It seems to me the "intellectual chaos" caused by Rand's bait-and-switch word-games is a far bigger problem."

Bait and switch word-games? This is a demeaning thing to say, and Rand never did any such thing.

I agree that Rand occasionally said foolish things. This is bound to happen to anyone who writes as much as she did on a wide variety of topics. I wager that anyone who has posted a lot on elists, discussion boards, and blogs has also said foolish things from time to time. I know I have.

I can't think of any foolish things that Rand said about fundamental philosophical issues. As an essayist, she often covered complex issues in a brief manner, thereby leaving many questions unanswered. But those essays are highly suggestive, and when Rand did decide to go into more detail, as in Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, the results could be remarkable.

I think Rand's weakest area was psychology. But as odd as some of her theories were, I don't think I would characterize most of them as foolish. Very strange at times, but not necessarily foolish.

I also have some serious problems with Rand's views about the history of philosophy and the influence of certain philosophers. Her comment that "Kant is the most evil man in mankind's history" is beyond foolish; it is utterly bizarre.

As for the most foolish essay Rand ever wrote, my nominees would be the piece she wrote for "The Objectivist" about a woman president, and her article "An Open Letter to Boris Spassky: The Metaphysical Lessons of Chess." Much of the latter is downright silly.

I think Rand was an authentic genius -- and I don't use this label often. But what is genius, in the final analysis, except a form of intellectual eccentricity? And if you add to this eccentricity the brass balls that Rand needed to carve a name for herself in philosophy -- while mastering a second language, combatting sexism, working outside of academia, and defending capitalism during a time when that was a dirty word -- then it is scarcely realistic to expect her to have been completely "normal" in other areas of life.

Thus, even if Rand said foolish things on occasion, she always said them with style, flair, and originality. But most of her orthodox followers have none of these merits, so they often manage to sound foolish even while defending a reasonable position.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

Ah, "lesser people." Always wanted to meet some.

I didn't say I was lesser than you...;-)

Go ahead! Say it! Get it over with!

--Brant

psychologist

the way out is through

Edited February 26, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[George H. Smith]

Einstein made substantial contributions to quantum theory, and I think it's safe to say that he understood QM -- but he rejected your position.

The point is that Einstein was definitely proven wrong with regard to his view on quantum mechanics.

Einstein had a series of debates with Niels Bohr, a principal architect of the Copenhagen interpretation of QM, according to which it is meaningless to ask questions such as "Where was the particle before I measured it?" But such questions clearly are not meaningless, at least not in our normal way of thinking and speaking. The problem here is that QM employs operational definitions and thereby attaches highly technical meanings to words that have different meanings in everyday discourse. Within the context of quantum theory, it may very well be "meaningless" to ask such questions, but this is only because of the operational definitions that have been employed.

I am not qualified to judge the technical issues debated by Einstein and Bohr, but they are irrelevant to Einstein's claim that QM does not require us to accept indeterminism in nature. His point on this subject was philosophical, not scientific.

Indeterminism is not just some practical problem, it is a fundamental property of nature at atomic scales. That is the only thing that counts, as physics is the fundamental science that studies nature, or in other words reality. Armchair fantasies by philosophers are not relevant.

If the armchair fantasies of philosophers are not relevant, then neither are the conceptual muddles of (some) physicists.

Ghs: You refer to "uncertainties." This is an epistemological concept, not a metaphysical one. Nature is neither certain nor uncertain of anything; only human beings are. And from human uncertainty per se -- whether this results from insufficient knowledge, problems of measurement, or whatever -- you can infer absolutely nothing about the nature of reality. This is a basic point that you don't seem to grasp.

D: No, this is a point that you don't grasp. It doesn't concern some "problems of measurement", it is the fact that this uncertainty is inherent in nature itself. It is for example in principle impossible to measure the position and the momentum of an electron with arbitrary accuracy at the same moment, therefore the notion of the exact orbit of an electron is meaningless."

The exact orbit of an electron may have no operational definition in QM, and the notion may be irrelevant in QM, but this is a far cry from claiming that the notion itself is meaningless.

From the fact that it is impossible to measure X in principle, it does not follow that it is meaningless to speak of X. Indeed, if you didn't already understand what X means, then how could you possibly say that it is impossible to measure X? If X is meaningless, then it is also meaningless to claim that X cannot be measured -- for we would have no idea of what we are talking about. And if this is the case, then some key claims of QM are also meaningless.

QM does not confer upon physicists the philosophical privilege to speak nonsense. I've seen arguments for the existence of God that make more sense than this.

This excursion into the QM version of Alice in Wonderland is giving me a headache, so I will stop for now.

Ghs