Moral Certainty

[George H. Smith]

There is no such thing as objective value. It always depends on the standard form which you judge.

Every cognitive discipline has standards by which is judges knowledge claims. This is as true, for example, of mathematics and history as it is of ethics. But these standards do not necessarily strip the discipline in question of objectivity.

All value judgments are "subjective" in the sense that they emanate from a valuing subject. But this meaning of "subjective" (which is often used in economics) has no bearing on the distinction between subjective and objective value judgments, as those terms are used in ethics.

Ghs

[Xray]

There is no such thing as objective value. It always depends on the standard form which you judge.

Every cognitive discipline has standards by which is judges knowledge claims.

Standards are always chosen. Inches or centimeters are example of different standards in measuring scales. The same with Celsius/Fahrenheit.

This is as true, for example, of mathematics and history as it is of ethics.

Are objective validation and valuation the same?

But these standards do not necessarily strip the discipline in question of objectivity.

In what way can ethics be objective? Since ethical standards are always chosen by humans, they are also subject to change. Just think of the dramatic changes in moral values which has occurred over the centuries.

All value judgments are "subjective" in the sense that they emanate from a valuing subject. But this meaning of "subjective" (which is often used in economics) has no bearing on the distinction between subjective and objective value judgments, as those terms are used in ethics.

Could you give an example of an "objective value judgement" in ethics?

Edited February 22, 2010 by Xray

[George H. Smith]

Could you give an example of an "objective value judgement" in ethics?

Since your initial claim was that "There is no such thing as objective value," for now all I need do is offer one example of an objective value judgment, even if it is a nonmoral one.

This knife is very sharp and cuts well, so it is a good knife.

To describe a knife as "good" is to render a value judgment. And this value judgment can be objectively verified, using the standard of cutting well (the purpose for which knives are made) as our standard of value.

If you agree with me that we now have at least one objective value judgment, then we can proceed to normative nonmoral value judgments that involve an "ought." And from there we can proceed to moral value judgments. It's best to take this one step at a time.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

Could you give an example of an "objective value judgement" in ethics?

Since your initial claim was that "There is no such thing as objective value," for now all I need do is offer one example of an objective value judgment, even if it is a nonmoral one.

This knife is very sharp and cuts well, so it is a good knife.

To describe a knife as "good" is to render a value judgment. And this value judgment can be objectively verified, using the standard of cutting well (the purpose for which knives are made) as our standard of value.

If you agree with me that we now have at least one objective value judgment, then we can proceed to normative nonmoral value judgments that involve an "ought." And from there we can proceed to moral value judgments. It's best to take this one step at a time.

Ghs

(Deja Vu:)

Some knives do not cut well and are "good" knives because they are only used to stick and have sharp points. Some knives are dull and are "good" for dull knife uses such as spreading butter. Some knives are almost useless pieces of dull rust but are "good" because the "bad" guys have them and you're the "good" guy with a "good" gun threatened by them. They, of course, see your gun as a very, very "bad" thing. All involved might agree it's a "badass" gun, but I digress. ("Do you feel lucky, punk?")

Good luck with Xray.

--Brant

fresh meat for the Xray machine

Edited February 22, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[George H. Smith]

Could you give an example of an "objective value judgement" in ethics?

Since your initial claim was that "There is no such thing as objective value," for now all I need do is offer one example of an objective value judgment, even if it is a nonmoral one.

This knife is very sharp and cuts well, so it is a good knife.

To describe a knife as "good" is to render a value judgment. And this value judgment can be objectively verified, using the standard of cutting well (the purpose for which knives are made) as our standard of value.

If you agree with me that we now have at least one objective value judgment, then we can proceed to normative nonmoral value judgments that involve an "ought." And from there we can proceed to moral value judgments. It's best to take this one step at a time.

Ghs

(Deja Vu:)

Some knives do not cut well and are "good" knives because they are only used to stick and have sharp points. Some knives are dull and are "good" for dull knife uses such as spreading butter. Some knives are almost useless pieces of dull rust but are "good" because the "bad" guys have them and you're the "good" guy with a "good" gun threatened by them. They, of course, see your gun as a very, very "bad" thing. All involved might agree it's a "badass" gun, but I digress. ("Do you feel lucky, punk?")

Good luck with Xray.

--Brant

fresh meat for the Xray machine

The fact that knives can serve different purposes in different contexts has no bearing on the relevant point. To say This knife is very sharp and cuts well, so it is a good knife is still a true proposition. And if at least one value judgment can be objectively true, then Xray's initial claim was mistaken.

In each example you gave, the value judgment "good" or "bad" is a shorthand for the description of a relationship. None of these judgments is "subjective" in the sense that Xray means.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

I suspect that what Xray means and what she thinks she means aren't necessarily the same thing. Anyway, she's in Germany so I don't expect to hear from her until tomorrow. She's been going on and on with her theme for nearly a year on OL which she repeats endlessly. For her all moral values are subjectively chosen; there are no objective ones; most people think their moralities are objective leading to war and conflict in the name of such, but all these "objective" moralities are subjective, including those of Objectivism, period. Michael got so pissed off with her he threw a +1100 post thread where she spent most of her time into the Garbage Pile and later limited her to 5 posts a day because she was laying her peculiar eggs all over this site. In a sense it's another Peter Taylor situation, but she is unfailingly civil so one can go on forever with this intellectual succubus, even grow old and die.

--Brant

[9thdoctor]

In a sense it's another Peter Taylor situation, but she is unfailingly civil so one can go on forever with this intellectual succubus, even grow old and die.

Come on, don’t try to demotivate George. For once, I’m looking forward to watching an Xray takedown. And please note the 4th rule of Fight Club: <object width="425" height="344"><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pynZAvm6RZo&hl=en_US&fs=1&"></param><param'>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pynZAvm6RZo&hl=en_US&fs=1&"></param><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"></param><param name="allowscriptaccess" value="always"></param><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pynZAvm6RZo&hl=en_US&fs=1&" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" width="425" height="344"></embed></object>

[George H. Smith]

In a sense it's another Peter Taylor situation, but she is unfailingly civil so one can go on forever with this intellectual succubus, even grow old and die.

Come on, don’t try to demotivate George. For once, I’m looking forward to watching an Xray takedown.

You just violated the first two rules of Fight Club: "Do not talk about Fight Club."

As for the sixth rule -- "No shirt, no shoes" -- I'm not sure how that would apply here. I suppose we could post photos, but I don't want to turn people against me unnecessarily.

As for the movie "Fight Club" -- Every Randian bone left in my body told me that I should dislike the movie, but I found it captivating.

Ghs

[9thdoctor]

As for the movie "Fight Club" -- Every Randian bone left in my body told me that I should dislike the movie, but I found it captivating.

There is a kind of parallel to Atlas Shrugged, except the guiding philosophy is that of an angry Buddhist, I’d say. Creating brainwashed anti-consumerist jihadists (the space monkeys). After 9/11 they couldn't have kept the ending.

[merjet]

The fact that knives can serve different purposes in different contexts has no bearing on the relevant point. To say This knife is very sharp and cuts well, so it is a good knife is still a true proposition. And if at least one value judgment can be objectively true, then Xray's initial claim was mistaken.

In each example you gave, the value judgment "good" or "bad" is a shorthand for the description of a relationship. None of these judgments is "subjective" in the sense that Xray means.

Ghs

Good luck. Per Xray a judgment that is not "subjective" doesn't make it "objective". She has her own unique, dogmatic meaning of "objective".

[tjohnson]

This knife is very sharp and cuts well, so it is a good knife.

To describe a knife as "good" is to render a value judgment. And this value judgment can be objectively verified, using the standard of cutting well (the purpose for which knives are made) as our standard of value.

I'm not so sure. I would say it's more accurate to say "I call this a good knife". The problem arises when we feel compelled to say it is something, ie a good knife. The description is easily verified (let's try cutting with it) but to simply say it is a good knife can be problematic because we don't normally go around explaining all our various standards of value when we make these pronouncements. This is why Korzybski said "whatever you say something is, it isn't". I guess that flies in the face of the Law of Identity eh?

[George H. Smith]

The fact that knives can serve different purposes in different contexts has no bearing on the relevant point. To say This knife is very sharp and cuts well, so it is a good knife is still a true proposition. And if at least one value judgment can be objectively true, then Xray's initial claim was mistaken.

In each example you gave, the value judgment "good" or "bad" is a shorthand for the description of a relationship. None of these judgments is "subjective" in the sense that Xray means.

Ghs

Good luck. Per Xray a judgment that is not "subjective" doesn't make it "objective". She has her own unique, dogmatic meaning of "objective".

The terms "subjective" and "objective" have been used in different ways in different disciplines. The best way out of this linguistic jungle -- assuming that a person is seriously interested in getting to the core of the problem -- is for the person who claims that value judgments cannot be "objective" to give examples of propositions that he or she believes are objective. These propositions can then be examined for their similarities and differences to value judgments.

In truth, every cognitive discipline employs value judgments. Even in the hard sciences we find value judgments to the effect that some kinds of evidence and arguments, and some theories, are better than others. These may be called cognitive value judgments.

Ghs

[tjohnson]

The terms "subjective" and "objective" have been used in different ways in different disciplines. The best way out of this linguistic jungle -- assuming that a person is seriously interested in getting to the core of the problem -- is for the person who claims that value judgments cannot be "objective" to give examples of propositions that he or she believes are objective. These propositions can then be examined for their similarities and differences to value judgments.

In truth, every cognitive discipline employs value judgments. Even in the hard sciences we find value judgments to the effect that some kinds of evidence and arguments, and some theories, are better than others. These may be called cognitive value judgments.

Ghs

'Objective' invariably has the connotation of independent of observer in some sense. Now, strictly speaking, this is impossible because there always has to be an observer but this does not prevent us from being objective. What this means is silently observing and not jumping to conclusions, taking notes, making accurate descriptions, taking measurements, staying calm, etc., all the things a good scientist does in the course of their work.

[George H. Smith]

This knife is very sharp and cuts well, so it is a good knife.

To describe a knife as "good" is to render a value judgment. And this value judgment can be objectively verified, using the standard of cutting well (the purpose for which knives are made) as our standard of value.

I'm not so sure. I would say it's more accurate to say "I call this a good knife". The problem arises when we feel compelled to say it is something, ie a good knife. The description is easily verified (let's try cutting with it) but to simply say it is a good knife can be problematic because we don't normally go around explaining all our various standards of value when we make these pronouncements. This is why Korzybski said "whatever you say something is, it isn't". I guess that flies in the face of the Law of Identity eh?

Suppose someone gave you a set of kitchen knives for a birthday present; and after opening your present she said, "Those are really good knives." I don't think you would have a problem understanding what she meant by this value judgment.

But suppose she said, "I call those really good knives." This would be a confusing way to speak, one that might make you wonder what she meant.

In most cases there is no need to explain our standard of value when judging knives, because that standard is implicit and understood by everyone. But you suppose you smoke a pipe, need something to ream the bowl with, and find that a regular kitchen knife works well for this purpose. Here, since a knife is not specifically made for this purpose, you would be apt to say "This knife makes a good pipe reamer," or "This knife can be used as a pipe reamer."

The expression "I call this X" usually serves no purpose unless X is an unusual usage, or you are naming something for the first time, or you are using a stipulative or précising definition for the purpose of technical analysis, or you are explaining the meaning of a word to someone who doesn't speak your language, etc.

Ghs

[tjohnson]

Suppose someone gave you a set of kitchen knives for a birthday present; and after opening your present she said, "Those are really good knives." I don't think you would have a problem understanding what she meant by this value judgment.

But suppose she said, "I call those really good knives." This would be a confusing way to speak, one that might make you wonder what she meant.

In most cases there is no need to explain our standard of value when judging knives, because that standard is implicit and understood by everyone. But you suppose you smoke a pipe, need something to ream the bowl with, and find that a regular kitchen knife works well for this purpose. Here, since a knife is not specifically made for this purpose, you would be apt to say "This knife makes a good pipe reamer," or "This knife can be used as a pipe reamer."

The expression "I call this X" usually serves no purpose unless X is an unusual usage, or you are naming something for the first time, or you are using a stipulative or précising definition for the purpose of technical analysis, or you are explaining the meaning of a word to someone who doesn't speak your language, etc.

Ghs

Now that's what I call a good response! I'm not proposing that we should go around saying "I call this an X or that a Y", I'm only pointing out that this is actually what we are doing and it is worth remembering this during discussions.

[Dragonfly]

The terms "subjective" and "objective" have been used in different ways in different disciplines. The best way out of this linguistic jungle -- assuming that a person is seriously interested in getting to the core of the problem -- is for the person who claims that value judgments cannot be "objective" to give examples of propositions that he or she believes are objective.

The mass of the neutron is 1.67493 * 10^-27 kg. The speed of light is 299792458 m/sec. Hydrogen can react with oxygen, in which reaction water is formed and a certain amount of energy is liberated. Etc. etc. The point is that these statements are independent of an individual observer. That doesn't mean that they are necessarily true: people can make errors, scientific instruments do have their limitations. But they refer to an external reality that is supposed to have an existence independent of any particular consciousness. From experience we know that certain methods, that we can summarize as "the scientific method", give us the best guarantee for objective results (different people using those methods will arrive at the same result for some specific statement, within the margin of error, and we expect that the proverbial intelligent Martian spiders will also arrive at the same result).

On the contrary, the statement "this is a good knife" is a subjective statement. Many people may think it is a good knife because it is sharp, but for some people this may be not a good criterion (they may find such knives dangerous, they can hurt you or people may use them to kill other people), they may find it a bad knife, just because it is sharp. So the value of a knife is something that depends on an individual valuation, different persons in different circumstances may lead to irreducibly different valuations, meaning that there is no "real" value that can be asymptotically approximated, as for example the length of that knife is.

[George H. Smith]

The mass of the neutron is 1.67493 * 10^-27 kg. The speed of light is 299792458 m/sec. Hydrogen can react with oxygen, in which reaction water is formed and a certain amount of energy is liberated. Etc. etc. The point is that these statements are independent of an individual observer.

These statements are not "independent of an individual observer." Statements and other cognitive valuations of truth and falsehood do not exist "out there," apart from the rational agents who make them.

If you want to say that facts exist independently of observers, then I agree. But the identification of a fact is the outcome of an epistemological process that presupposes a knowing subject. And those subjects must fulfill cognitive standards of evaluation (e.g., the scientific method) if they wish to justify their statements.

On the contrary, the statement "this is a good knife" is a subjective statement. Many people may think it is a good knife because it is sharp, but for some people this may be not a good criterion (they may find such knives dangerous, they can hurt you or people may use them to kill other people), they may find it a bad knife, just because it is sharp."

Many words -- not only value words -- have different meanings in different contexts. "Good" can apply to functional objects in different ways; but so long as one is clear about the standard one is using, then the resulting value judgment is objective. Such value judgments are purely descriptive ; they describe the ability of an object to fulfill a certain purpose.

Generally speaking, value judgments can either rank or grade. Here I will only consider the former type.

Value rankings compare something to something else in the same category, according to how well they meet a given standard. Suppose, while preparing dinner with a friend, I am slicing tomatoes for a salad, and I complain that the knife I'm using isn't very good. My friend then hands me another knife while saying, "Here, this knife is better."

"Better," in this context, is a value ranking. It is a descriptive, objectively verifiable statement. It means that the second knife has the characteristic that I need (greater sharpness) and will therefore accomplish my goal in a more efficient manner than the first knife.

Suppose that in response to my complaint about the first knife, my friend replies, "Well, that's just your subjective opinion. Where is it written that a knife must be sharp in order to qualify as good?"

To this I would say: "It's not written anywhere that I should be slicing tomatoes. But given that I want to make a salad, and given that I need to slice tomatoes for that salad, then I need a sharper knife to accomplish my goal. This isn't just my subjective preference; a sharper knife would be objectively better for that purpose."

So the value of a knife is something that depends on an individual valuation, different persons in different circumstances may lead to irreducibly different valuations, meaning that there is no "real" value that can be asymptotically approximated, as for example the length of that knife is."

The "value" of a knife does not exist in a world of Platonic forms, absolute and unchanging. It expresses the relationship between the properties of a given knife and the purpose for which it will be used.

Ghs

[tjohnson]

These statements are not "independent of an individual observer." Statements and other cognitive valuations of truth and falsehood do not exist "out there," apart from the rational agents who make them.

If you want to say that facts exist independently of observers, then I agree.

The above statement exists on a server somewhere on the internet, do you deny that? Also, can you give me an example of a fact without using a statement? We can hardly discuss "facts" without using statements of some sort.

[George H. Smith]

These statements are not "independent of an individual observer." Statements and other cognitive valuations of truth and falsehood do not exist "out there," apart from the rational agents who make them.

If you want to say that facts exist independently of observers, then I agree.

The above statement exists on a server somewhere on the internet, do you deny that? Also, can you give me an example of a fact without using a statement? We can hardly discuss "facts" without using statements of some sort.

There is a difference between a fact and a true proposition that identifies that fact. If I say "A cat is on the mat," and if there really is a cat on the mat, then my statement is true. But the fact that a cat is on the mat is not contingent on my identification of this fact.

As Rand might say, we cannot know X (a fact) without a method of knowing X. But to claim knowledge presupposes that there exists something to be known, something that exists apart from the process by which it is identified.

I assumed there would be general agreement on OL about Rand's basic epistemological theories, but I may have been mistaken. If so, the discussion of value judgments won't get very far until we first clear up some fundamental epistemological issues.

Ghs

[Dragonfly]

These statements are not "independent of an individual observer." Statements and other cognitive valuations of truth and falsehood do not exist "out there," apart from the rational agents who make them.

Perhaps my English is not good enough, but I don't mean that they are independent of any observer at all, but that different observers (including Martian spiders) will arrive at the same statements (within the margins of error) using objective methods (the "scientific method"), as they refer to intrinsic characteristics of the objects in consideration.

Many words -- not only value words -- have different meanings in different contexts. "Good" can apply to functional objects in different ways; but so long as one is clear about the standard one is using, then the resulting value judgment is objective. Such value judgments are purely descriptive ; they describe the ability of an object to fulfill a certain purpose.

But people may value that purpose differently, and therefore will also value that functional object differently.

The "value" of a knife does not exist in a world of Platonic forms, absolute and unchanging. It expresses the relationship between the properties of a given knife and the purpose for which it will be used.

Well, that's exactly the point. Some instrument for torture may be excellent for that purpose (which may be verified objectively), but many people would not think that that instrument therefore has a great objective value. A dictatorship may be very useful for the purpose of making many people miserable, but most of us wouldn't therefore think that a dictatorship is a great objective value.

[tjohnson]

I assumed there would be general agreement on OL about Rand's basic epistemological theories, but I may have been mistaken. If so, the discussion of value judgments won't get very far until we first clear up some fundamental epistemological issues.

Ghs

LOL, OK, as far as I'm concerned, the only possible meaning of 'knowledge' is structure. Language has structure and events have structure and if they have similar structure, then we have knowledge. There, that's my epistemology, well, Korzybski's actually.

[George H. Smith]

I assumed there would be general agreement on OL about Rand's basic epistemological theories, but I may have been mistaken. If so, the discussion of value judgments won't get very far until we first clear up some fundamental epistemological issues.

Ghs

LOL, OK, as far as I'm concerned, the only possible meaning of 'knowledge' is structure. Language has structure and events have structure and if they have similar structure, then we have knowledge. There, that's my epistemology, well, Korzybski's actually.

I read Science and Sanity many years ago. I don't recall many details, but I do recall that I didn't care for much for the book. It takes more than a theory of semantics to explain knowledge; it also takes a theory of epistemology. I say this knowing that Korzybski distinguished his theory of General Semantics from what is often signified by "semantics."

Ghs

[tjohnson]

I read Science and Sanity many years ago. I don't recall many details, but I do recall that I didn't care for much for the book. It takes more than a theory of semantics to explain knowledge; it also takes a theory of epistemology. I say this knowing that Korzybski distinguished his theory of General Semantics from what is often signified by "semantics."

Ghs

I read it 3 of 4 times and I had a far different reaction than you. Did you also notice all the bad things he said about philosophy? He was very pro-science and anti-philosophy.

[George H. Smith]

I read Science and Sanity many years ago. I don't recall many details, but I do recall that I didn't care for much for the book. It takes more than a theory of semantics to explain knowledge; it also takes a theory of epistemology. I say this knowing that Korzybski distinguished his theory of General Semantics from what is often signified by "semantics."

Ghs

I read it 3 of 4 times and I had a far different reaction than you. Did you also notice all the bad things he said about philosophy? He was very pro-science and anti-philosophy.

Yes, I remember Korzybski's hostility to philosophy; it was based, as I recall, on a flawed positivistic foundation. To paraphrase Etienne Gilson, those who declare themselves philosophy's undertakers are destined to be buried by it.

Ghs

[tjohnson]

Yes, I remember Korzybski's hostility to philosophy; it was based, as I recall, on a flawed positivistic foundation. To paraphrase Etienne Gilson, those who declare themselves philosophy's undertakers are destined to be buried by it.

Ghs

'Buried' is quite an apt term, I would say. There's BS, MS (More of the Same), and PHD (Piled Higher and Deeper).