Moral Certainty

[George H. Smith]

You are now raising the more complex subject of moral value judgments. In my initial reply to Xray, I indicated that I was now only considering a simpler type of "instrumental" value judgments, and that I would take up moral judgments at a later time -- if, that is, we can reach agreement that at least some value judgments are objective.

Well, with such an instrumental value definition not only Objectivist virtues as "productivity" or "independence" are objective, but such un-Objectivist values as "parasitism", "initiation of force", etc. are then equally objective values.

They can be in some instrumental value judgments, depending on the context.

So we now agree that some value judgments can be "objective." Is this correct?

If so, we can move on to nonmoral normative value judgments, and then to moral value judgments.

Ghs

I somehow got it into my head that I was responding to Xray; hence the "so we now agree" part. Sorry. I should know better than to write posts before that first cup of coffee.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

...for in the broadest sense we are all philosophers, even semanticists, even scientists.

We are all philosophers but we are not all Philosophers. Philosophers with a capital 'P' are very dangerous because they can poison the minds of people.

That may explain why I didn't care for the Philosopher Alfred Korzybski.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

PS. I would really like to know what assumptions are at the base of objectivism. I would venture that an important one is "Existence exists"

Read Rand, especially Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, if you really want to know. I'm not on OL to teach Objectivism 101 to people who don't know anything about philosophy.

Btw, an axiom is not the same thing as an assumption. As a self-proclaimed semanticist, you should know that.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

The physical object, the knife, can conform to certain objective standards of quality (such as the million folds that supposedly go into the best Samurai blades) and sharpness (which we might measure with a micrometer). We can call all these things "objective", I think, without debate. However the decision/s to adopt such standards adds the subjective element. I call this "subjective" because you can't derive a decision from a fact, or any set of facts, by the objective standard of logic.

Logic, strictly construed, can only tell you whether certain conclusions do or do not follow from given premises. It cannot tell you that should slice tomatoes or pursue any other purpose.

If, by "subjective element," you mean the decision to pursue a certain goal, then, yes, all human action has a "subjective element" insofar as every purposeful action requires a decision by the acting subject. So what? When axiologists and moral philosophers argue over whether ethics is "subjective" or "objective," your point has nothing to do with the crux of the controversy.

As I noted early on in this discussion, "subjective" is used in a variety of ways. I am here concerned with how it has generally been used in ethical theory.

Ghs

[Selene]

George:

You do not play fair!

You want something defined and in a clear context so an intelligent discussion can be of profit to everyone who wants to be involved!

Then you want to stick to those parameters and actually have a productive argument!

You anarchists are all alike!

Pure chaos.

By the way my complements on the way you keep the damn argument focused.

Adam

now we are all waiting for Godot or MsXray whoever shows up first.

[George H. Smith]

In an effort to keep you amused, I would like an example in which a theory of physics has been justified by its results -- with absolutely no philosophical presuppositions about the meaning of "justification," or about which results should qualify as justification and which should not, or about how the key terms used in physics should be defined, or about whether the conclusions of physics should be construed only as "operational truths" or as something more, and so forth.

Ghs

One of the most notable examples was the prediction that light would bend due to the gravitational field of the sun. It was predicted on the basis of General Relativity and measurements confirmed it. This means the the structure of GR is similar to the structure of the event in question and this is what it means "to know" something.

Similar structure? Does this mean that General Relativity Theory will bend when it gets close to the Sun? Just curious.

My point was that physicists work from an underlying philosophy of science. Many great physicists, such as Ernst Mach and Nobel Prize winner P.W. Bridgman, understood this and wrote a great deal on the philosophy of science. (See, for example, Bridgman's The Way Things Are.) Einstein was no exception. Here is a summary of his philosophy of science from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/einstein-philscience/

"Albert Einstein (1879-1955) is well known as the most prominent physicist of the twentieth century. Less well known, though of comparable importance, are his contributions to twentieth-century philosophy of science. Einstein's own philosophy of science is an original synthesis of elements drawn from sources as diverse as neo-Kantianism, conventionalism, and logical empiricism, its distinctive feature being its novel blending of realism with a holist, underdeterminationist form of conventionalism. Of special note is the manner in which Einstein's philosophical thinking was driven by and contributed to the solution of problems first encountered in his work in physics. Equally significant are Einstein's relations with and influence on other prominent twentieth-century philosophers of science, especially Moritz Schlick and Hans Reichenbach."

Ghs

[Xray]

- editing -

Edited February 24, 2010 by Xray

[Brant Gaede]

I would really like to know what assumptions are at the base of objectivism. I would venture that an important one is "Existence exists"

"Existence exists" makes about the same 'sense' as saying "Love loves".

But love does love. We don't say this because it's not axiomatic.

--Brant

[Dragonfly]

At least the philosophy of science should be left to people with a solid foundation in science and not to those prattling amateurs with a brass sign "Philosopher" on their door. So you may learn something useful about the philosophy of science from the eminent physicist and philosopher Bernard d'Espagnat, but not from the incompetent science nitwits Peikoff and Harriman, who still haven't advanced beyond Newton's worldview and who are telling us that modern physics is "corrupt". It is the nonsense spouted by such people that has given official philosophy such a bad reputation in science.

[George H. Smith]

At least the philosophy of science should be left to people with a solid foundation in science and not to those prattling amateurs with a brass sign "Philosopher" on their door. So you may learn something useful about the philosophy of science from the eminent physicist and philosopher Bernard d'Espagnat, but not from the incompetent science nitwits Peikoff and Harriman, who still haven't advanced beyond Newton's worldview and who are telling us that modern physics is "corrupt". It is the nonsense spouted by such people that has given official philosophy such a bad reputation in science.

I agree with you to a large extent, especially in regard to Peikoff. (I'm not familiar with Harriman.)

But this knife cuts two ways. (Clever how I worked a knife into this discussion as well.) When a physicist (or any scientist) moves beyond his realm of expertise and makes grand pronouncements about the metaphysical implications of, say, quantum mechanics, then he is fair game for the philosopher, even one who is not well-versed in physics. An expertise in science does not give the scientist a free pass when he moves into the realm of philosophy.

Physicists who draw unwarranted metaphysical conclusions from Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle are a good example of this problem.

Ghs

[Dragonfly]

Physicists who draw unwarranted metaphysical conclusions from Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle are a good example of this problem.

And what are for example unwarranted metaphysical conclusions from Heisenberg's uncertainty principle?

[Daniel Barnes]

Logic, strictly construed, can only tell you whether certain conclusions do or do not follow from given premises. It cannot tell you that should slice tomatoes or pursue any other purpose.

We agree.

As I noted early on in this discussion, "subjective" is used in a variety of ways. I am here concerned with how it has generally been used in ethical theory.

Well, now wait a minute. As I understand it, you're attempting to build up a case for an "objective" morality by starting with a "first step". But I'm not sure you've clearly explained the problem you're claiming to solve in the first place. In fact your remark I first quoted seems to entirely agree with Hume, and his is the classic statement of the difficulties of a fully objective ethics. Indeed it is this very point that Rand liked to make out that she had refuted. Your "first step" doesn't overcome Hume, so I'm not sure what the point of the second step is.

If your proposed "objective" morality doesn't address Hume, what does it address? Could you clarify? Otherwise I fear all we will end up with is a debate over the meanings of "subjective" and "objective", and as you say, there's little point in getting lost in such a jungle.

Edited February 24, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[George H. Smith]

Physicists who draw unwarranted metaphysical conclusions from Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle are a good example of this problem.

And what are for example unwarranted metaphysical conclusions from Heisenberg's uncertainty principle?

I was thinking of the argument that Heisenberg's uncertainly principle demonstrates causal indeterminancy in nature. As I recall, Heisenberg himself drew a conclusion similar to this, but it's been many years since I've read anything on this subject, and my memory is pretty vague on this particular.

[Xray]

I would really like to know what assumptions are at the base of objectivism. I would venture that an important one is "Existence exists"

"Existence exists" makes about the same 'sense' as saying "Love loves".

Could you give an example of an "objective value judgement" in ethics?

Since your initial claim was that "There is no such thing as objective value," for now all I need do is offer one example of an objective value judgment, even if it is a nonmoral one.

This knife is very sharp and cuts well, so it is a good knife.

To describe a knife as "good" is to render a value judgment. And this value judgment can be objectively verified, using the standard of cutting well (the purpose for which knives are made) as our standard of value.

If you agree with me that we now have at least one objective value judgment, then we can proceed to normative nonmoral value judgments that involve an "ought." And from there we can proceed to moral value judgments. It's best to take this one step at a time.

Ghs

Good idea to take this one step at a time.

It is true that my initial claim was that there is no such thing as an objective value.

Strictly speaking, the burden of proof would fall on you (in case your claim is that objective values do exist), since "X exists" is an affirmative statement, whereas mine is a negation.

Since your initial claim was that "There is no such thing as objective value," for now all I need do is offer one example of an objective value judgment, even if it is a nonmoral one.

Correct.

"Moral" or "non-moral" is irrelevant, since valuing comprises far more than the moral sector.

So, if I have understood you correctly, the proceedings will be that you provide what you think qualifies as evidence supporting your claim and it will be examined as to whether your evidence meets the burden of proof.

Here's your first piece claimed to be evidence:

"This knife is very sharp and cuts well, so it is a good knife."(GHS)

The meaning of "good" is 'suited to purpose'. The purpose being a subjectively chosen goal.

GHS: And this value judgment can be objectively verified, using the standard of cutting well (the purpose for which knives are made) as our standard of value.

What can be verified by testing is whether the blade is sharp and cuts well.

How one values the fact "sharp blade" depends on personal intent.

Therefore whether this fact is (subjectively) valued as 'good' or 'bad' is another issue. For example, if I need a dull knife for scraping paint, the sharp knife is not "good". The victim of a stabbing will certainly not value such knife as "good", etc.

It only becomes of value to an individual if this person uses it (or intends to use it) as an effective means to achieve a subjectively chosen end.

We can demonstrate the principle with an even more drastic example. Drastic examples often serve as an eye-opener.

My question to you:

Is calling "good" a gas chamber constructed for effective functioning an "objective value" judgement?

For this argumentation operates on the same level as your "sharp knife" example.

To whom is it of value? WHO will call it 'good'? Certainly not those for whose deaths this thing has been constructed.

"Good" is a value judgement, you wrote. True. A personal value judgement. For valuing requires a valuer who then attributes value to something in step with a subjectively pursued goal.

The means needed to achieve the subjectively valued goal can be assessed as suitable/not suitable.

If you want to cook, heat is of value to you because of your goal. But this does not make heat per se an "objective value".

View Post Dragonfly, on 23 February 2010 - 10:15 AM, said:

The mass of the neutron is 1.67493 * 10-27 kg. The speed of light is 299792458 m/sec. Hydrogen can react with oxygen, in which reaction water is formed and a certain amount of energy is liberated. Etc. etc. The point is that these statements are independent of an individual observer.

GHS: These statements are not "independent of an individual observer." Statements and other cognitive valuations of truth and falsehood do not exist "out there," apart from the rational agents who make them.

But still you will need criteria which separate statements like the above

"The mass of the neutron is 1.67493 * 10-27 kg. The speed of light is 299792458 m/sec."

from statements like

"I feel angry about person X" or "This was the vacation of my dreams."

What are these criteria?

What DF stated in the above quote are statements of (objective) fact existing independently of personal feelings and valuations, whereas the other statemens are about subjective feelings in connection with a situation.

Edited February 24, 2010 by Xray

[Dragonfly]

I was thinking of the argument that Heisenberg's uncertainly principle demonstrates causal indeterminancy in nature. As I recall, Heisenberg himself drew a conclusion similar to this, but it's been many years since I've read anything on this subject, and my memory is pretty vague on this particular.

But that is no unwarranted metaphysical conclusion, it is a scientifically demonstrated effect, there is a causal indeterminancy in nature. That philosophers who cannot think beyond their Newtonian billiard ball world view find that difficult to accept, because they don't understand the implications of physics is their problem. They think that causality is something self-evident. It is not. That we intuitively "feel" that it should be self-evident is because it corresponds to our experiences in daily life, which have for a long time been been confirmed in physical theories and empirical evidence. However, intuitions can lead us astray, which has been proven unequivocally when we were able to study atomic and subatomic particles, and therefore philosophers who don't understand physics nor the philosophy of physics should shut up about such things, as the metaphysics is derived from physics, not the other way around. They don't realize that their own ideas are not self-evident axioms, but hypotheses that are based on outdated scientific theories and fallible intuitions. They have no leg to stand on.

[tjohnson]

Similar structure? Does this mean that General Relativity Theory will bend when it gets close to the Sun? Just curious.

No, it means that the relations expressed in GR are similar to those found in observation. This is knowledge, there is no need for an entire field of study called Epistemology.

[Daniel Barnes]

Physicists who draw unwarranted metaphysical conclusions from Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle are a good example of this problem.

And what are for example unwarranted metaphysical conclusions from Heisenberg's uncertainty principle?

I was thinking of the argument that Heisenberg's uncertainly principle demonstrates causal indeterminancy in nature. As I recall, Heisenberg himself drew a conclusion similar to this, but it's been many years since I've read anything on this subject, and my memory is pretty vague on this particular.

But by what "metaphysical" authority do philosophers get to issue or withdraw these "warrants" over the conclusions of scientists?

This seems to me this is quite different from claiming this or that scientific theory fails certain logical or empirical tests. Is that all you mean by these "metaphysical" "warrants"?

I don't recall scientists

to be their kings...;-)

How did they get to be there then?

[George H. Smith]

Good idea to take this one step at a time.

It is true that my initial claim was that there is no such thing as an objective value.

Strictly speaking, the burden of proof would fall on you (in case your claim is that objective values do exist), since "X exists" is an affirmative statement, whereas mine is a negation.

This isn't necessarily true; it depends on exactly what your position is. But I don't want to get sidetracked into that issue now.

Here's your first piece claimed to be evidence:

"This knife is very sharp and cuts well, so it is a good knife."(GHS)

The meaning of "good" is 'suited to purpose'. The purpose being a subjectively chosen goal.

It is subjectively chosen in the sense that it is chosen by an acting "subject," yes. But that has no bearing on the question of whether some goals can be rationally justified in some manner.

What can be verified by testing is whether the blade is sharp and cuts well.

More can be verified than this. The value judgment itself, which posits a relationship between a sharp knife and my purpose, can be verified as well.

How one values the fact "sharp blade" depends on personal intent.

Yes and no. Yes, if I plan to use the knife. No, if I am merely admiring an expensive knife in a store and don't plan to purchase it. In the latter case, I might say "That is an excellent knife," even though I have no intent to use it.

Therefore whether this fact is (subjectively) valued as 'good' or 'bad' is another issue. For example, if I need a dull knife for scraping paint, the sharp knife is not "good". The victim of a stabbing will certainly not value such knife as "good", etc.

It only becomes of value to an individual if this person uses it (or intends to use it) as an effective means to achieve a subjectively chosen end.

Yes, of course. But it serves no purpose to write "subjectively chosen end." The phrase is redundant. All "ends" are chosen by subjects. If, on the other hand, by "subjective" you mean something akin to "chosen on whim, for no good reason," then you are simply wrong. There are both good and bad reasons for choosing the goals we do.

I discussed issues like your gas chamber example in subsequent posts, so I won't repeat what I said here, except to say: Yes, there can be "good" gas chambers in a purely instrumental sense.

To whom is it of value? WHO will call it 'good'? Certainly not those for whose deaths this thing has been constructed.

You sound very much like Ayn Rand here, who wrote: "The concept "value" is not a primary; it presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what?"

You have more in common with Rand than I imagined.

"Good" is a value judgement, you wrote. True. A personal value judgement. For valuing requires a valuer who then attributes value to something in step with a subjectively pursued goal."

All judgments are "personal" in this sense, including cognitive judgments. If we examine the evidence for a knowledge claim before accepting it, this is because we personally value truth over falsehood, and we evaluate a claim as "true" when it satisfies the requirements of our subjectively pursued goal of attaining knowledge. Of course, those who don't value knowledge may have a different standard of belief, but so what? That doesn't make our knowledge claims any less justified.

The means needed to achieve the subjectively valued goal can be assessed as suitable/not suitable.

If you want to cook, heat is of value to you because of your goal. But this does not make heat per se an "objective value".

I don't believe in values "per se" -- and neither did Rand, for that matter. She specifically said that values are not "intrinsic," and I assume you meant something similar by "per se."

What DF stated in the above quote are statements of (objective) fact existing independently of personal feelings and valuations, whereas the other statemens are about subjective feelings in connection with a situation.

I said nothing about "feelings" in regard to instrumental value judgments. I specifically referred to a description of the relationship between a goal and the means necessary to achieve it.

Ghs

[Dragonfly]

No, it means that the relations expressed in GR are similar to those found in observation. This is knowledge, there is no need for an entire field of study called Epistemology.

More general, physics and other sciences justify themselves by their results that are used in applied science and technology. An atomic bomb works if you want to destroy your enemy, a voodoo doll not. Anyone who uses a PC implicitly accepts the correctness of that "corrupt" quantum mechanics, without which the PC would not exist at all. Without General Relativity there would not be a GPS system that among other things brings you to your desired destination. The philosophy of science may examine what the characteristics are of that successful method, but it's theorizing after the fact. The scientific method has evolved in the course of time as the successful method of studying and conquering nature, not because some philosopher proposed it in advance, but because experience taught which methods bore fruit, and slowly the wheat was separated from the chaff (astronomy discarded astrology, chemistry discarded the mystical aspects of alchemy, hypothesizing gods for natural phenomena like thunder, rainbows or the moon was discarded, etc.).

[George H. Smith]

Physicists who draw unwarranted metaphysical conclusions from Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle are a good example of this problem.

And what are for example unwarranted metaphysical conclusions from Heisenberg's uncertainty principle?

I was thinking of the argument that Heisenberg's uncertainly principle demonstrates causal indeterminacy in nature. As I recall, Heisenberg himself drew a conclusion similar to this, but it's been many years since I've read anything on this subject, and my memory is pretty vague on this particular.

But by what "metaphysical" authority do philosophers get to issue or withdraw these "warrants" over the conclusions of scientists?

I specifically referred to the metaphysical conclusions drawn by some physicists. Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy, not physics. There are no experts or authorities in philosophy. The only "warrant" required to criticize a philosophical argument is clear thinking and sound judgment.

This seems to me this is quite different from claiming this or that scientific theory fails certain logical or empirical tests. Is that all you mean by these "metaphysical" "warrants"?"

I didn't say anything about "warrants." I referred to "unwarranted" -- i.e., unjustified -- metaphysical conclusions drawn by some physicists.

According to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, "it is physically impossible to measure both the exact position and the exact momentum of a particle (such as an electron) at the same time. The more precisely one quantity is measured, the less precisely the other is known." (The Gale Encyclopedia of Science at: http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G2-2830101134.html)

It is unwarranted to infer causal indeterminacy (in a metaphysical sense) from this problem of measurement, despite what some physicists may claim.

I don't recall scientists voting for philosophers to be their kings...;-)

This has do with philosophical reasoning, not with "philosophers" per se. Anyone can engage in philosophical reasoning. Einstein, for example, criticized the metaphysical conclusions that Heisenberg drew from his experiments. Karl Popper and other informed critics have as well.

If a great physicist told you that his experiments conclusively proved that socialism is the best politico-economic system, would you salute and say, "Yes, Sir!" Or might you have the temerity to point out that physics can prove no such thing?

If the latter, then who appointed you king over this great physicist?

Ghs

[Christopher]

No, it means that the relations expressed in GR are similar to those found in observation. This is knowledge, there is no need for an entire field of study called Epistemology.

More general, physics and other sciences justify themselves by their results that are used in applied science and technology. An atomic bomb works if you want to destroy your enemy, a voodoo doll not. Anyone who uses a PC implicitly accepts the correctness of that "corrupt" quantum mechanics, without which the PC would not exist at all. Without General Relativity there would not be a GPS system that among other things brings you to your desired destination. The philosophy of science may examine what the characteristics are of that successful method, but it's theorizing after the fact. The scientific method has evolved in the course of time as the successful method of studying and conquering nature, not because some philosopher proposed it in advance, but because experience taught which methods bore fruit, and slowly the wheat was separated from the chaff (astronomy discarded astrology, chemistry discarded the mystical aspects of alchemy, hypothesizing gods for natural phenomena like thunder, rainbows or the moon was discarded, etc.).

It's a nice argument, but isn't it circular? What works is defined as what's true, and what's true is defined as what works. Stepping out of the circle and looking at the beliefs, we can say that intrinsic to the process of empiricism and truth is awareness to matter independent of conscious thought, and that is a philosophy. Prior to the scientific method, the philosophy of science (let's call science the study of the universe) was plagued with a mixture of non-matter considerations: spirituality, etc. As such, empirical validity was not a precondition to recognition of truth... other sources of validity were used - e.g. inner consideration of Thor's will.

[George H. Smith]

Similar structure? Does this mean that General Relativity Theory will bend when it gets close to the Sun? Just curious.

No, it means that the relations expressed in GR are similar to those found in observation. This is knowledge, there is no need for an entire field of study called Epistemology.

Unlike you, unfortunately, I am not perched atop Mount Korzybski where I can look down on all those foolish epistemologists -- mere mortals who tried to understand the nature of concept formation and knowledge without someone to set them straight by proclaiming, "This is knowledge!"

Let's see -- we often describe physical relationships in terms of distance. So are the elements of true propositions somehow closer or farther apart than the elements of false propositions?

If not, then what kind of "relations" are you talking about? And, please, don't reply by merely invoking the word "structure." Reading hundreds of books on sociology over the years has made me very suspicious of that rubber word.

Ghs

[Daniel Barnes]

This has do with philosophical reasoning, not with "philosophers" per se. Anyone can engage in philosophical reasoning. Einstein, for example, criticized the metaphysical conclusions that Heisenberg drew from his experiments. Karl Popper and other informed critics have as well.

Well that's fine if you're putting forward a model where either side can engage in mutual criticism. I took it, obviously wrongly, that you were advocating the Randian doctrine where philosophy is the master discipline with power of ultimate veto over the other fields eg science. So no problem.

With that sorted out, back to the main issue as I see it. Would you mind clarifying?

[tjohnson]

If not, then what kind of "relations" are you talking about? And, please, don't reply by merely invoking the word "structure." Reading hundreds of books on sociology over the years has made me very suspicious of that rubber word.

Ghs

I guess it's easiest to use the analogy of a map. Our language is like a map of "reality". If we try to navigate with incorrect maps we get lost and, similarly, if we use incorrect language we are unable to predict and adapt to our environment. In the case of mathematical physics it's quite clear which relations are similar - we have predicted values of measurements and we have actual measurements. In other not-so-mathematical languages it's more difficult but the principle is the same. This explains why mathematics is so important and represents the prime source of all mankind's knowledge.

[George H. Smith]

Logic, strictly construed, can only tell you whether certain conclusions do or do not follow from given premises. It cannot tell you that should slice tomatoes or pursue any other purpose.

We agree.

As I noted early on in this discussion, "subjective" is used in a variety of ways. I am here concerned with how it has generally been used in ethical theory.

Well, now wait a minute. As I understand it, you're attempting to build up a case for an "objective" morality by starting with a "first step". But I'm not sure you've clearly explained the problem you're claiming to solve in the first place.

I was responding to Xray's claim that no value judgments can be "objective." I pointed out that this isn't true, at least in regard to purely instrumental value judgments. The upshot of this is that we cannot rule out the possibility of an objective ethics a priori, merely by invoking the supposed truth that no value judgments can be objective. This issue depends on the type of value judgments that an ethicist employs.

The nature of value judgments is only one aspect of the problem -- much more would need to be done to vindicate ethics as an objective enterprise -- but it is the aspect that I am concentrating on here.

In fact your remark I first quoted seems to entirely agree with Hume, and his is the classic statement of the difficulties of a fully objective ethics. Indeed it is this very point that Rand liked to make out that she had refuted. Your "first step" doesn't overcome Hume, so I'm not sure what the point of the second step is.

Hume was not an ethical subjectivist. He did not deny that ethics can be grounded in facts in some manner. His famous "is-ought" passage, which I assume is what you are referring to, was directed against "moral rationalists," such as Samuel Clarke, who believed that moral principles can be derived from reason alone, without recourse to experience. Hume insisted that reason alone is not sufficient; we must also consult experience, especially the facts of human nature, if we wish construct an integrated "science of man." (In the eighteenth century, "science" was used in a generic sense to mean any type of systematic investigation. Moral philosophy was regarded by Hume and many other Scots, such as Adam Smith, as an important part of the science of man.) For an excellent treatment of Hume's ethics, see Stephen Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property (Oxford, 1991), Chapter 5.

If your proposed "objective" morality doesn't address Hume, what does it address? Could you clarify? Otherwise I fear all we will end up with is a debate over the meanings of "subjective" and "objective", and as you say, there's little point in getting lost in such a jungle.

Again, I was simply addressing a claim made by Xray. Value judgments permeate every cognitive discipline, and a general theory of value -- known as "axiology" -- is an issue distinct from ethics per se.

Ghs