Moral Certainty

[anthony]

Daniel,

Yup, you got me - an amateur philosopher who thrives on all the debate by those far more qualified, but one who is not going to try to re-invent the wheel any longer.

Rand got it right enough for me to live by all these decades, and that's what I needed and still need.

(Just another of those silent majority I believe she alluded to, who grabbed her ideas like they were dying of thirst - and probably drive academic philosophers crazy with their simple-mindedness.)

But agree with you, or not, I'm damned glad that independent thinkers like you and others on this forum, exist.

Tony

[Xray]

So, George, are you enjoying the intellectual chaos that is typically unleashed by people who

(1) don't understand the difference between physics and metaphysics ("physics is the fundamental science that studies nature, or in other words reality")

and

(2) pay no heed to any potential difference between what they can observe and what's actually there?

Good luck!

JR

Speaking of intellectual chaos: What do you think of Ayn Rand's claim that man needed morality when living solitary on a desert island? Good luck!

"You who prattle that morality is social and that man would need no morality on a desert island—it is on a desert island that he would need it most. Let him try to claim, when there are no victims to pay for it, that a rock is a house, that sand is clothing, that food will drop into his mouth without cause or effort, that he will collect a harvest tomorrow by devouring his stock seed today—and reality will wipe him out, as he deserves; reality will show him that life is a value to be bought and that thinking is the only coin noble enough to buy it." (Rand) http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/morality.html

So Rand thinks that an individual who is in error about facts (by e. g. claiming that sand is clothing) has no "morality"?

Edited February 26, 2010 by Xray

[Selene]

Speaking of intellectual chaos: What do you think of Ayn Rand's claim that man needed morality when living solitary on a desert island? Good luck!

"You who prattle that morality is social and that man would need no morality on a desert island—it is on a desert island that he would need it most. Let him try to claim, when there are no victims to pay for it, that a rock is a house, that sand is clothing, that food will drop into his mouth without cause or effort, that he will collect a harvest tomorrow by devouring his stock seed today—and reality will wipe him out, as he deserves; reality will show him that life is a value to be bought and that thinking is the only coin noble enough to buy it." (Rand) http://aynrandlexico...n/morality.html

So Rand thinks that an individual who is in error about facts (by e. g. claiming that sand is clothing) has no "morality"? Priceless!

Alert!

Act I, Scene Two (2) - Ms. Xray takes George on a sailing trip and dumps him overboard with her desert island rant.

Take you seats! Dr. popcorn please!

Adam

Edited February 26, 2010 by Selene

[George H. Smith]

Speaking of intellectual chaos: What do you think of Ayn Rand's claim that man needed morality when living solitary on a desert island? Good luck!

Why wouldn't it?

According to Rand, "The task of ethics is to define man's proper code of values and thus to give him the means of attaining happiness."

The problem of which actions will lead to greater happiness would apply as much to a solitary individual as it does to individuals in society.

It would be a serious mistake to suppose that this is an eccentric position, one peculiar to Rand. On the contrary, Rand's approach to ethics is fundamentally the same as the approach of many Aristotelian moral philosophers. For example, in Rational Man, an excellent presentation of an Aristotelian ethics, Henry Veatch writes: [M]oral rules are more in the nature of counsels of perfection or instructions as to what one ought or ought not to do in order to attain happiness."

Moreover, Veatch contends that "values are simply facts of nature."

Many modern texts on moral philosophy ignore the Aristotelian tradition and claim that moral principles apply only when one interacts with other people. Why is this so? Because principles relating to self-interest are merely prudential maxims, not genuine moral principles. A genuine moral principle, we are told, requires that we sacrifice our own interests for the good of others, and one cannot engage in self-sacrifice by oneself. And this is why morality would be irrelevant to a solitary individual.

So goes the standard line. Given your sarcastic repudiation of Rand (and other Aristotelians), may I assume that you agree with this reasoning?

Ghs

[9thdoctor]

Dr. popcorn please!

Plus beer! I’ve been looking forward to Xray’s return, I figured she was sharpening her weapons, but this latest swipe wouldn’t make it through room temp margarine.

[Daniel Barnes]

Here is a passage from O'Neil's paper:

"One ought to do x, in order that y" can be translated into "if one wants y, one ought to do x," which is conditional, depending upon the subjective desire for y. The "ought" in the teleological conditional, "if one wants y, one ought to do x", does not present a problem in regard to the is-ought gap, for it is not a genuine deontological "ought," and may be rendered in a non-prescriptive form. Thus, the following syllogisms are valid and equivalent, despite the is-ought dichotomy (which applies to the deontological "ought" only)," etc. etc.

This is a typical tactic. After positing an Is-Ought problem, and after being presented with a hypothetical (i.e., conditional) imperative in which a prescriptive conclusion does follow from descriptive premises, champions of the Is-Ought problem reply that this doesn't count, because a conditional Ought is not "a genuine deontological" Ought.....A more flagrant case of stacking the philosophical deck would be hard to find.

I think this is a little unfair. It's not like O'Neil suddenly and arbitrarily introduces a "genuine deontological 'ought'" to stack the deck and get him out of a bind. In fact he provides his reasoning quite clearly in the sentence directly prior to the passage you cite above:

O'Neil: "The other alternative, the supplying of a benefit - either directly positive or the absence of a negative sanction-indicates a telelogization of the moral maxim, and for this reason is unacceptable, for it makes the maxim depend upon the individual, subjective human will." (my italics)

So O'Neil is saying the price of bridging the prescriptive/descriptive gap is, in this case, a complete concession to subjectivity. Which is of course something of a problem for a claim to a fully objective ethics AFAICS.

You cite Rand repudiating what O'Neil considers to be the type of "ought" in the problem turns on ie a non-subjective one, one not dependent on the individual will. Rather than this refuting O'Neil, I suggest this is merely another example of how Rand seems to be in fact "solving" something rather different from what is generally considered to be the problem.

[George H. Smith]

Here is a passage from O'Neil's paper:

"One ought to do x, in order that y" can be translated into "if one wants y, one ought to do x," which is conditional, depending upon the subjective desire for y. The "ought" in the teleological conditional, "if one wants y, one ought to do x", does not present a problem in regard to the is-ought gap, for it is not a genuine deontological "ought," and may be rendered in a non-prescriptive form. Thus, the following syllogisms are valid and equivalent, despite the is-ought dichotomy (which applies to the deontological "ought" only)," etc. etc.

This is a typical tactic. After positing an Is-Ought problem, and after being presented with a hypothetical (i.e., conditional) imperative in which a prescriptive conclusion does follow from descriptive premises, champions of the Is-Ought problem reply that this doesn't count, because a conditional Ought is not "a genuine deontological" Ought.....A more flagrant case of stacking the philosophical deck would be hard to find.

I think this is a little unfair. It's not like O'Neil suddenly and arbitrarily introduces a "genuine deontological 'ought'" to stack the deck and get him out of a bind. In fact he provides his reasoning quite clearly in the sentence directly prior to the passage you cite above:

O'Neil: "The other alternative, the supplying of a benefit - either directly positive or the absence of a negative sanction-indicates a telelogization of the moral maxim, and for this reason is unacceptable, for it makes the maxim depend upon the individual, subjective human will." (my italics)

So O'Neil is saying the price of bridging the prescriptive/descriptive gap is, in this case, a complete concession to subjectivity. Which is of course something of a problem for a claim to a fully objective ethics AFAICS.

I am well aware of the reasoning behind the passage that I quoted by O'Neil. It is standard fare, and I've read many versions of it over the past four decades.

But what O'Neil says simply isn't true. For one thing, it confuses the cognitive goals of a discipline per se with the personal reasons that an individual may have for abiding by the precepts of that discipline.

Rand claims that the purpose of ethics, qua cognitive discipline, is to discover the values that are essential to man's happiness. And since she considers values to be a type of fact, there are no "oughts" at this level of analysis (which Aristotelians frequently describe as "theoretical ethics, in contrast to "practical ethics.").

Simply put, Rand's hypothetical imperatives kick in on a personal level only after a person decides that he wants to live and be happy. Well, suppose a person says he doesn't give a damn about happiness, so he asks why he should pay any attention to ethics. There are various ways to respond to this -- for instance, we might question whether it is possible for anyone not to care about happiness in some sense -- but ultimately the abstract discipline of ethics cannot command someone that he ought to adopt happiness as a goal. Thus, in this sense, a personal -- or, if you prefer, "subjective" -- decision and commitment are necessary before a person will pay any attention to the factual value claims of theoretical ethics.

But this subjective commitment does not mean that the abstract precepts of theoretical ethics are themselves "subjective." If they are firmly grounded in human nature, then we may deem them "true." If not, we may reject them as "false."

The above relates to the old question, "Why should I be moral?" -- i.e, why should I embrace the principles of abstract ethics, even if they are true? Well, let's consider a similar question.

Suppose someone asks you why he should accept the mathematical proposition 2+2=4. In response, you explain the rules of addition, concluding that he should accept the claim that 4 is the correct answer.

But this doesn't satisfy your interlocutor. He now asks why he should accept those rules of addition, even if they do yield correct answers. Maybe he doesn't care about truth, after all.

Would you claim that the discipline of mathematics can categorically say that he "ought" to care about mathematics?. No, of course not. This requires a "subjective" commitment on his part. But this subjective requirement doesn't mean that the discipline of mathematics is itself "subjective." The justifiable propositions of mathematics are objectively valid, regardless of whether this person decides to accept them or not.

The same reasoning applies to abstract ethics and its application to individual lives.

I've been spending too much time on OL, and I need to pay more attention to a writing deadline. I have therefore presented only a quick sketch here. There are many gaps and unanswered questions, so if you are going to respond to this, I would appreciate it if you would give some thought to my general line of reasoning before picking at certain points. You cannot reasonably expect me to write a full-length technical article in this format.

Ghs

[tjohnson]

According to Rand, "The task of ethics is to define man's proper code of values and thus to give him the means of attaining happiness."

Well this is not "the task of ethics" according to everyone else. Not one single reference I can find for the word 'ethics' says anything about "attaining happiness". It is all about right and wrong, good and evil, etc. I think this is what is meant by 'bait and switch'.

[merjet]

Well this is not "the task of ethics" according to everyone else. Not one single reference I can find for the word 'ethics' says anything about "attaining happiness". It is all about right and wrong, good and evil, etc. I think this is what is meant by 'bait and switch'.

Your search must have been quite limited. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotelian_ethics#The_highest_good

[George H. Smith]

According to Rand, "The task of ethics is to define man's proper code of values and thus to give him the means of attaining happiness."

Well this is not "the task of ethics" according to everyone else. Not one single reference I can find for the word 'ethics' says anything about "attaining happiness". It is all about right and wrong, good and evil, etc. I think this is what is meant by 'bait and switch'.

I didn't know you had read what "everyone else" -- from the ancient Greek and Roman philosophers to the eighteenth century British moralists to modern day Aristolelians -- had to say about ethics. Very impressive, but you apparently overlooked the passage from Veatch that I quoted a little earlier.

I figured you didn't read philosophy at all, since you learned from Korzybski that it is a futile enterprise.

Sarcasm aside, your post contains some of the most ignorant remarks that I have ever read.

Ghs

[Daniel Barnes]

I am well aware of the reasoning behind the passage that I quoted by O'Neil. It is standard fare, and I've read many versions of it over the past four decades.

OK, but perhaps other readers aren't, so I thought I'd better supply the context.

I've been spending too much time on OL, and I need to pay more attention to a writing deadline. I have therefore only presented only a quick sketch here. There are many gaps and unanswered questions, so if you are going to respond to this, I would appreciate it if you would give some thought to my general line of reasoning before picking at certain points. You cannot reasonably expect me to write a full-length technical article in this format.

I never have. In fact I think I've gone to some lengths to make my questions as simple as possible. However, I do appreciate your additional efforts, and so won't detain you further. To finish, perhaps for now, I'd like to emphasise first what I see as a strong point of agreement between us.

You write:

"...ultimately the abstract discipline of ethics cannot command someone that he ought to adopt happiness as a goal. Thus, in this sense, a personal -- or, if you prefer, "subjective" -- decision and commitment are necessary before a person will pay any attention to the factual value claims of theoretical ethics."

I completely agree with this, and your comparison of an objective discipline of ethics to, say, the objective rules of mathematics, or the rules of logic for that matter. These can, indeed, stand "outside ourselves" in the objective sense (for example the tablets of the Ten Commandments). And we do indeed subjectively decide to adopt or not adopt these rules and standards. As you may or may not be aware, we Popperians refer to this as the dichotomy between facts and decisions. (I personally think this is a bit clearer than the standard fact vs value, as obviously the decision to adopt or not adopt this or that value is where the rubber hits the road. But anyway).

So I think we both agree that an objective ethics is possible; just not a comprehensively or fully objective one. That is, there is always a subjective element in the form of a personal decision to adopt this or that code. Now, as subjective is something of a hate word in Objectivism, I offer a mild renovation of the term, as I have done before. That it is, in this case, not really a bug, but a feature. For I would argue that it is this personal, subjective element that delivers its moral quality. If it was something you had to follow, like a law of physics, or if it could be endlessly derived like a book of log tables, it would have about as much moral content as either ie none. Our personal decision to act according to this or that code makes us responsible for the consequences of us acting according to this code. This more positive view of subjectivity is a point where we may differ, but now you know how I see it.

It seems then, any quibbling over terms aside, we are reasonably in agreement. Let me know if otherwise.

We do disagree on one thing however: whether Rand's theory closes the traditional "is-ought" gap. For the position I have outlined above is actually fully consistent with the "is-ought" gap, hence should be unsatisfactory to Rand.

From this I conclude that Rand did not solve the problem. You may claim otherwise but we can leave that for another day.

Edited February 27, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Christopher]

I'm flipping through this thread and I keep reading about "causality," that everything (including the path of an electron) has a cause.

Might it be sufficient to simply say that causality can be at minimum the current attributes of an object in space-time (position + velocity) operating under laws of the universe? Given this standpoint, the laws of the universe are universally causal attributes in all behavior.

My systems-thinking is not so sharp right now, but do we generally consider the laws of the universe to be content within the universe? If not, then we could reduce "cause" within the universe to be merely a product of object attributes which in turn have a causal effect within the system. As such, the most basic causal force of anything would be merely existence within the system itself.

Christopher

[psychoanaleesis]

Really? Moral certainty is the root of all harm man does to another man? If that's the case, I'll still take this because I can be sure of whether I want to harm my neighbor or not. Rather than be a despicable, diffident, cowardly creature that cannot decide on whether to and where to place his anger and intentions. If this is the cause of all harm, then this is also the cause of all things right and just because one can say: I certainly like this or I certainly don't like this. I love this or I loathe this.

If a man has no moral certainty, one can only answer the questions in superfluous moderation. Do you love him/her? Sometimes. Do you want to live or die? It's alright either way. Are you a human being with dignity? Maybe.

Those are the answers you will get and the highest concepts of certainty like "Forever", "Always", "Never" shall be erased from your vocabulary. The highest praises and the lowest insults will become a meek and impish sound of "fine", "okay". Then you cannot judge who is a killer and who is the victim. It will hurt but you will not be certain of even if it hurts at all.

There will be no more comparison nor contrast. Good and evil mixed is evil in itself because the good allowed it so to exist. The difference, distinction will be gone from man and it would not matter to him what happens whatsoever. When there is only mediocrity and moderation, the Choices are automatically annihilated. When man will have no claim to responsibility and no sense of responsibility, then everything will be thrown into chaos and a sludge.

You read cause and effect because every action has an equal and opposite reaction. Given adequate tools and knowledge, even the movement of the smallest particle can be predicted or traced back and better yet: controlled and that is what certainty is all about. A sense of control over yourself and your environment as a conscious being.

What did that Betrand Russell think when he said this? Did he think he can escape the law of cause and effect by abstaining from choosing? If he did say it, what made him sure of that statement in the first place? Weak argument.

Edited February 27, 2010 by David Lee

[tjohnson]

I figured you didn't read philosophy at all, since you learned from Korzybski that it is a futile enterprise.

You're right I haven't read any philosophy, except Korzybski I just use the dictionary and a few other sources;

1. Morality is an informal public system applying to all rational persons, governing behavior that affects others, and has the lessening of evil or harm as its goal

2. concern with the distinction between good and evil or right and wrong; right or good conduct

3. moral - concerned with principles of right and wrong or conforming to standards of behavior and character based on those principles

4. The quality of being in accord with standards of right or good conduct.

5. A system of ideas of right and wrong conduct

This is why the statement that one needs morality on a deserted island doesn't make sense to people who use English in the normal manner. If anything one needs survival skills, not morality. Is it possible Rand did not understand English very well?

[tjohnson]

Really? Moral certainty is the root of all harm man does to another man? If that's the case, I'll still take this because I can be sure of whether I want to harm my neighbor or not.

So you think moral certainty is an allright thing even if it leads to things like genocide?

[Daniel Barnes]

But agree with you, or not, I'm damned glad that independent thinkers like you and others on this forum, exist.

Why thank you, and likewise.

[George H. Smith]

So I think we both agree that an objective ethics is possible; just not a comprehensively or fully objective one. That is, there is always a subjective element in the form of a personal decision to adopt this or that code.

I'm not sure what you mean by "this or that code." If you mean different moral principles on the most fundamental of levels, then I think some codes could be rationally assessed as better than others. If, however, you are referring to more concrete principles -- the sort of thing that Francis Bacon called "middle axioms" -- then the decision to adopt one code over another might be highly contextual and therefore more a matter of individual choice.

Now, as subjective is something of a hate word in Objectivism, I offer a mild renovation of the term, as I have done before. That it is, in this case, not really a bug, but a feature. For I would argue that it is this personal, subjective element that delivers its moral quality. If it was something you had to follow, like a law of physics, or if it could be endlessly derived like a book of log tables, it would have about as much moral content as either ie none. Our personal decision to act according to this or that code makes us responsible for the consequences of us acting according to this code. This more positive view of subjectivity is a point where we may differ, but now you know how I see it.

I might quibble with your use of "subjective" here, especially since I consider the phrase "personal, subjective element" to be redundant. A personal choice need not be capricious or arbitrary, so it may not be "subjective" in this pejorative sense. Even if a choice is not logically mandated, strictly speaking, there still may be good reasons for making it.

I am unwilling to press this point, however, given the ambiguity that attends the word "happiness." This word can mean different things to different people, and I regard this as one of the most unsettled and unsettling problems in ethical theory. I wish I could say that I have reached a completely satisfactory resolution of this problem, so I could say exactly what "happiness" means when we speak of it as an ultimate value -- but I have not and I cannot.

I like your comment about the positive aspects of a subjective commitment. If truth be known, I have always had a soft spot for existentialism. I wouldn't want this news to become public, lest it stain my Randian credentials, so let's keep it between the two of us. ;)

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

I figured you didn't read philosophy at all, since you learned from Korzybski that it is a futile enterprise.

You're right I haven't read any philosophy, except Korzybski I just use the dictionary and a few other sources;

1. Morality is an informal public system applying to all rational persons, governing behavior that affects others, and has the lessening of evil or harm as its goal

2. concern with the distinction between good and evil or right and wrong; right or good conduct

3. moral - concerned with principles of right and wrong or conforming to standards of behavior and character based on those principles

4. The quality of being in accord with standards of right or good conduct.

5. A system of ideas of right and wrong conduct

This is why the statement that one needs morality on a deserted island doesn't make sense to people who use English in the normal manner. If anything one needs survival skills, not morality. Is it possible Rand did not understand English very well?

The line you quoted from Rand -- "The task of ethics is to define man's proper code of values and thus to give him the means of attaining happiness" -- is not her definition of ethics, or morality. Rather, it specifies the reason why man needs ethics.

Ghs

[psychoanaleesis]

Really? Moral certainty is the root of all harm man does to another man? If that's the case, I'll still take this because I can be sure of whether I want to harm my neighbor or not.

So you think moral certainty is an allright thing even if it leads to things like genocide?

Yes. I refuse to explain further. Find it out for yourself if you wish.

P.S. To those who like to listen or look:

In a real fight, I don't intend to fight fairly. In philosophical arguments, this is the same principle that I uphold. The only thing that I'll give a fair or equal appraisal to are the facts that my opponents present. I do not leave an even ground for evil. As heaven is above and hell is below- for my enemies both in the physical and intellectual - I will seek for ways from the facts (whether I wield a weapon or my convictions) to gain the upper hand and for them to be always fighting an uphill, losing battle.

Edited February 27, 2010 by David Lee

[Brant Gaede]

Take it easy, David. This overall is too much too soon. It's one thing to know a lot and another to know enough the right way to know how ignorant one really is. For instance, I didn't know this until I was well into my 30s. Next month I'll be 66. I'm still acutely aware of my ignorance and how I'll be ignorant still on the day I die, even if that is 30 years from now.

BTW, if you'd like to read some Nathaniel Branden apropos psychology, I suggest "The Six Pillars of Self Esteem" as a good starter. Generally it's best to read him latest to earliest.

--Brant

[Brant Gaede]

dup

Edited February 27, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[psychoanaleesis]

Brant:

Why are you selling NB's work to me? (Oh, please don't post in case any of you guys have seen/copied with the intent to quote me. I do not take back what I said. I take back merely my consent to saying that. It will no longer exist in this forum.)

Edited February 27, 2010 by David Lee

[Daniel Barnes]

I like your comment about the positive aspects of a subjective commitment. If truth be known, I have always had a soft spot for existentialism. I wouldn't want this news to become public, lest it stain my Randian credentials, so let's keep it between the two of us. ;)

It's ok. I don't spy for the ARI...;-)

Of course as you know "existentialism" was Rand's first choice for a name for her philosophy, but she found it had already been taken. Actually so had objectivism, but she rolled with it anyhow. Good brand names are hard to come by.

Thanks, I enjoyed the exchange.

Edited February 27, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[psychoanaleesis]

Thanks, all you who are concerned about my level of knowledge. But things happen - in my own good time.

[tjohnson]

I figured you didn't read philosophy at all, since you learned from Korzybski that it is a futile enterprise.

You're right I haven't read any philosophy, except Korzybski I just use the dictionary and a few other sources;

1. Morality is an informal public system applying to all rational persons, governing behavior that affects others, and has the lessening of evil or harm as its goal

2. concern with the distinction between good and evil or right and wrong; right or good conduct

3. moral - concerned with principles of right and wrong or conforming to standards of behavior and character based on those principles

4. The quality of being in accord with standards of right or good conduct.

5. A system of ideas of right and wrong conduct

This is why the statement that one needs morality on a deserted island doesn't make sense to people who use English in the normal manner. If anything one needs survival skills, not morality. Is it possible Rand did not understand English very well?

The line you quoted from Rand -- "The task of ethics is to define man's proper code of values and thus to give him the means of attaining happiness" -- is not her definition of ethics, or morality. Rather, it specifies the reason why man needs ethics.

Ghs

So then the implication isthat we need principles about right and wrong, good and evil, etc. in order for mankind to achieve happiness? If so, how does this fit in with the guy on the deserted island? What have 'good' and 'evil' got to do with his happiness on the deserted island?