Moral Certainty

[George H. Smith]

I for one am very pleased that Ghs hasn't bailed from this debate - yet.

He is bringing some much-needed clarity and perspective to a seeming dilemma that has confounded me.

And making a strong case for philosophy being the science behind all sciences.

Thanks for the kind remarks.

I want to be very clear about something. Although metaphysics can provide us with some fundamental knowledge, this knowledge is very general and may be described as a framework that enables us integrate the more specific knowledge that can only be gained from the various sciences. I share the scorn of John Locke and other empiricists for traditional metaphysical claims.

I may have more to say about this later. For now I will see if I can locate in my computer files the discussion of metaphysics that I included Why Atheism? If I can, I will post it in the Articles section.

Ghs

[anthony]

Ghs,

In #121 you write "Rand does not consider the relation between facts and values to be a serious problem, because, to her, values represent a kind of fact..."

I have never heard this put so explicitly before.

It was my first impression, and most enduring one of her, that to Rand, ideas, concepts, virtues and values, were not just abstract notions, but also her personal friends (and foes,sometimes) that are as real as anything can be - or at the very least corresponding precisely to Reality.

For a youngster who spent too much time living in his head, this was 'self-evident'. ;)

This is the root of much of my befuddlement and disagreement in engaging with people: those who don't want to see that a value is a fact of reality, or a composite of facts.

Thank you,

Tony

[tjohnson]

From the fact that it is impossible to measure X in principle, it does not follow that it is meaningless to speak of X. Indeed, if you didn't already understand what X means, then how could you possibly say that it is impossible to measure X? If X is meaningless, then it is also meaningless to claim that X cannot be measured -- for we would have no idea of what we are talking about. And if this is the case, then some key claims of QM are also meaningless.

QM does not confer upon physicists the philosophical privilege to speak nonsense. I've seen arguments for the existence of God that make more sense than this.

I agree that it's unfortunate physicists entered into hopeless philosophical discussions - nothing can be settled in that context. A question or statement may be deemed meaningless in one context but it does have a meaning in some context. For example, if you insist that you can measure the position and momentum of an electron to arbitrary accuracy then your statement has meaning in the field of psychiatry, but not physics.

[rhartford]

. . . .

"Rand does not consider the relation between facts and values to be a serious problem, because, for her, values represent a kind of fact (and, in this regard, she follows in the tradition of Aristotelian philosophers). The concept of value expresses the beneficial or harmful relationship of some aspect of reality to a living organism, and to say that something is of value to an organism is to say that it is conducive to the life of that organism. When we say that water is of value to a plant, for example, we mean that water is conducive to the life of that plant. The concept of value, in this instance, signifies the life-serving function of water in relation to the plant, and this relationship is objectively demonstrable. The value judgment involved here is true; i.e., it describes an actual relationship. The water will, in fact, further the life of the plant, so to say that water is of value to the plant is to describe a fact of reality. Therefore, in this case at least, there is no problem of "deriving" a value from a fact -- as if one is dealing with two separate realms -- because the value judgment expresses a fact; it is an estimate of a relationship, and this estimate is either accurate or inaccurate, true or false"

"If this basic view of values is correct, then any attempt to divorce the realm of values from the realm of facts is fundamentally misguided at the outset..." (pp. 283-84).

. . . .

The clarity and depth of knowledge displayed in George Smith's posts make them a pleasure to read. I like the above because it uses the term "value" in its fundamental sense, not the sense used by many on this list. His use of the term is clearer than that found in Rand's essay "The Objectivist Ethics," and is clearer than my own use in the paper "Objectivity and the Proof of Egoism," The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2.

In that paper, I "carefully use the term 'value' to denote a single concept valid for all living organisms. . . [and I] limit the concept of value to denote a beneficial condition for its own life that an organism produces through its own action."

"In a human context, some authors use the term value to denote any goal sought or anything that a person chooses to value. That is more properly labeled a value principle. This paper will not use the term value to denote a value principle. Also, this paper will not use the term 'ultimate value.' That term confuses the final goal of life with the values that are the means to achieving the goal of life." (p. 296)

[Brant Gaede]

People have and need values however else we label or particularize them. They are both subjective and objective depending on this or that. Objective values, while basic at least, root human beings while denying the existence of any objective values leaves people floating around relative to nothing but various arbitrary epistemological constructs, subjective this and subjective that. To say such a totalitarian anything can go playground because of countless arbitrary subjectivities reflected in religions, governments and sundry tribes is an argument in itself against any real objectivity in values qua human conduct to oneself and others and is to affirm a denial of the possibility of an effective quest for human betterment and the superiority, so far, of Western civilization, weakening its foundations.

--Brant

[Daniel Barnes]

double post

Edited February 26, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Daniel Barnes]

My ultimate aim was to show that moral judgments, like other value judgments, can be objective, in the sense that they can be rationally justified. Such judgments need not be mere expressions of personal preference (subjectivism), "emotive ejaculations" (emotivism), etc. But this is a far cry from vindicating the entire discipline of ethics.

Thank you. If, by "rationally justified" you mean justified by logical means, then I understand you. I look forward to your demonstration.

I've decided to leave Hume aside for now, since that discussion would take us far afield...(1) The problem of the relationship between between facts and values is not the same as the traditional Is-Ought Problem.

This was the other question I sought to clarify. And just as well, because just as I suspected we have some potential sources of confusion right here.

Firstly, I'm not sure everyone would agree with you that the relationship between facts and values is not basically the same as the traditional Is-Ought problem. For example, AFAICS neither Patrick M O'Neill nor David Ramsay Steele make this distinction in their critical discussions of Rand's ethics. Neither does Barbara Branden, who writes in her The Passion of Ayn Rand (and handily quoted in Steele) "... the problem that haunted philosophers since the time of Aristotle and Plato: the relationship of 'ought' and 'is' - the question of in what manner moral values can be derived from facts." I don't think any of the above requires a 101 course in Ethics, Logic, or History of Philosophy (although Branden is mistaken to attribute the problem to the Ancient Greeks, as Steele points out).

But let us be open minded and accept your claim anyway. So we then have two problems:

1) The relationship between facts and values

2) The traditional Is-Ought problem

While I found your brief exposition interesting, and I do intend to track down your book at some stage, it seemed to me to aim at what you've nominated as 1) and to "leave Hume aside."

Unfortunately, 2) is the problem Rand claimed to have solved. She indicates this clearly in the quote I provided from The Virtue of Selfishness:

"The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do. So much for the issue of the relation between “is” and “ought.”

Further, most other Objectivists make out Rand solved 2) as well (though I note Barbara Branden in the extended verson of the above quote is more tentative, and says Rand took only "a major step toward" it). We can test how widespread this belief is by simply going on to a typical Objectivist forum and asking them whether Rand refuted Hume on this issue - but I think I know what answer we'd get...;-). Finally, I'm not aware of Rand herself making the distinction you're making.

So even granting your distinction, 2) seems to be the important claim, making 1) somewhat beside the point.

Perhaps your 1) is part of a build-up towards a Randian solution to 2). Or perhaps not? Perhaps you want to talk about "values" on the way to a vindication of objective "moral values". Or perhaps not? Either way it would be good to know where you intend to end up regarding 2) as this is still not apparent.

In short, do you think that:

A: Rand did solve the traditional Is-Ought problem

B: Rand did not solve the traditional Is-Ought problem

C: Rand did not solve the traditional Is-Ought problem, but made a significant step towards it.

I would not be much interested in debating B or C, so we could save each other a lot of typing if we get this clear out front....;-)

Edited February 26, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Daniel Barnes]

Ah, "lesser people." Always wanted to meet some.

I didn't say I was lesser than you...;-)

Go ahead! Say it! Get it over with!

You left yourself wide open for that one...;-)

[George H. Smith]

This was the other question I sought to clarify. And just as well, because just as I suspected we have some potential sources of confusion right here.

Firstly, I'm not sure everyone would agree with you that the relationship between facts and values is not basically the same as the traditional Is-Ought problem. For example, neither Patrick M O'Neill nor David Ramsay Steele make this distinction in their critical discussions of Rand's ethics. Neither does Barbara Branden, who writes in her The Passion of Ayn Rand (and handily quoted in Steele) "... the problem that haunted philosophers since the time of Aristotle and Plato: the relationship of 'ought' and 'is' - the question of in what manner moral values can be derived from facts." As far as I can see none of the above requires a 101 course in Ethics, Logic, or History of Philosophy.

But let us be open minded and accept your claim anyway. So we then have two problems:

1) The relationship between facts and values

2) The traditional Is-Ought problem

While I found your brief exposition interesting, and I do intend to track down your book at some stage, it seemed to me to aim at what you've nominated as 1) and to "leave Hume aside."

Unfortunately, 2) is the problem Rand claimed to have solved. She indicates this clearly in the quote I provided from The Virtue of Selfishness:

"The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do. So much for the issue of the relation between “is” and “ought.”

Further, most other Objectivists make out Rand solved 2) as well (though I note Barbara Branden in the extended version of the above quote is more tentative, and says Rand took only "a major step toward" it). We can test how widespread this belief is by simply going on to a typical Objectivist forum and asking them whether Rand refuted Hume on this issue - but I think I know what answer we'd get...;-). Finally, I'm not aware of Rand herself making the distinction you're making.

So even granting your distinction, 2) seems to be the important claim, making 1) somewhat beside the point.

Perhaps your 1) is part of a build-up towards a Randian solution to 2). Or perhaps not? Perhaps you want to talk about "values" on the way to a vindication of objective "moral values". Or perhaps not? Either way it would be good to know where you intend to end up regarding 2) as this is still not apparent.

In short, do you think that:

A: Rand did solve the traditional Is-Ought problem

B: Rand did not solve the traditional Is-Ought problem

C: Rand did not solve the traditional Is-Ought problem, but made a significant step towards it.

I would not be much interested in debating B or C, so we could save each other a lot of typing if we get this clear out front....;-)

Thank you for pointing out the problems I would need to address were I to write a book on ethics. Perhaps I will write such a book some day. Or perhaps not.

If you still find my purpose in addressing the subject of instrumental value judgments "not apparent," even though I have stated that purpose several times; and if you still don't understand my interpretation of Rand's approach to facts and values, even though I made this crystal clear in the passage I quoted from ATCAG, perhaps this is because you have eyes to read but no ability to comprehend. Or perhaps not.

Perhaps I care that others may disagree with my interpretation of Rand. Or perhaps not.

Perhaps I am interested in debating you about A, but not about B and C. Or perhaps not.

Perhaps I give a shit about what you think. Or perhaps not.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

Ah, "lesser people." Always wanted to meet some.

I didn't say I was lesser than you...;-)

Go ahead! Say it! Get it over with!

You left yourself wide open for that one...;-)

Having some fun is so important to me. I want to die with a smile on my face and be left on display on my bed to be toasted during my wake.

--Brant

I'm weirder than you think

[Brant Gaede]

Ought I care about is-ought? Ought I eat if I'm hungry or might I eat if I'm hungry? I know I might but don't know if I ought. For me is-ought should be is-ought-if. I'm hungry and I ought to eat if I don't want to be hungry. If so then might we call "ought" transitive and "might" intransitive? This destroys the moral imperative of "ought" and creates a circle between the metaphysical to the epistemological back to the metaphysical. The moral imperative thus resides in the "if" which concerns the justification of the actual action to be taken and the moral realm is the action realm.

--Brant

good gobbledygook

Edited February 26, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[Selene]

Ought I care about is-ought? Ought I eat if I'm hungry or might I eat if I'm hungry? I know I might but don't know if I ought. For me is-ought should be is-ought-if. I'm hungry and I ought to eat if I don't want to be hungry. If so then might we call "ought" transitive and "might" intransitive? This destroys the moral imperative of "ought" and creates a circle between the metaphysical to the epistemological back to the metaphysical. The moral imperative thus resides in the "if" which concerns the justification of the actual action to be taken and the moral realm is the action realm.

--Brant

good gobbledygook

Damn soldier!

We could start a religion on that gobbledygook!

And since there is a "G" in God and four (4) "g's in the "Good God GobbledyGook" religion, we trump the Trinity!

Adam

looking for land to build the square temples

[Daniel Barnes]

Perhaps I give a shit about what you think. Or perhaps not.

So when I ask you to give a straight answer to this:

A: Rand did solve the traditional Is-Ought problem

B: Rand did not solve the traditional Is-Ought problem

C: Rand did not solve the traditional Is-Ought problem, but made a significant step towards it

What I get is a little hissy fit.

Stick to posturing, scholastic misdirection instead George. There's probably a career in it.

Edited February 26, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[anthony]

I have to rush in here where cleverer people might be afraid to tread.

What exactly is the problem with Ayn Rand's solution to the Is/Ought dichotomy?

She identified the nature of Man as a completely autonomous and mortal being; so it follows that it is right that a man 'should' place the highest value in himself, and life, above all others.

She identified Man as lacking all weapons and instincts for survival, but having a Mind; it follows that his Rationality is his only means to 'flourish' and should be his greatest Value.

(Essentially, what I think she indicated, is that whatever is Man's greatest capability, is what ought to be his morality.)

Then to round off her Rational Egoism morality, is the corollary of the above - that one must not impose force on others' lives and minds.

What am I missing here? Isn't it that simple?

[Selene]

My vote was D...

None of the above are acceptable to me...

Adam

Post Script:

Tony:

You are correct.

It is that simple.

Hope this finds you well.

Adam

Edited February 26, 2010 by Selene

[Dragonfly]

I am not qualified to judge the technical issues debated by Einstein and Bohr, but they are irrelevant to Einstein's claim that QM does not require us to accept indeterminism in nature. His point on this subject was philosophical, not scientific.

But his philosophical ideas lead him to a physical theory, about the so-called hidden variables, see the EPR paradox. This theory led to certain predictions. However, the Bell experiments have shown that Einstein's predictions were wrong and that QM was correct.

The exact orbit of an electron may have no operational definition in QM, and the notion may be irrelevant in QM, but this is a far cry from claiming that the notion itself is meaningless.

If you cannot in principle define an orbit, such a notion is as meaningless as God or a fairy.

From the fact that it is impossible to measure X in principle, it does not follow that it is meaningless to speak of X. Indeed, if you didn't already understand what X means, then how could you possibly say that it is impossible to measure X? If X is meaningless, then it is also meaningless to claim that X cannot be measured -- for we would have no idea of what we are talking about. And if this is the case, then some key claims of QM are also meaningless.

It is not true that you cannot measure the position of an electron with arbitrary accuracy, that is allowed in QM, you cannot measure the position and the momentum simultaneously with arbitrary position (technically: the commutator of p and x is non-zero). That implies that it is not possible to define an exact orbit. Such an exact orbit is a mathematical concept that can be used in many situations (when Planck's constant can be considered to be negligibly small, as in classical systems). Saying that the exact orbit of an electron is a meaningless concept just means that that particular mathematical concept cannot be applied to electrons, as Planck's constant can in such systems not be ignored. We understand very well what an exact orbit means, we only conclude that this concept has no meaning in the case of an electron. Just as we understand quite well what "green" means, but saying that a certain displacement in space is green is meaningless, as we can in principle not measure the color of a displacement. That we might imagine that displacement has a certain color is irrelevant.

QM does not confer upon physicists the philosophical privilege to speak nonsense. I've seen arguments for the existence of God that make more sense than this.

The funny thing is that it is the philosophers who speak nonsense, because they don't understand the issues at hand.

[tjohnson]

Ought I care about is-ought? Ought I eat if I'm hungry or might I eat if I'm hungry? I know I might but don't know if I ought. For me is-ought should be is-ought-if. I'm hungry and I ought to eat if I don't want to be hungry. If so then might we call "ought" transitive and "might" intransitive? This destroys the moral imperative of "ought" and creates a circle between the metaphysical to the epistemological back to the metaphysical. The moral imperative thus resides in the "if" which concerns the justification of the actual action to be taken and the moral realm is the action realm.

--Brant

good gobbledygook

Good stuff, Brant!

[George H. Smith]

Perhaps I give a shit about what you think. Or perhaps not.

So when I ask you to give a straight answer to this:

A: Rand did solve the traditional Is-Ought problem

B: Rand did not solve the traditional Is-Ought problem

C: Rand did not solve the traditional Is-Ought problem, but made a significant step towards it

What I get is a little hissy fit.

Stick to posturing, scholastic misdirection instead George. There's probably a career in it.

A passage from ATCAG that I quoted earlier began: "Rand does not consider the relation between facts and values to be a serious problem, because, for her, values represent a kind of fact (and, in this regard, she follows in the tradition of Aristotelian philosophers)...."

I also quoted a passage from Rand herself about hypothetical imperatives.

Which parts of those passages did you not understand?

If you want me to take you seriously, then pay some attention to what I have written. And drop the condescending BS about logic and "logical means." (These came up in earlier posts.) What do you think I have in mind when I speak of "rational demonstration" -- illogical means?

Let me take a wild guess. When you speak of "logical means," I'll bet you mean strict deductive reasoning, as we find in the traditional Aristotelian syllogism. Right?

Moreover, since the conclusion of a syllogism can contain nothing not already contained in the major and minor premises, no normative proposition can logically be deduced from purely descriptive premises -- and this is the insoluble Is-Ought problem, in your view. Thus, if by "rational justification" someone means something other than strict deductive reasoning, you will reject the argument as illogical. Am I right again?

If I am incorrect, then explain what you do mean by "logic" and "logical means."

Ghs

[Daniel Barnes]

I have to rush in here where cleverer people might be afraid to tread.

What exactly is the problem with Ayn Rand's solution to the Is/Ought dichotomy?

She identified the nature of Man as a completely autonomous and mortal being; so it follows that it is right that a man 'should' place the highest value in himself, and life, above all others.

She identified Man as lacking all weapons and instincts for survival, but having a Mind; it follows that his Rationality is his only means to 'flourish' and should be his greatest Value.

(Essentially, what I think she indicated, is that whatever is Man's greatest capability, is what ought to be his morality.)

Then to round off her Rational Egoism morality, is the corollary of the above - that one must not impose force on others' lives and minds.

What am I missing here? Isn't it that simple?

I just looked out my window, and saw the sun moving through the sky! It's that simple. What is it with all you people who argue that the earth moves, and not the sun? Isn't it obvious?..;-)

whYNOT, hope you don't mind the analogy, but the point is that often very plausible-sounding theories turn out to be false on close examination.

I don't know you, but I'd be willing to bet you haven't really spent a lot of time really examining this plausible-sounding theory of Rand's. It's not that I don't think you're clever enough, I'm sure you are. It's just a question of getting your head around the problem in the first place. Which takes a bit of time and effort. And having done so myself, I'm pretty sure that Rand didn't only not solve the problem, but that she didn't really grok it in the first place. But I could be wrong. The only way you'll know is to try to find out yourself.

The fact is that the "is/ought problem" is one of, sigh, logical derivation. Kinda boring sounding, I know, compared Rand's more exciting rhetorical expressions about "man's highest values" etc. But there it is.

You can read a pretty good technical exposition of where she goes wrong courtesy of a fellow I quoted earlier, Patrick M O'Neil.

Read it a couple of times. If you can't fault his arguments - I couldn't - then you get a choice between believing what Rand claimed, and what the force of logical argument tells us (one of the great benefits of things like logic is that it can pitilessly unmask things we somewhat lazily believe as, unfortunately, being false). If you're not happy with that, read a bunch of other stuff, for and against until you feel confident you've got the issues. Which do get a bit complex. The point is, of course, not to win any debates, but so you know in your own mind you understand it, and don't have to take the word of someone like me, or Ayn Rand for that matter, on the subject.

That's what I'd recommend.

[Brant Gaede]

Don't worry, Daniel. George just needs another sugar in his coffee.

--Brant

[tjohnson]

She identified the nature of Man as a completely autonomous and mortal being; so it follows that it is right that a man 'should' place the highest value in himself, and life, above all others.

I'm not sure what you mean by 'autonomous' here but I would describe man as primarily a social being, in fact even a doctrinal being.

[Daniel Barnes]

If you want me to take you seriously, then pay some attention to what I have written. And drop the condescending BS about logic and "logical means." (These came up in earlier posts.) What do you think I have in mind when I speak of "rational demonstration" -- illogical means?

Well, I've debated enough Objectivists to know that what many of them mean when they say "rational" or even "logical" is something other than what most non-Objectivists mean by it. So I apologise if that came across as patronising, it certainly wasn't intended as such. I was just making sure we were talking about the same thing.

As to what you've written to date, I am paying attention to it. However, in my experience a lot of internet debate - and debate in general - starts around people trying to solve two different problems. And you don't find this out till after about post #457. Hence, blasted Popperian that I am, I like to start with a clear agreement on what the problem is at hand right upfront.

Currently I think we don't have that. I want to talk about the problem as it is put in Hume, as this seems to pertain directly to Rand's most controversial ethical claim. You've specifically said you want to talk about not-Hume - though you have indicated this is kind of a preliminary position to the big question. So unless you've got Hume in your long term sights, we should both spare each other the debate, though I will certainly enjoy reading what you have to say on the not-Hume side.

If you think it would take a book to answer the options A, B, C, as I put them, well let's simply let the matter rest there, as I wouldn't ask you to write a book live here on Objectivist Living....;-) These forums are for cavalry charges, not marathons.

Let me take a wild guess. When you speak of "logical means," I'll bet you mean strict deductive reasoning, as we find in the traditional Aristotelian syllogism. Right?

Blasted Popperian that I am, that is pretty much it.

Edited February 26, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[George H. Smith]

The fact is that the "is/ought problem" is one of, sigh, logical derivation. Kinda boring sounding, I know, compared Rand's more exciting rhetorical expressions about "man's highest values" etc. But there it is.

You can read a pretty good technical exposition of where she goes wrong courtesy of a fellow I quoted earlier, Patrick M O'Neil.

Here is a passage from O'Neil's paper:

"One ought to do x, in order that y" can be translated into "if one wants y, one ought to do x," which is conditional, depending upon the subjective desire for y. The "ought" in the teleological conditional, "if one wants y, one ought to do x", does not present a problem in regard to the is-ought gap, for it is not a genuine deontolngical "ought," and may be rendered in anon-prescriptive form. Thus, the following syllogisms are valid and equivalent, despite the is-ought dichotomy (which applies to the deontological "ought" only)," etc. etc.

This is a typical tactic. After positing an Is-Ought problem, and after being presented with a hypothetical (i.e., conditional) imperative in which a prescriptive conclusion does follow from descriptive premises, champions of the Is-Ought problem reply that this doesn't count, because a conditional Ought is not "a genuine deontological" Ought.

Thus, according to this approach, when Rand explicitly repudiates deontologism and says, "Reality confronts man with a great many "musts," but all of them are conditional," she is not really talking about genuine moral principles at all, so she has not really addressed, much less solved, the Is-Ought problem.

A more flagrant case of stacking the philosophical deck would be hard to find.

I am reminded of a scene in Woody's Allen's "Manhattan." A woman at a cocktail party tells some friends that she finally had an orgasm, but her psychiatrist told her it was the wrong kind. Allen's character replies, "That's funny; all of my orgasms have been right on the money."

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

I want to talk about the problem as it is put in Hume, as this seems to pertain directly to Rand's most controversial ethical claim. You've specifically said you want to talk about not-Hume - though you have indicated this is kind of a preliminary position to the big question. So unless you've got Hume in your long term sights, we should both spare each other the debate, though I will certainly enjoy reading what you have to say on the not-Hume side."

My comment that I was going to bypass Hume was said in the context of our previous exchange about Hume. I said that I thought you misunderstood what Hume was getting at, and you said something to the effect that it really didn't matter, because the Is-Ought problem can stand alone. I simply didn't want to get sidetracked into the historical problem of what Hume really meant. As illustrated by some of my recent posts, I am perfectly willing to discuss the traditional Is-Ought problem, regardless of what Hume meant. I am also willing to discuss the different interpretations of Hume, if that's what you want.

Btw, Hume was not the first to mention this problem. Thomas Aquinas says something very similar in his Summa Theologica, and so, much later, does the moral sense philosopher Francis Hutcheson, who influenced Hume a great deal. I vaguely recall running across some other examples as well, but I cannot recall the specifics offhand.

Ghs

[Xray]

QM does not confer upon physicists the philosophical privilege to speak nonsense. I've seen arguments for the existence of God that make more sense than this.

TIA for providing examples of such arguments.

Ba'al Chatzaf: Not quite the same as philosophy done by the philosophers. Scientific matters are precise, quantitative and, above all, checked and cross checked by careful experiment. Very different than the word salad tossed up by professional philosophers.

Dragonfly' date='26 February 2010 - 01:34 PM' timestamp='1267212878' post='91844']

The funny thing is that it is the philosophers who speak nonsense, because they don't understand the issues at hand.

In philosophy discussions, I often think of H.L. Mencken's comment: (quote posted by DF on another thread):

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=5267&st=0&p=44961entry44961

"Philosophy consists very largely of one philosopher arguing that all others are jackasses. He usually proves it, and I should add that he also usually proves that he is one himself." (H. L. Mencken)

Edited February 26, 2010 by Xray