Moral Certainty

[Brant Gaede]

To keep the discussion focused on the core issue: is the premise that there exists "objective morality" true or false?

You guys are going to have to wait until I write it up in the next few years.

Then, it's convert or die!

The Objectivist Ethics is a series, properly speaking, of tentative propositions in search of the gold of truth, but it should be understood no matter how close to the truth they'll always be tentative so the working environment consequently demands NIOF, or freedom. That's why its immoral to initiate force and moral not too. We won't get any closer to the gold than that for we can't get any more basic, socially (and tentatively) speaking.

--Brant

can I be right? Absolutely!

Edited March 7, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[merjet]

"A sound argument is a valid argument with true premises", it says in the article.

From this it follows that every argument based on false premises is unsound.

So what? The conclusion may still be true, as I have proven. It's a matter of logic and facts, not your subjective feelings.

Edited March 7, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[Christopher]

Humans are hunter-gatherers by nature. There is pleasure in the successful hunt. This is the basic male perspective. There are variations both of kind and degree.

--Brant

Side note (from the Xray static): hunter societies and war-prone societies alike generally worshipped male deities, whereas peaceful agricultural societies generally worshipped female deities. Likewise, hunting and war are behaviors more closely associated to testosterone, whereas peace and nurturance (including land fertility) is more closely associated to oxytocin. Indeed, pleasure of a successful hunt is definitely masculine.

[dan2100]

To keep the discussion focused on the core issue: is the premise that there exists "objective morality" true or false?

You guys are going to have to wait until I write it up in the next few years.

Then, it's convert or die!

The Objectivist Ethics is a series, properly speaking, of tentative propositions in search of the gold of truth, but it should be understood no matter how close to the truth they'll always be tentative so the working environment consequently demands NIOF, or freedom. That's why its immoral to initiate force and moral not too. We won't get any closer to the gold than that for we can't get any more basic, socially (and tentatively) speaking.

--Brant

can I be right? Absolutely!

Couldn't one of the true propositions -- the final gold you're searching for -- be NIOF? In other words, NIOF is not just an instrument for getting at moral truth, but is one of the [moral] truths.

[Brant Gaede]

To keep the discussion focused on the core issue: is the premise that there exists "objective morality" true or false?

You guys are going to have to wait until I write it up in the next few years.

Then, it's convert or die!

The Objectivist Ethics is a series, properly speaking, of tentative propositions in search of the gold of truth, but it should be understood no matter how close to the truth they'll always be tentative so the working environment consequently demands NIOF, or freedom. That's why its immoral to initiate force and moral not too. We won't get any closer to the gold than that for we can't get any more basic, socially (and tentatively) speaking.

--Brant

can I be right? Absolutely!

Couldn't one of the true propositions -- the final gold you're searching for -- be NIOF? In other words, NIOF is not just an instrument for getting at moral truth, but is one of the [moral] truths.

Sure, but first you have to identify the proper social context for individualism and before that where individualism came from. Also, a lot of rights' reasoning is required. NIOF by itself is an atomistic theoretical rendition of morality and politics as an integrated whole each justifying the other like a hot air balloon being justified by it's human crew and the human crew justifying the balloon while all that made the flight possible is left forgotten back on the ground. This is the basic problem with libertarianism for an Objectivist. Where is the reality of the (individual) reasoning mind and morality of rational self-interest? These made NIOF possible just as Ayn Rand made libertarianism as we understand it today possible. Very few libertarians come from the left or Rand predecessors.

--Brant

Edited March 11, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[Alfonso Jones]

Sure, but first you have to identify the proper social context for individualism and before that where individualism came from. Also, a lot of rights' reasoning is required. NIOF by itself is an atomistic theoretical rendition of morality and politics as an integrated whole each justifying the other like a hot air balloon being justified by it's human crew and the human crew justifying the balloon while all that made the flight possible is left forgotten back on the ground. This is the basic problem with libertarianism for an Objectivist. Where is the reality of the (individual) reasoning mind and morality of rational self-interest? These made NIOF possible just as Ayn Rand made libertarianism as we understand it today possible. Very few libertarians come from the left or Rand predecessors.

--Brant

Well put, Brant.

Bill P

[tjohnson]

All bears are fish.

All fish are mammals.

Therefore, all bears are mammals.

This conclusion does not follow from these premises because they are incorrect. The fact that the conclusion is correct is independent of the the 2 incorrect statements that precede it.

IF all bears are fish AND IF all fish are mammals THEN all bears are mammals.

But we see that the first two conditions are not met and so we cannot make this conclusion even if it is correct.

[Selene]

All bears are fish.

All fish are mammals.

Therefore, all bears are mammals.

"bears" = x

"fish" = y

"mammals" = Q

All "x" are "y"

All "y" are "Q"

therefore

All "x" are "Q"

[merjet]

All bears are fish.

All fish are mammals.

Therefore, all bears are mammals.

This conclusion does not follow from these premises because they are incorrect. The fact that the conclusion is correct is independent of the the 2 incorrect statements that precede it.

You, too, should learn what valid/invalid and sound/unsound mean in logic.

All bears are mammals.

All mammals are animals.

Therefore, all bears are animals.

Both syllogism have the same form: All X are Y. All Y are Z. Therefore, all X are Z.

Both syllogisms are valid. The first is unsound; the second sound.

[Selene]

OK -

Two (2) to one (1)

You lose...lol

Adam

[tjohnson]

All bears are fish.

All fish are mammals.

Therefore, all bears are mammals.

This conclusion does not follow from these premises because they are incorrect. The fact that the conclusion is correct is independent of the the 2 incorrect statements that precede it.

You, too, should learn what valid/invalid and sound/unsound mean in logic.

All bears are mammals.

All mammals are animals.

Therefore, all bears are animals.

Both syllogism have the same form: All X are Y. All Y are Z. Therefore, all X are Z.

Both syllogisms are valid. The first is unsound; the second sound.

I'm only interested in valid and sound reasoning.

All bears are fish

All fish have gills

Therefore, bears have gills

Ooooh, this is fun!

[merjet]

I'm only interested in valid and sound reasoning.

All bears are fish

All fish have gills

Therefore, bears have gills

Ooooh, this is fun!

Does that mean you never make logical inferences from a hypothesis/premise that you haven't verified is true? After all, your conclusion may be unsound. Regardless, it is something you do often enough on OL.

Edited March 11, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[Xray]

I'm only interested in valid and sound reasoning.

Me too. For it interests me whether the premises of an argument are true or false.

Imo it borders on the comical (in logic) to call "valid" conclusions derived from patently false premises.

Question to Merlin: if the premises of a philosophical thought system can be exposed as false, what are the consequences for the system?

Edited March 12, 2010 by Xray

[bmacwilliam]

I'm only interested in valid and sound reasoning.

Me too. For it interests me whether the premises of an argument are true or false.

Imo it borders on the comical (in logic) to call "valid" conclusions derived from patently false premises.

Question to Merlin: if the premises of a philosophical thought system can be exposed as false, what are the consequences for the system?

It just makes it much more likely but not guaranteed that conclusions will be false.

[merjet]

Question to Merlin: if the premises of a philosophical thought system can be exposed as false, what are the consequences for the system?

It just makes it much more likely but not guaranteed that conclusions will be false.

I agree w/o the "much", although it could be "much" in some cases.

[Xray]

1) So would you agree that something can only become "a value" until and after individuals or groups have attributed value to it?

2) Given the variety of personal preferences, doesn't this lay every value question right at the doorstep of subjectivity?

3) If there exist no values per se, then objective values can't exist either.

4) For example, Rand's own premise of no values per se existing would collapse her claim that e. g. money is an objective value.

5) Money is a means serving to engage in trading. It may be valued or not, depending on individual preferences.

6) So it is entirely subjective to claim that money as "objective" value "ought to" be valued by all.

1) Nope.

2) Nope.

3) Nope.

4) Not necessarily; it depends on what Rand means by "objective value" in that context.

5) Yup.

6) You are conflating at least two different issues.

Ghs

TIA George for explaining each point of your answers.

As for the passage where Rand mentions money as "objective value", I think it is in Atlas Shrugged, either in D'Anconia's speech or in Galt's, but can't find it right now. Does anyone happen to have the page number or could post the quote here?

GHS: (quoted in # 203) Even when it comes to some basic issues, I have some fairly substantial disagreements with Rand. For example, I don't care for her definition of value ("that which one acts to gain and/or keep"), and I care even less for her definition of virtue ("the act by which one acts to gain and/or keep" a value).

GHS: I don't care for Rand's definition of "value" ("that which one acts to gain and/or keep") because it is too narrow. We don't necessarily act to gain and/or keep something that we value. Earlier, I gave the example of a past event, the American Revolution, that I value but cannot do anything about. Similarly, I may value (or find value in) a painting or other work of art without doing anything to gain and/or keep it.

If you think Rand's definition is flawed, then, going by your statement, this implies that the inferences she draws from her concept of value are based on a flawed premise (incomplete definition in this case).

I'm also interested getting an answer to the questions I asked you in post #176:

You had written:

GHS: I don't believe in values "per se" -- and neither did Rand, for that matter.

Xray: I don't believe in them either. So there's another common ground we have in this discussion.

Given Rand's premise of values per se NOT existing, how does this mesh with her presenting a list of "cardinal values": "Reason, Purpose, Self-Esteem"?

If they are no values per se - and they can't be, because e. g. every dictator has a "purpose" too, and can declare it "reasonable" from his point of view to silence dissenters via censorship, torture or and whatever means he esteems as "good" (= suited to purpose) - then what are they?

Also, what does your not caring for Rand's definition of value mean for her Cardinal Value list: "Reason, Purpose Self-Esteem"?

GHS: My ideas about "virtue" are more fixed and definite than my ideas about "value" (in the generic sense), but I will need to postpone that discussion for a later time.

What do you think of Rand's Cardinal Virtue list: "Rationality, Productiveness, Pride"?

I'm interested in your fixed and definite ideas about "virtue".

"Virtue" does no figure in my personal ethics at all, since the term is too loaded connotatively in my mind with "morally prim and proper" behavior, with morality standards "by society" being imposed on the individual.

George H. Smith, on 24 February 2010 - 01:10 AM, said:

You are now raising the more complex subject of moral value judgments. In my initial reply to Xray, I indicated that I was now only considering a simpler type of "instrumental" value judgments, and that I would take up moral judgments at a later time -- if, that is, we can reach agreement that at least some value judgments are objective.

Dragonfly: Well, with such an instrumental value definition not only Objectivist virtues as "productivity" or "independence" are objective, but such un-Objectivist values as "parasitism", "initiation of force", etc. are then equally objective values.

DF is correct.

GHS: If you agree with me that we now have at least one objective value judgment, then we can proceed to normative nonmoral value judgments that involve an "ought." And from there we can proceed to moral value judgments. It's best to take this one step at a time.

We have agreed that "This knife is a good knife" is a value judgement referring to the instrumental value the knife has for the user. Good = suited to purpose. A knife called "good" is evaluated as suitable means to achieve a subjectively chosen goal. That is, the knife becomes "a value" only when value is attributed to it by an individual/individuals.

Which means that values (not even mere instrumental values) can't exist objectively "out there" awaiting discovery.

The problem for an ethics discussion is that "good" = 'suited to purpose' also implies everything people value as a suitable meas to achieve and end, as can be seen in the above example with the dictator calling censorhsip as "good".

GHS: I don't want to defend Perry's thesis here; I merely mention it as a plausible possibility. And, please, don't repeat the tired refrain that Perry's definition would render all values "subjective." Perry explains why this isn't so, so you should read his account first-hand before swinging wildly at it.

I asked you back:

Xray: Does Perry list values which he thinks are objective? If yes, can you give an example?

I promise I won't "swing wildly" at anything before having made myself familiar first with what I'm dealing with.

Nice coincidence which makes me smile: as I'm typing this post, the postman rings and brings - guess what: Perry's book Realms of Value . (I was lucky, for Amazon only had one used example in stock).

Since it's quite voluminous, it may take me a while to work through it. But thanks for directing me to this book.

So in order to make headway with your case (if I have understood you correctly, you think that objective moral value judgements exist), you would have to provide as evidence an example of an "absolute good". For without an absolute good, no objective moral judgements are possible.

Can you give an example of an "objective moral value judgement"?

Edited March 20, 2010 by Xray

[tjohnson]

I'm only interested in valid and sound reasoning.

Me too. For it interests me whether the premises of an argument are true or false.

Imo it borders on the comical (in logic) to call "valid" conclusions derived from patently false premises.

Question to Merlin: if the premises of a philosophical thought system can be exposed as false, what are the consequences for the system?

It just makes it much more likely but not guaranteed that conclusions will be false.

Yes, and if it happens to be right it is nothing more than pure luck. I've seen it happen in surveying where 2 errors canceled each other out but I got the right answer.

[Xray]

George. H. Smith's take on Rand's definitions of value and virtue:

GHS: I don't care for Rand's definition of "value" ("that which one acts to gain and/or keep") because it is too narrow. We don't necessarily act to gain and/or keep something that we value. Earlier, I gave the example of a past event, the American Revolution, that I value but cannot do anything about. Similarly, I may value (or find value in) a painting or other work of art without doing anything to gain and/or keep it.

Which implies that the inferences Rand draws from her concept of value woud be based on a flawed premise (incomplete definition in this case).

GHS: Thus, although it is true in a sense that virtues, as Rand says, are the means by which we achieve and maintain values (this is a paraphrase; I don't have the quote in front of me), to use this as the definition is inadequate, because it fails to incorporate the habitual feature of virtues.

Rand actually says that the values are the means:

TVOS, p. 27: "The three cardinal values of the Objectvist ethics - the three values which toghether, are the means to and the realization of one's ultimate value, one's own life - are: Reason, Purpose, Self-Esteem " (Rand)

As for virtue, it is an "act" in her opinion.

"Value is that which one acts to gain or keep. Virtue is the act by which one gains and/or keeps it." (Rand, TVOS, p. 27.)

This definition is indeed inadequate, downright wrong imo. For calling virtue an "act" is way off the mark.

For example, Rand lists "Pride" among the "cardinal virtues" of the Objectivist ethics, thus according to her own definition, pride would have to be an "act". But calling pride an act makes as little sense as calling virtue an act. Virtue is no act, it is a quality.

So again, Rand provides a flawed premise in the form of an inadequate definition.

Can we agree that basing one's case on flawed premises (whether it is in a courtroom or in a discussion) would mean to pull the ground from under one's own feet?

If yes, I'd suggest we leave Rand's inadequate definitions of value/virtue aside and proceed without them.

You already provided your notions of virtue and vice:

My notions of "virtue" and "vice" are the standard ones found in the Aristotelian tradition and the vast majority of other traditions as well. A virtue is a morally good habit, whereas a vice is a morally bad habit.

Virtues and vices are dispositions to act in a certain manner; they are character traits, so to speak. This is why we can say that a person committed an immoral act (i.e., an act that violates a moral principle) without necessarily condemning the person himself as an "immoral" or "bad" person.

The later applies only when immoral behavior is a person's characteristic way of acting. (Btw, I have some problems with the term "immoral," as it is commonly used in many cases, but that's a topic for another discussion.)

Thus, although it is true in a sense that virtues, as Rand says, are the means by which we achieve and maintain values (this is a paraphrase; I don't have the quote in front of me), to use this as the definition is inadequate, because it fails to incorporate the habitual feature of virtues.

The classical approach to virtue and vice that I have sketched here has interesting implications for moral education and moral psychology.

Ghs

"A virtue is a morally good habit, whereas a vice is a morally bad habit." (GHS)

Labeling a virtue as a "morally good" habit raises the question: "By what moral standards"?

So depending on the moral standard from which you judge, a person's behavior can be labeled as virtuous (or the opposite) - right?

GHS: Virtues and vices are dispositions to act in a certain manner; they are character traits, so to speak. This is why we can say that a person committed an immoral act (i.e., an act that violates a moral principle) without necessarily condemning the person himself as an "immoral" or "bad" person.

Again, to take into acount are the (varying) moral standards by which an act is judged as "virtuous" (or the opposite).

Standards of moral value (especally one's own personal standards) are often treated in these discussions as if they were etched in stone as "objective".

(Btw, I have some problems with the term "immoral," as it is commonly used in many cases, but that's a topic for another discussion.)

Are these problems possibly related to your awareness of moral standards differing widely?

In your book Why Atheism, you provide compelling arguments regarding the importance of the burden of proof:

P. 32: "This principle states that the burden of proof falls on the person who affirms the truth of a proposition, e. g. "God exists".

P. 33: "The onus probandi is is about as clear and incontestable as any philosophical procedure could possibly be. Indeed it is indispensabe to any intellectual exchange in which the participants are seriously committed to the pursuit of truth." (George H. Smith, in Why Atheism).

My question:

Do you claim that "objective" moral virtues exist?

- If the answer is "yes", in order to make your case, the burden of proof would be on you.

- So if the answer is yes, what evidence can you provide supporting your case?

Edited April 10, 2010 by Xray

[George H. Smith]

As for virtue, it is an "act" in her opinion.

"Value is that which one acts to gain or keep. Virtue is the act by which one gains and/or keeps it." (Rand, TVOS, p. 27.)

This definition is indeed inadequate, downright wrong imo. For calling virtue an "act" is way off the mark.

For example, Rand lists "Pride" among the "cardinal virtues" of the Objectivist ethics, thus according to her own definition, pride would have to be an "act". But calling pride an act makes as little sense as calling virtue an act. Virtue is no act, it is a quality.

So again, Rand provides a flawed premise in the form of an inadequate definition.

Can we agree that basing one's case on flawed premises (whether it is in a courtroom or in a discussion) would mean to pull the ground from under one's own feet?

If yes, I'd suggest we leave Rand's inadequate definitions of value/virtue aside and proceed without them.

If you read what Rand says about specific virtues, she frequently employs the classical "disposition" conception, if only implicitly. For example, she refers to the virtue of rationality as the "total commitment to a state of full, conscious awareness, to the maintenance of a full mental focus in all issues, in all choices," etc. She also speaks of her other virtues, such as productiveness and pride (the latter is obviously not an "act"), in similar terms.

As far as I know, Rand never explicitly identified the line "virtue is the act by which one gains and/or keeps [a value]" as a formal definition of "virtue." She may have intended it only as a brief and selective description -- but it is usually treated as a definition, and that's how I have taken it.

"A virtue is a morally good habit, whereas a vice is a morally bad habit." (GHS)

Labeling a virtue as a "morally good" habit raises the question: "By what moral standards"?

So depending on the moral standard from which you judge, a person's behavior can be labeled as virtuous (or the opposite) - right?

Yes, I would expect you to use your own moral standards, rather than the moral standards of other people, when determining which dispositions are virtuous and which are vicious. I would also expect you to have good reasons for your choice of some moral standards over others. I assume you don't flip a coin when deciding such matters.

GHS: Virtues and vices are dispositions to act in a certain manner; they are character traits, so to speak. This is why we can say that a person committed an immoral act (i.e., an act that violates a moral principle) without necessarily condemning the person himself as an "immoral" or "bad" person.

Again, to take into account are the (varying) moral standards by which an act is judged as "virtuous" (or the opposite).

Yes, as a matter of empirical fact, there are varying moral standards. John Wayne Gacy, Ted Bundy, and other serial killers probably had different moral standards than you or I. But this doesn't mean that reasonable arguments cannot be given in favor of some moral standards over others.

Standards of moral value (especially one's own personal standards) are often treated in these discussions as if they were etched in stone as "objective".

You seem to be the only person on this list who equates "objective" with "etched in stone." Rand certainly didn't hold that view, and neither do I.

Ghs

[Xray]

If you read what Rand says about specific virtues, she frequently employs the classical "disposition" conception, if only implicitly. For example, she refers to the virtue of rationality as the "total commitment to a state of full, conscious awareness, to the maintenance of a full mental focus in all issues, in all choices," etc. She also speaks of her other virtues, such as productiveness and pride (the latter is obviously not an "act"), in similar terms.

The virtue of rationality described in this way would also apply to a bank robber planning a raid. It would in fact apply to everyone engaging in planning an act involving the selection of suitable means in order to achieve a personal goal, whatever that goal is.

GHS: As far as I know, Rand never explicitly identified the line "virtue is the act by which one gains and/or keeps [a value]" as a formal definition of "virtue." She may have intended it only as a brief and selective description -- but it is usually treated as a definition, and that's how I have taken it.

Has Rand formally defined "virtue" anywhere?

Edited April 11, 2010 by Xray

[George H. Smith]

If you read what Rand says about specific virtues, she frequently employs the classical "disposition" conception, if only implicitly. For example, she refers to the virtue of rationality as the "total commitment to a state of full, conscious awareness, to the maintenance of a full mental focus in all issues, in all choices," etc. She also speaks of her other virtues, such as productiveness and pride (the latter is obviously not an "act"), in similar terms.

The virtue of rationality described in this way would also apply to a bank robber planning a raid. It would in fact apply to everyone engaging in planning an act involving the selection of suitable means in order to achieve a personal goal, whatever that goal is.

You seem to have a passion for interpreting Rand in most unsympathetic manner possible.

I only quoted a fragment of Rand's discussion of the virtue of rationality. This was for the purpose of illustrating the "disposition" aspect of her treatment. If you read the full discussion in "The Objectivist Ethics," you will find that, for Rand, the virtue of rationality is a kind of generic virtue, one that subsumes a number of other virtues, specifically, independence, integrity, honesty, and justice. These would clearly not apply to a bank robber, no matter how thoroughly he planned his crime.

So how about giving Rand a break from time to time, even if you don't agree with her arguments. Adopting a proofreader's mentality while considering snippets from her work won't get us anywhere.

Ghs

[anonrobt]

If you read what Rand says about specific virtues, she frequently employs the classical "disposition" conception, if only implicitly. For example, she refers to the virtue of rationality as the "total commitment to a state of full, conscious awareness, to the maintenance of a full mental focus in all issues, in all choices," etc. She also speaks of her other virtues, such as productiveness and pride (the latter is obviously not an "act"), in similar terms.

The virtue of rationality described in this way would also apply to a bank robber planning a raid. It would in fact apply to everyone engaging in planning an act involving the selection of suitable means in order to achieve a personal goal, whatever that goal is.

You seem to have a passion for interpreting Rand in most unsympathetic manner possible.

I only quoted a fragment of Rand's discussion of the virtue of rationality. This was for the purpose of illustrating the "disposition" aspect of her treatment. If you read the full discussion in "The Objectivist Ethics," you will find that, for Rand, the virtue of rationality is a kind of generic virtue, one that subsumes a number of other virtues, specifically, independence, integrity, honesty, and justice. These would clearly not apply to a bank robber, no matter how thoroughly he planned his crime.

So how about giving Rand a break from time to time, even if you don't agree with her arguments. Adopting a proofreader's mentality while considering snippets from her work won't get us anywhere.

Ghs

Yes - she keeps trying to turn concrete examples into floating abstractions...

[George H. Smith]

The virtue of rationality described in this way would also apply to a bank robber planning a raid. It would in fact apply to everyone engaging in planning an act involving the selection of suitable means in order to achieve a personal goal, whatever that goal is.

You seem to have a passion for interpreting Rand in most unsympathetic manner possible.

I only quoted a fragment of Rand's discussion of the virtue of rationality. This was for the purpose of illustrating the "disposition" aspect of her treatment. If you read the full discussion in "The Objectivist Ethics," you will find that, for Rand, the virtue of rationality is a kind of generic virtue, one that subsumes a number of other virtues, specifically, independence, integrity, honesty, and justice. These would clearly not apply to a bank robber, no matter how thoroughly he planned his crime.

So how about giving Rand a break from time to time, even if you don't agree with her arguments. Adopting a proofreader's mentality while considering snippets from her work won't get us anywhere.

Ghs

Yes - she keeps trying to turn concrete examples into floating abstractions...

I think there is a deeper problem involved here, one that I seen manifested many times over the years in Rand's more unsympathetic critics. This is a complicated issue, so I will try to keep my points as simple as I can.

Rand was primarily a philosophical essayist. With one exception (ITOE), she was not a writer of philosophical treatises, nor did she write philosophical articles in the formal sense of that term, i.e., of the sort that would be published in a modern philosophy journal.

This is by no means a criticism of Rand. On the contrary, some of the most interesting and influential philosophers of the modern (post-Renaissance) era have been essayists rather than technical philosophers. The modern essay form was pioneered in the 16th century by Montaigne, who also gave the word essay its modern literary meaning.

The modern philosophical essay was essentially a reaction to the elaborate and systematic treatises that had emerged from medieval scholasticism. It is scarcely coincidental that from the time of Descartes (who often used the essay format) to Kant -- a span of approximately 150 years, during which the essay format was widely used -- virtually every major philosopher worked outside of universities and other established institutions. This was the golden age of the independent intellectual.

The essay was the preferred vehicle of the Enlightenment; it was a method of transmitting philosophical ideas to a general audience, rather than aiming at professional intellectuals ensconced in universities. (Universities were frequently condemned as bastions of reactionary ideas.) Many Enlightenment figures, such as David Hume, were quite explicit about this public function of essay writing. The point was to bypass established intellectuals and speak directly to the educated public, and this could not be done by using the dry and technical methods of the scholastics (i.e., "schoolmen").

Scholasticism -- in style, if not in substance -- tended to reemerge after the time of Kant, who specifically stated that he used a highly technical vocabulary because he did not want his ideas to be accessible to the masses, who would inevitably mangle and misunderstand them. German universities took the lead here, and were later followed by universities in other countries.

Adam Smith, who argued for the free market system of Scottish universities over the hidebound system of tenure at Oxford and Cambridge, noted that European universities were one of the last vestiges of the medieval guild system. Only after seven years of apprenticeship -- four in undergraduate studies and three in graduate studies -- was one deemed qualified to teach the "mysteries" of (in this case) various intellectual crafts.

Anyway, this is obviously a long story, but my point is that Rand was essentially a throwback to the Enlightenment ideal of the public (or market) intellectual.

So what does all this have to do with my original point? Well, I've already made this post longer than I planned, so I'll pick up on this later tonight. I've found that the eyes of readers tend to glaze over when reading lengthy posts.

[anthony]

The virtue of rationality described in this way would also apply to a bank robber planning a raid. It would in fact apply to everyone engaging in planning an act involving the selection of suitable means in order to achieve a personal goal, whatever that goal is.

You seem to have a passion for interpreting Rand in most unsympathetic manner possible.

I only quoted a fragment of Rand's discussion of the virtue of rationality. This was for the purpose of illustrating the "disposition" aspect of her treatment. If you read the full discussion in "The Objectivist Ethics," you will find that, for Rand, the virtue of rationality is a kind of generic virtue, one that subsumes a number of other virtues, specifically, independence, integrity, honesty, and justice. These would clearly not apply to a bank robber, no matter how thoroughly he planned his crime.

So how about giving Rand a break from time to time, even if you don't agree with her arguments. Adopting a proofreader's mentality while considering snippets from her work won't get us anywhere.

Ghs

Yes - she keeps trying to turn concrete examples into floating abstractions...

I think there is a deeper problem involved here, one that I seen manifested many times over the years in Rand's more unsympathetic critics. This is a complicated issue, so I will try to keep my points as simple as I can.

Rand was primarily a philosophical essayist. With one exception (ITOE), she was not a writer of philosophical treatises, nor did she write philosophical articles in the formal sense of that term, i.e., of the sort that would be published in a modern philosophy journal.

This is by no means a criticism of Rand. On the contrary, some of the most interesting and influential philosophers of the modern (post-Renaissance) era have been essayists rather than technical philosophers. The modern essay form was pioneered in the 16th century by Montaigne, who also gave the word essay its modern literary meaning.

The modern philosophical essay was essentially a reaction to the elaborate and systematic treatises that had emerged from medieval scholasticism. It is scarcely coincidental that from the time of Descartes (who often used the essay format) to Kant -- a span of approximately 150 years, during which the essay format was widely used -- virtually every major philosopher worked outside of universities and other established institutions. This was the golden age of the independent intellectual.

The essay was the preferred vehicle of the Enlightenment; it was a method of transmitting philosophical ideas to a general audience, rather than aiming at professional intellectuals ensconced in universities. (Universities were frequently condemned as bastions of reactionary ideas.) Many Enlightenment figures, such as David Hume, were quite explicit about this public function of essay writing. The point was to bypass established intellectuals and speak directly to the educated public, and this could not be done by using the dry and technical methods of the scholastics (i.e., "schoolmen").

Scholasticism -- in style, if not in substance -- tended to reemerge after the time of Kant, who specifically stated that he used a highly technical vocabulary because he did not want his ideas to be accessible to the masses, who would inevitably mangle and misunderstand them. German universities took the lead here, and were later followed by universities in other countries.

Adam Smith, who argued for the free market system of Scottish universities over the hidebound system of tenure at Oxford and Cambridge, noted that European universities were one of the last vestiges of the medieval guild system. Only after seven years of apprenticeship -- four in undergraduate studies and three in graduate studies -- was one deemed qualified to teach the "mysteries" of (in this case) various intellectual crafts.

Anyway, this is obviously a long story, but my point is that Rand was essentially a throwback to the Enlightenment ideal of the public (or market) intellectual.

So what does all this have to do with my original point? Well, I've already made this post longer than I planned, so I'll pick up on this later tonight. I've found that the eyes of readers tend to glaze over when reading lengthy posts.

Ghs,

Not wanting to divert your flow, but as a few added points:

It's always seemed to me that Rand revolutionized philosophy, by popularizing it.

Like she was the 'direct sales and marketing' of the philosophical world, short-cutting the traditional routes via scholars and academics.

Would you agree?

Anyhow, the end-users, laymen (like myself) benefitted, even if the universities don't particularly approve.

There is an aspect of AR's style of delivery that puts off many of those 'laymen' in my experience. I refer to those critics of Rand who seem to delight in finding fault - with her life, or her philosophy.

I can best illustrate it with someone telling me once: "How can you appreciate such a dogmatic, authoritarian, teacher, when you value your independence so highly?"

My reply was- and is- "Because she's right; and despite her didactic style, her work emphasises unwavering independence."

The pity is that for some, Rand's absolute Moral Certainty stops them in their tracks. They chuck out the baby with the bathwater in the most stupidly juvenile fashion - (I don't care what you have to teach me, I won't be preached at by anybody. So there!)

Remnants of religious dogmatism, moral relativism, and 'post-modernism' have done vast damage to rationality.

Tony

[dan2100]

It's always seemed to me that Rand revolutionized philosophy, by popularizing it.

Like she was the 'direct sales and marketing' of the philosophical world, short-cutting the traditional routes via scholars and academics.

Would you agree?

As the examples George used should have made clear: Rand was not the first to do this.

Anyhow, the end-users, laymen (like myself) benefitted, even if the universities don't particularly approve.

There is an aspect of AR's style of delivery that puts off many of those 'laymen' in my experience. I refer to those critics of Rand who seem to delight in finding fault - with her life, or her philosophy.

I can best illustrate it with someone telling me once: "How can you appreciate such a dogmatic, authoritarian, teacher, when you value your independence so highly?"

My reply was- and is- "Because she's right; and despite her didactic style, her work emphasises unwavering independence."

The pity is that for some, Rand's absolute Moral Certainty stops them in their tracks. They chuck out the baby with the bathwater in the most stupidly juvenile fashion - (I don't care what you have to teach me, I won't be preached at by anybody. So there!)

Remnants of religious dogmatism, moral relativism, and 'post-modernism' have done vast damage to rationality.

I'm not so sure it's just that. I think there's always been a deep suspicion of certainty and of systematic thinking in parts of the Western world, especially the Anglo-American parts. I think that has as much to do with this as "religious dogmatism, moral relativism, and 'post-modernism'" -- all of which I would say are not really remnants at this stage, but, as movements, as big players.