Moral Certainty

[George H. Smith]

Anyway, this is obviously a long story, but my point is that Rand was essentially a throwback to the Enlightenment ideal of the public (or market) intellectual.

So what does all this have to do with my original point? Well, I've already made this post longer than I planned, so I'll pick up on this later tonight. I've found that the eyes of readers tend to glaze over when reading lengthy posts.

I didn't continue these thoughts immediately because I couldn't think of a way to express them properly, i.e., in a manner that doesn't sound overly simplistic or come across as a plea to excuse Rand from legitimate criticism. Then, earlier today, I came across this passage on the Atlas Society website, from Chapter Five of David Kelley's Truth and Toleration.

Kelley's point is essentially the same as mine (though with different purposes in mind), so I will quote it at length:

[begin Kelley quotation]

Ayn Rand did not develop her ideas in the form of detailed treatises. Her philosophical essays, as distinct from her fiction and her cultural and political commentary, would fit comfortably in a single volume. [4] A philosophical system must address a wide range of specific issues—the classical problems of philosophy that arise in every branch. The great historical systems met this standard. It cannot be met in a single volume, no matter how brilliant. And of course Objectivism is a young philosophy; it hasn't had two hundred years, much less two thousand, for scholars to play out all the possible variations, to sift and explore the ideas, to develop their consequences. By historical standards, what we have is no more (though no less) than the foundation and outline of a system.

In epistemology, for example, the one issue that Ayn Rand dealt with in detail was the nature of concepts and universals. Her Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology is comparable in its systematic character to the writings of Aristotle or Locke on this question. Beyond a brief suggestion, however, she wrote nothing about the nature of propositions, an issue that is essential for a viable theory of truth. In regard to the senses, her distinction between what we perceive and the form in which we perceive it is the key that solves the traditional puzzles of perception, but using the key is not a trivial matter; a great many subordinate questions must be answered to formulate and validate the distinction properly. Ayn Rand identified the fact that knowledge is hierarchical and contextual, insights that I have relied upon throughout this essay, and that point to the solution of many traditional problems in epistemology. But a pointer is not a solution. Objectivism does not yet have well-developed answers to such questions as what constitutes proof; or how to draw the line between the arbitrary and the false. Nor does it have an adequate theory of induction and scientific explanation.

An analysis of other areas in philosophy would reveal the same pattern: great insights that are partially developed in some directions, not at all in others....

[End Kelley quotation]

Kelley's excellent explanation saved me a lot of writing, so here are my conclusions:

There are different ways to read a philosophical essayist, depending on one's purpose in reading her and one's opinion of her philosophical abilities.

Since a philosophical essay, by its very nature, only skims the surface of a complex subject (or subjects), it is absurdly easy to find holes in it, such as unstated assumptions, unproven assertions, and the like. One can easily do this not only with the essays by Ayn Rand, but with those written by a host of other philosophical essayists as well, such as Montaigne, Pascal, Hume, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and many more.

If, however, one fundamentally respects the abilities of a given philosopher, there is another way to read her, namely, from a perspective that I call "sympathetic." This perspective does not mean that one overlooks or excuses problems in an essay; rather, it means that one is inclined to give the philosopher the benefit of the doubt by considering the possibility that the problem is owing to the brevity of the essay format, not to incompetence on the part of the writer.

There is a lot more to this issue -- for one thing, there are many different ways to read a philosopher, most of which I haven't mentioned here -- but we are basically dealing with presumptions , i.e., initial attitudes that we employ when reading a philosopher. These presumptions (which are defeasible, btw) depend not only on one's purpose in reading (which will vary) but also on one's assessment of a philosopher's credibility.

I have a high regard for Rand's credibility, which is why I sometimes get annoyed by what I see as pot shots taken by those on OL who seem to have a low regard for Rand's philosophic abilities. The latter was manifested in an earlier discussion about whether Rand should be viewed as a "serious" philosopher. (I had hoped to steer that discussion into the topic that I am discussing now, but it got sidetracked into the accusation that I was appealing to authority; and when I denied this, I was branded a "liar" by some pip-squeak whom I do not now recall.)

On numerous occasions, X-Ray has said something to the effect, "Well, if you disagree with Rand's definition of X (e.g. "value" and "virtue"), then you must disagree with the conclusions which rely on those definitions." And I have sometimes responded, in effect, "Maybe yes, maybe no."

I have responded like this because I don't expect to find a full and adequate explanation of every problem in an essay, whether it be written by Rand or someone else. Since I don't view Rand as some kind of dummy who couldn't reason her way out of a paper bag. or who was oblivious to objections so obvious that even a philosophy freshman could spot them, I presume that she could have given a reasonable explanation, even if that explanation is not found in the text of an essay. And this presumption leads me to the attempt to figure out a solution that is consistent with Rand's overall approach.

The problem is that people who don't regard Rand as a "serious" philosopher work from a different presumption, and they will not be inclined to give her the benefit of the doubt. This is neither right or wrong per se, but different presumptions generate conflicts that run deeper than simple differences of interpretation.

I am not entirely happy with this exposition, but it will have to do for now. I can clarify some points as we go along, if necessary.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

It seems quite the case that the validity of the senses comes from the observation that they are designed to keep us from bumping into things--the things that are perceived. These things partially represent reality. There is a great deal of reality we do not perceive directly requiring special instruments. I personally have little use for these specialized philosophical discussions George is so good at and I am not a philosopher. Some of these strike me as arcane or bordering on the arcane, but I recognize that George doesn't want to bump into things intellectually at least figuratively so they are important and interesting to him.

--Brant

where's the money?

glad he's sticking up for Rand

Edited April 14, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[George H. Smith]

It seems quite the case that the validity of the senses comes from the observation that they are designed to keep us from bumping into things--the things that are perceived. These things partially represent reality. There is a great deal of reality we do not perceive directly requiring special instruments. I personally have little use for these specialized philosophical discussions George is so good at and I am not a philosopher. Some of these strike me as arcane or bordering on the arcane, but I recognize that George doesn't want to bump into things intellectually at least figuratively so they are important and interesting to him.

--Brant

where's the money?

glad he's sticking up for Rand

If I were willing to publish my first drafts, which I'm not, I could publish tons of stuff for little or no money. For me, the first draft is easy; it's the second and third drafts -- and so on, until I reach something that I arbitrarily dub "the final draft" -- that are extremely time-consuming and aggravating for me to write.

Why? Because after working out the basic ideas in a first draft, I usually feel as if I sufficiently understand an issue or a problem, and I therefore want to move on to something else. The later drafts are written principally for the benefit of potential readers, not for myself, and I find that kind of writing to be extremely tedious, since (depending on the subject) I have to explain a lot of background that, to me, seems perfectly obvious.

Nevertheless, if someone plunks down money for a book, I think a writer is obliged to express himself as clearly as he possibly can. It is for this reason that I have a highly negative reactions to books on philosophy that, whatever their content may be, are written in a stream--of-consciousness style -- as if any and every thought that occurs to a thinker is so precious that it deserves to be immortalized on the printed page so readers can marvel at a brilliant mind at work. What pretentious bunk this usually is. .

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

"Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies" was a hell of a read.

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

"Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies" was a hell of a read.

--Brant

Thank you. There are some very good essays in that book and some that, well, were publishable. One of my favorite pieces, "The Righteous Persecution of Drug Consumers and Other Heretics," was originally submitted to Reason Magazine and refused. At that time, it was the only piece I had ever written that had been turned down by a publisher.

The book came about as a result of a call I got from the Humanist philosopher and publisher Paul Kurtz. Paul asked if I would be interested in doing a revised version of Atheism: The Case Against God. Paul noted that the original version had been a best-seller, by Prometheus standards, and he thought that a revised edition would do extremely well.

I told Paul that ATCAG was written in a burst of youthful enthusiasm (I was mostly 23 when I wrote it), and that its "juvenile radicalism" --as an older Herbert Spencer once described Social Statics, a book he wrote in his late twenties and arguably his best work -- generated a certain polemical style that appealed to a lot of readers. But I didn't think a rewrite would remain true to that style, so I would end up writing a different book, in effect. And I didn't think the rewritten book, however more respectable it might be by conventional academic standards, would be nearly as interesting as the original. So I preferred to let the original stand as is, warts and all.

I then noted that I had a number of essays on hand, some published and some unpublished, that were worthwhile, as well as some essays that I would like to write. Hence came Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies. (A few of the articles, such as "Deism and the Assault on Revealed Religion," were adapted from a ten-lecture course on "A History of Atheism and Religious Dissent" that I had presented for my Forum for Philosophical Studies many years before. Unfortunately, I no longer have those extensive notes.)

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

I could have stopped subscribing to Reason magazine 10-15 or even 20 years ago instead of last year and not missed much.

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

I could have stopped subscribing to Reason magazine 10-15 or even 20 years ago instead of last year and not missed much.

--Brant

I stopped reading Reason Magazine over 20 years ago and haven't missed much of anything, so far as I can tell from glancing at issues in a local bookstore.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

I could have stopped subscribing to Reason magazine 10-15 or even 20 years ago instead of last year and not missed much.

--Brant

I stopped reading Reason Magazine over 20 years ago and haven't missed much of anything, so far as I can tell from glancing at issues in a local bookstore.

Ghs

So this is what envy feels like. Bummer.

--Brant

[Xray]

WhyNot: There is an aspect of AR's style of delivery that puts off many of those 'laymen' in my experience. I refer to those critics of Rand who seem to delight in finding fault - with her life, or her philosophy.

I can best illustrate it with someone telling me once: "How can you appreciate such a dogmatic, authoritarian, teacher, when you value your independence so highly?"

My reply was- and is- "Because she's right; and despite her didactic style, her work emphasises unwavering independence."

Do you believe a dogmatic and authoritarian teacher would really value your independence if e. g. you told him/her that you disagree with the contents of the teaching and have decided to abandon Objectivism, Marxism, Catholicism or whatever other ideological -isms are out there?

For that would be the real litmus test to see if they practise what they preach.

WhYNot: The pity is that for some, Rand's absolute Moral Certainty stops them in their tracks.

To me, the claim "absolute moral certainty" certainly raises a red flag. For history has seen too many tragedies resulting from this belief.

WhYNot: They chuck out the baby with the bathwater in the most stupidly juvenile fashion - (I don't care what you have to teach me, I won't be preached at by anybody. So there!)

And moral dogmatists do the exact opposite: they drown the baby in the bathwater, stifling any opinion which threatens their moral system.

WhyNot: Remnants of religious dogmatism, moral relativism, and 'post-modernism' have done vast damage to rationality.

That "-ism" cocktail has pretty different ingredients.

The main misunderstanding moral dogmatists have is that moral relativism automatically implies an "anything goes" attitude. For they fear if they abandon their belief in objective moral values, everything will collapse.

George H. Smith:

You seem to be the only person on this list who equates "objective" with "etched in stone." Rand certainly didn't hold that view, and neither do I.

I used 'etched in stone' as a figure of speech, not as a definition of "objective".

Yes - she keeps trying to turn concrete examples into floating abstractions...

Actually I'm doing the exact opposite: I'm trying to tie floating abstractions to reality by applying them to concrete examples.

I only quoted a fragment of Rand's discussion of the virtue of rationality. This was for the purpose of illustrating the "disposition" aspect of her treatment. If you read the full discussion in "The Objectivist Ethics," you will find that, for Rand, the virtue of rationality is a kind of generic virtue, one that subsumes a number of other virtues, specifically, independence, integrity, honesty, and justice. These would clearly not apply to a bank robber, no matter how thoroughly he planned his crime.

The problem is that those other virtues are mostly what Greg Nyquist called "fudge words" which people can fill with whatever suits them. Take "justice" for example: virtually every ideologist will have that word in stock. Millions have lost the lives in the name of "justice" ...

Or take "integrity". A look at Randian heroes is quite enlightening in that respect. Since Rand meant her heroes to be understood as role models of how man should be, examing them closely in that respect is warranted. Remember the scene where Dagny cold-bloodedly shoots the guard? Was this an act of integrity? Imo there was no need to shoot that guard at all. To me, this scene was among the most shocking in AS.

As for "honesty" - I can think of quite a few situations where honesty would actually conflict with rationality. So in favor of which virtue is the scale to be tipped in such a situation?

GHS: Rand was primarily a philosophical essayist. With one exception (ITOE), she was not a writer of philosophical treatises, nor did she write philosophical articles in the formal sense of that term, i.e., of the sort that would be published in a modern philosophy journal.

Imo Rand was primarily an ideological essayist, who tried to back up the claim of correctness in her thinking via epistemology, the result being ITOE.

(I don't want to get off topic here in the ethics section by asking you if ITOE meets your standard of value in epistemology).

GHS:"A virtue is a morally good habit, whereas a vice is a morally bad habit."

Xray: Labeling a virtue as a "morally good" habit raises the question: "By what moral standards"?

So depending on the moral standard from which you judge, a person's behavior can be labeled as virtuous (or the opposite) - right?

GHS: Yes, I would expect you to use your own moral standards, rather than the moral standards of other people, when determining which dispositions are virtuous and which are vicious. I would also expect you to have good reasons for your choice of some moral standards over others. I assume you don't flip a coin when deciding such matters.

No, I don't flip coins, and can give you convincing reasons why I e. g. don't consider pride as a virtue. Imo to consider pride as a virtue makes as little sense as to consider 'pleasure' as a virtue.

Xray: Again, to take into account are the (varying) moral standards by which an act is judged as "virtuous" (or the opposite).

GHS: Yes, as a matter of empirical fact, there are varying moral standards. John Wayne Gacy, Ted Bundy, and other serial killers probably had different moral standards than you or I. But this doesn't mean that reasonable arguments cannot be given in favor of some moral standards over others.

Of course we can compare our moral standards and explain in a reasonable discussion why we have them. To realize that values are subjective does not exclude that people can agree on certain values, or try to convince others of theirs.

I for example was finally led by an atheist's convincing arguments to question my belief in religious values.

To realize that values are subjective does not exclude that people can agree on certain values. The Declaration of Human Rights is an example of a list of subjective values several countries (not all) have agreed on. Every ethics discussion is actually a ongoing process, a process which imo would only be hampered by the belief in objective morality.

The simple fact that moral standards have dramatically changed in the history of mankind contradicts the belief in any "objective" moral standard.

Edited April 18, 2010 by Xray

[Xray]

I only quoted a fragment of Rand's discussion of the virtue of rationality. This was for the purpose of illustrating the "disposition" aspect of her treatment. If you read the full discussion in "The Objectivist Ethics," you will find that, for Rand, the virtue of rationality is a kind of generic virtue, one that subsumes a number of other virtues, specifically, independence, integrity, honesty, and justice.

Im commented on the "fudge word" problematic regarding terms like justice etc. in #334.

GHS: Adopting a proofreader's mentality while considering snippets from her work won't get us anywhere.

A general remark: As for quoting sentences from Rand's work, I never do this with the intent of taking anything out of context in order to distort her message. This would go against my ethical principles in a discussion, and even if I didn't have any ethical principles in that respect, it would be just plain stupid on my part if I tried any ruse here with a discussion partner who has such profound knowledge of the primary source form which the quote was taken.

As for having a "proofreader's mentality" when going through philosophical texts, I would consider it as an asset.

For contradictions can be seen far more clearly if one goes through the source with a fine toothed comb.

And for a philosopher who pointed out many times the importance of non-contradiction, Rand contradicts herself remarkably often.

In case you are interested in going through the complete primary source here at OL, paragraph by paragraph (The Objectivist Ethics is only 26 pages long), let me know.

On another thread, you wrote:

"I would argue (and have argued for many years) "that Rand's ethical and moral theories are not logically dependent on her epistemological theories." GHS

#161 http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=8329&st=160&p=97046entry97046

For when you read The Objectivist Ethics, imo it is quite clear that Rand saw her epistemology as the foundation of her moral theories. Just think of the parts where she refers to her epistemological word creations like "perceptual concretes", "conceptualizing", etc.

So I'm interested how you arrived at your conclusion. You mean that you can't see the logical dependence? In that case, I would agree with you. I can't see it either.

So how about giving Rand a break from time to time, even if you don't agree with her arguments.

The problem is the premises on which her arguments are based. For the issue is examining the premises themselves. The proposition stated in a premise is true if it correspondends to a fact of reality.

So if the premise of an argument can be exposed as false, it has dramatic consequences for the argument, since the conclusions based on the false premise have no basis in reality.

Example to illustrate the point:

Premise: Animals can't feel pain.

Conclusion: Therefore it makes no difference how one treats them.

It is wrong to conclude that it makes no difference how one treats animals because they feel no pain. The root error lies in the false premise.

Classic case of a false premise is Rand's so-called definition of "sacrifice" (= trading a higher for a lower value).

This is no definition, but a value judgement. She presents her personal connotation with a term as an "objective" definition, i. e. confuses connotation and denotation.

Now look at how much of her argumentation she bases on that false premise.

You wrote:

GHS: (quoted in # 203) "Even when it comes to some basic issues, I have some fairly substantial disagreements with Rand. For example, I don't care for her definition of value ("that which one acts to gain and/or keep"), and I care even less for her definition of virtue ("the act by which one acts to gain and/or keep" a value)."

The key term is "basic". Basic issues always implies checking premises.

A few posts back, I had suggested to you:

"Can we agree that basing one's case on flawed premises (whether it is in a courtroom or in a discussion) would mean to pull the ground from under one's own feet?

If yes, I'd suggest we leave Rand's inadequate definitions of value/virtue aside and proceed without them." (Xray)

I'd suggest we leave Rand's non-definition of "sacrifice" aside as well (There exists no "wrong" definition. Either something is a definition or it isn't).

GHS: Since a philosophical essay, by its very nature, only skims the surface of a complex subject (or subjects), it is absurdly easy to find holes in it, such as unstated assumptions, unproven assertions, and the like.

Again, the issue is always the premises on which the philosopher bases his arguments. Going straight for them is the royal road.

GHSIf, however, one fundamentally respects the abilities of a given philosopher, there is another way to read her, namely, from a perspective that I call "sympathetic."

When it comes to philosophers of our time, isn't respect for their abilities closely tied to the truth of their premises?

In other words, suppose you found out her premises are false, would you still advocate her philosophy?

GHS: These presumptions (which are defeasible, btw) depend not only on one's purpose in reading (which will vary) but also on one's assessment of a philosopher's credibility.

Same issue as above. Doesn't the truth of philospher's premises play an essential part in establishing that credibility?

GHS: I have a high regard which is why I sometimes get annoyed by what I see as pot shots taken by those on OL who seem to harve a low regard for Rand's philosophic abilities.

On what precisely is your high regard for Rand's credibility based?

GHS: The latter was manifested in an earlier discussion about whether Rand should be viewed as a "serious" philosopher.

I have no interest in whether Rand is considered a serious philosopher. I'm interested in whether what she says has basis in fact. Freeing an ethics discussion from the confines of religion has been among most the profound "changes of values" I have personally experienced, which is why my focus is on "Philosophers without Gods, to quote a book with the same title.

Edited April 24, 2010 by Xray

[Brant Gaede]

Xray: What would your reaction have been if Dagny just walked up to the guard and simply shot him out of hand? And if the other heroes killed almost everybody if not everybody in the guards' quarters? I'm curious because that's what happens in a real life operation of that kind and Ayn Rand didn't have it in her to write that kind of real life.

Shooting the guard is consistent with the novel, which seemingly requires everyone to first have a conversation.

In a movie, of course, the guard would suddenly go for his gun or some such thing. A movie would have to be much more action oriented and dynamic. You'd need a mini-series for the verbosity. Or, a movie would have to be much, much different than the novel, unlike We the Living.

--Brant

Edited April 24, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[George H. Smith]

I only quoted a fragment of Rand's discussion of the virtue of rationality. This was for the purpose of illustrating the "disposition" aspect of her treatment. If you read the full discussion in "The Objectivist Ethics," you will find that, for Rand, the virtue of rationality is a kind of generic virtue, one that subsumes a number of other virtues, specifically, independence, integrity, honesty, and justice. These would clearly not apply to a bank robber, no matter how thoroughly he planned his crime.

The problem is that those other virtues are mostly what Greg Nyquist called "fudge words" which people can fill with whatever suits them. Take "justice" for example: virtually every ideologist will have that word in stock. Millions have lost the lives in the name of "justice" ...

So what? Many different words have been used in many different ways. What do you suggest we do about it? Banish all such words from our vocabulary? A better solution is to be tolerably clear about what we mean when we use a word.

Or take "integrity". A look at Randian heroes is quite enlightening in that respect. Since Rand meant her heroes to be understood as role models of how man should be, examing them closely in that respect is warranted. Remember the scene where Dagny cold-bloodedly shoots the guard? Was this an act of integrity? Imo there was no need to shoot that guard at all. To me, this scene was among the most shocking in AS.

Anyone who gets his entire philosophy of life from a novel deserves whatever he gets. Are you aware that AS is work of fiction? If so, are you aware that fiction writers frequently write scenes for dramatic effect that are not meant to be taken as practical advice for how readers should live their lives?

As for "honesty" - I can think of quite a few situations where honesty would actually conflict with rationality. So in favor of which virtue is the scale to be tipped in such a situation?

By "honesty," Rand doesn't mean that it is never rational or moral to lie to others. If a thug is pointing a gun at you, for example, you are not obligated to tell him the truth. That would be absurd.

You write very long posts, so I'm going to take this a little bit at a time.

Ghs

[Barbara Branden]

I hadn't read any of this thread until now-- but before I began to read it, I had posted the following to another thread::

"Brant, by my understanding of Rand you're quite right that she did not grasp the effect of her rants and moralizing. She had no understanding of the power of her personality -- for good or for bad. I remember once telling her that when she entered a room, all eyes turned to her, that she exuded an aliveness, an intensity, a certainty, that had an almost hypnotic effect. She was startled by my statement; it was not at all her sense of herself -- especialy since she felt inadequate in social situations.

"I did not add that I had come to understand the dangerous power of certainty after years of studying her effect on people -- that for many people, the strength of her convictions persuaded them of the truth of what she claimed almost apart from the content or reasons of those convictions."

Barbara

[Brant Gaede]

I hadn't read any of this thread until now-- but before I began to read it, I had posted the following to another thread::

"Brant, by my understanding of Rand you're quite right that she did not grasp the effect of her rants and moralizing. She had no understanding of the power of her personality -- for good or for bad. I remember once telling her that when she entered a room, all eyes turned to her, that she exuded an aliveness, an intensity, a certainty, that had an almost hypnotic effect. She was startled by my statement; it was not at all her sense of herself -- especialy since she felt inadequate in social situations.

"I did not add that I had come to understand the dangerous power of certainty after years of studying her effect on people -- that for many people, the strength of her convictions persuaded them of the truth of what she claimed almost apart from the content or reasons of those convictions."

Barbara

Thanks. This is a crystallization for me of the effect she could have on not fully formed, young, minds. What do they want more than certainty? It's a big, scary world awaiting them and certainty is an amelioration of fear.

--Brant

[Brant Gaede]

I hadn't read any of this thread until now-- but before I began to read it, I had posted the following to another thread::

"Brant, by my understanding of Rand you're quite right that she did not grasp the effect of her rants and moralizing. She had no understanding of the power of her personality -- for good or for bad. I remember once telling her that when she entered a room, all eyes turned to her, that she exuded an aliveness, an intensity, a certainty, that had an almost hypnotic effect. She was startled by my statement; it was not at all her sense of herself -- especialy since she felt inadequate in social situations.

"I did not add that I had come to understand the dangerous power of certainty after years of studying her effect on people -- that for many people, the strength of her convictions persuaded them of the truth of what she claimed almost apart from the content or reasons of those convictions."

Barbara

Thanks. This is a crystallization for me of the effect she could have on not fully formed, young, minds. What do they want more than certainty? It's a big, scary world awaiting them and certainty is an amelioration of fear.

--Brant

Who in Atlas "had the power of certainty"?

--Brant

[Christopher]

Who in Atlas "had the power of certainty"?

Anyone who used their minds were certain about their behavior in those areas where they used them. Guilt caused some people to stop their minds in certain situations though, like Reardan with his family

[Brant Gaede]

Who in Atlas "had the power of certainty"?

Anyone who used their minds were certain about their behavior in those areas where they used them. Guilt caused some people to stop their minds in certain situations though, like Reardan with his family

I am thinking of one particular character and I'm pretty sure who it is; I'm still trying to find the quote.

--Brant

help!

[Xray]

George H. Smith: Many different words have been used in many different ways. What do you suggest we do about it? Banish all such words from our vocabulary? A better solution is to be tolerably clear about what we mean when we use a word.

I'd suggest to tie the 'floating abstraction fudge words' like e. g. "freedom", "justice", etc. to reality by asking those who propagate them to be not only "tolerably clear", but "unmistakeably clear", thus getting them to show their colors without allowing them any wiggle room.

By asking them direct questions like e. g.

"Freedom for whom and from what?"

"Is that freedom of person X reached at the expense of others whose freedoem is impaired?"

"Let's exercise it through with a concrete example and examine it from all angles."

In that context, I would have asked Ayn Rand Rand point-blank questions like: "In Dagny's situation, would you have shot the guard too, Miss Rand? Would you have done it as "calmly and impersonally" as your heroine?

If yes, why?

If not, why not?"

These questions would have been justified since Rand stressed in her afterword to AS that people (of a similar mindset) like her fictional heroes did exist, leaving no doubt imo as to whom she had in mind: herself and those close to her.

Brant Gaede: Xray: What would your reaction have been if Dagny just walked up to the guard and simply shot him out of hand? And if the other heroes killed almost everybody if not everybody in the guards' quarters? I'm curious because that's what happens in a real life operation of that kind and Ayn Rand didn't have it in her to write that kind of real life.

Good question. I believe I would have been as shocked if the action(s) were also described as "calmly and impersonally", which to me suggests a cold-blooded 'killer' attitude.

BG: Shooting the guard is consistent with the novel, which seemingly requires everyone to first have a conversation.

Imo it is consistent with the novel in that no empathy is shown. The conversation serves the purpose to illustrate a philosophy without mercy.

Anyone who gets his entire philosophy of life from a novel deserves whatever he gets.

No doubt having such an attitude is bound to end in disaster.

GHS: Are you aware that AS is work of fiction?

That question, slightly modified, would have been a good one to ask Rand: "Have you forgotten that AS is a (mere) work of fiction, Miss Rand?" I recall Rand really suffered from there being no real John Galt-like heroes in her life.

Imo her calling Frank "John Galt on strike" was a helpless, almost touching attempt to 'rationalize' her husband's massive problems.

GHS: If so, are you aware that fiction writers frequently write scenes for dramatic effect that are not meant to be taken as practical advice for how readers should live their lives?

I don't think it was for mere dramatic effect. The issue runs far deeper than that.

A while back on OL, Dragonfly offered an excellent analysis of that scene.

Dragonfly:

"Rand inserts this passage as a philosophical lesson, and by doing that she doesn't soften the whole thing up, as Brant suggests, on the contrary, she makes it much harder by mentally torturing the guard."

....

"If she had wanted to show that a man who is not being able to make a decision is harmed by reality, there would be thousands of ways she could have done that without compromising Dagny (again: Rand creates the scenes and does not reproduce literally some real action). But she clearly gives the clue in the last sentence of that scene:

Quote [bolding mine (Xray)]

"Calmly and impersonally, she, who would have hesitated to fire at an animal, pulled the trigger and fired straight at the heart of a man who had wanted to exist without the responsibility of consciousness." AS, p. 1051 (pb).

There is only one conclusion possible: Dagny (who no doubt represents Rand's own ideas here) sees that guard, who cannot make up his mind (as he has insufficient information, as Jonathan correctly observed) as something lower than an animal, and has no compunction at all to shoot him. That is the core of that scene, the reason that she put it into the book, and not some naturalist excuse that he happened to be in the way by Galt's rescue (which she could have solved in many other ways, as I already indicated).

...

Rand inserts this passage as a philosophical lesson, and by doing that she doesn't soften the whole thing up, as Brant suggests, on the contrary, she makes it much harder by mentally torturing the guard."

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=7712&st=220&p=82449entry82449, post #234

DF: "The idea that the shooting of the guard by Dagny is just because he was in the way in an action scene where they're rescuing Galt and that this scene has no deeper philosophical meaning is a favorite fairy tale among Objectivists. I shot down that theory already 39;82320']here (scroll down a bit) and 39;82449']here."

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=8004&st=140&p=86738entry86738, post #158

DF: "If Rand only wanted to describe the situation where a guard had to be neutralized to rescue Galt, there are many other ways that could have been done, as I've indicated in an earlier post. Again: this is not some journalistic or naturalistic report where unexpected things happen that somehow have to be solved, this is a novel in which the author creates the scenes as she wants them. And Rand's comments makes it quite clear what the meaning of the scene is, namely not that you may kill a guard in an emergency situation, but that someone who cannot make up his mind is lower than an animal, and that you therefore may kill him without compunction. That is the reason that so many readers object to this scene, who would not have objected when Dagny had shot a guard in a real emergency where every second counts. Instead Dagny has all the time to do a sadistic cat-and-mouse play with the guard, who, no doubt quite contrary to Rand's intentions, in fact becomes the hero of the scene. After all he refuses to accept Dagny's allegations on faith, even at gunpoint, where a pragmatic person would have either attacked Dagny or surrendered. He's an idealist who refuses to act on uncertain and conflicting information and he's even prepared to die for it."

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=8004&st=180&p=86854entry86854, post # 182

GHS: What do you think of DF's arguments?

Edited April 30, 2010 by Xray

[George H. Smith]

George H. Smith: Many different words have been used in many different ways. What do you suggest we do about it? Banish all such words from our vocabulary? A better solution is to be tolerably clear about what we mean when we use a word.

I'd suggest to tie the 'floating abstraction fudge words' like e. g. "freedom", "justice", etc. to reality by asking those who propagate them to be not only "tolerably clear", but "unmistakably clear", thus getting them to show their colors without allowing them any wiggle room.

"Unmistakably clear" is fine with me. But "freedom' and "justice" are not floating abstractions. Nor need they function as "fudge words." To say, for example, that a kidnap victim has been deprived of her freedom is not fudging anything.

In that context, I would have asked Ayn Rand Rand point-blank questions like: "In Dagny's situation, would you have shot the guard too, Miss Rand? Would you have done it as "calmly and impersonally" as your heroine?

If yes, why?

If not, why not?"

Too bad you didn't get a chance to ask Rand.

Even if everything you say about the Dagny passage is correct, at most this would only show that Rand incorrectly applied her philosophical theory to a particular fictional scenario. So what? If you want unequivocal statements about what Rand meant by "freedom" and "justice," then you need to consult her nonfiction essays, such as "Man's Rights." In those she is unmistakably clear, so you should be a happy camper.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

I still think too much is being made of this guard thing. Like I said here on OL quite a while back, the guard was going to be killed by the heroine as a kind of gestalt to the heroine being killed by the guard at the end of "We the Living"--a kind of rebalancing of the scales. Esthetically, there had to be a conversation first. Most people in AS, especially the heroes, talk way too for real life much. Now, go write the scene better than Rand did. Throw in all the empathy you want to or can or whatever. Then rewrite the novel to match the rewrite of the scene. You don't have to actually do the latter in this scenario, just write a short paper on the major changes that will be necessary. The write a paper on the empathy of Joseph Stalin, Adolph Hitler, Lenin, Mao, Castro, Pol Pot, etc. In regard to Rand, write about her lack of empathy for the Wet Nurse or Cheryl Taggart.

"Atlas Shrugged" was a huge "No!" to collectivism written out of a profound empathy to humanity. That this empathy didn't well manifest itself through all the facets of who was Ayn Rand is, in this context, a triviality.

--Brant

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I'll be writing about this later, but I have been studying a lot on fiction writing. One HUGE concept I have learned is "through-line." There are several terms for through-line, like inner story, etc., but this is the term I like the best so far. It basically means a thread of plot and character development (among several) running throughout a larger work.

All major characters have through-lines, and an important part of a through-line is whether the character changes on something fundamental or remains steadfast. Most major fiction writing courses I have looked at, in fact, teach that a fundamental change in the major character is the whole point of the character's through-line. However, there are too many works like James Bond's stories where the main character remains steadfast to adopt that view.

Galt, for example, is another who did not change. He merely got fed up, made a plan to leave and take the good productive folks with him, executed his plan, told off the bad guys and schlubs, and left. There were some adventure things thrown in, but that's basically his through-line. If the story were only about Galt, it would not be all that interesting.

Dagny had a more complex through-line. She did not change according to her opinion of herself, nor according to her view of reality. Those parts remained steadfast. But she did change in relation to what she felt about other people. Dagny learned to hate. And she did so gradually.

Notice that her progression was presented in terms of giving up the railroad, but basically it meant giving up on a certain kind of person to use that railroad. In the early part, she would explode at her brother and other stupid people, but the sense was always in an expectation that one day they would see and correct their errors. As the book went on, she became more and more tired and increasingly repressed as she had to deal with the obstacles from others. Dagny even took time off to think about it when it all became clear to her. Finally, she accepted the hate. In fact, she learned to hate people who refused to think for themselves so much she could execute a person like the guard in cold blood and feel indifferent to his losing his life.

That's a lot of hate, but that's her through-line. And that is what finally made this passage make sense to me.

It was on purpose, too. Dagny's descent in her view of the non-thinkers is like a straight arrow from benevolence to hatred. Rand could not take this anywhere else at the end except a physical execution if she were to remain true to illustrating Dagny's change in the most dramatic form possible.

Now, is it good to learn how to hate that much?

That's a good question, and I do not believe it is, but that is a discussion for another time.

Michael

[Xray]

GHS: "Unmistakably clear" is fine with me. But "freedom' and "justice" are not floating abstractions. Nor need they function as "fudge words." To say, for example, that a kidnap victim has been deprived of her freedom is not fudging anything.

In that case, it IS unmistakeably clear what is meant by freedom.

GHS: If you want unequivocal statements about what Rand meant by "freedom" and "justice," then you need to consult her nonfiction essays, such as "Man's Rights." In those she is unmistakably clear, so you should be a happy camper.

It starts with "If one wants to advocate a free society, that is capitalism - "

Rand was an idelogist far more than a philosopher.

George:

I would like to continue the discussion about objective values. Whether they exist or not is of crucial importance, since every idea of objective morality rests on the premise of objective value.

Imo we have not gotten very far yet in examining whether objective values exist at all.

It has stopped with "instrumental values" being regarded as not sufficient, given that an instrumental value is a value "suited to purpose", which means that e. g. a killer's well-functioning gun or a dictator's well-functioning censorship would also be "objective" values if one equates "objective" value with a mere "instrumental" value.

From the # 93post (you asked about this quote on the 'Altruism' thread; thanks to Brant for finding it):

Xray: The means needed to achieve the subjectively valued goal can be assessed as suitable/not suitable.

If you want to cook, heat is of value to you because of your goal. But this does not make heat per se an "objective value".

I don't believe in values "per se" -- and neither did Rand, for that matter. She specifically said that values are not "intrinsic," and I assume you meant something similar by "per se."

Yes.

Therefore if "Reason, Purpose, Self-Esteem" are no intrinsic values, no values per se - then what are they?

Good idea to take this one step at a time.

It is true that my initial claim was that there is no such thing as an objective value.

Strictly speaking, the burden of proof would fall on you (in case your claim is that objective values do exist), since "X exists" is an affirmative statement, whereas mine is a negation.

This isn't necessarily true; it depends on exactly what your position is.

In what way does it depend on exactly what my position is? TIA for explaining.

Edited May 16, 2010 by Xray

[George H. Smith]

The means needed to achieve the subjectively valued goal can be assessed as suitable/not suitable.

If you want to cook, heat is of value to you because of your goal. But this does not make heat per se an "objective value".

I don't believe in values "per se" -- and neither did Rand, for that matter. She specifically said that values are not "intrinsic," and I assume you meant something similar by "per se."

Yes.

Therefore if "Reason, Purpose, Self-Esteem" are no intrinsic values, no values per se - then what are they?

An important feature of Rand' approach is her distinction between theories of intrinsic value, subjective value, and objective value. She rejects the first two theories and defends the third. (See, for example, her discussion in "What is Capitalism?" (in CUI, especially p. 20_.)

This is a well-known aspect of Rand's theory of value. I am frankly surprised that you are not familiar with it. Perhaps you should spend more time reading Rand before taking pot shots at her.

Ghs

[dan2100]

I am frankly surprised that you are not familiar with it. Perhaps you should spend more time reading Rand before taking pot shots at her.

Ghs

George, after years on the Internet and interacting with people via email, snailmail, and face-to-face regarding Rand and Objectivism, I'm frankly not surprised when someone is unfamiliar with some fairly or even extremely obvious aspect of Rand's thought or of Objectivism. I'm also frankly not surprised when people don't read her works or other important works by Objectivists -- not to mention journal articles and more obscure tracts. It's seems the nature of most people -- and I'm not excluding myself here -- to hold strong opinions without doing the required reading or other research. (In fact, online, the usual tack critics of Rand and Objectivism take is that they were in some online forum with someone claiming to be an Objectivist. This is akin to claiming to be a Proust expert not because you actually read and studied Proust's work and some of the relevant scholarship around him, but because you got into a mud-slinging match with someone online who claimed to have read some Proust back in college.)

[George H. Smith]

I am frankly surprised that you are not familiar with it. Perhaps you should spend more time reading Rand before taking pot shots at her.

Ghs

George, after years on the Internet and interacting with people via email, snailmail, and face-to-face regarding Rand and Objectivism, I'm frankly not surprised when someone is unfamiliar with some fairly or even extremely obvious aspect of Rand's thought or of Objectivism. I'm also frankly not surprised when people don't read her works or other important works by Objectivists -- not to mention journal articles and more obscure tracts. It's seems the nature of most people -- and I'm not excluding myself here -- to hold strong opinions without doing the required reading or other research. (In fact, online, the usual tack critics of Rand and Objectivism take is that they were in some online forum with someone claiming to be an Objectivist. This is akin to claiming to be a Proust expert not because you actually read and studied Proust's work and some of the relevant scholarship around him, but because you got into a mud-slinging match with someone online who claimed to have read some Proust back in college.)

I understand your point. But one of Xray's favorite topics is the supposed inadequacy of Rand's approach to values. Xray's profile indicates that she has subscribed to OL for over a year, so I assume she has been voicing her objections to Rand's theory of value for most of that time.

Now, if I were to join a website devoted to Proust, I would make a point of educating myself about his writings and ideas. I certainly wouldn't spend a year harping on a single point about Proust without first making damned sure that I knew what I'm talking about.

This is not just a hypothetical for me. Around 18 months ago, I joined the Yahoo site JazzWestCoast. This list has an impressive number of professional jazz critics and historians (many members have written books) and professional musicians (including arrangers and composers), some of whom have been active since the 1950s. Thus, although I had been a jazz buff since my high school days, I realized that I was a novice by JWC standards.

The knowledge that I was in the company of people who knew a lot more than I did generated an appropriate modesty. Although JWC has its share of arguments, for the first year I restricted myself pretty much to asking questions and seeking advice about what I should listen to and what I should read on the history of jazz. And I did a lot of reading during that year -- at least 25 books on jazz and its history.

Within the last six months I got a sense of confidence, based on the previous year of self-education, that motivated me to participate more actively in the debates. And now, when I do join in, I am treated with respect, even when more knowledgeable members disagree with me. And I earned that respect.

Of course, I'm not suggesting that an OL newbie should wait a year before actively participating in debates; jazz is a much broader subject than Objectivism, for one thing. But the basic principle applies in both cases. Xray's ignorance of Rand's distinction between intrinsic, subjective, and objective values is comparable to someone posting on JWC that he doesn't like the way Johnny Hodges played lead trumpet for Count Basie's Band, when in fact Hodges played alto sax for Duke Ellington's Band._

Ghs