Logical Structure of Objectivism

[Selene]

"You who prattle that morality is social and that man woould need no morality on a desert island - it is on a desert island that he would need it most.

This is certainly a very unorthodox use of the term 'morality'. If there was something a man on desert island would need most it would be ingenuity, resolve, patience, a strong will to survive, etc. But maybe this is what Rand means by 'morality'??

"What is morality, or ethics?" Ayn uses an equal sign here.

Ethics is an objective, metaphysical necessity of man’s survival . . ."

ergo ....

Ta da

Morality is an objective metaphysical necessity of man's survival now she takes you to the desert island and makes the "need" statement

Adam

[BaalChatzaf]

I (meaning X-Ray) am now going to prove the Ayn is wrong by fact checking a fictitious speech, spoken by a fictitious character in a romantic novel

Galt's Speech is not just any old speech. It is the summation and condensation of Rand's entire philosophy. Therefore any category errors, logical errors and factual errors expressed in that speech reflect the corresponding errors in her philosophy. I am assuming that there are no oversight errors or typographical errors in the Speech as it is written out in copies of the novel -Atlas Shrugged-. Whatever problems Ayn Rand had, doing careful work was not one of them. According to all the biographical data I have on Rand, she was a perfectionist both in her intent and her execution. Whatsoever she wrote for publication, therefore reflects or reflected are thinking at the time of publication.

So if the Speech has defects of a categorical, factual or logical nature, they fairly reflect the same defect in her philosophy. Objectivism, the philosophy, stands or falls as does the Speech.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited December 6, 2009 by BaalChatzaf

[Xray]

"Hello my name is Xray:

I am now going to prove the Ayn is wrong by fact checking a fictitious speech, spoken by a fictitious character in a romantic novel

What you leave out of the equation is that that many Objectivists do quote from Galt's speech as if his statements were fact.

See also Ba'al's post:

Ba'al Chatzaf: Galt's Speech is not just any old speech. It is the summation and condensation of Rand's entire philosophy. Therefore any category errors, logical errors and factual errors expressed in that speech reflect the corresponding errors in her philosophy. I am assuming that there are no oversight errors or typographical errors in the Speech as it is written out in copies of the novel -Atlas Shrugged-. Whatever problems Ayn Rand had, doing careful work was not one of them. According to all the biographical data I have on Rand, she was a perfectionist both in her intent and her execution. Whatsoever she wrote for publication, therefore reflects or reflected are thinking at the time of publication.

So if the Speech has defects of a categorical, factual or logical nature, they fairly reflect the same defect in her philosophy. Objectivism, the philosophy, stands or falls as does the Speech.

Selene: Not only am I going to do that and expect you to willingly suspend disbelief about why a sentient being would do this, but I am also

going to misuse the authoresses meaning of morality and conflate it with my subjective definition of morality.

Ethics is an objective, metaphysical necessity of man’s survival . . ."

Where did I subjectively define morality here?

If you want to go into defining morality, we can do this here or in one of the "ethics" threads.

"Ethics is an objective, metaphysical necessity of man’s survival . . ." (Ayn)

This is no definition since it does not differentiate enough. In its ambiguity, the statement would apply to e. g. water an air as well.

[Rand's idea of "metaphysical" is "that which pertains to reality, to the nature of things, to existence" (TVOS, 14). She even even speaks (ibid) of "metaphysical facts"(!).]

Ba'al So if the Speech has defects of a categorical, factual or logical nature, they fairly reflect the same defect in her philosophy. Objectivism, the philosophy, stands or falls as does the Speech.

Crucial point.

Objectivists often tell critics to read Rand in context, as if "Rand in context" were the be all and end all in itself.

But it does no stop there if one wants cut through. The next step is reading Rand in the context of reality and that's where the cascade of contradictions can be observed.

Edited December 6, 2009 by Xray

[merjet]

Compare it yourself. Merlin: Is it, or is it not, the Objectivist position that the choice to live is pre-moral? That is, if you choose death, there is no moral judgment associated with this, either by yourself and others. It's like fine, like whatever, dude! Death, life...whatever you want.*

I did compare your cryptic remark to the Rand quotes I cited, and the former was a hatchet job. Peikoff said the choice "precedes morality"; Rand did not (in published works) to the best of my knowledge.

I don't know what "the Objectivist position" means coming from you. Given your record of misrepresentations and distortions, it seems to mean whatever you whimsically want it to mean. Also, your asking for "the Objectivist position" in this case is like asking for "the one true meaning" of "puppy."

Edited December 6, 2009 by Merlin Jetton

[merjet]

The blunder is Rand's who collapses her own premise of 'objective values' by acknowledging the subjectivity of values without even realizing that she contradicts herself.

Translation:

Premise 1 - When Ayn Rand said X (a word/term) she meant this#1.

Premise 2 - In Xray-speak X (same word/term) means this#2.

Premise 3 - (Non-objectively and may be unstated.) Xray is right and Rand is wrong.

Conclusion - Attack!

You dodged Barnes' blunder and his alleged 'makes no sense'.

Note also the factual contradiction. He says:

"To live, man must hold three things as the supreme and ruling values of his life: Reason, Purpose, Self Esteem. (Galt)

Well, these don't happen to be my supreme and ruling values, but still I live.

Merlin, how is this possible, since per Galt I must have these as supreme and ruling values to "live" ?

Something must be wrong with Galt's premise.

Hogwash. There is no contradiction. For anybody else who tries to and can understand more than one sentence at a time, Galt is talking about living according to a rational moral code, not survival by any means. Looters and moochers manage to survive dependently, but they are not who he talks about in that sentence.

Are you trying to tell us you live without reason, purposes, or self-esteem? Please tell us what your supreme and ruling values are.

[tjohnson]

"You who prattle that morality is social and that man woould need no morality on a desert island - it is on a desert island that he would need it most.

This is certainly a very unorthodox use of the term 'morality'. If there was something a man on desert island would need most it would be ingenuity, resolve, patience, a strong will to survive, etc. But maybe this is what Rand means by 'morality'??

"What is morality, or ethics?" Ayn uses an equal sign here.

Ethics is an objective, metaphysical necessity of man's survival . . ."

ergo ....

Ta da

Morality is an objective metaphysical necessity of man's survival now she takes you to the desert island and makes the "need" statement

Adam

• S: (n) ethic, moral principle, value-system, value orientation (the principles of right and wrong that are accepted by an individual or a social group) "the Puritan ethic"; "a person with old-fashioned values"
• S: (n) ethic, ethical code (a system of principles governing morality and acceptable conduct)
• S: (n) ethical motive, ethics, morals, morality (motivation based on ideas of right and wrong)
• S: (n) ethics, moral philosophy (the philosophical study of moral values and rules)

In view of the above Rand's idea of what 'ethics' means is very different from the usual meaning. There is nothing in traditional use of the term that indicates ethics is necessary for survival. It usually means something necessary to establish acceptable, proper, right, etc. behaviour. But we have been through this before many times. I will not argue that the man on the desert island will need to use all his survival skills to live and if Rand wants to call that 'ethics' so be it. But it certainly creates communication difficulties when you try to explain the philosophy to others!

[Selene]

"You who prattle that morality is social and that man woould need no morality on a desert island - it is on a desert island that he would need it most.

This is certainly a very unorthodox use of the term 'morality'. If there was something a man on desert island would need most it would be ingenuity, resolve, patience, a strong will to survive, etc. But maybe this is what Rand means by 'morality'??

"What is morality, or ethics?" Ayn uses an equal sign here.

Ethics is an objective, metaphysical necessity of man's survival . . ."

ergo ....

Ta da

Morality is an objective metaphysical necessity of man's survival now she takes you to the desert island and makes the "need" statement

Adam

• S: (n) ethic, moral principle, value-system, value orientation (the principles of right and wrong that are accepted by an individual or a social group) "the Puritan ethic"; "a person with old-fashioned values"
• S: (n) ethic, ethical code (a system of principles governing morality and acceptable conduct)
• S: (n) ethical motive, ethics, morals, morality (motivation based on ideas of right and wrong)
• S: (n) ethics, moral philosophy (the philosophical study of moral values and rules)

In view of the above Rand's idea of what 'ethics' means is very different from the usual meaning. There is nothing in traditional use of the term that indicates ethics is necessary for survival. It usually means something necessary to establish acceptable, proper, right, etc. behaviour. But we have been through this before many times. I will not argue that the man on the desert island will need to use all his survival skills to live and if Rand wants to call that 'ethics' so be it. But it certainly creates communication difficulties when you try to explain the philosophy to others!

GS:

Yes it does. It is also the responsibility of the Objectivist to recognize that and come into the conversation prepared to explain that to the other person. One of the reasons for defining terms. Glad we can understand each other.

Unfortunately, many Objectivist get pompous and condescending instead of using the opportunity to work with the person to understand the differences in Ayn's lexicon. semantic etc.

Adam

[rhartford]

"Objectivity thus has two distinct roles: its descriptive role for logically proving the choice to live, and its normative role for implementation of the choice to live.

. . .

But when it comes to deciding which ethical standard or code to actually live by, the justification is offered in the context of a more fundamental issue: how to live as a moral person.

The issue of how to live as a moral person isn’t driven by the justification, although many people present the issue that way. Rather, the desire to live as a moral person precedes the justification.

Looking back, as a youngster I was interested in "what was right," both in terms of discovering truth and understanding proper action. For me, understanding proper action meant and means knowledge of the actions that can be proved valid. That led to my attempt at a cognitive validation of the foundational principle of ethics in my 2007 paper.

As you rightly say, my "desire to live as a moral person precede[d] the justification." But, in my case, and I suspect in most cases, a person's search for "how to live as a moral person" is driven by a search for a justified moral code.

Edited December 6, 2009 by Robert Hartford

[Daniel Barnes]

Compare it yourself. Merlin: Is it, or is it not, the Objectivist position that the choice to live is pre-moral? That is, if you choose death, there is no moral judgment associated with this, either by yourself and others. It's like fine, like whatever, dude! Death, life...whatever you want.*

I did compare your cryptic remark to the Rand quotes I cited, and the former was a hatchet job. Peikoff said the choice "precedes morality"; Rand did not (in published works) to the best of my knowledge.

I don't know what "the Objectivist position" means coming from you. Given your record of misrepresentations and distortions, it seems to mean whatever you whimsically want it to mean. Also, your asking for "the Objectivist position" in this case is like asking for "the one true meaning" of "puppy."

This is truly pathetic.

If you "don't know what 'the Objectivist position' means" coming from me, how about you look in "Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand" from whence I took it?

While indeed it is a book by Leonard Peikoff, you don't seem to have noticed the title.

Yes, what a "hatchet" job it is for me to dare to present a position from a book called "Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand" and make the claim that it represents the views of Objectivism and Ayn Rand! The temerity!

Well, at least now everyone can see exactly the type of shocking "misrepresentations and distortions" Merlin likes to accuse me of....;-)

Edited December 6, 2009 by Daniel Barnes

[Selene]

Compare it yourself. Merlin: Is it, or is it not, the Objectivist position that the choice to live is pre-moral? That is, if you choose death, there is no moral judgment associated with this, either by yourself and others. It's like fine, like whatever, dude! Death, life...whatever you want.*

I did compare your cryptic remark to the Rand quotes I cited, and the former was a hatchet job. Peikoff said the choice "precedes morality"; Rand did not (in published works) to the best of my knowledge.

I don't know what "the Objectivist position" means coming from you. Given your record of misrepresentations and distortions, it seems to mean whatever you whimsically want it to mean. Also, your asking for "the Objectivist position" in this case is like asking for "the one true meaning" of "puppy."

This is truly pathetic.

If you "don't know what 'the Objectivist position" means" coming from me, how about you look in "Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand" from whence I took it?

While indeed it is a book by Leonard Peikoff, you don't seem to have noticed the title.

Ah so Marxism: The Philosophy of Karl Marx by Leon Trotsky [comes with ice pick] would be a trustworthy source also,... if it existed?

Adam

[anonrobt]

Compare it yourself. Merlin: Is it, or is it not, the Objectivist position that the choice to live is pre-moral? That is, if you choose death, there is no moral judgment associated with this, either by yourself and others. It's like fine, like whatever, dude! Death, life...whatever you want.*

I did compare your cryptic remark to the Rand quotes I cited, and the former was a hatchet job. Peikoff said the choice "precedes morality"; Rand did not (in published works) to the best of my knowledge.

I don't know what "the Objectivist position" means coming from you. Given your record of misrepresentations and distortions, it seems to mean whatever you whimsically want it to mean. Also, your asking for "the Objectivist position" in this case is like asking for "the one true meaning" of "puppy."

This is truly pathetic.

If you "don't know what 'the Objectivist position" means" coming from me, how about you look in "Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand" from whence I took it?

While indeed it is a book by Leonard Peikoff, you don't seem to have noticed the title.

One should take a look at the topic Choosing Life in the forum - it carries this further, the issue...

[Daniel Barnes]

Ah so Marxism: The Philosophy of Karl Marx by Leon Trotsky [comes with ice pick] would be a trustworthy source also,... if it existed?

Adam, everyone knows that your (not entirely) imaginary book The Philosophy of Karl Marx by Leon Trotsky was secretly rewritten by Zionist Elders and the CIA.

Edited December 6, 2009 by Daniel Barnes

[Selene]

Ah so Marxism: The Philosophy of Karl Marx by Leon Trotsky [comes with ice pick] would be a trustworthy source also,... if it existed?

Adam, everyone knows that your (not entirely) imaginary book The Philosophy of Karl Marx by Leon Trotsky was secretly rewritten by Zionist Elders and the CIA.

The sad part is that the book is still available...1963 -

Hmm, now that you mention it, I think I saw one of the other two shooting teams in Dealy Plaza reading that book.

Thanks for the memory jog!

By the way where were you on November 22nd, 1963 and while you are at it, where were you on the night of January 16th?

Adam

getting the thumb cuffs ready

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

The mere fact of violation doesn't explain why your ethical standards should take precedence over others.

Brendan,

Here' the problem that gets left out with this kind of thinking. If someone "violates" my ethical standards, they are forcing me into a kind of slavery to them. There are actual people with actual guns to back up that enslavement. And they will come.

On my end, if I decide to stop working (as did Galt) and this "violates" the ethical standards of others, this also forces them into a kind of slavery. But that slavery is to reality, not to me. The only thing backing up that "enslavement" is that they will die if they do not produce or find food, shelter, etc. Reality will kill them. I'm not backing up anything in that case. I'm just gone.

In other words, the "violation" of my ethical standards involves someone pointing a gun at me in the end and telling me to produce something. My "violation" of the ethical standards of others (the "Galt violation" so to speak) is simply my absence. There is no gun. (Or club or whatever. You know what I mean.) There is only them and reality.

This is the crucial point.

So Galt was not chastising people because he wanted them to be like him and follow his one true path to enlightenment. He simply wanted them to get out of his way and leave him alone. But, so long as they want something from him, he chastised them for not offering anything in return and living according to a code where that is acceptable. And to help out, as a gift, he gave them an analysis of their errors and a blueprint for how to offer something. And find happiness, his form of happiness, to boot.

Maybe your impression of the book is different, but in my impression, Galt is not really concerned with anyone who does not want something from him. It's live and let live, so to speak.

But here's a thought. You might be surprised to learn that I actually agree with you that dividing all people up into producers and parasites is wrong and makes for dangerous politics. And I agree with you that such a division is an extreme oversimplification.

In my view, these poles (producer and parasite) are the extreme ends of a scale with all sorts of ways to measure the human experience in between. Not only are most all people mixed, there are also vastly different standards involved in human affairs that are just as critical.

For instance, I am reading Dan Ariely's Predictably Irrational right now. He makes a strong empirical case for family/friend/good neighbor being one setting with its own kinds of values/standards and the marketplace being another. He shows—through repeatable experiments—how things like chipping in and helping out in a family setting can tear apart the family when strict market values are applied, and vice-versa, how using "family" values in the marketplace can lead to financial ruin. And he shows where they can mix quite successfully. And a lot of other cool stuff, besides. I find that pretending that both settings—with their respective values and standards—are the same is one of the oversimplifications that the producer/parasite model makes.

I do think, however, that focusing on the producer/parasite poles is extremely useful for arriving at isolated—albeit universal—principles. Especially when guns are involved. The destruction guns cause when used on humans is extreme, so it is fitting to look at extreme poles in evaluating their meaning.

Here's one such principle, and an ethical principal at that (from Galt's radio speech in Atlas Shrugged): "Morality ends where a gun begins."

Michael

[CNA]

Mike,

I apologize but can you please check your private message I just sent. very important please

[Xray]

You dodged Barnes' blunder and his alleged 'makes no sense'.

It was you who dodged addressing the gist of my # 365 post where I pointed out that what Barnes said meshes perfectly with what Rand implied in her "hat" example: that people choose their subjective values (to which she did not object).

The fact that in other parts of her work, Rand made contradictory statements is the problem of her thinking, not of DB's.

So that boot is on Rand's, not on Barnes' foot.

Contrary to the myth, coherent thinking was not Rand's strong suit. I can give you a plethora of examples proving this.

For anybody else who tries to and can understand more than one sentence at a time, Galt is talking about living according to a rational moral code, not survival by any means. Looters and moochers manage to survive dependently, but they are not who he talks about in that sentence.

And "rational" is what Galt arbitrarily claims it to be. Simple as that. So when he says it is rational, you believe it?

Sea also my posts # 365 an # 370 where I elaborated further.

Have you also read Dragonfly's # 393 post? Any comments?

Are you trying to tell us you live without reason, purposes, or self-esteem? Please tell us what your supreme and ruling values are.

I'm telling you that testing in how far Rand's alleged definitions of her cardinal values "Reason, Purpose, Self-esteem" correspond to reality is the litmus test where you can see what is left of them.

Reason is per Rand: "the faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by man’s senses."

Okay, then the bank robber visually checking out a flight route too possesses this faculty, one of Objectivism's cardinal values.

Rand does not define purpose, merely says what the purpose is. Therefore "purpose" taken alone can't be a value in itself, not even a subjective value.

"Productive work is the central purpose of a rational man’s life, the central value that integrates and determines the hierarchy of all his other values. Reason is the source, the precondition of his productive work—pride is the result". (Rand)

"Productive work" is another empty container everyone can fill out with their own 'productions'. A serial killer can think of himself as productive and also have "pride" in the number of his victims.

Self-esteem is per Rand "the inviolate certainty that his mind is competent to think and his person is worthy of happiness, which means: is worthy of living".

Merlin, do you know of any person not mentally impaired who does not have the inviolate certainty that man's mind is competent to think? My five year-olds already know that we have a brain enabling us to think.

So I suppose Rand again meant it connotatively, which means nothing but 'what she conceives as thinking in the right way', (which per Rand, can only be the objectivist way). Circle closed.

"Worthy of happiness, worthy of living" imo reflect Rand's own trauma of being rejected in her early years. That old wound of hers never healed.

But for someone who has never experienced such trauma, it can be assumed that the desire for being thought "worthy of living" won't show up as their cardinal value.

Edited December 6, 2009 by Xray

[Daniel Barnes]

You dodged Barnes' blunder and his alleged 'makes no sense'.

Apparently it is a shocking "blunder" to attribute to Rand and Objectivism views put forward in "Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand."

Is there no depth of dishonesty that critics of Rand will not stoop too?

Surely no serious academic would consider such a ridiculous claim as authentic?

We look forward to the forthcoming edition of the above sufficiently corrected by M. Jetton to reflect the true views of Miss Rand...;-)

Edited December 6, 2009 by Daniel Barnes

[jeffrey smith]

I do think, however, that focusing on the producer/parasite poles is extremely useful for arriving at isolated—albeit universal—principles. Especially when guns are involved. The destruction guns cause when used on humans is extreme, so it is fitting to look at extreme poles in evaluating their meaning.

Here's one such principle, and an ethical principal at that (from Galt's radio speech in Atlas Shrugged): "Morality ends where a gun begins."

Michael

Yet even there the matter is not as clearcut as Rand believed it to be.

Her meaning in that sentence was, in essence, that coercion removes the ability to make moral decisions on the part of the coerced person, and that nothing such a person does in such a situation can be considered either immoral or moral. But that's not a view that is always accepted: it is possible to act morally even in the presence of co-ercion: at the very least, to respond to the co-ercion in a moral manner.

The classic situation is A telling B that if B does not kill C, A will himself kill B, with the premise that neither B nor C have done up to that point anything morally culpable: in other words, C is not a terrorist planning to destroy a city or a serial killer whom the law can not bring to justice for one reason or another. C is just an ordinary person who has the unfortunate problem that A wants him dead. A further premise is that B would be unable to avoid being killed by A if A chooses to kill B. In those circumstances, does the threat to his own life give enough justification (or at least excuse) for B to kill C, or is the morally good choice to refuse to kill C even if it is certain that A will then kill B?

I've seen a quote from Rand in which she was presented with this hypothetical situation (as part of a live radio show, IIRC). She answered (rough paraphrase/summary) that she couldn't answer it, because it was impossible to make a moral choice in such a situation: the element of coercion had placed the situation outside the possibility of moral choice.

It so happens that a famous Talmudic passage (Sanhedrin 74a, if you want to look it up) revolves around this sort of situation: a man came before the Talmudic sage Raba, to ask for guidance in a case in which he had been forced into being person B (the person who must kill or be killed). Raba answered, "Let him [person A] kill you, but you may not kill the other man [person C]. Who can say your blood is redder than his? Perhaps his blood is redder than yours." [Raba was apparently quoting a Mesopotamian proverb.] To phrase it in semi-Randian terms, there are times when fulfilling the value principles that allow you to live as "man qua man" means allowing oneself to die; that refusing to accept the coercion is the proper moral choice ("No, I will not do this, even if you do kill me.")

I suspect that Rand herself allowed some wrinkles in her view of the matter. Otherwise, her statement that the Russian people bore responsibility for their own government makes no sense--obviously the Russians were being coerced on a daily basis, so they bore no responsibility if coercion truly removes the possibility of moral choice.

(BTW, in some versions of the story, Raba is said to have continued with some friendly advice that the man might want to make a sudden trip to see his cousins on the other side of the Roman-Parthian border. This conversation took place in a city then known as Pumbeditha, and probably has implications for some of the modern residents of that place. The modern name is Fallujah.)

Jeffrey S.

[Ellen Stuttle]

1) What is it you're thinking I'm "quite wrong" about? That you miss the difference [between words and concepts]? Or that there is a difference?

The former, obviously, as I refer to the Objectivist adoption of the nominalist position of words as "labels".

Well, that's a reason why I think that you miss the difference. Else why would you consider Rand's calling words "labels" to be an "adoption of the nominalist position"? Labels of what (i.e., what does Rand say is being labeled)?

2) Specifically what "same problem"? If all you mean is infinite regress, I don't see that that problem does arise for a hierarchy of concepts. (It would be a problem if all that words did refer to was other words, but as messy as word meanings can get in standard language, there are ponies in there, i.e., real referents.)

Once again, the problem is not "real referents." It never has been.

That's why in the "puppy" example both people point to "real referents." It demonstrates how this doesn't decide a disagreement over who has the "true" or "false" meaning of a word.*

There's another reason why I think you miss the difference between concepts and words. The problem isn't, and never has been, one of "real referents"? According to whom? That's just where the issue of defining lies, according to Rand (ITOE): in identifying the nature of the referents subsumed by a concept.

As to the puppy example, I consider it a red-herring, since what you have there is merely different uses of the same word, each with referents for which a correct or incorrect definition can be given. (Obversely, the same referents, with the same respective correct or incorrect definitions, could be labeled and expressed using words of any other language besides English.)

There are actually several problems conjoined, not the least of which is that concepts exist in our heads. Thus, until we get mind-melding up and running, they require some kind of shared audio-symbolic representation for us to discuss them. This usually means words, which brings us back to the beginning again. This is why "conceptual" analysis in practice amounts to verbalism.

Daniel, one point on which I think you have a legitimate criticism of actual Objectivist practice pertaining to definitions is that I have seen multiple cases in which Objectivists have argued, and sometimes fiercely, about the "real" meaning of a word instead of discussing the difference between the concept they're using and another concept labeled in common parlance by the same word. Unfortunately, Rand herself gave impetus to this practice in a passage you linked farther along from the Introduction to VOS.

I'll quote the full passage:

http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/selfishness.html

Second entry.

The meaning ascribed in popular usage to the word “selfishness” is not merely wrong: it represents a devastating intellectual “package-deal,” which is responsible, more than any other single factor, for the arrested moral development of mankind.

In popular usage, the word “selfishness” is a synonym of evil; the image it conjures is of a murderous brute who tramples over piles of corpses to achieve his own ends, who cares for no living being and pursues nothing but the gratification of the mindless whims of any immediate moment.

Yet the exact meaning and dictionary definition of the word “selfishness” is: concern with one’s own interests.

This concept does not include a moral evaluation; it does not tell us whether concern with one’s own interests is good or evil; nor does it tell us what constitutes man’s actual interests. It is the task of ethics to answer such questions.

“Introduction,” The Virtue of Selfishness, vii

Note that she starts by speaking of "the word 'selfishness'" but then switches in the fourth paragraph to "concept." The Introduction was written in 1964, prior to ITOE, which was published in 1966-67. I figure that she hadn't yet clearly worked out the views on the nature of definitions which she discussed in the later work. Regrettable that she didn't revise or at least elucidate the earlier passage in the light of the later. I think she would still have said that the concept meant by standard usage is a "package-deal" and a devastatingly harmful one, linking evil and self-interest as it does. But if she'd been consistent with her later presentation, she would have changed from speaking of the meaning of the word being wrong and instead focused entirely on the problem with the concept (which she might have considered a pseudo-concept).

I suspect you'd claim that this would make no difference, that the problem of Objectivists' arguing about the meaning of the word rather than about the nature of the referents is inevitable. I don't agree about the inevitability; I think the practice is a mistaken application of Rand's views on definitions and that people could learn not to make this mistake.

This is not to say that words are useless, any more than letters are useless just because debating spelling is trivial. It's just that arguments over their meaning cannot be resolved into "true" and "false" without resort to convention as the standard for such a decision. And Rand rejects convention as such a standard so it seems to me to be checkmate.

I see no checkmate, only a misunderstanding of Rand's views on definitions.

Instead of arguments over definitions, which cannot be so decided, we should instead debate plans, proposals, policies, theories etc which can be. For example, while the argument over the meaning of "puppy" cannot be resolved without resort to convention, a debate over whether, say, lowering taxes will [lead] to greater prosperity or whether Mercury is closer to the Sun than Earth can be tested, and decided as "true" or "false" regardless of what convention dictates.

Although, again, you're speaking as if debates about definitions will necessarily pertain to the meaning of words, not to the nature of the referents, even on your own claim that what should be debated is "plans, proposals, policies, theories etc", how would you decide the truth or falsity of the propositions you indicate without the disputants first having in mind the same referents for the terms of the propositions? The disputants would have to agree that they're talking about "that particular object in the sky," for instance, to assess its relative closeness to "that other particular object in the sky" compared to the celestial object on which they're living.

But perhaps I am wrong, so perhaps you could counter with some examples of some important "true" and "false" definitions that Rand identified, and step us through the workings by which she determined that they were "true" and the common usages she derided were "false".

I've already discussed the "selfishness" example. Re "altruism," another where her usage is at variance with common usage, I think she acknowledges the difference. "Sacrifice" you folks have been going at, and at, and at -- the usual commotion over whether or not what she was talking about is something anyone does. I think that she didn't realize the difference between her meaning and standard-parlance meaning and that what she was identifying, correctly, is the factual result of people's being whipped by the scourge of guilt into taking actions and/or making monetary contributions for the sake of some moral ideal which they're told they ought to hold as more important than their own happiness: a net loss for the sake of no real reward.

Whatever the confusions introduced with her re-definings of common-parlance terms, however, she does illustrate in ITOE the process whereby one would arrive at a true definition of a concept's referents: the long example she gives on the meaning of "man." And whatever problems one might see in details of her discussion, I think it's plain that she isn't engaged in "verbalism" but instead in showing how to keep one's conceptual hierarchy tied to real referents and reflective of their real interrelationships.

Fast-forwarding through the end of your post: I already talked about "selfishness" above. Your slam at what Harry Binswanger argued on "Maverick Philosopher" I think misrepresents what happened. (I read all of that discussion while it was in process.) However, I'm not desirous of spending the time analyzing the details.

I'm unclear what you're talking about in your final paragraph:

And of course, shared meanings do not preclude the use of language for our own purposes of self-development either. I think this is an important function of language, and have previously remarked how this was one of the few interesting and imaginative parts of Rand's theory, and that it was a pity she didn't pursue it.

Ellen

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

To phrase it in semi-Randian terms, there are times when fulfilling the value principles that allow you to live as "man qua man" means allowing oneself to die; that refusing to accept the coercion is the proper moral choice ("No, I will not do this, even if you do kill me.")

I suspect that Rand herself allowed some wrinkles in her view of the matter.

Jeff,

Leaving aside Rand's odd pronouncement about the victims of a dictatorship being the cause (talk about colossal context-dropping!), I understand Rand's views in general to be of the "No, I will not do this, even if you do kill me" variety after a certain line has been crossed (i.e., in a pertinent context).

I even see that this is the message when Galt told Dagny to turn on him so she would not be tortured, as he would kill himself rather than live in a world where her torture was the inevitable outcome of staying true to his convictions.

Michael

[jeffrey smith]

To phrase it in semi-Randian terms, there are times when fulfilling the value principles that allow you to live as "man qua man" means allowing oneself to die; that refusing to accept the coercion is the proper moral choice ("No, I will not do this, even if you do kill me.")

I suspect that Rand herself allowed some wrinkles in her view of the matter.

Jeff,

Leaving aside Rand's odd pronouncement about the victims of a dictatorship being the cause (talk about colossal context-dropping!), I understand Rand's views in general to be of the "No, I will not do this, even if you do kill me" variety after a certain line has been crossed (i.e., in a pertinent context).

I even see that this is the message when Galt told Dagny to turn on him so she would not be tortured, as he would kill himself rather than live in a world where her torture was the inevitable outcome of staying true to his convictions.

Michael

It's possible. The quote I saw was fairly specific, but I think she stated her answer in the form of a refusal to give person B (the person ordered to kill) advice, not as what she might do in such a situation. So it's possible she felt she would prefer to die in such a situation, but that she had no right to say that others should do so.

I think the "Dagny being tortured" scene is not exactly relevant. It would be relevant if Galt was talking in terms of himself being forced to torture Dagny. As it stands, I think it's more connected to something Rand wrote in the "Ethics of Emergencies" (in VOS): If it is the man or woman one loves, then one can be willing to give one's own life to save him or her--for the selfish reason that life without the loved person would be unbearable.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Jeff,

It is relevant. The theme is the same even though the situation is different.

(Friggen aspies... )

Michael

[Brendan Hutching]

But here's a thought. You might be surprised to learn that I actually agree with you that dividing all people up into producers and parasites is wrong and makes for dangerous politics. And I agree with you that such a division is an extreme oversimplification.

Yes, it’s a no-brainer. But thanks for the thought, and in that spirit, here’s one in return. If the producer/parasite dichotomy does not reflect reality, what is the justification for using it to support your arguments, besides the convenience?

Miss Rand offers a handy aphorism in this case. If you detect a contradiction in your thinking, check your premises. If I were you, the premise I would check is this one: “In other words, the "violation" of my ethical standards involves someone pointing a gun at me in the end and telling me to produce something”.

While I agree that having someone point a gun at your end would be a bit nerve-wracking, who is forcing you to produce at gun-point?

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Brendan,

I didn't say it didn't reflect reality. I said it was oversimplified (and even dangerous) to categorize ALL people that way.

I find it obvious that the "producer/parasite" poles perfectly reflect facets of the human condition. The value of using the standard lies in the truth of the correspondence, which can be borne out by simple observation. You just limit it to where it is accurate.

Just to complete the rhetoric, there are people you could easily characterize as predominantly parasites and predominantly producers in all societies. So that is one more reflection of reality.

Even oversimplified things can reflect reality. The problem is reach, not total wrongness.

My main issue with categorizing ALL people (meaning all people in general, not just facets of all people) according to an oversimplified standard is that it leads to bigoted thinking. It's one thing to tell a person that in such-and-such a situation, he is being a producer and in another case a parasite, and calling him a parasite (or producer) in general—then dividing up humanity that way. In the first case, we are looking at parts of a person's life, so we are simply judging acts, not the total character of folks. In the second, if we are talking about all of humanity, we are being bigoted

As to the gun question, that image might be a bit oversimplified. So long as I started using metaphors in discussing ethics, here are some more. There is also a carrot (and a whip) along with the rod in the command to produce. But there is no question who the master is and what the command is. Nor is there any question about who pays and who gets paid.

You asked who this is. It's the government and folks to take recourse to it.

In any case and on the other end, I find it very difficult to call the wish to be left alone a valid violation of someone else's ethical standards.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Well, that's a reason why I think that you miss the difference. Else why would you consider Rand's calling words "labels" to be an "adoption of the nominalist position"? Labels of what (i.e., what does Rand say is being labeled)?

1) Concepts and also less obviously 2) physical objects, states of affairs, etc ie ostensive definitions, which Rand also mentions.

There's another reason why I think you miss the difference between concepts and words. The problem isn't, and never has been, one of "real referents"? According to whom? That's just where the issue of defining lies, according to Rand (ITOE): in identifying the nature of the referents subsumed by a concept.

Just to be clear, the problem I'm talking about is the problem of so called "true" and "false" definitions. Both the "puppies" refer to "real referents", ergo this particular problem is not one of whether "real referents" are involved or not. I specifically chose this example to head off this objection, though of course I got it anyway...;-)

As to the puppy example, I consider it a red-herring, since what you have there is merely different uses of the same word, each with referents for which a correct or incorrect definition can be given. (Obversely, the same referents, with the same respective correct or incorrect definitions, could be labeled and expressed using words of any other language besides English.)

Who says any different? The example was intended to be exactly the common problem you describe below, but with the referents deliberately markedly different (not to mention trivial) to try and throw the underlying issue into sharp relief. (Imagine your two Objectivists arguing over the "true" definition of a "puppy"). I could have easily chosen, say, "democracy" as an example. Or "selfishness". But "puppy" seemed to me to be about as obvious as I could make it (plus it has the nice grace note of being one of Popper's examples in the extensive end notes to The Open Society Vol 2). Perhaps not still not obvious enough however.

Daniel, one point on which I think you have a legitimate criticism of actual Objectivist practice pertaining to definitions is that I have seen multiple cases in which Objectivists have argued, and sometimes fiercely, about the "real" meaning of a word instead of discussing the difference between the concept they're using and another concept labeled in common parlance by the same word. Unfortunately, Rand herself gave impetus to this practice in a passage you linked farther along from the Introduction to VOS.

Rand doesn't just "give impetus" to this practice as if it was some kind of accidental nudge. It's expressed perfectly succinctly, in italics, in the ITOE. I'm sure I don't need to repeat this for you, but here it is again anyway:

"The truth or falsehood of all of man’s conclusions, inferences, thought and knowledge rests on the truth or falsehood of his definitions." (ITOE p65)

It seems reasonable to conclude she meant it.

Now, what you seem to be saying here (and below) is that really Rand was perfectly happy to accept multiple definitions (ie multiple concepts) of words so long as everyone explains what they mean, rather than declare some "true" and others "false" using a method that no-one seems able to produce. Well, if that's the case why doesn't she say so, in italics, in the ITOE?

Note that she starts by speaking of "the word 'selfishness'" but then switches in the fourth paragraph to "concept." The Introduction was written in 1964, prior to ITOE, which was published in 1966-67. I figure that she hadn't yet clearly worked out the views on the nature of definitions which she discussed in the later work. Regrettable that she didn't revise or at least elucidate the earlier passage in the light of the later. I think she would still have said that the concept meant by standard usage is a "package-deal" and a devastatingly harmful one, linking evil and self-interest as it does. But if she'd been consistent with her later presentation, she would have changed from speaking of the meaning of the word being wrong and instead focused entirely on the problem with the concept (which she might have considered a pseudo-concept).

If there is a problem in the theoretical link between self-interest and evil, I venture to suggest that using mediaeval scholastic methodology is not going to be the best way to identify and solve it. Instead it will result in exactly what you describe, and my argument predicts: two Objectivists tearing each other to pieces and progressing the problem forward not a whit.

I am trying to explain why this happens - it is due to a fundamental error of Rand's - and suggest a more productive approach.

I suspect you'd claim that this would make no difference, that the problem of Objectivists' arguing about the meaning of the word rather than about the nature of the referents is inevitable. I don't agree about the inevitability; I think the practice is a mistaken application of Rand's views on definitions and that people could learn not to make this mistake.

I fail to see where the "mistaken application" is. It's not a question of interpretation: Rand's views are quite explicit on the subject. They can be summarised simply in the above quote from the ITOE. Objectivists demonstrably follow her in this, as you have said. They just don't know it's fallacious. Not many people do, regrettably.

Although, again, you're speaking as if debates about definitions will necessarily pertain to the meaning of words, not to the nature of the referents, even on your own claim that what should be debated is "plans, proposals, policies, theories etc", how would you decide the truth or falsity of the propositions you indicate without the disputants first having in mind the same referents for the terms of the propositions? The disputants would have to agree that they're talking about "that particular object in the sky," for instance, to assess its relative closeness to "that other particular object in the sky" compared to the celestial object on which they're living.

But that is precisely what I do say! The disputants would have to agree on the meaning of their terms. This is what is called a convention.

I'm not sure how you could think this is a point against my argument when it is my argument...;-)

I've already discussed the "selfishness" example.

No, you haven't. To repeat, the question I posed was: can you give some examples of important "true" and "false" definitions that Rand identified, and step us through the workings by which she made these determinations. (I suggested "selfishness" as a possible starter).

You didn't respond to this, but instead discussed some infelicities in Rand's presentation between words and concepts.

Now that this is clear, do you have some examples in mind?

Re "altruism," another where her usage is at variance with common usage, I think she acknowledges the difference.

Likewise with this. Once again, the issue is not "where her usage is at variance" with common usage. It's not about "acknowledging" the difference. I've said nothing of the sort, I'm not sure why you think this is relevant. Let me restate again: Rand did not say "Let a million meanings bloom!" She said that the definitions of words could be divided into categories of "true" and "false", and that this making determination was extremely important - all our knowledge rests on it!

All I have asked for is some examples of this supposedly important supposed process supposedly working. None seem to be forthcoming.

Whatever the confusions introduced with her re-definings of common-parlance terms...

Once again, this is not the issue.

...however, she does illustrate in ITOE the process whereby one would arrive at a true definition of a concept's referents: the long example she gives on the meaning of "man." And whatever problems one might see in details of her discussion, I think it's plain that she isn't engaged in "verbalism" but instead in showing how to keep one's conceptual hierarchy tied to real referents and reflective of their real interrelationships.

The problem is exactly in the details of her discussion. This is what I'm saying: it sounds like a plausible theory, except when you look at the details, it doesn't work. And the output is verbalism. Having claimed that a "proper, philosophically valid [!] definition" is that man is a "rational animal", look at the entirely ad hoc way she avoids classifying a rational spider from Mars as being a man - as if spiders aren't animals! And this is before we even begin to touch on what Rand means or does not mean by "rational".

This is classic verbalism, and a perfect example of the type of problems I'm talking about. So I'm afraid you are quite demonstrably wrong here.

I'm unclear what you're talking about in your final paragraph:

And of course, shared meanings do not preclude the use of language for our own purposes of self-development either. I think this is an important function of language, and have previously remarked how this was one of the few interesting and imaginative parts of Rand's theory, and that it was a pity she didn't pursue it.

Oh, there's an interesting passage in the ITOE (I don't have it with me, I'm surfing in Hawaii, lucky me...;-)) where she talks about how language has in effect a very personal function, in developing the self. I really felt she was on to something there for a bit.

Edited December 7, 2009 by Daniel Barnes