Logical Structure of Objectivism

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Daniel and Merlin,

Let me echo and applaud the underlying cordiality of this exchange between you (despite some slight sporadic surface turbulence).

It's a value I detected in you both a long time ago. It's one of the reasons I'm glad you're both around.

Michael

[Brendan Hutching]

Merlin: “Please explain how a definition can be both wrong and not false.”

A definition is like a label. You open a can labelled “tomatoes” to discover peaches. So the tomatoes label is wrong. Does that make it false? Of course not.

I see. But try this. The word or definiendum, rather than the definition, is the label. You say the tomatoes label is wrong, but that is not saying the definition of tomatoes is wrong.

When I say that a correct definition can only be “true”, I mean that it is a tautology, or true by definition. But “true” in this sense cannot be contrasted with “false”, since tautologies cannot be false.

I take it you mean tautological the same way as meaning 5 of analytic here. If that is correct, then why should a definition (more specifically, the definiens) ever be changed? By the way, I think the concept rigid designator coined by Saul Kripke is useful. (That doesn't mean I agree with all he says or has said about it.)

Sorry. My bad. A definition is not a tautology. Rather, the definition is logically equivalent to the word it describes. Even so, “soft, red fruit with juicy pulp, used as a vegetable” can function in place of “tomato” as a label. So mislabeling can also involve the definition.

But I agree that a definition can be formed well or badly. However, a badly formed definition is wrong because it incorrectly describes the word. So you could define a tomato as a “hard, red, sour vegetable”. In order to show that this is wrong, you could bite into a tomato, but this would only be convincing if there were prior agreement that the word referred to that particular object.

If someone insisted that “tomato” meant “hard, red, sour vegetable”, you could only break the stalemate by appealing to convention. The same applies to more abstract terms such as “selfishness” etc.

[Xray]

Very important point about categories being arbitrary.

GS, I have a question. There has been a lot of discussion about categories here (what Rand calls "concept" is actually category).

But what about the conceptual identity of the concrete objects we are dealing with? Each of these objects has its own set of characteristics differentiating it from other objects.

Has Korzybski in his writings, dealt with this 'identity by difference' aspect?

Korzybski encouraged the use of what he called 'extensional devices' like subscripts. In life we only deal with absolute individuals like tree₁, tree₂, tree₃ etc. and so differences are fundamental.

There is the recognition that "In life we only deal with absolute individuals .....", meaning that relationships are with the real, not the abstracts.

GS: ....It is the human abstracting process that emphasizes similarities while ignoring differences that results in classes, categories, groups, etc. Is this what you mean? (GS)

Are you thinking of abstracting as related to categories only (Rand's so-called "concepts"), and not to individual entities?

If I observe A tree, this is mentally abstracted from its surroundings by its set of differentiating characteristics. The tree is the real. The idea or image of it exists in my mind. The idea or image is an abstract representation of the tree, i.e. an abstract.

If I observe several entities which I categorize on similarities and put under the label tree, the category, tree, is not a real some thing. It is a mental invention, something arbitrarily created. Lexical categories are arbitrary, i. e. there is no natural law of language dictating that there has to be an extra lexical category 'tree' at all. Other languages may group differently, e. g. only have one term for trees and bushes, etc. All categories are arbitrary. In English for example, there exist more terms categorizing movement than in German, etc.

So while the fact of categorizing itself is a natural law observed in language, what kind of categories are etablished is always arbitrary.

A category is no entity. A category is the mental process of grouping on similarities.

When it comes to individual entities, the process is of mentally abstracting by difference.

An abstract of an entity has an objective correspondent, whereas an abstract category has no objective correspondent.

When I take 'a' fork from the drawer, I mentally abstract one specific item (the objective correspondent, arbitrarily labeled with the audiovisual symbol 'fork'), by isolating (differentiating) it from its surroundings (= the other entities labeled as 'forks' in the drawer).

This brings us right back to "In life we only deal with absolute individuals like tree1, tree2, tree3" etc.

Why it is so crucial not to confuse 'category' with 'entity' becomes clear when looking at Rand's philosophical credo "Life proper to man". "Man" here does not refer to an individual entity, it has no objective correspondent. It is a category. It all the more ironic since Rand herself correctly pointed out on other occasions that e. g. a "society" is no entity.

"Life proper to man" ignores individuality by presenting a one set of values for all. .

Instead of acknowledging the difference between individuals, their individuality (which implies the fact that every individual is a subjectively valuing entity), the opposite happens, with people's values not fitting the Objectivist ideology being despised as "whims".

In view of all that, it is no surprise that the members of Rand's inner circle called themselves "the collective".

Edited December 17, 2009 by Xray

[Xray]

Imo Rand's fallacy of "life proper to man" is the direct result of the false premise "objective value".

Misled by her false premise, she then went on applying it to "man" (= all humans).

But statements about a category which are not applicable to all members of the category are false.

One can state "man is mortal" since it applies to all humans without exception. It is an (objective) fact.

Rand wants to introduce that same "objectivity" with her set of alleged "objective" values. She presents her "objective" values as if they were (objective) natural law, their alleged objectivity making them necessarily "true" for all without exception.

Hence she arrives at "life proper to man". The false premise of objective value leads directly to the fallacy of "life proper to man".

Edited December 18, 2009 by Xray

[Brant Gaede]

Imo Rand's fallacy of "life proper to man" is the direct result of the false premise "objective value".

Misled by her false premise, she then went on applying it to "man" (= all humans).

But statements about a category which are not applicable to all members of the category are false.

One can state "man is mortal" since it applies to all humans without exception. It is an (objective) fact.

Rand wants to introduce that same "objectivity" with her set of alleged "objective" values. She presents her "objective" values as if they were (objective) natural law, their alleged objectivity making them necessarily "true" for all without exception.

Hence she arrives at "life proper to man". The false premise of objective value leads directly to the fallacy of "life proper to man".

Life proper to man, Rand: productive work, etc. Xray: anything goes (because there cannot be anything improper to the category of man). Rand: should be, ought to be. Xray: whatever is.

--Brant

Edited December 18, 2009 by Brant Gaede

[Daniel Barnes]

All categories are arbitrary.

A small but important correction. Arbitrary overstates the situation (rather like Merlin's division between "tied to reality" and "convention" when the two are very far from being mutually exclusive).

All categories are artificial. But that does not mean they are arbitrary.

ar·bi·trar·y

1. Determined by chance, whim, or impulse, and not by necessity, reason, or principle: stopped at the first motel we passed, an arbitrary choice.

This is an overstatement that is quite commonly made, within Objectivism and without.

[merjet]

If someone insisted that “tomato” meant “hard, red, sour vegetable”, you could only break the stalemate by appealing to convention. The same applies to more abstract terms such as “selfishness” etc.

Maybe and maybe not. The someone might be stubborn enough to reject convention.

[merjet]

All categories are arbitrary.

A small but important correction. Arbitrary overstates the situation (rather like Merlin's division between "tied to reality" and "convention" when the two are very far from being mutually exclusive).

A small but important correction. I didn't say they were mutually exclusive, but very different. The issue is which one is more important. They are "mutually exclusive" only in the sense of only one winner.

All categories are artificial. But that does not mean they are arbitrary.

I agree.

Edited December 18, 2009 by Merlin Jetton

[merjet]

But statements about a category which are not applicable to all members of the category are false.

Some animals have wings.

[tjohnson]

But statements about a category which are not applicable to all members of the category are false.

Some animals have wings.

That's not a statement about the category 'animal', it's a statement about some members. Xray, what do you mean a statement about a category?

[Xray]

All categories are arbitrary.

A small but important correction. Arbitrary overstates the situation (rather like Merlin's division between "tied to reality" and "convention" when the two are very far from being mutually exclusive).

All categories are artificial. But that does not mean they are arbitrary.

ar·bi·trar·y

1. Determined by chance, whim, or impulse, and not by necessity, reason, or principle: stopped at the first motel we passed, an arbitrary choice.

This is an overstatement that is quite commonly made, within Objectivism and without.

Arbitrariness here is the technical term used in linguistics:

Arbitrariness

The basic principle of the arbitrariness of the sign (l'arbitraire du signe) in the extract is: there is no natural reason why a particular sign should be attached to a particular concept.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Course_in_General_Linguistics

GS wrote:

View Postgeneral semanticist, on 11 December 2009 - 09:20 AM, said:

Did it ever occur to you that these categories like 'fish' and 'mammal' are arbitrary? We human are at liberty to create as many categories as we wish. One day the whale is a fish the next day it isn't because we said so. Suppose you drive your car without a seatbelt on then one day they pass a law saying you have to wear seatbelts. Now you are an outlaw because we created a new category of outlaws, ie. people who don't wear seatbelts. You didn't change into an outlaw but someone changed their definition of an outlaw. We create whatever categories we find useful and we change them whenever we want, get used to it!

I just came across this example on another thread re categorizing:

Quote:

"In the realm of perceived objects, man is confronted with an array of uniquely contrasted objects. By way of illustration, he might be sitting in a park, viewing objects such as a swimming duck, a walking person, a jogger, a bench, and a ball (before he has come to mentally hold these objects in the form of such verbal concepts, i.e. words). Out of this array, he is able to realize the concept of “man,” which is materialized in the persons of the walker and the jogger.

To begin with, he can form a concept of man only if he begins by looking at certain objects which share a comparable element, which Rand terms the Conceptual Common Denominator. In this case, he observes that the duck, the walker, and the jogger (not the bench and the ball) may all be compared according to the Conceptual Common Denominator of “mobile life.”5

In the first step of forming the concept “man,” which is a unique subcategory of mobile life, he observes that the walker and the jogger possess the similar characteristic of “furless legs and a torso,” which makes them different from the duck;" (end quote)

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=7989

Creating "mobile life" as a category is a subjective mental invention, and in no way 'necessary' as a first step of forming the concept of "man" when observing a duck, a walker, a jogger, a bench and a ball.

For every category can figure as subcategory in countless other categories as well as for man it coud be mammal, primate, everything which has a head, eyes, everything which is shorter than 4 meters, and many more).

Selecting similarities for a category knows no objective bounds.

For practical purposes in everyday life, all that is necessary is a general agreement as to the meaning of terms so that one does not go to a hardware store to buy a cake.

Rand makes it appear as if categorizing ("concept formation") were some complicted mental feat requiring effort. Not so.

Very young children already know what a "dog" is as opposed to a "horse". A few encounters with the finite objects (either live encounters or e. g. seeing them pointed out in picture books) suffice to accomplish that.

Merlin:

View PostXray, on 17 December 2009 - 07:47 PM, said:

But statements about a category which are not applicable to all members of the category are false.

Some animals have wings.

Your point being? The statement "Some animals have wings" does not refer to the category 'animal' as a whole.

Merlin

View PostBrendan Hutching, on 16 December 2009 - 01:02 PM, said:

If someone insisted that “tomato” meant “hard, red, sour vegetable”, you could only break the stalemate by appealing to convention. The same applies to more abstract terms such as “selfishness” etc.

Maybe and maybe not. The someone might be stubborn enough to reject convention.

One could hand them a soft, sweet tomato and ask them what it is called.

As for "selfishness", one could ask them if they are aware that it is used connotatively for valuing behavior.

Edited December 18, 2009 by Xray

[Xray]

But statements about a category which are not applicable to all members of the category are false.

Some animals have wings.

That's not a statement about the category 'animal', it's a statement about some members. Xray, what do you mean a statement about a category?

GS, we crossposted - I just replied to Merlin in # 536:

"Your point being? The statement "Some animals have wings" does not refer to the category 'animal' as a whole." (Xray)

As for statements about a category - sorry if I was not precise enough - I mean general statements regarding a category (which are only correct if they apply to all members of the category).

Like for example "Man is mortal". This statement is true because it applies to all members of the category, without exception. It is a fact.

Rand wants to introduce that same "objectivity" with her set of alleged "objective" values. She presents her so-called "objective" values as if they were (objective) natural law, their alleged objectivity making them necessarily "true" for all without exception. The error lies in the false premise that values are objective, from which it follows that Rand's idea of "life proper to man" is not shared by all membes of the category "man".

Rand's "life proper to man" is a fallacy because there can't exist any such thing as life proper to man comprising all humans. How can anyone decide what is "proper" for their fellow men?

Isn't a "one set for all" catalog of values the very opposite of individualism?

Rand speaks of cardinal values and cardinal virtues.

Problem is, other ideologies (transcedent or not) have their set of alleged "objective" cardinal values and virtues too ...

Edited December 18, 2009 by Xray

[BaalChatzaf]

GS, we crossposted - I just replied to Merlin in # 536:

"Your point being? The statement "Some animals have wings" does not refer to the category 'animal' as a whole." (Xray)

As for statements about a cateogory, I mean general statements about a category.

Like for example "Man is mortal". This statement is true because it applies to all members of the category, without exception. It is a fact.

Rand wants to introduce that same "objectivity" with her set of alleged "objective" values. She presents her "objective" values as if they were (objective) natural law, their alleged objectivity making them necessarily "true" for all without exception. The error lies in the false premise that values are objective.

Time to learn some logical terminology. A statement of the form all x has the property P is called a universally quantified statement. A statement of the form some x has the property P is a existentially quantified statement. Both statements involve an entire class of entities. Let A be the set of animals and W be the set of winged things. The statement all A in W can be written A ^ W = A where ^ means set intersection. The statement some A are W can be written as A ^ W != 0 where 0 is the empty set and != is read not equal.

Note that both statements involve the entire class A.

If you are going to indulge in logical criticism as you seem to like to do, it behooves you to learn some logic and property terminology.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[merjet]

Arbitrariness here is the technical term used in linguistics:

Arbitrariness

The basic principle of the arbitrariness of the sign (l'arbitraire du signe) in the extract is: there is no natural reason why a particular sign should be attached to a particular concept.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Course_in_General_Linguistics

Xray pulls a switcheroo. She has said "all categories are arbitrary" many times, but now she says she meant something like "the sign/word used to label a category is arbitrary."

Indeed, the same webpage says: "The object itself - a real tree, in the real world - is the referent. For Saussure, the arbitrary involves not the link between the sign and its referent ...."

Rand makes it appear as if categorizing ("concept formation") were some complicted mental feat requiring effort. Not so.

Very young children already know what a "dog" is as opposed to a "horse".

The first sentence is your subjective valuation. In ITOE Rand did address very young children forming concepts to some extent.

Edited December 19, 2009 by Merlin Jetton

[Xray]

Time to learn some logical terminology. A statement of the form all x has the property P is called a universally quantified statement.

This formalizes my statement: "All men are mortal". (All x has the property P).

And that is what the discussion is about.

For Rand claims her life "proper to man" to apply to all men, that is for every human being, not just a selection (as in "some x has the property P").

If you are going to indulge in logical criticism as you seem to like to do, it behooves you to learn some logic and property terminology.

I'm always eager to learn, so if you would please formalize Rand's claim of "life proper to man" here.

You say it can't be done because of the 'value' thing? That formalizing an "ought to" makes no sense? I agree.

For we would get:

All x (entire class of entities, i. e. all humans) "ought to" have the property P (living Rand's idea of life proper to man).

In short, it is a mere formalizing of a wish: that others "ought to" share one's personal set of values.

What do you think:

Are "values" subjectively created and attributed by each individual,

or

do "values" exist in the objective realm independently of an individual creating, therefore, merely await "discovery"?

Xray pulls a switcheroo. She has said "all categories are arbitrary" many times, but now she says she meant something like "the sign/word used to label a category is arbitrary."

Indeed, the same webpage says: "The object itself - a real tree, in the real world - is the referent. For Saussure, the arbitrary involves not the link between the sign and its referent but that between the signifier and the signified in the interior of the sign."

I pointed out that "arbitrary" is also a technical term used in linguistics, giving an an example. My focus was not on what you imply - that the sign labeling the category is arbitrary (although this is true as well).

I meant "arbitrary" in my statement "categories are arbitrary" to be understood as it is used in linguistics. Hence the link.

Edited December 19, 2009 by Xray

[Brendan Hutching]

Maybe and maybe not. The someone might be stubborn enough to reject convention.

By all means. But where does that leave the stubborn person? In futile argument about the “real” meanings of words. Until the stubborn person’s arguments become accepted by a sufficient number of people and the new meaning becomes standard. So convention wins again.

[merjet]

Until the stubborn person’s arguments become accepted by a sufficient number of people and the new meaning becomes standard. So convention wins again.

And if that doesn't happen, a far more likely outcome? Convention loses again.

Daniel hasn't answered, so I ask you. How does convention work for new words?

[tjohnson]

Daniel hasn't answered, so I ask you. How does convention work for new words?

People start using new words to mean something and when enough people do it finds it's way into a dictionary. I'm sure you already know this??

[merjet]

People start using new words to mean something and when enough people do it finds it's way into a dictionary. I'm sure you already know this??

Of course, I know it. The point is that when a word is first used (by anybody) there is no convention to follow.

[BaalChatzaf]

People start using new words to mean something and when enough people do it finds it's way into a dictionary. I'm sure you already know this??

Of course, I know it. The point is that when a word is first used (by anybody) there is no convention to follow.

The initial use is established by demonstration or context. Infants and young children know no conventions initially but they manage to learn how to speak or otherwise communicate.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[tjohnson]

People start using new words to mean something and when enough people do it finds it's way into a dictionary. I'm sure you already know this??

Of course, I know it. The point is that when a word is first used (by anybody) there is no convention to follow.

OK, the first time a caveman said 'rock' and held a rock in his hands there was no convention to follow for the selection of the word to represent the object. Now the question is, so what??

[Alfonso Jones]

People start using new words to mean something and when enough people do it finds it's way into a dictionary. I'm sure you already know this??

Of course, I know it. The point is that when a word is first used (by anybody) there is no convention to follow.

OK, the first time a caveman said 'rock' and held a rock in his hands there was no convention to follow for the selection of the word to represent the object. Now the question is, so what??

I suspect what had to happen to ensure communication was for the caveman to, perhaps, drop this rock, and pick up another one and say "rock" again. Then to repeat that with several other rocks of varying size, color, etc.... Until the other party could determine what the items deemed "rock" had in common.

Bill P

[tjohnson]

I suspect what had to happen to ensure communication was for the caveman to, perhaps, drop this rock, and pick up another one and say "rock" again. Then to repeat that with several other rocks of varying size, color, etc.... Until the other party could determine what the items deemed "rock" had in common.

Bill P

Yes, that makes sense. There might have been some quicker than others and figured it out right away.

[Selene]

I suspect what had to happen to ensure communication was for the caveman to, perhaps, drop this rock, and pick up another one and say "rock" again. Then to repeat that with several other rocks of varying size, color, etc.... Until the other party could determine what the items deemed "rock" had in common.

Bill P

Yes, that makes sense. There might have been some quicker than others and figured it out right away.

The quicker ones were the ones who used the rocks as "educational tools" by smacking the stupid ones in the head.

Adam

[Alfonso Jones]

I suspect what had to happen to ensure communication was for the caveman to, perhaps, drop this rock, and pick up another one and say "rock" again. Then to repeat that with several other rocks of varying size, color, etc.... Until the other party could determine what the items deemed "rock" had in common.

Bill P

Yes, that makes sense. There might have been some quicker than others and figured it out right away.

Perhaps - but if the caveman held up a large grey rock, how would the others know whether the meaning was rock, large rock, the color grey, or what? Only looking for the commonality (or lucky but unverified guessing) would get you there.

Bill P