A Phenomenological Examination of the "Differentia" As Presented In Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology

[ValueChaser]

A Phenomenological Examination of the Differentia As Presented In Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology

By John C. Paschalis

(For Lauren Jarrell)

Thomas Jefferson wrote, “Question with boldness even the existence of a God; because, if there be one, he must more approve of the homage of reason, than that of blind-folded fear.” In Jefferson’s famous quote he rightly demands that rational inquiry be the prerequisite of claiming that a proposal is true, no matter how many people within the populace regard a given proposal’s truth as self-evident and beyond question. Of course, there do exist a few truths that are self-evident and beyond question, such as the axioms of existence, identity, and consciousness that Ayn Rand has presented: “existence exists”, “A is A”, and “I am conscious of existence.”¹ These axioms are self-evident truths that one need not justify or question, whereas a proposal is a verbalized idea that awaits justification—and we may infer from Jefferson’s quote that only proposals, not self-evident axioms, should be objects of constant inquiry, for these axioms lie inexorably at the very base of the “reason” to which Jefferson is paying homage. Jefferson’s quote is relevant to the proposals of Ayn Rand: we as philosophers must demand that rational inquiry be the prerequisite of claiming that any of Rand’s proposals are true, no matter how many people within the official circle of Objectivists regard them as unquestionable, no matter how many of them establish an attitude that institutionalizes deafness to questions originating from honest philosophers of different schools--and who proceed to marginalize and/or ostracize those honest philosophers.

If there are doubts to be had about the philosophy of Ayn Rand, those whose subject is her theory of concept-formation should be brought to the forefront. The truth or falsehood of our ideas (i.e. concepts) is critical. The degree of confidence in our own ideas about the world when we are studying it in our heads, is equal to the degree of confidence in ourselves when we are using those very ideas in the active pursuit of a goal in the world. Every action we take to benefit our lives, from the ethical action of applying to a job we would like to have, to the political action of respecting the rights of a person we dislike, to the esthetic action of decorating our homes in a particular style, rests on the ideas of who we are and what we should do. Epistemology, as the branch of philosophy that deals with ideas of which we are conscious, is fundamental to every human action. Epistemologists may be responsible for answering many questions about our conscious minds, but perhaps the most relevant and direct question is this: are our conceptions of “who we are” and of “what we should do” freely chosen and potentially enhanced--and if so, what do we do in terms of conscious thinking to choose and enhance these conceptions?

To the first of these questions, Ayn Rand answers yes. To the second, Rand answers that the conceptions of “who we are” and “what we should do” are formed along the lines of the same method that we use to form all ideas: the method that she terms “measurement-omission” and explains in her book, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology.²

Measurement-omission in its most basic form takes place in the realm of perceived objects such as “chair” or “ashtray”.³ In its more advanced form, it also takes place in more developed abstractions such as “capitalism” or “racism,” which are not immediately perceived but which are formed according to the same process of measurement-omission by which immediately perceived objects are.⁴ (It is unnecessary in the context of this essay to examine measurement-omission in terms of such grand-level abstractions, since reference to simple objects is enough to establish the nature of measurement-omission.)

In the realm of perceived objects, man is confronted with an array of uniquely contrasted objects. By way of illustration, he might be sitting in a park, viewing objects such as a swimming duck, a walking person, a jogger, a bench, and a ball (before he has come to mentally hold these objects in the form of such verbal concepts, i.e. words). Out of this array, he is able to realize the concept of “man,” which is materialized in the persons of the walker and the jogger.

To begin with, he can form a concept of man only if he begins by looking at certain objects which share a comparable element, which Rand terms the Conceptual Common Denominator. In this case, he observes that the duck, the walker, and the jogger (not the bench and the ball) may all be compared according to the Conceptual Common Denominator of “mobile life.”⁵

In the first step of forming the concept “man,” which is a unique subcategory of mobile life, he observes that the walker and the jogger possess the similar characteristic of “furless legs and a torso,” which makes them different from the duck; differentiation is the process that distinguishes two or more entities from one or more different entities within a Conceptual Common Denominator, according to a similar characteristic that is perceived. The walker and the jogger, but not the duck, are similar on account of having the same distinguishing characteristic of “furless legs and a torso.” (The mind of the observer realizes the similarity by means of a selective focus, in which the characteristic of furless legs and a torso is cognitively separated or severed from the walker and the jogger.) This separation is the first step in forming a new concept of that category of mobile life (“man”) which represents the walker and the jogger; so far, the observer has perceived the distinguishing characteristic in each the walker and the jogger that now serves as the component of a new concept.⁶

Once the characteristic of furless legs and a torso is perceived in each the walker and the jogger, the observer next must proceed to “omit” the differing measurements of each man’s furless legs and torso, in order to form a universal concept of man. Let’s say that the walker has short legs and a fat torso, and that the jogger has long legs and a thin torso. The specific length of the legs is inessential to the cognitive attribute of “furless legs,” and the specific weight of the torso is inessential to the cognitive attribute of “torso.” So these particular measurements of “short” and “fat” are omitted (but not regarded as non-existent) in order to form the completely new mental entity “man”, which consists of “furless legs and a torso.” Ayn Rand holds that “the relevant measurements must exist in some quantity, but may exist in any quantity.”⁷

If the new mental entity were to be defined in words, it would be “Man is that form of mobile life which has furless legs and a torso,” with the Conceptual Common Denominator of “mobile life” serving as the genus of the definition, and the distinguishing characteristic of “furless legs and a torso” serving as its differentia.⁸ (Rand presents the most comprehensive definition of man as: “Man is the rational animal.”⁹ She demonstrates that a concept can have multiple definitions, which are non-contradictory, each having a different differentia.¹⁰ ) But what if (1) the distinguishing characteristic of any object is concealed from a person’s limited perspective on the object, and (2) within his perspective, he views another characteristic which may serve to distinguish the object, and (3) this perceived characteristic causes the object to be mistaken as a different class of objects which also possess and distinguish it? We will see how Ayn Rand regards this situation as impossible, and how she regards the very question as misconceived.

The state of multiple perspectives on an object is featured in Jean Paul Sartre’s phenomenology,¹¹ which is not a method of concept-formation, but which carries implications for Rand’s theory nonetheless. T.Z. Lavine writes that, “Phenomenology for Sartre is the modest study of phenomena, of appearances in relation to the structures of human consciousness through which they appear to us as they do. Sartre proposed to study being as it appears to human consciousness.”¹² What is relevant in Sartre’s quotation is that we are initially conscious of objects by means of their appearance to us as conscious beings. In the following quotation, Sartre demonstrates that an object can be perceived only in one of its multiple aspects (i.e. appearances). He writes that an existent

in fact can not be reduced to a finite series of manifestation since each one of them is a relation

to a subject constantly changing. Although an object may disclose itself only through a single

Abschattung, the sole fact of there being a subject implies the possibility of multiplying the points

of view on that Abschattung. This suffices to multiply to infinity the Abschattung under

consideration.¹³

According to this quotation, the subject (i.e. consciousness) can constantly change in terms of multiple and different viewpoints from which it can perceive the same object. (We may accept in Sartre that there is a multiplicity of different viewpoints, but the proposal that they are “infinite” is questionable). A standing person can see an object from one perspective, then walk around the back of it and see a theretofore unknown aspect of it from a different perspective, than stand at an angle from it and see another different aspect of it, and so on. Therefore, at any one time the consciousness of the perceiver can see only one unique aspect of the object due to position of his stare.

The distinguishing characteristic of an object that serves as its differentia can easily be an aspect, or a part of the aspect, which is outside one’s immediate range of perception (due to his position). Suppose that a child is facing one blue poster board with a political slogan written on it, one red poster board with a different political slogan written on it, and one oval picture frame. He forms the concept of poster board by focusing on the two pieces’ distinguishing characteristic, a large square paper that can be affected with ink, and contrasting it to the oval picture frame. Then he omits the measurements of the blue and red colors which are features of the particular poster boards. Thus he forms the universal concept of poster board. He names the concept with the words “poster board” and defines it with the words “a large square paper that can be affected with ink.” Then, one week later, he is looking through the dark entrance of his crawlspace and observes what dimly appears as a large, blank, square paper; it is facing him and he thinks it is supported and held up by other objects behind it. He classifies it as a “poster board” because it is “a large square paper that can be affected with ink.”

What he does not realize is that the square paper in the crawlspace is actually one facet, or appearance, of a box. When he enters the crawlspace one month later, he discovers that the object he thought was a large square paper that can be affected with ink, now consists of six squares connected at right angles (which he uses as a new differentia). The observation of this new distinguishing characteristic necessarily depended on walking past the object and observing its new dimensions, thus depending on a few new positions of the child’s eyes. But what if the child had not altered his first position to the object by walking past it and thereby examining its dimensions from a few new positions? Was he incorrect when he initially classified the box as an entity with “a large square paper that can be affected with ink”--rather than as an entity with “six squares connected at right angles”? (Can one claim that he was incorrect because he was considering not the box as a three-dimensional whole, but only one of its flat aspects? No. The entity is a large square paper that can be affected with ink when viewed from a sideways position, but it is also a large square paper that is seamlessly part of a three-dimensional entity nevertheless.)

Ayn Rand would answer “No, he was not incorrect—at the time.” Rand holds that there are objects which have more than one distinguishing characteristic, with each distinguishing characteristic being revealed “one at a time” with the growth of knowledge (such was the case of the box when the changing perspective on it yielded another distinguishing characteristic). The classification of the box as “a large square paper that can be affected with ink” is correct because that definition was properly formed according to the available knowledge of the observer at the time. However, when the child changes his perspective on the box and thereby gains new knowledge of it, the definition must be revised to include the new differentia (“six squares connected at right angles”), and to exclude the initial differentia (“a large square paper that can be affected with ink”) because the latter does not serve to adequately represent the object in the perspective of new knowledge. The new differentia, by contrast, more adequately represents the object in the perspective of the new knowledge. Rand writes that, “Man cannot know more than he has discovered—and he may not know less than the evidence indicates, if his concepts and definitions are to be objectively valid.” In summation, when one forms a revised definition of a concept due to new evidence, that newer definition must be considered the correct one, because it is the more comprehensive (i.e., the more essential) definition.¹⁴

We can now examine how the aforementioned question is misconceived. To repeat, what if (1) the distinguishing characteristic of any object is concealed from a person’s limited perspective on the object, and (2) within his perspective, he views another characteristic which may serve to distinguish the object, and (3) this perceived characteristic causes the object to be mistaken as a different class of objects which also possess and distinguish it? Let us examine this question according to its three parts.

(1)First of all, the essential distinguishing characteristic is never “concealed” from awareness: it is simply unknown according to the person’s limited perspective (which is a synonym for context of knowledge). A distinguishing characteristic that is “concealed” from awareness is a contradiction in terms—in order to distinguish the object from other objects in the same Conceptual Common Denominator, the characteristic obviously must be perceived, or else it is unknown and therefore it is not a “presently available” characteristic by which to distinguish it. As Rand wrote above, “Man cannot know more than he has discovered. . . .” An object is distinguished according to a characteristic that is perceived in the known aspects of this object, which reveal the distinguishing characteristic to the observer. If a characteristic of the object exists, but is unknown, it cannot serve to distinguish the object because it is yet unknown. (2) Therefore, within his field of perception, there is no “other” characteristic which serves to distinguish the object; there is only the characteristic which the context allows: a perceived one that distinguishes the object from others. (3) Therefore, there is no possibility of the object being mistaken as different class of objects. It is classified in the only classification it belongs to according to the only differentia it is perceived to have.¹⁵

The original “problem” is not a problem after all. There is no “incorrect differentia” which causes an object to be mistaken for something that it is not. Knowledge of an object is always true.

Let us now look at one more example where a change in the position of the observer (and therefore in his available knowledge) causes him to revise a concept according to a newly discovered differentia. A cashier in a grocery store is identifying a bag of oranges for the purpose of charging the correct price. Having already formed a definition of navel oranges, he knows that its differentia is “a smooth sphere of the color orange.” He sees this characteristic in several of the oranges. He classifies the oranges as navel oranges and proceeds to charge the corresponding price. The customer points out that the oranges in the bag are not navel oranges but Minneola oranges, takes a couple of oranges out of the bag, and points out their distinguishing characteristic: a bump on the end of the orange. At the same time the customer states, “These are Minneola oranges.” (The bumps were pointing away from the cashier until the customer took out the oranges and turned them around in his hand.) The cashier then reclassifies the oranges according to the newly revealed characteristic, and forms a new definition of them by means of the new differentia of “a bumpy sphere of the color orange.” This is the more essential differentia of Minneola oranges. The more essential characteristic is known in the broader context of the cashier’s knowledge, but it was unknown in his initial context of knowledge. He voids the original price of navel oranges and charges the price for Minneola oranges (which happen to be less expensive).

Note here that the presence of a teacher is critical to forming the new concept: the cashier does not have the time to examine each and every fruit he must ring up, so he has to depend on the customer to broaden his context of knowledge. In interactions wherein two people have a vested interest in a mutually beneficial result, and only one person knows the essential characteristic on which the result depends whereas the other does not, the former must educate the latter in order for each person to gain. Since these “unequal” interactions are possible, teaching (one type of education) is critical in the formation of one’s concepts. (Of course, this presupposes that the one who lacks the knowledge of the essential be teachable, i.e., that he is willing to expand his knowledge according to the essential characteristic—that is to say, it presupposes that the one who lacks the knowledge of the essential will be rational.) But what attitude should a teacher assume when informing a student who is incorrect, yet willing to follow a rational method of concept-formation? The student can come to incorrect concepts of important matters; the cashier would have charged the customer more than his oranges were worth if the latter had not intervened. So should the customer pass a moral judgment? But the cashier was operating according to every bit of knowledge he possessed prior to being educated. Therefore, should the customer try to hold tolerance of the cashier’s ignorance as a virtue until after the cashier is educated, at which point a moral judgment is justified? The ethical implications of Ayn Rand’s theory of concept-formation, namely that the formation of valid definitions is a gradual process that is contextually correct at each stage of knowledge,¹⁶ will be reserved for the conclusion to this essay.

References

¹Leonard Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (New York: Meridian, 1993), 4-11.

²Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 2nd ed. (New York: Meridian, 1990).

³Rand, “Cognition and Measurement” and “Concept-Formation,” in Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 2nd ed., 5-9, 10-18.

⁴Rand, “Abstraction From Abstractions” in Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 2nd ed., 19-28.

⁵Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 13-15.

⁶Rand, “Concept-Formation,” in Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 2nd ed., 10-18. Also see “Cognition and Measurement,” 5-9, and 137-139.

⁷Rand, “Concept-Formation” in Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 2nd ed., 10-18. Also see “Cognition and Measurement,” 5-9.

⁸Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 2nd ed., 41.

⁹Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 2nd ed., 42-44.

¹⁰Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 2nd ed., 42-45.

¹¹Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (New York: Washington Square Press, 1992), 4-6.

¹²T.Z. Lavine, From Socrates To Sartre: The Philosophic Quest (Toronto: Bantam, 1984), 351.

¹³Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 5. One may arrive at an approximate understanding of the term “Abschattung” in Edmund Husserl’s entry (http://www.iep.utm.edu/husserl/) in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy; refer to Part 5 (Ideen I) at (http://www.iep.utm.edu/husserl/#H5).

¹⁴Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 2nd ed., 42-47.

¹⁵Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 2nd ed., 42-47. Also see “Concept-Formation”, 10-18.

¹⁶Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 2nd ed., 42-47.

[tjohnson]

Of course, there do exist a few truths that are self-evident and beyond question, such as the axioms of existence, identity, and consciousness that Ayn Rand has presented: "existence exists", "A is A", and "I am conscious of existence."

There is no statement that is "self-evident and beyond question". Every analytic system requires assumptions and periodically reviewing them and tossing out unrequired or obsolete ones is an important part of the evolution of knowledge. A very good example from physics is the assumption that the universe behaves the same everywhere in the universe, ie. the relationship we observe here apply in the far reaches of the universe as well. Is this self-evident? Is it beyond question?

[DavidMcK]

Yes it is self-evident and beyond question, because of the law of causality: That an entity acting will act in accordance with its nature and circumstances. If it acts differently in the further reaches of the universe there must be something different, without the law of identity applied to action you have no science whatsoever. The objectivist causality principle is best described by H.W.B. Joseph, in his 'Introduction to Logic' (he might not have liked the association with objectivism btw).

[BaalChatzaf]

Of course, there do exist a few truths that are self-evident and beyond question, such as the axioms of existence, identity, and consciousness that Ayn Rand has presented: "existence exists", "A is A", and "I am conscious of existence."

There is no statement that is "self-evident and beyond question". Every analytic system requires assumptions and periodically reviewing them and tossing out unrequired or obsolete ones is an important part of the evolution of knowledge. A very good example from physics is the assumption that the universe behaves the same everywhere in the universe, ie. the relationship we observe here apply in the far reaches of the universe as well. Is this self-evident? Is it beyond question?

While the assumption of uniformity is not apriori true, as a matter of practical necessity we cannot do science without assuming uniformity.

How could be apply the results of an experiment made in location A to to location B, otherwise. We import uniformity into physics by means of the conservations laws. The conservation of linear momentum, the conservation of angular momentum and the conservation of energy which implies that a experimental result gotten at time t will hold at time t' (later on) provide no conditions have changed in the mean time. Without the conservation laws (which are not apriori true) we would have no physics.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Dragonfly]

How could be apply the results of an experiment made in location A to to location B, otherwise. We import uniformity into physics by means of the conservations laws. The conservation of linear momentum, the conservation of angular momentum and the conservation of energy which implies that a experimental result gotten at time t will hold at time t' (later on) provide no conditions have changed in the mean time. Without the conservation laws (which are not apriori true) we would have no physics.

We would have no physics as we know, but non-uniformity doesn't necessary imply that no physics at all is possible. You cannot a priori rule out that the laws of physics as we know them are only locally valid. They might in principle be different for systems a billion lightyears away/ago. It turns out that we can understand and describe such remote/old systems by assuming uniformity of physics, but that is an empirical result and certainly not beyond question. In fact there are theories that there exist universes with different physical laws, the problem is only that we don't know yet how to test such theories, as we cannot observe such universes. But perhaps we can one day find indirect evidence for such universes.

[BaalChatzaf]

We would have no physics as we know, but non-uniformity doesn't necessary imply that no physics at all is possible. You cannot a priori rule out that the laws of physics as we know them are only locally valid. They might in principle be different for systems a billion lightyears away/ago. It turns out that we can understand and describe such remote/old systems by assuming uniformity of physics, but that is an empirical result and certainly not beyond question. In fact there are theories that there exist universes with different physical laws, the problem is only that we don't know yet how to test such theories, as we cannot observe such universes. But perhaps we can one day find indirect evidence for such universes.

We could try formulating imaginary universes with different laws. If the math corresponding to these different laws is logically consistent then such alternatives are at least possible. This does not guarantee that any real universe corresponds to them. A consistency check is the only thing we can manage without something real to match the math to.

We have done this with regard to geometry. At one time it was believed that Euclidean geometry was the only possible geometry, but now we know that is not the case. By a similar process we could formulate a non-Lagrangian cosmos (say) where the least action principle does not hold, or where the usual symmetries and their corresponding conservation laws do not hold. Imagine a cosmos devoid of the locally spherical symmetries. The inverse square law would not hold (for example).

Ba'al Chatzaf

[tjohnson]

Yes it is self-evident and beyond question, because of the law of causality: That an entity acting will act in accordance with its nature and circumstances. If it acts differently in the further reaches of the universe there must be something different, without the law of identity applied to action you have no science whatsoever.

I really don't know what this means "That an entity acting will act in accordance with its nature and circumstances". A part of physics, for example, is to study "the nature" of electrons. So you are saying that the electron will act like an electron? Pardon me if I say this is not saying much.

[Alfonso Jones]

Yes it is self-evident and beyond question, because of the law of causality: That an entity acting will act in accordance with its nature and circumstances. If it acts differently in the further reaches of the universe there must be something different, without the law of identity applied to action you have no science whatsoever.

I really don't know what this means "That an entity acting will act in accordance with its nature and circumstances". A part of physics, for example, is to study "the nature" of electrons. So you are saying that the electron will act like an electron? Pardon me if I say this is not saying much.

LOL.

I want to be a fly on the wall when you read (and comment out loud on) the first chapter of Peikoff's OPAR (or perhaps much of Aristotle).

Cheers,

Bill P

[Alfonso Jones]

Yes it is self-evident and beyond question, because of the law of causality: That an entity acting will act in accordance with its nature and circumstances. If it acts differently in the further reaches of the universe there must be something different, without the law of identity applied to action you have no science whatsoever.

I really don't know what this means "That an entity acting will act in accordance with its nature and circumstances". A part of physics, for example, is to study "the nature" of electrons. So you are saying that the electron will act like an electron? Pardon me if I say this is not saying much.

LOL.

I want to be a fly on the wall when you read (and comment out loud on) the first chapter of Peikoff's OPAR (or perhaps much of Aristotle).

Cheers,

Bill P

[Dragonfly]

Yes it is self-evident and beyond question, because of the law of causality: That an entity acting will act in accordance with its nature and circumstances. If it acts differently in the further reaches of the universe there must be something different, without the law of identity applied to action you have no science whatsoever.

I really don't know what this means "That an entity acting will act in accordance with its nature and circumstances". A part of physics, for example, is to study "the nature" of electrons. So you are saying that the electron will act like an electron? Pardon me if I say this is not saying much.

Indeed, it isn't saying anything at all. What does the phrase "in accordance with its nature" mean? What is "its nature"? How do we determine what "its nature" is? The only way to find out is to observe how it behaves, how it acts. So an entity will act in accordance with the way it acts. Well, duh. That is a completely useless tautology. It doesn't tell us anything about how that entity acts. It could act in a completely random way or whatever odd behavior you can think of, and it's still acting according to its nature, as its nature is defined by the way it acts. In other words, this is one of the most useless statements in the universe.

[merjet]

What does "X will act in accordance with its nature" mean?

It is easy to dismiss it as meaningless about an electron. However, is it meaningless about people's economic behavior? Is it meaningless relative to Obama's (and others') claim that passing a health care reform law will fix the U.S. health care system? I say no. Passing a new law isn't going to fundamentally change the way people behave. Passing a new law is not going to change abusive behavior into angelic behavior. Passing a new law will make matters worse. If Obama did understand "X will act in accordance with its nature", then he would advocate a drastically different law. The nontrivial message in "X will act in accordance with its nature" is not about electrons.

Edited December 19, 2009 by Merlin Jetton

[tjohnson]

What does "X will act in accordance with its nature" mean?

It is easy to dismiss it as meaningless about an electron. However, is it meaningless about people's economic behavior? Is it meaningless relative to Obama's (and others') claim that passing a health care reform law will fix the U.S. health care system? I say no. Passing a new law isn't going to fundamentally change the way people behave. Passing a new law is not going to change abusive behavior into angelic behavior. Passing a new law will make matters worse. If Obama did understand "X will act in accordance with its nature", then he would advocate a drastically different law. The nontrivial message in "X will act in accordance with its nature" is not about electrons.

It's no different if you are speaking about physics or economics the principle that 'X will act according to it's nature' asserts nothing. People act according to their nature, fine, but the study of people's nature, or the nature of man is like any other study and must rest on some assumptions.

Edited December 19, 2009 by general semanticist

[ValueChaser]

Of course, there do exist a few truths that are self-evident and beyond question, such as the axioms of existence, identity, and consciousness that Ayn Rand has presented: "existence exists", "A is A", and "I am conscious of existence."

There is no statement that is "self-evident and beyond question". Every analytic system requires assumptions and periodically reviewing them and tossing out unrequired or obsolete ones is an important part of the evolution of knowledge. A very good example from physics is the assumption that the universe behaves the same everywhere in the universe, ie. the relationship we observe here apply in the far reaches of the universe as well. Is this self-evident? Is it beyond question?

general semanticist--

I feel astonished in respect to your belief that the statements identifying the axioms of existence, identity, and consciousness are not self-evident and beyond question. (I feel astonished even given your example in physics that implies the former two axioms are questionable.) But let me respectfully give you the benefit of the doubt by presenting a different perspective on what has already been stated.

Say there are unknown galaxies whose planets function according to undiscovered sets of natural laws. (I think this is possible.) Maybe in one galaxy there exists a planet that is surrounded by an atmosphere of a hydrogen compound, which is so dense that the law of gravity as we know it is reversed there. Maybe in another there exists a planet which is maleable and constantly changing its forms. And so on.

In such galaxies, the new entities and the laws that govern them would be different. But the entities and their causal properties would unfailingly exist nevertheless, and they would possess identity. Do you contest this statement?

Edited December 21, 2009 by ValueChaser

[tjohnson]

general semanticist--

I feel astonished in respect to your belief that the statements identifying the axioms of existence, identity, and consciousness are not self-evident and beyond question. (I feel astonished even given your example in physics that implies the former two axioms are questionable.) But let me respectfully give you the benefit of the doubt by presenting a different perspective on what has already been stated.

Say there are unknown galaxies whose planets function according to undiscovered sets of natural laws. (I think this is possible.) Maybe in one galaxy there exists a planet that is surrounded by an atmosphere of a hydrogen compound, which is so dense that the law of gravity as we know it to be reversed there. Maybe in another there exists a planet which is maleable and constantly changing its forms. And so on.

In such galaxies, the new entities and the laws that govern them would be different. But the entities and their causal properties would unfailingly exist nevertheless, and they would possess identity. Do you contest this statement?

That's not exactly what I had in mind about the laws of physics applying throughout the universe. I meant, for example, that lightwaves propogate the same everywhere in the universe. This assumption is required for all of our observations of distant objects to make sense in our theory of the structure of the universe. If light behaved differently somewhere else then the theory collapses and maybe the universe is actually quite small or not expanding etc. etc.

Edited December 21, 2009 by general semanticist

[Dragonfly]

Say there are unknown galaxies whose planets function according to undiscovered sets of natural laws. (I think this is possible.) Maybe in one galaxy there exists a planet that is surrounded by an atmosphere of a hydrogen compound, which is so dense that the law of gravity as we know it to be reversed there. Maybe in another there exists a planet which is maleable and constantly changing its forms. And so on.

In such galaxies, the new entities and the laws that govern them would be different. But the entities and their causal properties would unfailingly exist nevertheless, and they would possess identity. Do you contest this statement?

But in answer to GS's question "A very good example from physics is the assumption that the universe behaves the same everywhere in the universe, ie. the relationship we observe here apply in the far reaches of the universe as well. Is this self-evident? Is it beyond question?" you replied "Yes it is self-evident and beyond question, because of the law of causality: That an entity acting will act in accordance with its nature and circumstances". Now you say that there might in principle be galaxies with different laws of physics, which contradicts your earlier assertion that from the law of causality follows that the relationships we observe here, must apply everywhere in the universe. So that so-called law of causality doesn't tell us anything at all, saying that entities behave as they behave is an empty tautology, it doesn't tell us how those entities should behave.

[ValueChaser]

Say there are unknown galaxies whose planets function according to undiscovered sets of natural laws. (I think this is possible.) Maybe in one galaxy there exists a planet that is surrounded by an atmosphere of a hydrogen compound, which is so dense that the law of gravity as we know it to be reversed there. Maybe in another there exists a planet which is maleable and constantly changing its forms. And so on.

In such galaxies, the new entities and the laws that govern them would be different. But the entities and their causal properties would unfailingly exist nevertheless, and they would possess identity. Do you contest this statement?

But in answer to GS's question "A very good example from physics is the assumption that the universe behaves the same everywhere in the universe, ie. the relationship we observe here apply in the far reaches of the universe as well. Is this self-evident? Is it beyond question?" you replied "Yes it is self-evident and beyond question, because of the law of causality: That an entity acting will act in accordance with its nature and circumstances". Now you say that there might in principle be galaxies with different laws of physics, which contradicts your earlier assertion that from the law of causality follows that the relationships we observe here, must apply everywhere in the universe. So that so-called law of causality doesn't tell us anything at all, saying that entities behave as they behave is an empty tautology, it doesn't tell us how those entities should behave.

Dragonfly--

I did not make that reply. DavidMcK did.

[Dragonfly]

I did not make that reply. DavidMcK did.

Oops, sorry! You didn't contradict yourself as I erroneously thought by not reading carefully. Nevertheless, that doesn't change the fact that that so-called law of causality is an empty statement that doesn't give us any useful information.

[ValueChaser]

Ok Dragonfly, you make an important point that I'd like to address:

Yes it is self-evident and beyond question, because of the law of causality: That an entity acting will act in accordance with its nature and circumstances. If it acts differently in the further reaches of the universe there must be something different, without the law of identity applied to action you have no science whatsoever.

I really don't know what this means "That an entity acting will act in accordance with its nature and circumstances". A part of physics, for example, is to study "the nature" of electrons. So you are saying that the electron will act like an electron? Pardon me if I say this is not saying much.

Indeed, it isn't saying anything at all. What does the phrase "in accordance with its nature" mean? What is "its nature"? How do we determine what "its nature" is? The only way to find out is to observe how it behaves, how it acts. So an entity will act in accordance with the way it acts. Well, duh. That is a completely useless tautology. It doesn't tell us anything about how that entity acts. It could act in a completely random way or whatever odd behavior you can think of, and it's still acting according to its nature, as its nature is defined by the way it acts. In other words, this is one of the most useless statements in the universe.

And then, Dragonfly, you repeat your point in your last post:

. . . .that doesn't change the fact that that so-called law of causality is an empty statement that doesn't give us any useful information.

The law of causality of course "doesn't give us any useful information" about entities in action. Yes, the observation of causality in a particular entity in action, and the consequent awareness that the law of causality is therefore applicable to that entity, in no way implies a conceptual definition of the entity, nor even what Ayn Rand termed an "ostensive" definition of the entity. Shit happens. That is one way that the law of causality may be formulated. But when "the shit hits the fan," we need not be aware that a particular instance of (sh)it is "happening" according to the particular (sh)it's nature, i.e., we need not be aware of the law of causality because we see it hitting the fan. (And now my reputation as a serious thinker on OL is destroyed. .) But that is not to say that the law of causality is useless. It is important in distinguishing truth from falsehood with respect to events that have no directly perceivable cause--events to which a number of apparent causes can be attributed.

For example, take the destruction of the Twin Towers on 9/11. By means of perceptual observation, we as adults perceive that a plane struck a building--next, the plane disappeared--next, another plane struck the building--next, the second plane disappeared--next, the building collapsed. The following explanation is beyond a reasonable doubt: the building collapsed because of planes of a certain speed colliding with a building whose structural integrity was such that the building could not withstand the impact, not because of an "inside job." But how could one persuasively, i.e. adequately and strikingly, explain this to a conspiracy theorist, or even to oneself, without an explicit knowledge of the law of causality and without using that law's terminology?

Edited December 23, 2009 by ValueChaser

[Guyau]

John,

You remarked that Rand’s axiomatic concepts and her axiomatic statements do not need to be justified or questioned. That they are in some sense self-evident* is part of Rand’s view of these, but she held that though their truth does not require justification beyond connection with what is given in perception, their status as axioms does require justification. Part of the process of justifying them as axioms, in her sense of what are philosophical axioms, is to question them, to try to deny them. Rand does some of this in Galt’s Speech. I have done more of that here.

I do not recall if it made it into his book Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, but in one of his lectures in the 70s, Leonard Peikoff remarked that of any philosophy whatever, one who has taken up Rand’s axioms, will say: name your starting points. (Logical and epistemological starting points will be distinct but harmonious.) Name your starting points, and justify why those should be the starting points of your philosophy. I think those are good things to look for in every philosophy. So we ask of Descartes or of Locke, what are your starting points, why those, and are they true and appropriate as starting points. Some philosophers do not have starting points, at least not explicitly. An example would be Robert Nozick. Still, if one studies his works taken all together—Philosophical Explanations, The Nature of Rationality, Socratic Puzzles, and Invariances: The Structure of Objective Reality—one might distill some common primitives of method and truth. That such a philosopher did not set out such primitives, that he may have still been wondering at the end of his life which, if any, articulate constants there are, does not mean he had nothing valuable to say in philosophical matters.

I do myself think that trying to discern and probe the fundamentals of one’s widest comprehensive framework* is a worthwhile part of philosophy today. Putting it a bit mildly.

(More, shortly.)

[Guyau]

Every action we take to benefit our lives, from the ethical action of applying to a job we would like to have, to the political action of respecting the rights of a person we dislike, to the esthetic action of decorating our homes in a particular style, rests on the ideas of who we are and what we should do.

I like that.

Your recapitulation of parts of Rand’s theory of concepts, but with your own examples, is a refreshing refresher. I would mention to you, in case you have not already seen this: the phenomenon of categorical perception. This is some automatically supplied processing of perceptual material by the brain. It gives us a boost for schematic and conceptual abstract rendition of the world.

Thank you for composing this article. Looking forward to the sequel.

[Guyau]

Here is a little more Sartre, preceding the quotation in John’s article, which should be of interest in comparison to Rand:

“But if we once get away from what Nietzsche called ‘the illusion of worlds-behind-the scene’, and if we no longer believe in the being-behind-the-appearance, then the appearance becomes full positivity; its essence is an ‘appearing’ which is no longer opposed to being but on the contrary is the measure of it. For the being of an existent is exactly what it appears. Thus we arrive at the idea of the phenomenon such as we can find, for example, in the ‘phenomenology’ of Husserl or of Heidegger—the phenomenon or the relative-absolute. Relative the phenomenon remains, for ‘to appear’ supposes in essence somebody to whom to appear. But it does not have the double relativity of Kant’s Erscheinung [appearance]. It does not point over its shoulder to a true being which would be, for it, absolute. What it is, it is absolutely, for it reveals itself as it is. The phenomenon can be studied and described as such, for it is absolutely indicative of itself.” (EN 4)

Compare:

“Existence exists—and the act of grasping that statement implies . . . that one exists possessing consciousness, consciousness being the faculty of perceiving that which exists” (AS 1014).

“‘Things as they are’ are things as perceived by your mind [your reason]” (AS 1036).

[ValueChaser]

John,

You remarked that Rand’s axiomatic concepts and her axiomatic statements do not need to be justified or questioned. That they are in some sense self-evident* is part of Rand’s view of these, but she held that though their truth does not require justification beyond connection with what is given in perception, their status as axioms does require justification. Part of the process of justifying them as axioms, in her sense of what are philosophical axioms, is to question them, to try to deny them. Rand does some of this in Galt’s Speech. I have done more of that here.

I do not recall if it made it into his book Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, but in one of his lectures in the 70s, Leonard Peikoff remarked that of any philosophy whatever, one who has taken up Rand’s axioms, will say: name your starting points. (Logical and epistemological starting points will be distinct but harmonious.) Name your starting points, and justify why those should be the starting points of your philosophy. I think those are good things to look for in every philosophy. So we ask of Descartes or of Locke, what are your starting points, why those, and are they true and appropriate as starting points. Some philosophers do not have starting points, at least not explicitly. An example would be Robert Nozick. Still, if one studies his works taken all together—Philosophical Explanations, The Nature of Rationality, Socratic Puzzles, and Invariances: The Structure of Objective Reality—one might distill some common primitives of method and truth. That such a philosopher did not set out such primitives, that he may have still been wondering at the end of his life which, if any, articulate constants there are, does not mean he had nothing valuable to say in philosophical matters.

I do myself think that trying to discern and probe the fundamentals of one’s widest comprehensive framework* is a worthwhile part of philosophy today. Putting it a bit mildly.

(More, shortly.)

For starters, I would like to thank everyone here for their contribution. I appreciate the support for my view of the metaphysical axioms, yet the improvement of any article seems to come best from constructive criticism that the article's writer considers fundamental.

As such, I thank Stephen and general semanticist for reminding me of the problem with the following sentence, the sentence which has been contested in this thread:

"Of course, there do exist a few truths that are self-evident and beyond question, such as the axioms of existence, identity, and consciousness that Ayn Rand has presented: 'existence exists', 'A is A', and 'I am conscious of existence.'¹"

I can't edit this article as it appears on OL. But if I were to rewrite this article and post it elsewhere, I would eliminate the conjunction "and beyond question," yet retain the point that axioms are "self-evident."

(I'm not even sure if axiomatic proposals are "truths" proper, as I wrote; I'm mostly sure they are not "truths" but I want to study others' writings a little more to see if it is the wrong term. The point I am trying to make is that the axioms are valid; I was not concerned with applying a comprehensive definition of truth when I wrote the sentence.)

I see the problem of regarding an axiomatic concept as "beyond question". The self-evident fact that the concept refers to is beyond question, but the verbalized concept itself is not beyond question, until one validates the concept. For example, one reads "existence exists" in Ayn Rand. Is one not to confirm it in some way? If one does not confirm it, i.e., if one does not "connect" it to the world around him, "existence exists" is merely taken as words--words which can be memorized and only used as the substance of a kind of dogmatic faith. I have just finished reading the chapter "Axiomatic Concepts" in ITOE. In that chapter, Rand notes that the process of forming a concept of existence involves a process of abstraction, which to me is done very easily. I would summarize the process as explained in this chapter very simply: one observes the existence of an entity before oneself, omitting the unique time when one is perceiving it to exist, and omitting all of the "measurements" of the existent. In this way, existence is grasped. We are thus able to validate the absolutism of existence--by what really amounts to an easy process of observation; and if "time" is really an important issue here, how simple it is to omit it because time is in the background when we observe things!!! Maybe I did not adequately explain this. But I myself know that existence exists, and I hate to give it more thought. I am able to see that existence exists and I don't need to constantly confirm it at every moment in my life. (I will post later why this is such an emotional issue for me.) Existence exists.

Thus the conjunction "and beyond question" in my sentence is confusing to a reader.

--John

Edited January 6, 2010 by ValueChaser