Logical Structure of Objectivism

[merjet]

Self-interest is an absolute natural characteristics of every volitional individual. That's it.

There is no issue of self-interest vs "non self-interest", nor is self-interest subject to modification in any way. It's a 100% condition by nature.

"Complementing self-interests" means that person X wants something which person Y is happy to offer.

Children want to be cared for and taught, which I am happy to do. Therefore the children's and my self-interest complement each other.

Xray-speak is very unclear to me. How does the first for one person reconcile with the second without conflict?

"The first" refers to what you said Dec 8. "The second" refers to what you said Dec 9. How do you reconcile the first and the second w/o conflict? The first is presumably about any individual, e.g. you. The second is about two (or more) individuals in a relationship.

The second is fairly clear. The first is cryptic Xray speak. How exactly does "100% conditioned by nature" in the first relate to the second? The self-interests of different people are often not complementary.

Edited December 10, 2009 by Merlin Jetton

[Brendan Hutching]

Do you mean "how do these behaviours demonstrate the one true definition for everybody"?

I mean the one “true” definition for everybody. If that’s a straw man, fine. We can then agree that the definition is conventional, ie “true” according to common usage.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Brendan,

The definitions of a word as standing for more than one concept is conventional just like the development of a language is. And just like the choice of a word to represent a concept is. The word varies but the concept stays the same. As I keep saying, chair and cadeira (in Portuguese) mean the same concept. And even the word "convention" itself can stand for more than one concept (i.e., assembly or common usage or treaty, etc.).

The definition of a concept occurs according to a standard. I see no reason whatsoever to restrict that standard to "convention." There are many other standards that can be used. The definition of a concept will be true or false in relation to the standard used.

In other words, the concept and standard determine the validity of the definition, not the other way around.

So, if convention is your epistemological method of cognition—i.e., if it is conventional for people to say the earth is flat and you use convention as your standard of truth (you believe the earth is flat because most people say so), you will be correct if you claim that, according to convention, defining the earth as round is flat-out false. It will be false, too. It will be false because most people will say it is false. That's the standard you chose.

But if you use another standard, one different than convention, well... you have to use another epistemological method... and there goes your conventional truth right out the window...

Michael

[tjohnson]

The definition of a concept occurs according to a standard.

You don't define concepts, you define words. Repeat after me, "concepts are not words". People don't ask what concepts mean, they ask what words mean. i have a concept of 'tree' in my brain, it makes no sense to speak about defining this concept.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

You don't define concepts, you define words. Repeat after me, "concepts are not words". People don't ask what concepts mean, they ask what words mean. i have a concept of 'tree' in my brain, it makes no sense to speak about defining this concept.

GS,

Yes you do define concepts. There is a whole book about it in the classical Objectivist literature giving a specific methodology.

It would be great if you read ITOE one day.

Or at least read a few of the gazillion posts on OL by many different posters mentioning the definition of concepts.

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

The definition of a concept occurs according to a standard.

You don't define concepts, you define words. Repeat after me, "concepts are not words". People don't ask what concepts mean, they ask what words mean. i have a concept of 'tree' in my brain, it makes no sense to speak about defining this concept.

This begs the question of what is a word? A word is a label. Proper nouns are not labels of concepts, common nouns are. But what is the utility of this discussion?

--Brant

[Brendan Hutching]

the earth is flat

“The earth is flat” is not a definition. It’s a proposition, because it makes the claim: x is the case. And it can be shown to be true or false empirically by, for example, seeing a photograph of the earth taken from space.

Definitions are not propositions. They make no truth claim. For example, take a definition of earth that includes flatness: the earth is the flat planet on which we live, third in order from the sun.

What’s the problem with this definition? It has no real-world referent. The only referent is a concept: “flat earth”. So there’s your answer if someone tries to persuade you that the definition of the real-world referent called “earth” includes flatness.

[tjohnson]

GS,

Yes you do define concepts. There is a whole book about it in the classical Objectivist literature giving a specific methodology.

It would be great if you read ITOE one day.

Or at least read a few of the gazillion posts on OL by many different posters mentioning the definition of concepts.

Michael

One thing I have seen posted many, many times here is about the importance of defining your terms. Well, in my book, there is a difference between a 'word' (a symbol like a sound or marks on paper etc.) and a 'concept' (some sort of mental image in your brain). You can define

what you mean by 'a tree' but you can't define what you mean by an image in your brain. My view on this will not change by reading ITOE.

[merjet]

“The earth is flat” is not a definition.

Trivial point.

It’s a proposition, because it makes the claim: x is the case. And it can be shown to be true or false empirically by, for example, seeing a photograph of the earth taken from space.

Definitions are not propositions. They make no truth claim.

That is your opinion with which many people disagree. Definitions are tantamount to propositions. They can be easily put in propositional form. Regarding the truth or falsity of definitions, see my whale example here.

A consequence of holding that definitions are not propositions is to sever definitions from being tied to reality (beyond anything more than interpersonal agreement).

Edited December 11, 2009 by Merlin Jetton

[tjohnson]

This begs the question of what is a word? A word is a label. Proper nouns are not labels of concepts, common nouns are. But what is the utility of this discussion?

--Brant

My objective is to try and avoid confusion in these discussions and this confusion, about words and concepts, is one I see arising over and over again and so the discussions go in circles. BTW, I don't see why a proper noun is not a label for a concept? I'm sure my concept of 'Tuscon' is different from yours, for example.

[tjohnson]

Next consider an example. Suppose somebody defined "whale" as "a big fish with a blow-hole." Legend has it that long ago this was considered to be tied to reality. A whale lived in the water and was shaped like some fish. As more was learned about both whales and fish, the ties began to break. There were important differences. Whales are mammals (give birth to live young, etc.) and fish are not. Fish have permanent gills and whales do not. Fish are cold-blooded and whales are warm-blooded. So "whale" needed redefining in order to not categorize them as fish and make a more suitable definiens such as a modern one given here.

Did it ever occur to you that these categories like 'fish' and 'mammal' are arbitrary? We human are at liberty to create as many categories as we wish. One day the whale is a fish the next day it isn't because we said so. Suppose you drive your car without a seatbelt on then one day they pass a law saying you have to wear seatbelts. Now you are an outlaw because we created a new category of outlaws, ie. people who don't wear seatbelts. You didn't change into an outlaw but someone changed their definition of an outlaw. We create whatever categories we find useful and we change them whenever we want, get used to it!

[Brant Gaede]

This begs the question of what is a word? A word is a label. Proper nouns are not labels of concepts, common nouns are. But what is the utility of this discussion?

--Brant

My objective is to try and avoid confusion in these discussions and this confusion, about words and concepts, is one I see arising over and over again and so the discussions go in circles. BTW, I don't see why a proper noun is not a label for a concept? I'm sure my concept of 'Tuscon' is different from yours, for example.

You got me on the proper noun thingie.

--Brant

[merjet]

Did it ever occur to you that these categories like 'fish' and 'mammal' are arbitrary?

Speak for yourself. Of course, there is some arbitrariness in what sound or combination of letters is used to make a new word. But how far does the arbitrariness go? "Fish" was coined in English to refer to a particular kind of animal. Does that mean somebody arbitrarily attributing it to tigers and trees is fine? Or to a shellfish selfish person?

Similarly, one inch and one centimeter were at some time arbitrarily selected lengths. Does that allow me to reasonably say that General Semanticist is 150 inches tall or 60 centimeters tall, on the grounds that what I call an inch or centimeter is arbitrary?

If the meanings of all words are so arbitrary, what does that entail for science?

We create whatever categories we find useful and we change them whenever we want, get used to it!

Do you do so arbitrarily?

Edited December 11, 2009 by Merlin Jetton

[tjohnson]

If the meanings of all words are so arbitrary, what does that entail for science?

You seem to be confusing 'arbitrary' with 'meaningless'. The meanings of specific words at any given time may be arbitrary (subject to change) but they still have a definite meaning to the people using them at the time. The important thing is that they mean the same thing to the people using them, otherwise communcation breaks down.

Edited December 11, 2009 by general semanticist

[merjet]

You seem to be confusing 'arbitrary' with 'meaningless'.

Not at all.

The meanings of specific words at any given time may be arbitrary (subject to change) but they still have a definite meaning to the people using them at the time. The important thing is that they mean the same thing to the people using them, otherwise communcation breaks down.

Yeah! You put some limits on "arbitrary". Not only communication, but also thought!

[Daniel Barnes]

You got me on the proper noun thingie.

It's not your fault, it's an unresolved problem with Rand's theory of concept formation. She bluffs her way past it (p11, ITOE) but this is rather obviously ad hoc.

[Daniel Barnes]

This begs the question of what is a word? A word is a label. Proper nouns are not labels of concepts, common nouns are. But what is the utility of this discussion?

Brant here asks a perfectly reasonable question. Is this all a pedantic, obscure waste of time?

To answer it, let's start from an observation, "based in reality" as Objectivists like to say:

Daniel, one point on which I think you have a legitimate criticism of actual Objectivist practice pertaining to definitions is that I have seen multiple cases in which Objectivists have argued, and sometimes fiercely, about the "real" meaning of a word instead of discussing the difference between the concept they're using and another concept labeled in common parlance by the same word. Unfortunately, Rand herself gave impetus to this practice in a passage you linked farther along from the Introduction to VOS.

Now, Ellen is of the opinion that this actual Objectivist practice of arguing, sometimes fiercely, over "true" or "real" meaning of terms is a "mistaken application" of Rand's theory - a mistake that Ellen considers Rand herself "gave impetus" to in various presentation blunders. She also appears to think that under these presentation errors, Rand has a viable theory, although she (Ellen) hints at some unspecified problems in the "details". I would be curious to see what, if any, significant consequences she thinks there have been for the Objectivist movement arising from these blunders.

(I don't know whether Merlin agrees with Ellen in any of this. For all I know what Ellen thinks is "mistaken" Objectivist practice he and others may think is entirely sound and productive).

Obviously I have observed the same widespread arguments in Objectivism. However, I have a quite different view from Ellen's as to how it has come about, and further, have a provocative hypothesis as to its consequences for the Objectivist movement, which I think are important.

I am happy to explain, in brief, how and why.

First, I argue that far from being a "mistaken application" of Rand's theories, this unfortunate Objectivist practice is entirely consistent with the adoption of the Aristotelian essentialist methodology, which produced exactly the same effect (scholasticism) when Aristotle was revived in the Middle Ages, and continues to dog most modern philosophy* due to the massive underlying influence of both he and his teacher, Plato - though it is obviously more notable where Aristotle's influence is most direct. It does not matter whether the "essence" in question is "metaphysical" or "epistemological" - the methodology is the same.

In effect, Rand borrowed Aristotle's OS to run her shiny new Objectivism software on. However, she failed to notice that this ancient and plausible-sounding OS itself has, on close examination, serious hidden logical problems that effectively render it defunct. Karl Popper observed that there are at least three: 1) How to distinguish a supposed "true" essential definition from mere verbal convention 2) the problem of distinguishing "true" definitions from "false" ones and 3) the problem of avoiding an infinite regress of definitions - which with some irony proceeds from one of the useful logical doctrines of Aristotle himself, which is that it is impossible to prove the truth of all statements.

Now, any of these three seem to me to be fatal for her theory (so far we have been discussing mostly 2)), and AFAICS it appears that Rand was not familiar with any of them. For example, she claimed the supposed "truth" or "falsehood" of definitions was what all human knowledge rested on, yet gave us no clear instructions as to how this was to be determined (I have tried to show, via a deliberately trivial example, that even appeals to "reality" do not solve disagreement - both "puppies" are real. This was intended to show that as Rand's theory cannot solve trivial disagreements over simple objects, we cannot hope to rely on it solving similar disagreements over complex abstractions. In fact on reaching this stalemate they often degenerate further into 1) and 3)).

Secondly, I agree with Brant that this topic is a perfect license for boring, pedantic, cloudy, pretentious dialogue. This is no doubt a possible reason why this underlying issues have been so long overlooked - that it is not very much fun to argue!

However, just because a subject is boring, muddy and complicated doesn't it isn't important. In fact, my bold hypothesis is that Objectivism's progress is primarily thwarted not so much by collectivist society's hostility, or the advanced intellectual nature of Rand's ideas, or even the BrandensTM or the drooling beasts over at the ARCHNblog, but by an ancient, and fundamentally buggy, methodological structure.

That's why, despite the lipservice paid to "reality", Objectivists find themselves perpetually at war with themselves over the meaning of words - a war which has at least three strong arguments to say that it is a completely phoney one, and a massive waste of the intellectual energies of some of humanity's best and brightest.

This also suggests why, despite claiming to have the fundamentally correct philosophy, and to be able to loftily inform us what "true" science or "true" art is, Objectivism has actually produced very little in fields like science or art. This is another hallmark of scholasticism: that one spends all their time sharpening one's pencil, and never writing anything.

Of course, my theory might be wrong. And indeed finding out might entail a great deal of sometimes pedantic, sometimes hostile, and sometimes confusing discussion. But the end result of it might just be something important that makes it all worthwhile, both for you and me.

*For an example of this sisters-under-the-skin relationship between Objectivism and modern philosophy, it is interesting to compare Rand and, say, Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein held that philosophy's role is to clarify the meanings of terms, whereas science investigates matters of fact. Similarly, In science, Rand claims (p290 ITOE), it is philosophy's job to "define the terms" of questions scientists investigate - that philosophy would tell them for example, what words like "mind" and "brain" mean (ie the concepts they stand for). While it is amusing to step back and actually imagine philosophers instructing scientists as to the proper meaning of the word "brain" (!) the similarity, and the basic emphasis on verbalism, is clear.

Edited December 11, 2009 by Daniel Barnes

[Ellen Stuttle]

Daniel,

I have other projects uppermost at the moment, but I will try to get back to you on this.

Meanwhile, I submit to your attention a quote from Popper which concludes a segment wherein he describes the maturing of his thought on "nominalism" and his coming to think that his choice of "methodological nominalism" as a description for his views was misleading:

Unended Quest

Routledge Classics Paperback, 1992

pg. 18

I now believe that Polanyi and Gomperz were both right. Polany was right because the natural sciences are largely free from verbal discussion, while verbalism was, and still is, rampant in many forms in the social sciences. [....] Gomperz was right because a realist who believes in an "external world" necessarily believes in the existence of a cosmos rather than a chaos; that is, in regularities. And though I felt more opposed to classical essentialism than to nominalism, I did not then realize that, in substituting the problem of biological adaptation to regularities for the problem of the existence of similarities, I stood closer to "realism" than to nominalism.

Popper ended up with a view very close to Rand's -- or put that the other way around if you prefer: Rand's view was very close to Popper's mature view. Although I agree with you that she was an "essentialist," she was not a classical essentialist (and he wasn't what's generally called a "nominalist").

Ellen

Edited December 11, 2009 by Ellen Stuttle

[Daniel Barnes]

I have other projects uppermost at the moment, but I will try to get back to you on this.

So do I, including my review of Burn's book (very favourable) which has been sitting in draft for weeks and which I really must finish before anything else.

Meanwhile, I submit to your attention a quote from Popper which concludes a segment wherein he describes the maturing of his thought on "nominalism" and his coming to think that his choice of "methodological nominalism" as a description for his views was misleading:

Yes, Popper eventually abandoned the "methodological" in his nominalism (and essentialism) when criticising the Aristotelian doctrine of definitions to as he felt this had become confusing. For example, the terms "methodological nominalism" and "methodological essentialism" are still in The Open Society, but do not occur in later condensations of these arguments (for example in "Popper Selections").

But this is merely terminological. The arguments themselves are AFAICS unchanged, as one can see by comparing the later condensation in Popper Selections (Two Kinds Of Definition) with the original (The Aristotelian Roots of Hegelianism, plus extensive notes) in The Open Society. I personally prefer the "methodological", because that's the type of problem this is. I think Popper shouldn't have bothered changing it.

Popper ended up with a view very close to Rand's -- or put that the other way around if you prefer: Rand's view was very close to Popper's mature view. Although I agree with you that she was an "essentialist," she was not a classical essentialist (and he wasn't what's generally called a "nominalist").

I strongly disagree that this is the case. There is nothing at all in Popper even remotely like Rand's claim that "The truth or falsehood of all of man’s conclusions, inferences, thought and knowledge rests on the truth or falsehood of his definitions." All you will find is extensive arguments against this position in Popper, old and young.

So I think you are quite demonstrably wrong here. But that's ok: I don't expect you to be a Popper scholar, and it as I have written above it is a confusing subject. The confusion arises for two reasons: one, because Popper agrees that say, the laws of nature, or the purposes of artificial things might be said to be a kind of "essence" (eg the "essence" of a clock is to tell time) (Conjectures and Refutations, p142). Also, like "essences", these laws are often hidden from us. All this Popper admits. But what Popper proposes might be descibed roughly as nominalist means to essentialist ends.

Whereas Rand, in sharp contrast, adopted Aristotle's essentialist means wholesale. And therein lies the problem.

The other reason is that Rand is a vague and often highly confused writer, whose philosophy is (as you know) in my opinion pretty much a freestyle grab bag consisting of mostly shonky constructions held together by ad hoc adaptions and attempts to rhetorically intimidate. So you can certainly find similarities with other thinkers like Popper in Rand, but unfortunately all this does is demonstrates Rand's incoherence. Recall I myself have used Fred Seddon's formulation of Rand's "contextual" theory of knowledge myself (We may know P, but P may be false) to illustrate how Rand's theory results in a standard skeptical position. Yet I don't think there's even the faintest chance Rand realised that, or would ever admit it....;-)

Edited December 12, 2009 by Daniel Barnes

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Daniel,

Isn't it odd after these couple of years to see someone else arguing the same arguments I used to make about the similarity between Rand and Popper?

Practically nobody agreed with me back then.

Heh.

I still hold that Rand and Popper used different words and jargon to mean many of the same things underneath. Same concepts. Different labels.

I see you haven't changed your view, though...

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Isn't it odd after these couple of years to see someone else arguing the same arguments I used to make about the similarity between Rand and Popper?

And I equally enjoy making the same refutations. Just like old times...;-)

[merjet]

You got me on the proper noun thingie.

It's not your fault, it's an unresolved problem with Rand's theory of concept formation. She bluffs her way past it (p11, ITOE) but this is rather obviously ad hoc.

How does she bluff? Please tell us your more profound analysis of proper names.

[merjet]

Now, Ellen is of the opinion that this actual Objectivist practice of arguing, sometimes fiercely, over "true" or "real" meaning of terms is a "mistaken application" of Rand's theory - a mistake that Ellen considers Rand herself "gave impetus" to in various presentation blunders. ... (I don't know whether Merlin agrees with Ellen in any of this. For all I know what Ellen thinks is "mistaken" Objectivist practice he and others may think is entirely sound and productive).

The practice is far from uniform, so I decline to comment on it. However, it is not only an issue of true/false, but dictionary definition or common usage versus a stipulative definition. If a definition of either kind isn't tied to reality or is incoherent, that is what makes a definition false.

It does not matter whether the "essence" in question is "metaphysical" or "epistemological" - the methodology is the same.

Popperycock. Plato's and Aristotle's doctines of forms were far apart. What is this so-called method, intellectual intuition? This term (or the Greek equivalent), in my view per either one, is intellectual grasping, the analog of perception, and contrasted with demonstrative or discursive knowledge.

Karl Popper observed that there are at least three: 1) How to distinguish a supposed "true" essential definition from mere verbal convention 2) the problem of distinguishing "true" definitions from "false" ones and 3) the problem of avoiding an infinite regress of definitions - which with some irony proceeds from one of the useful logical doctrines of Aristotle himself, which is that it is impossible to prove the truth of all statements.

#1 is not an issue. I've already addressed #2. There is an infinite regress problem if the only resource is a dictionary. Observation breaks the regress. "You can see a lot by just looking." -- Yogi Berra

For example, she claimed the supposed "truth" or "falsehood" of definitions was what all human knowledge rested on, yet gave us no clear instructions as to how this was to be determined

Popperycock. I asked Barnes at least twice what definitions rest on per Rand, with no response. He behaves as if the answer is nothing or at best a dictionary. I finally answered the question myself with quotes from Rand here. Related, I asked him about 'rules of definition' as commonly found in introductory logic textbooks, and got no response to that.

However, just because a subject is boring, muddy and complicated doesn't it isn't important.

That's pretty ironic coming from you, given that Popper declared that definitions were unimportant.

"And we can at once see from this that definitions do not play any very important part in science. ... Our 'scientific knowledge', in the sense in which this term may be properly used, remains entirely unaffected if we eliminate all definitions" (Two Kinds of Definitions here. Scroll down.)

Edited December 12, 2009 by Merlin Jetton

[Brendan Hutching]

Definitions are tantamount to propositions.

In a definition, the definiens is, or should be, equivalent to the defiendum, the word being defined. So the one can substituted for the other without loss of meaning.

As for your whale example, “big fish with a blow-hole” is the wrong definiens. But that doesn’t mean the definition “a whale is a big fish with a blow-hole” is false, because it’s not a statement about an object or state of affairs. It just attempts to provide the meaning of the word.

A proposition, on the other hand, is a claim about objects or states of affairs. The fact that a definition can be put into a form of words that mimics a proposition proves nothing.

The difference is a logical one: definitions are tautologies. A correct definition can only be “true”, while propositions make a claim that may be true or false.

[Daniel Barnes]

...I decline to comment...

Wow. Here Merlin is faced with a factual observation of common Objectivist practice, whose existence is verified as a "legitimate criticism" even by one of my opponents (in this discussion at least). And how does he respond?

"...I decline to comment..."

Of course, no one can force you to address facts you'd prefer not to, Merlin. That's a choice you have to make yourself.

Popperycock. Plato's and Aristotle's doctines of forms were far apart. What is this so-called method, intellectual intuition? This term (or the Greek equivalent), in my view per either one, is intellectual grasping, the analog of perception, and contrasted with demonstrative or discursive knowledge.

This is a completely irrelevant tangent, tho I do recall you disappeared up it last time we discussed it, never to return...-)

#1 is not an issue.

Why?

I've already addressed #2.

Yes, and you admitted that even your best answer was not a "silver bullet", nor even "highly rigorous." But this is exactly what I argue! Your best answer doesn't solve the problem.

In other words...you agree with me! I don't know why you are so intent on making it appear otherwise.

Handily, Brendan further drives home the problems with your situation.

There is an infinite regress problem if the only resource is a dictionary. Observation breaks the regress. "You can see a lot by just looking." -- Yogi Berra

In fact, observation merely leads to my original "puppy" example, which, unless I have missed it, you have also so far also declined to answer, other than in the form of a cryptic multichoice. Are you going to continue to decline to answer this question as well?

Popperycock. I asked Barnes at least twice what definitions rest on per Rand, with no response. He behaves as if the answer is nothing or at best a dictionary.

But this is nonsense. With my "puppy" example I deliberately chose ostensive definitions (pointing at a young man, and a young dog respectively) in order to "tie both to reality" just as you require - cutting to the chase, as it were. Yet despite me making the example for your convenience, so far you have declined to clearly respond. Do you intend to at some point?

Related, I asked him about 'rules of definition' as commonly found in introductory logic textbooks, and got no response to that.

Why would I object to rules of definition? Rules of definition are conventions, as we all know. It's not me that rejects "mere conventions" as unreliable guides to truth and falsehood, but Rand!

That's pretty ironic coming from you, given that Popper declared that definitions were unimportant.

This is rather desperate, Merlin. Obviously, the consequences of a mistaken theory - say, that definitions are important, when it turns out they are not - may indeed be very important. And in fact this is exactly what Popper says in the very essay you just quote-mined. For example:

"The development of thought since Aristotle could, I think, be summed up by saying that every discipline, as long as it used the Aristotelian method of definition, has remained arrested in a state of empty verbiage and barren scholasticism, and that the degree to which the various sciences have been able to make any progress depended on the degree to which they have been able to get rid of this essentialist method. (This is why so much of our 'social science' still belongs to the Middle Ages.)" - Popper, "Two Kinds Of Definition"

So now we've got that straight, are these consequences important or not? Or perhaps you would prefer to decline to answer?

Edited December 13, 2009 by Daniel Barnes