Logical Structure of Objectivism

[Ellen Stuttle]

Daniel,

Isn't it odd after these couple of years to see someone else arguing the same arguments I used to make about the similarity between Rand and Popper?

Practically nobody agreed with me back then.

Heh.

I still hold that Rand and Popper used different words and jargon to mean many of the same things underneath. Same concepts. Different labels.

I see you haven't changed your view, though...

Michael

I agreed with you then that there was similarity in what Rand and Popper objected to.

Where I disagreed was with your insistence that Rand wasn't essentialist in her views on definitions. I don't know if even today you've realized that, yes, she was.

What you were doing then was trying to answer Popper's objections to "essentialism" by claiming that Rand wasn't an essentialist, where instead the approach to have taken was to argue that Popper's objections (some of which aren't well stated anyway) didn't apply to Rand.

Ellen

[Ellen Stuttle]

There is an infinite regress problem if the only resource is a dictionary. Observation breaks the regress. "You can see a lot by just looking." -- Yogi Berra

In fact, observation merely leads to my original "puppy" example, which, unless I have missed it, you have also so far also declined to answer, other than in the form of a cryptic multichoice. Are you going to continue to decline to answer this question as well?

Popperycock. I asked Barnes at least twice what definitions rest on per Rand, with no response. He behaves as if the answer is nothing or at best a dictionary.

But this is nonsense. With my "puppy" example I deliberately chose ostensive definitions (pointing at a young man, and a young dog respectively) in order to "tie both to reality" just as you require - cutting to the chase, as it were. [....]

That one is so simple, Daniel, I don't understand why you keep bringing it up as if it's pertinent to Rand's views on definitions. You point and say "puppy, meaning 1" and likewise "puppy, meaning 2." There's nothing in Rand that says that one word can't be used as the label for more than one concept.

Where do you get the idea that she'd be required to say that one of the meanings is wrong? As I said before, if someone defined the animal referred to by "puppy, meaning 1" as "a young feline," THEN the definition would be false. But there's nothing which makes one of the two definitions (young canine or callow youth) of "puppy" false because the word is also used to refer to a different concept.

Ellen

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Stuttle,

Actually, you disagreed with a lot more, like you are still doing with this habit of crawling into someone's head and telling them what they think.

I will give you credit about your focus on Rand's use of the term essential. It is very confusing and discussing it had value to my own thinking, but you maintained back then (and still maintain) that Rand was an "essentialist."

She was not.

She basically used "essential trait" as a perceived characteristic that one mentions—among countless other characteristics belonging to an existent—to identify the existent, which is the purpose of a definition, not to somehow arrive at a mystical metaphysical essence and thus, ultimately, understand the nature of the universe. The fact that she paraphrased Aristotle a couple of times to sound more learned clouded over this distinction.

I hate to say it with Rand, but she went into "fake it until you make it" mode a few times.

Allowing that metaphysical essence stuff to creep in as what Rand really meant is where we part ways and why I object to the term "essentialist."

EDIT: To be clear, "essence" (as used by Rand despite a couple of isolated confusing passages) is what one perceives as a unique characteristic of a grouping of existents (i.e., the differentia) in relation to a wider grouping (i.e., the genus) to which the existent is previously categorized hierarchy-wise. "Essential characteristic" is an epistemological tool used for categorizing. Used in this manner (Rand's manner), "essence" is not a metaphysical "thingness," a secret force or existent in its own right that we try to somehow divine or identify through concepts.

The closest it comes to this metaphysically is that the unique characteristic actually is present in the existents identified (which is validated by observation) and can be compared against the characteristics of similar things.

To repeat, Rand was not an "essentialist."

Michael

[tjohnson]

As I said before, if someone defined the animal referred to by "puppy, meaning 1" as "a young feline," THEN the definition would be false.

So, if someone thinks a puppy is young feline then they are using the wrong definition. In other words, 'a young feline' is not one of the accepted/used definitions of 'puppy'. Again, the definition 'a young feline', if used for 'puppy' is incorrect. Well I'll be damned!

[Xray]

Did it ever occur to you that these categories like 'fish' and 'mammal' are arbitrary? We human are at liberty to create as many categories as we wish. One day the whale is a fish the next day it isn't because we said so. Suppose you drive your car without a seatbelt on then one day they pass a law saying you have to wear seatbelts. Now you are an outlaw because we created a new category of outlaws, ie. people who don't wear seatbelts. You didn't change into an outlaw but someone changed their definition of an outlaw. We create whatever categories we find useful and we change them whenever we want, get used to it!

Very important point about categories being arbitrary.

GS, I have a question. There has been a lot of discussion about categories here (what Rand calls "concept" is actually category).

But what about the conceptual identity of the concrete objects we are dealing with? Each of these objects has its own set of characteristics differentiating it from other objects.

Has Korzybski in his writings, dealt with this 'identity by difference' aspect?

As I said before, if someone defined the animal referred to by "puppy, meaning 1" as "a young feline," THEN the definition would be false.

So, if someone thinks a puppy is young feline then they are using the wrong definition. In other words, 'a young feline' is not one of the accepted/used definitions of 'puppy'. Again, the definition 'a young feline', if used for 'puppy' is incorrect. Well I'll be damned!

Puppy denotes "young dog", but can be used connotatively (= valuing) to refer to an immature youth.

Puppy cannot denote 'young feline'.

A lampdshade cannot be defined with the semantic markers belonging to 'table'.

When Jane says to John "Would you please pass me the butter", and he hands her a fork instead, telling her "My definion of "butter" is 'an eating tool with tines' the communication will break down completely, and Jane will be correctly suspecting that John has a mental problem.

A term like 'selfless' is per se connotative (for there exists no person without a 'self'; the sentence "John is selfless" is a subjective value judgement of behavior, it does not define anything).

Therefore Rand's so-called definition of "selfish/selfless" is no definition at all, it is a mere subjective interpretation of connotative terms, and therefore, definition-wise, irrelevant.

Edited December 13, 2009 by Xray

[Daniel Barnes]

That one is so simple, Daniel, I don't understand why you keep bringing it up as if it's pertinent to Rand's views on definitions. You point and say "puppy, meaning 1" and likewise "puppy, meaning 2." There's nothing in Rand that says that one word can't be used as the label for more than one concept.

But as you point out, even Rand herself confused the problem in her discussion of "selfishness." Further, there is plenty more in Rand that easily fosters such a confusion. For example (as others discussed earlier):

Rand: “Sacrifice” does not mean the rejection of the worthless, but of the precious. “Sacrifice” does not mean the rejection of the evil for the sake of the good, but of the good for the sake of the evil. “Sacrifice” is the surrender of that which you value in favor of that which you don’t. (Galt's speech FTNI 139)

Now it seems perfectly obvious that in the first and second sentences of this quote, Rand is telling us what the word sacrifice does not mean. Then in the third, what the word does mean.

It also seems obvious what she's not saying. She's not saying: "Here's my particular interpretation of a commonly used word, "sacrifice", but if you want use it to mean what it commonly means, that's just fine by me!" Further, once again there is this seamless transposition of word and concept in Rand's own usage.

And this is precisely one of the problems with not just Rand, but "conceptual" debates on the whole - that they inexorably reduce down to debates over the meanings of words.

I freely admit that if confronted with the "puppy" situation, Rand would probably say exactly what you suggest. However, I put it to you that if the same debate was conducted over "sacrifice", and I pointed to a certain act as being a "sacrifice" - for example, a woman denying herself a hat in order to by food for her child - she would tell me I was wrong. I really can't imagine, and nothing in such a passage implies, she would merely label them sacrifice1 and sacrifice2 as methodological nominalism would recommend. This inconsistency, however, is hardly my problem and suggests that Rand simply doesn't really understand the problems her theory entails.

There may be various other places where Rand may have an inkling of this problem, which prompts her to talk about about words being merely "labels" or "symbols" for concepts. But AFAICS she never outlines how this confusion is to be avoided. She also sometimes refers to concepts as being "symbols" as well, which only reinforces how easily interchangeable these things become! In other words, despite some superficial gestures in a nominalistic direction, on the whole she falls into the standard scholastic pattern.

Now, contra me, you indicate Rand's theory does have a method for avoiding these problems, and they are in fact just a misunderstanding on the part of some of her followers.

In that case, could you outline how you think Rand's theory works, and maybe walk us through some examples of how Objectivists might overcome their misunderstandings to arrive at "true" and "false" definitions?

Edited December 13, 2009 by Daniel Barnes

[tjohnson]

Very important point about categories being arbitrary.

GS, I have a question. There has been a lot of discussion about categories here (what Rand calls "concept" is actually category).

But what about the conceptual identity of the concrete objects we are dealing with? Each of these objects has its own set of characteristics differentiating it from other objects.

Has Korzybski in his writings, dealt with this 'identity by difference' aspect?

Korzybski encouraged the use of what he called 'extensional devices' like subscripts. In life we only deal with absolute individuals like tree₁, tree₂, tree₃ etc. and so differences are fundamental. It is the human abstracting process that emphasizes similarities while ignoring differences that results in classes, categories, groups, etc. Is this what you mean?

[merjet]

As for your whale example, “big fish with a blow-hole” is the wrong definiens. But that doesn’t mean the definition “a whale is a big fish with a blow-hole” is false, because it’s not a statement about an object or state of affairs. It just attempts to provide the meaning of the word

Please explain how a definition can be both wrong and not false.

The following are two on-line dictionary definitions.

wrong adj.

4a. contrary to fact, reason, some set standard, etc.; incorrect; inaccurate; false (source)

wrong adj.

4. Not according to truth; not conforming to fact or intent; not right; mistaken; erroneous; as, a wrong statement. (source)

A correct definition can only be “true”, while propositions make a claim that may be true or false.

What does true in quotes mean?

[merjet]

Here Merlin is faced with a factual observation of common Objectivist practice, whose existence is verified as a "legitimate criticism" even by one of my opponents (in this discussion at least). And how does he respond? "...I decline to comment..."

So what? Do you expect me to endorse every (alleged) common practice by a large, diverse group of people, many of whom I know nothing about, simply because you call them, and/or they call themselves, Objectivists?

This is a completely irrelevant tangent

It was as relevant as your unsubstantiated assertion about methodology.

Yes, and you admitted that even your best answer was not a "silver bullet", nor even "highly rigorous." But this is exactly what I argue! Your best answer doesn't solve the problem.

Please show your "silver bullet." Indeed, show any bullet that isn't a dud, which is all you have done so far. What is your best answer and what does it solve?

Handily, Brendan further drives home the problems with your situation.

I disagree and replied to Brendan above.

In fact, observation merely leads to my original "puppy" example, which, unless I have missed it, you have also so far also declined to answer, other than in the form of a cryptic multichoice. Are you going to continue to decline to answer this question as well?

What observation?

Wow. My multichoice question is cryptic? It is your puppy example in different words. Are you going to continue to not answer your own question? You expect me to answer a question that you won't? Nevertheless, I agree with Ellen and did respond in one way. Your puppy example is a straw man. Lastly, like Ellen said, your puppy example muddies and misses the main issue.

Why would I object to rules of definition? Rules of definition are conventions, as we all know. It's not me that rejects "mere conventions" as unreliable guides to truth and falsehood, but Rand!

You have several times said neither Rand nor I have provided any basis for deciding if a definition is true/false. Are such rules a standard for that or not? Moreover, 'follow convention' is not one of the rules.

Rand saying the common meanings of a few words are confused is far, far from saying all conventional meanings are unreliable. Again, your assertion is another gross exaggeration. Popper rejected some common meanings, too.

This is rather desperate, Merlin. Obviously, the consequences of a mistaken theory - say, that definitions are important, when it turns out they are not - may indeed be very important. And in fact this is exactly what Popper says in the very essay you just quote-mined.

That is your and Popper's opinion. I disagree, and Popper's essay is one misdiagnosis after another as I explained months ago.

So now we've got that straight, are these consequences important or not? Or perhaps you would prefer to decline to answer?

Neither you nor Popper have it straight. Popper's essay is one misdiagnosis after another.

[tjohnson]

Here Korzybski makes an interesting distinction between nominal and analytic definitions.

For instance, many millions of human beings have defined a stroke of lightning as being the "punishment of God" of evil men; other millions have defined it as a "natural, casual, periodical phenomenon"; yet other millions have defined it as an "electric spark." What has been the result of these "non-important" definitions in practical life?.......

........The matter of definition, I have said, is very important. I am not now speaking of nominal definitions, which for convenience merely give names to known objects. I am speaking of such definitions of phenomena as result from correct analysis of the phenomena. Nominal definitions are mere conveniences and are neither true nor false; but analytic definitions are definitive propositions and are true or else false. Let us dwell upon the matter a little more.

In the illustration of the definitions of lightning, there were three; the first was the most mistaken and its application brought the most harm; the second was less incorrect and the practical results less bad; the third under the present conditions of our knowledge, was the "true one" and it brought the maximum benefit. This lightning illustration suggests the important idea of relative truth and relative falsehood-the idea, that is, of degrees of truth and degrees of falsehood. A definition may be neither absolutely true nor absolutely false; but of two definitions of the same thing' one of them may be truer or falser than the other.

I think this is pertinent to this discussion.

[Xray]

Ms. Xray:

1) your absurd and irrational gender based smothering statement that "children [with no exceptions stated] want to be cared[female mothering assumption] for and taught[completely undefined as to what they ALL will be taught].

That children want to be be cared for is a natural law fact and therefore not subject to alteration.

As for the alleged 'female mothering assumption' - it is you who bring in the unnecessary gender bias. For who says men cannot be good caregivers for children, be it as a teacher or a father? I have met a lot of caring fathers in my job, and also caring male teachers.

Ms. Xray:

I am wondering are you a volunteer teacher...

No. I'm a professional teacher. But I have done volunteer teaching as well.

Selene: because I have misunderstood your devotion to your student's well being that you would be teaching and caring for them out of your own selfish needs and receiving no compensation or benefits.

Devotion to my students' well-being is both an integral part of my job profile and something I enjoy doing.

Edited December 14, 2009 by Xray

[merjet]

I think this is pertinent to this discussion.

Agreed.

Consider the whale example, defining "whale" as “big fish with a blow-hole.” The definition is true for somebody with little knowledge of the animals. Whales are shaped like some fish and they are aquatic like fish. On the other hand, the definition is false for somebody more knowledgeable. Fish have permanent gills and whales do not. Whales are mammals and fish are not. Whales are warm-blooded and have lots of blubber, unlike fish. There are more differences. Also, porpoises and dolphins satisfy the cruder definition.

[merjet]

I never said the self-interests of people are always compatible (actually every confict be tracted back to opposing self-interests), but in the example I cited, mine and the children's self-interests are complementary. That was my point.

That didn't answer any of my questions.

[Xray]

Self-interest is an absolute natural characteristics of every volitional individual. That's it.

There is no issue of self-interest vs "non self-interest", nor is self-interest subject to modification in any way. It's a 100% condition by nature.

"Complementing self-interests" means that person X wants something which person Y is happy to offer.

Children want to be cared for and taught, which I am happy to do. Therefore the children's and my self-interest complement each other.

Xray-speak is very unclear to me. How does the first for one person reconcile with the second without conflict?

"The first" refers to what you said Dec 8. "The second" refers to what you said Dec 9. How do you reconcile the first and the second w/o conflict? The first is presumably about any individual, e.g. you. The second is about two (or more) individuals in a relationship.

The second is fairly clear. The first is cryptic Xray speak. How exactly does "100% conditioned by nature" in the first relate to the second? The self-interests of different people are often not complementary.

Xray: I never said the self-interests of people are always complementary (actually every conflict be traced back to opposing self-interests), but in the example I cited, mine and the children's self-interests are complementary. That was my point.

That didn't answer any of my questions.

Where is the problem? What is so hard to understand about the fact that people's self-interests can be compatible, complementary, or not?

If you want, we can continue the discussion about self-interest/"altruism" here:

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=5032&st=500

In # 503, I linked to an article which might interest you.

Edited December 14, 2009 by Xray

[merjet]

What is so hard to understand about the fact that people's self-interests can be compatible, complementary, or not?

Where did I say it is so hard to understand?

[Steve Gagne]

What does any of this bickering have to do with Bill's original question about 'the current status of the work in progress by Thomas and Kelley, "The Logical Structure of Objectivism?"'

[Alfonso Jones]

What does any of this bickering have to do with Bill's original question about 'the current status of the work in progress by Thomas and Kelley, "The Logical Structure of Objectivism?"'

LOL.

Folks can wander a bit off the topic, eh?

Bill P

[Daniel Barnes]

What does any of this bickering have to do with Bill's original question about 'the current status of the work in progress by Thomas and Kelley, "The Logical Structure of Objectivism?"'

Malign this discussion as you might, but it's making a damn sight more progress than the work in question.

[Brendan Hutching]

Please explain how a definition can be both wrong and not false.

Merlin: “Please explain how a definition can be both wrong and not false.”

A definition is like a label. You open a can labelled “tomatoes” to discover peaches. So the tomatoes label is wrong. Does that make it false? Of course not.

When I say that a correct definition can only be “true”, I mean that it is a tautology, or true by definition. But “true” in this sense cannot be contrasted with “false”, since tautologies cannot be false.

[merjet]

Malign this discussion as you might, but it's making a damn sight more progress than the work in question.

I don't really know what progress has been made on LSO recently, but I'm inclined to agree. Despite the bickering between Daniel and me, I believe we have made some progress. That doesn't mean we have come to agree more, but our discussing definitions at least has helped me to clarify my own position. I hope Daniel feels the same. Definition is something I think about infrequently. Despite the bickering, there is much Daniel and I do agree on. It is just not as visible. We have a history that began a few years ago on SOLO, now Rebirth of Reason. Daniel likes to dish it out with Rand as the target. (I think he makes good points about Rand sometimes.) I'm a tit-for-tat kind of guy (to a point), so I dish it out right back at him. We have never met face-to-face, but I'm confident our interaction would be a lot more cordial face-to-face.

About this thread diverging from the topic being LSO, I blame that on Daniel for this post. If he wants to blame it on the post that preceded his, that's fine by me.

Edited December 15, 2009 by Merlin Jetton

[merjet]

Merlin: “Please explain how a definition can be both wrong and not false.”

A definition is like a label. You open a can labelled “tomatoes” to discover peaches. So the tomatoes label is wrong. Does that make it false? Of course not.

I see. But try this. The word or definiendum, rather than the definition, is the label. You say the tomatoes label is wrong, but that is not saying the definition of tomatoes is wrong.

When I say that a correct definition can only be “true”, I mean that it is a tautology, or true by definition. But “true” in this sense cannot be contrasted with “false”, since tautologies cannot be false.

I take it you mean tautological the same way as meaning 5 of analytic here. If that is correct, then why should a definition (more specifically, the definiens) ever be changed? By the way, I think the concept rigid designator coined by Saul Kripke is useful. (That doesn't mean I agree with all he says or has said about it.)

[tjohnson]

I think using simple objects for examples in this discussion confuses the issue. The word 'tomato' is a symbol for some object which is described in the definition. If someone uses 'tomato' to represent an orange then they didn't learn how to speak English right - that's pretty much the end of the story. But what about the definition of something more complicated, like lightning, to use Korzybski's example. If you think 'lightning' represents punishment from God then this isn't merely a language issue, this is about "facts" etc. In this sense some definitions may be more true than others, based on our current knowledge.

[merjet]

The word 'tomato' is a symbol for some object which is described in the definition.

True, but it's more. You can point to a tomato, or hold one in your hand, and say, "This is a tomato." Giving a definiens for "tomato" is another act.

But what about the definition of something more complicated, like lightning, to use Korzybski's example. If you think 'lightning' represents punishment from God then this isn't merely a language issue, this is about "facts" etc. In this sense some definitions may be more true than others, based on our current knowledge.

Agreed again.

[tjohnson]

The word 'tomato' is a symbol for some object which is described in the definition.

True, but it's more. You can point to a tomato, or hold one in your hand, and say, "This is a tomato." Giving a definiens for "tomato" is another act.

Yes, you can define by intension or extension, ie. by giving examples.

[Daniel Barnes]

I don't really know what progress has been made on LSO recently, but I'm inclined to agree. Despite the bickering between Daniel and me, I believe we have made some progress. That doesn't mean we have come to agree more, but our discussing definitions at least has helped me to clarify my own position. I hope Daniel feels the same. Definition is something I think about infrequently. Despite the bickering, there is much Daniel and I do agree on. It is just not as visible. We have a history that began a few years ago on SOLO, now Rebirth of Reason. Daniel likes to dish it out with Rand as the target. (I think he makes good points about Rand sometimes.) I'm a tit-for-tat kind of guy (to a point), so I dish it out right back at him. We have never met face-to-face, but I'm confident our interaction would be a lot more cordial face-to-face.

They say that back in the 18thC unless you were being really rude to each other, you weren't really considered to be seriously arguing...;-)

I always start from the premise that I'm talking to Ayn Rand fans, and assume that if they survived reading her vigorous polemics without fainting dead away they should be able to withstand similarly vigorous criticism. Merlin can clearly not only withstand it, but return it with interest.

I fully agree with Merlin that this has so far been a productive discussion on various levels, not least because it's forced me to go back and re-read Popper's arguments and some criticisms of them on this score to make sure I had my head around the situation. I still feel reasonably confident I do, but in the course of reviewing it have come across at least one intriguing new critique of this particular Popperian dogma that I propound, so will report back if it turns out to be any good. (And incidentally, in the course of re-reading I came across an interesting sidelight on another issue in Nietzsche's discussion of the effect of Kant on Kleist. It reminded me of Rand, and made me wonder if she'd picked up some of her anti-Kantianism from her Nietzchean readings. But that is by-the-by).

I also have no doubt that should Merlin and I ever have a drink in the vicinity of Fenway Park it would not only be cordial, but perhaps even rather enjoyable. He has made some good points against me in the past and indeed against Rand herself, and with his wide-ranging knowledge and intellect he certainly keeps me on my game. What more could you ask? Further, in the past I've also seen him deal with young, slightly misguided types with a level of sympathy and tact that really impressed me, and I wrote him to say so. (Sadly I am not so young, so he knows he can deal with me more firmly!)

Undoubtedly some of my points over the years will be overstated, misguided, or flat out wrong, but we will never know until we beat it all into a stiff broth, just as we are doing in this case. On the other hand perhaps, if I'm lucky, I'll find some serious problems that perhaps have been overlooked that Objectivism will have to deal with, or that might account for some of the underlying issues within the movement (eg what I see as the assymetry between Objectivism's publicity and its fertility). So hopefully even the bickering will be to some purpose....;-)