Logical Structure of Objectivism

[merjet]

Merlin, once again, they're not mutually exclusive.

You keep acting as if they were.

I already said they aren't mutually exclusive. Again, are they (standard #1 and standard #2; link) very different?

Well I would have thought it was obvious by now!

You can't do it. If each wants to insist, a la Rand, that their meanings are somehow the "true" ones, and the other's is "false" communication breaks down. It's an obscurantist turn.

I'm still waiting after your obscurantist reply.

Rand does not say there is only one true definition for a word. That is your straw man. I see your puppy poser is as devastating as a toy gun.

Edited November 27, 2009 by Merlin Jetton

[Daniel Barnes]

I'm still waiting after your obscurantist reply.

You insist I do something I say can't be done? What is "obscurantist" about the phrase "You can't do it"?

Rand does not say there is only one true definition for a word. That is your straw man. I see your puppy poser is as devastating as a toy gun.

And your "tied to reality" is about as strong as a wet noodle...;-)

Well please give me an example of what Rand called a "false" definition then, and explain how she arrived at that conclusion. She insists that identifying "false" definitions is of vital importance, the truth of all our knowledge rests on it!

I've even given you a nice, central example in "selfishness."

Why don't you show us how the conventional version is "false"?

Or isn't the"truth" or "falsehood" of such definitions really of much importance after all?

Edited November 27, 2009 by Daniel Barnes

[Xray]

A true definition properly classifies stuff. A false definition incorrectly describes the category (or classification).

As implied in your post, classification is categorizing. Categories are per se arbitrary, evidenced e. g. in the fact that different languages categorize differently.

Just a random example: in English, the term for "wardrobe" refers to a container for clothes, not for kitchenware.

So the sentence ce "take some cups from the wardrobe" would be wrong use of English.

Whereas in German, there exists a general term ("Schrank") which is used both for kitchenware and for clothes.

In ITOE, Rand conveys the impression that forming a mental image of a linguistic category (she calls it "concept formation") requires sustained mental effort. Not true.

When I tell my three-year-olds to please get themselves a tissue to blow their nose, they won't go looking for a dust cloth or a kitchen towel. They already know how to categorize.

Animals btw can categorize as well. Categorizing does not even need language.

MSK: Notice that Rand even claims that stuff can be reclassified. In plain English, even though she implied the opposite, this actually means a concept can be wrong.

In ITOE, in plain English, she even uses the term "invalid concept".

Doesn't "objective value" fit the bill perfectly?

So if the issue is whether an idea (an abstract (not the thing) held in mind) corresponds to fact existing independently of mind, then the fact in focus is that each individual is endowed with volition and capacity to choose.

Thus, one arrives at the objective fact that value means to attribute value in step with personal preference identifying (value) valuations as subjective via inherent

characteristics of each individual.

Edited November 28, 2009 by Xray

[Xray]

Actually, that all values have a subjective element is objectively demonstrable.

This is because the adoption of a value, like a goal, requires a decision.

And decisions cannot be logically derived from facts. Yes, decisions pertain to facts. They can be constrained by, or made possible by facts. But they cannot be derived from them. This is the well-known dichotomy between facts and decisions. Thus there is always a subjective element in decisions.

Anyone who cares to dispute claim this is welcome to demonstrate the logical means by which they derive a decision from a fact, or any set of facts.

Down at the nitty gritty level, decision = choice = personal preference = subjective value.

So decision per se necessarily utilizes the natural law of subjective choice. A decision implies valuation in regard to the facts (or what is believed to be facts).

This is what identifies value (valuation) as subjective; i.e., created and subjectively attributed as opposed to objectively discovered.

Edited November 28, 2009 by Xray

[Daniel Barnes]

Is anyone learning how to think better for reading this thread?

--Brant

sees man in a woman (wo"man") and you can too: try real hard

sees woman on a ... "I get to be on top!" (Tom Hanks in "Big")

We live in hope!..;-)

[Daniel Barnes]

I merely mentioned the conceptual chain of "word-->concept-->referent" because I have seen you equivocate this more than once in your arguments. Even above, you are insinuating that in Objectivism, a concept cannot be a referent, although you don't outright say that.

I haven't "equivocated" on this anywhere. It isn't "insinuated" either. The only thing you're right about is that I don't say it!

Obviously a concept can be a referent. A referent is something that is referred to, generally by a word or symbol. In the words of my previous post, that something can be a concept, a physical state of affairs, whatever.

I can't understand how you can read the exact opposite into what I write?

A true definition properly classifies stuff. A false definition incorrectly describes the category (or classification).

Sounds terrific. So, just as I asked Merlin, let's see some actual examples of "true" vs "false" definitions that Rand identified, and the means by which she arrived at this determination.

After all, all our knowledge rests on this process!

I've given you a possible example in selfishness, but feel free to give us one of your own.

[Xray]

Ah, the old "you haven't read ITOE" routine.

You haven't missed a thing in not having read ITOE, GS.

In it for example you will find Rand making statements like "Consciouness is conscious", (p. 48), which makes about as much sense as saying "Tiredness is tired" or "Hungry is hungry".

Then she proceeds to call "Consciousness is conscious" an "axiomatic concept" and says "A is A" is the 'formal axiom' for it.

She speaks about definitions as "contextual absolutes", which is contradiction in terms since 'absolute' implies precisely the opposite: absence of contextuality.

She also states there in all seriousness that love can be measured, erroneously believing that linguistic terms used as labels like 'affection', constitute something like an objective measuring scale. Per Rand, the top of the scale includes "romantic love".

She also says that "affection" is applicable only in regard to persons. I suppose dog owners will shake their heads at that.

Edited November 29, 2009 by Xray

[Xray]

One way we learn concepts is by observing examples chair₁, chair₂, chair₃, etc. and after we have seen enough we "get it", which means we can imagine "a chair" without seeing it. This imagined chair does not refer to specific "real" chair.

That is the Platonic chair of which chair_1, chair_2, chair_3 are defective imitations.

It is of course the other way round: chair_1, chair _2, chair_3 are the finite objects an individual observes before being able to categorize.

There has been lot of talk about categorizing here, but what about the relationship with the finite object? Did caveman sit there while working at his his stone weapon and tell himself "this is going to be categorized as "hand axe"? Wasn't it the other way round and an (arbitrary) chain of sounds was connected to the finite object first?

Edited November 29, 2009 by Xray

[merjet]

You insist I do something I say can't be done?

LOL. You expect somebody else to answer your puppy poser and you can't (or won't) even do it yourself. It is answerable the way I stated it here.

And your "tied to reality" is about as strong as a wet noodle...;-)

Here you suggest that your disagreeing duo both have their definitions "tied to reality." Now you imply your disagreeing duo are both using "wet noodles". Your puppy poser is ready to self-destruct.

Please tell us how convention works when new words are invented.

[merjet]

And decisions cannot be logically derived from facts. Yes, decisions pertain to facts. They can be constrained by, or made possible by facts. But they cannot be derived from them. This is the well-known dichotomy between facts and decisions. Thus there is always a subjective element in decisions.

Anyone who cares to dispute claim this is welcome to demonstrate the logical means by which they derive a decision from a fact, or any set of facts.

Suppose I'm following a recipe that calls for 4 cups of flour. There is some flour in my cupboard, but I can't tell whether or not there is at least 4 cups simply by looking in the bag. So, according to what you said, there is no logical way to decide if there is at least 4 cups of flour in the bag. Also, according to Xray, whether or not there is at least 4 cups is subjective and cannot be objectively discovered. This is another example of Xray holding that some truth is subjective.

logical -

2. capable of reasoning or of using reason in an orderly cogent fashion (source)

This is what happens when you imagine that observation cannot confirm or falsify stuff and that only word games can.

Touché.

[Dragonfly]

Also, according to Xray, whether or not there is at least 4 cups is subjective and cannot be objectively discovered.

That is a lie.

[Selene]

Also, according to Xray, whether or not there is at least 4 cups is subjective and cannot be objectively discovered.

That is a lie.

A lie in that Ms. Xray did not say that or that he is falsely attributing the statement as to what he perceived Ms. Xray was arguing?

One is easily established, the other would be subject to interpretation...yes.

Adam

Edited November 29, 2009 by Selene

[merjet]

Also, according to Xray, whether or not there is at least 4 cups is subjective and cannot be objectively discovered.

That is a lie.

So decision per se necessarily utilizes the natural law of subjective choice. A decision implies valuation in regard to the facts (or what is believed to be facts).

This is what identifies value (valuation) as subjective; i.e., created and subjectively attributed as opposed to objectively discovered.

[Dragonfly]

Also, according to Xray, whether or not there is at least 4 cups is subjective and cannot be objectively discovered.

That is a lie.

So decision per se necessarily utilizes the natural law of subjective choice. A decision implies valuation in regard to the facts (or what is believed to be facts).

This is what identifies value (valuation) as subjective; i.e., created and subjectively attributed as opposed to objectively discovered.

From that does not follow that the fact whether there are at least 4 cups is subjective, only how that fact is valued is subjective.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I merely mentioned the conceptual chain of "word-->concept-->referent" because I have seen you equivocate this more than once in your arguments. Even above, you are insinuating that in Objectivism, a concept cannot be a referent, although you don't outright say that.

I haven't "equivocated" on this anywhere. It isn't "insinuated" either. The only thing you're right about is that I don't say it!

Obviously a concept can be a referent. A referent is something that is referred to, generally by a word or symbol. In the words of my previous post, that something can be a concept, a physical state of affairs, whatever.

I can't understand how you can read the exact opposite into what I write?

A true definition properly classifies stuff. A false definition incorrectly describes the category (or classification).

Sounds terrific. So, just as I asked Merlin, let's see some actual examples of "true" vs "false" definitions that Rand identified, and the means by which she arrived at this determination.

After all, all our knowledge rests on this process!

I've given you a possible example in selfishness, but feel free to give us one of your own.

Daniel,

I am not reading into your words what you did not write. I am observing that you have often used "word" and "concept" interchangeably when criticizing Objectivism. Here is an example where you started to get it right:

Confusingly, Objectivism adopted one facet of nominalism, which is the idea that words are labels that we stick on concepts.

But of course, accepting this facet carries an obvious implication: that the labels are not somehow magically attached to their referents, but are artificial creations. We decide what labels we stick on what referent.

We agree on this point, except there seems to be a negative flavor (I don't agree with) to your observation of "the idea that words are labels that we stick on concepts" by calling it "nominalism," using the word "confusingly," etc.

But you continued your discussion in that post from this point on as if the concept we use to integrate a referent is an artificial creation in the same manner that a word is by totally brushing aside concept. That smacks of mixing them up and not understanding the nature of each.

The concept we use for a referent is not optional. The word is. Concepts are universal to all people. The specific words denoting them are not. This has roots in the universal nature of human beings. Our automatic mental integrating processes are identical. But we have volition on a higher level of awareness.

A word is simply a tag for the same mental image people hold in their heads (i.e., a concept). That mental image is the same in essential parts from one person to the next, even though the tag attached to it might change and we use such tags to communicate it.

Now let's look at your conclusion to see the confusion.

So there are no end of objective, factual reasons that may influence our decision to use a particular word to for a particular thing.

But of course this is quite different from pretending "true" and "false" meanings can be somehow determined by purely objective means such as logic, such as Rand suggests. This is quite impossible due to the fact/decision problem above among other things.

The insinuation here is that we can choose our concepts just as artificially as we choose our words ("the fact/decision problem," etc.).

That's just not true. Once we decide or learn which concept a word stands for, we can use it with clarity and certainty of meaning.

Now here's the thing. We don't use only words to communicate concepts. We can also point (among other things), even though you constantly deride this.

You want a false definition? Hell, that's easy. Point to a flock of swans and say, "The definition of a swan is a fish with three legs. Like those over there." That got both the genus and differentia wrong and proved it by pointing.

Here's a true definition (from the Free Online Dictionary): "Any of various large aquatic birds of the family Anatidae chiefly of the genera Cygnus and Olor, having webbed feet, a long slender neck, and usually white plumage."

That definition is true and backed up by observation. And yes you can point at the referent and see that the definition is true. "Large aquatic bird of the family Anatidae" is the genus and "chiefly of the genera Cygnus and Olor, having webbed feet, a long slender neck, and usually white plumage" are the differentia.

Are there other definitions for "swan" that are true? Sure. It depends on the level of detail you want to use in the genus. Can a mutated swan emerge that has other differentia? Sure. You have to observe it first before a definition for it can mean anything (or make it up and throw it into an "imaginary creature" category). But you will never define a swan as as a fish and be anything but wrong. It is conceivable (although highly unlikely) that a language can emerge that uses the word "fish" to mean the concept of "bird," but even in this case, the concept stays the same. In that case, you merely have to translate when you communicate.

When we get to a higher concept like "selfish," which has several meanings in common usage, you have to be more careful. It's easy to do switch and bait, then conclude that this proves that definitions are useless. Or worse, as Rand's entire work shows, a switch and bait on meaning can confound a good person and lead him to accept toxic concepts as good for him, or good concepts as toxic, just because they come with the same name (label, tag) in his culture. The word "selfish" is one such example. Unfortunately, that word denotes several very different concepts.

As given in the posts above, the word "sacrifice" is another good example of one label, several concepts, and a plethora of referents—all of which can be mixed up at random if you use switch and bait epistemology.

This is just one reason why definitions are so critical in communication.

Michael

[merjet]

From that does not follow that the fact whether there are at least 4 cups is subjective, only how that fact is valued is subjective.

No, not only that. The decision is subjective per Xray. "Down at the nitty gritty level, decision = choice = personal preference = subjective value." (post #279)

Edited November 29, 2009 by Merlin Jetton

[Dragonfly]

From that does not follow that the fact whether there are at least 4 cups is subjective, only how that fact is valued is subjective.

No, not only that. The decision is subjective per Xray. "Down at the nitty gritty level, decision = choice = personal preference = subjective value." (post #279)

Of course the decision is subjective. Different persons will make different decisions based on the same facts.

[merjet]

Of course the decision is subjective. Different persons will make different decisions based on the same facts.

Really? Suppose there is in fact more than 5 cups of flour in the bag. Different people are going to logically disagree about whether or not these is at least 4 cups of flour in the bag?

Edited November 29, 2009 by Merlin Jetton

[Dragonfly]

Of course the decision is subjective. Different persons will make different decisions based on the same facts.

Really? Suppose there is in fact more than 5 cups of flour in the bag. Different people are going to logically disagree about whether or not these is at least 4 cups of flour in the bag?

They don't have to disagree about the contents of the bag, but they can make different decisions. Some people will for example want to use the flour, others not.

[merjet]

They don't have to disagree about the contents of the bag, but they can make different decisions. Some people will for example want to use the flour, others not.

Other decisions aren't the issue. The issue I raised is deciding whether or not there is at least 4 cups of flour in the bag.

Edited November 29, 2009 by Merlin Jetton

[9thdoctor]

Also, according to Xray, whether or not there is at least 4 cups is subjective and cannot be objectively discovered.

That is a lie.

So decision per se necessarily utilizes the natural law of subjective choice. A decision implies valuation in regard to the facts (or what is believed to be facts).

This is what identifies value (valuation) as subjective; i.e., created and subjectively attributed as opposed to objectively discovered.

I think you’ve mischaracterized Xray. Her “all values are subjective” mantra doesn’t apply to measuring flour, she’s mainly talking about morality and is/ought.

How much flour makes a “cup” is an arbitrary (though I wouldn’t use the term “subjective”) convention, another measure could be used; this is like the difference between feet and cubits. You’re suggesting Xray’s subjectivism bars her from correctly using such arbitrarily determined, though objectively definable measures, and I don’t see that in the material you quoted from her.

Nevertheless, if she offers you some cookies and milk, make a run for it.

[Dragonfly]

They don't have to disagree about the contents of the bag, but they can make different decisions. Some people will for example want to use the flour, others not.

Other decisions aren't the issue. The issue I raised is deciding whether or not there is at least 4 cups of flour in the bag.

You know very well that that is not what Xray meant when she spoke about a "decision". Your playing word games by deliberately "misunderstanding" her is a bit too transparent.

[Xray]

Correction of a typo I made in # 282:

I had written about ITOE:

"In it for example you will find Rand making statements like "Consciouness is conscious", (p. 48), which makes about as much sense as saying "Tiredness is tired" or "Hungry is hungry". (Xray)

I meant to write "which makes about as much sense as saying "Tiredness is tired" or "Hunger is hungry."

They don't have to disagree about the contents of the bag, but they can make different decisions. Some people will for example want to use the flour, others not.

Other decisions aren't the issue. The issue I raised is deciding whether or not there is at least 4 cups of flour in the bag.

Merlin,

DF explained it clearly enough to you - where's the difficulty in understanding this?

It is about decisions, not about validations. Of course persons can disagree about how many cups of flour are in the bag, whether it is flour at all etc. But a person's possible error regarding facts does not make the truth about those facts subjective. Those facts can be verified.

A person can of course decide to ignore or deny a fact. For example, people who hate to be wrong sometimes stubbornly insist on their assessment despite facts indicating the contrary. Guilty defendants deny facts. Behind every lie is the personal decision to, despite knowing about a fact, consciously deny to others the truth about this fact.

Again, these personal decisions in no way make the truth about those facts 'subjective'. For the facts exist independently of the subjective decision to ignore/deny them.

I had written:

"So decision per se necessarily utilizes the natural law of subjective choice. A decision implies valuation in regard to the facts (or what is believed to be facts)". (Xray)

For example, a person can decide to put in their coffee a spoonful of what they believe is sugar, but later realize it was salt. Again, the fact exists independently of a person's decision based on error.

For the umpteenth time: there is no such thing as 'subjective' truth. I never implied anything of that sort in any of my posts, and am inclined to believe that DF is correct in the assessment he made in post # 297.

Edited November 29, 2009 by Xray

[merjet]

It is about decisions, not about validations.

Readers, who is playing the word game?

[Daniel Barnes]

You know very well that that is not what Xray meant when she spoke about a "decision". Your playing word games by deliberately "misunderstanding" her is a bit too transparent.

Merlin is indeed playing word games, obviously mischaracterising X-Ray's position as 9th Doctor also points out. Words always come with different shades of meaning, and he has just picked on a different shade of meaning of "decide". I'm surprised Merlin hasn't tried to argue that "decisions" are themselves a species of fact, as one can, say, look up a legal "decision" in the court record to see what was, in fact, decided.

But this is just exploiting a mere ambiguity in the word "decision", and nothing to do with the topic at hand. Still, perhaps he will try that next....;-)

Ironically, I would be only too happy if he would provide us with a logical decision for a definition in precisely the sense he uses for the bag of the flour!

For the the number of cups of flour in a bag is in fact decidable as true or false. That's not the issue at all. Rather, Rand argues that the definition of "cup" is somehow decideable as "true" or "false" in the same sense, rather than, as I suggest, it being merely a convenient artificial convention that is only useful for discussion insofar as we agree on it. For example, if I call a "cup" what Rand calls a "thimble" - note that both definitions are "tied to" reality - then there will be be many more cups in the bag.

He similarly mischaracterises the "puppy" problem. The problem is not that both are true (I assume that's what his multiple-choice answerimplies - who knows?). Definitions are tautological anyway. The problem is not one of multiple "true" meanings - Rand did not say: all definitions are true! Let a million meanings bloom!

She said that the truth or falsehood of definitions was the critical problem - she even italicised the passage in the ITOE - as all human knowledge rests on it. Yet she simultaneously denied using conventional meanings as a standard for truth.

Honestly, I can't see how this can be accomplished. Hence I've asked for some actual examples, preferably ones Rand herself identified, of "true" and "false" definitions, and the means by which she arrived at these determinations. I've even proffered an example myself to help those who agree with Rand's theory, such as Merlin, start addressing the problem. As Rand thought the issue so vitally important, one would assume this would be easy, that there would be plenty of examples.

I'm still waiting.

Edited November 29, 2009 by Daniel Barnes