Logical Structure of Objectivism

[Selene]

OK

By the "nature" of "objective" and "facts". you mean precisely what?

Nature, in this context, I define as 1. In modern scientific writing "nature" refers to all directly observable phenomena of the "physical" or material universe, and it is contrasted only with any other sort of existence, such as spiritual or supernatural existence. In a scientific text, the unqualified term “nature” normally means the same as “the cosmos” or “the universe”.

Adam

[Daniel Barnes]

I don't want to go into the merits of the issue of value in this post, other than to say that if a decision is subjective, so is the decision to use this or that idea, or this or that symbol, or even the decision to call this or that objective (including "facts").

Now you are talking the most excellent good sense!

I don't mind discussion, even contentious discussion and discussion I do not agree with, but I am tired of seeing good discussions polluted with bursts of spam-like BS. Five posts of that crap a day is more than enough for now.

It's your forum, I think you should run it however you wish. As I always say - it's a big internets!

[Brant Gaede]

I don't want to go into the merits of the issue of value in this post, other than to say that if a decision is subjective, so is the decision to use this or that idea, or this or that symbol, or even the decision to call this or that objective (including "facts").

Now you are talking the most excellent good sense!

I don't mind discussion, even contentious discussion and discussion I do not agree with, but I am tired of seeing good discussions polluted with bursts of spam-like BS. Five posts of that crap a day is more than enough for now.

It's your forum, I think you should run it however you wish. As I always say - it's a big internets!

Don't worry, Daniel; she'll easily adjust to five-a-day posting simply by making her posts longer and, I hope, better and more thoughtful. I personally prefer small essays to the one sentence quotes and one sentence replies she does so often. Watch, she'll still be here a lot. Maybe she'll lose some of her need to repeat herself so often or keep engaging Adam.

--Brant

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Now you are talking the most excellent good sense!

Daniel,

Dayaamm!

I suppose I set myself up for that.

I didn't mean I agree with it!

Double dayaamm!

... it's a big internets!

Is that a subjective singular and an objective plural, or an objective singular and a subjective plural?

Objectively speaking, that is?

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

I didn't mean I agree with it!

That's a shame, because you were on the right track with it. Here's why:

Confusingly, Objectivism adopted one facet of nominalism, which is the idea that words are labels that we stick on concepts.

But of course, accepting this facet carries an obvious implication: that the labels are not somehow magically attached to their referents, but are artificial creations. We decide what labels we stick on what referent.

Of course, artificial doesn't mean arbitrary (the two are often muddled, and not just by Objectivists). There may be factual reasons that influence our decisions as to what label to stick on what referent. For example, it may be a fact that there is commonly understood meaning for a word, so we may decide to adopt that meaning because we want to be more easily understood. Or, based on the same fact, we may decide to use an private and confusing meaning because we want to be obscurantist and confuse people! The word may be chosen to imitate the actual sound we're referring to, like the onomatopoeia of "clatter" or "bang." Or not. And so on and so forth.

So there are no end of objective, factual reasons that may influence our decision to use a particular word to for a particular thing.

But of course this is quite different from pretending "true" and "false" meanings can be somehow determined by purely objective means such as logic, such as Rand suggests. This is quite impossible due to the fact/decision problem above among other things.

Edited November 27, 2009 by Daniel Barnes

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Confusingly, Objectivism adopted one facet of nominalism, which is the idea that words are labels that we stick on concepts.

But of course, accepting this facet carries an obvious implication: that the labels are not somehow magically attached to their referents, but are artificial creations. We decide what labels we stick on what referent.

Daniel,

Say what?

You just had it and lost it in the same breath.

Here is you:

- Label refers to concept.

- Label refers to referent.

You used these interchangeably, as if one were the other.

Here is the correct conceptual chain.

- Label refers to concept.

- Concept refers to referent.

In the correct chain, label does not refer to referent directly, but only indirectly because it refers to the concept, which in turn refers to the referent.

Labels obviously cannot be "somehow magically attached to their referents," but the concepts have to be (not magically, of course, but by their very nature of being integrations of observed reality). This is why "chair" in English means the identical concept as "cadeira" in Portuguese. The concept is the same. The label is different.

I agree with you that labels are chosen artificially. I do not agree with you (inferred from your usage) that labels and concepts are identical, having no difference in nature.

Human beings in Brazil observe reality and integrate concepts in an identical manner as do human beings in the USA (or NZ, where you are). Their labels are different, but their human nature is the same, they do not exist in a different reality and their concepts are the same.

The only caveat is that when culture enters the picture, some higher concepts will be found to be different, although the people in one culture can easily learn the conceptual culture of the other. This is because the human method of integrating concepts is identical irrespective of who does it. Ditto for logic and math. Logic and math operate according to the same human laws in all places. It dosn't matter if you say one, two, three or um, dois, três.

How does your "artificial creation" stand up now when referencing a number in different languages? Hmmm?...

Are there only general descriptions and no "true" or "false" meaning for, say, 3 when using the very different labels "three" and "três"?

Or do they mean the same thing and this meaning can be made explicit and strict?!!!

They obviously refer to the same thing. And more. The concept of "3" (referencing a number denoting more than 2 and less than 4 identical units) can have a 100% true definition, with genus and differentia and the whole kit-and-kaboodle—and an identical definition in Portuguese and in English. Only the "labels" will be different. Just like what happens with any other concept standing for an observed referent.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Here is you:

- Label refers to concept.

- Label refers to referent.

You used these interchangeably, as if one were the other.

Here is the correct conceptual chain.

- Label refers to concept.

- Concept refers to referent.

Um, anything that is referred to by a word is a referent of that word, Mike. Concept, object, whatever. If a concept then refers to another concept, or a physical state of affairs, that doesn't alter this.

I do not agree with you (inferred from your usage) that labels and concepts are identical, having no difference in nature.

I did not say this, nor can it be correctly inferred from what I have said. It's false. So much for that then.

And of course Rand permitted ostensive definition, ie referring directly (say pointing) to an object, and saying "I mean that!"

Are there only general descriptions and no "true" or "false" meaning for, say, 3 when using the very different labels "three" and "três"?

Or do they mean the same thing and this meaning can be made explicit and strict?!!!

Yes, we can use different labels for the same thing. Yes, we can use the same label for different things. They're labels; they go where we decide to put them!

If we decide to try to understand each other, even when using different languages, we can soon work towards getting roughly the same meaning and overcoming different labelings so communication can develop.

If we decide to not try to understand each other, to each insist that only our particular meaning is the "true" one and the other's is "false", then communication must reach an impasse, even when we speak ostensibly the same language.

If you know how this "truth" or "falsehood" can be logically decided, without recourse to convention (Rand rejected convention as the standard of truth for definitions) please demonstrate your workings. No one else has so far.

This decision to reject convention and retreat into your own private universe of meaning is why Harry Binswanger complains that he has reached the point where he cannot understand non-Objectivist philosophy, nor make himself understood to non-Objectivists!

He's become hermetically sealed in The World Ayn Rand Made.

Edited November 27, 2009 by Daniel Barnes

[Daniel Barnes]

I wrote above:

>If you know how this "truth" or "falsehood" can be logically decided, without recourse to convention (Rand rejected convention as the standard of truth for definitions) please demonstrate your workings. No one else has so far.

That "no one else" includes Rand herself.

Edited November 27, 2009 by Daniel Barnes

[tjohnson]

I would like to know what the referent of a concept is. IMO, there is no such thing. A concept is nothing more than an image produced in your brain, The image you imagine when I say 'chair' is your concept of a chair, period. One way we learn concepts is by observing examples chair₁, chair₂, chair₃, etc. and after we have seen enough we "get it", which means we can imagine "a chair" without seeing it. This imagined chair does not refer to specific "real" chair.

Edited November 27, 2009 by general semanticist

[merjet]

If you know how this "truth" or "falsehood" can be logically decided, without recourse to convention (Rand rejected convention as the standard of truth for definitions) please demonstrate your workings. No one else has so far.

She rejected convention as the primary standard because she chose tying definitions to reality. As the primary standard convention is a loser.

I'm hearing that recording stuck on saying "doesn't pass, I'm still waiting" again. Is that an unfalsifiable assertion, Daniel?

I'm still waiting for your answer to your puppy poser and what you might say about rules of definition.

[BaalChatzaf]

One way we learn concepts is by observing examples chair₁, chair₂, chair₃, etc. and after we have seen enough we "get it", which means we can imagine "a chair" without seeing it. This imagined chair does not refer to specific "real" chair.

That is the Platonic chair of which chair_1, chair_2, chair_3 are defective imitations.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[merjet]

This imagined chair does not refer to specific "real" chair.

I can imagine a specific real chair. I can also imagine a series of real chairs, none alike, i.e. an open set.

[tjohnson]

This imagined chair does not refer to specific "real" chair.

I can imagine a specific real chair. I can also imagine a series of real chairs, none alike, i.e. an open set.

Yes, I can also but these images do not refer to anything, they simply reside in our brains. Michael was speaking about the referent of a concept and I'm curious as to what that might be.

Edited November 27, 2009 by general semanticist

[merjet]

Yes, I can also but these images do not refer to anything, they simply reside in our brains.

Mine refer.

[tjohnson]

I can imagine a specific real chair. I can also imagine a series of real chairs, none alike, i.e. an open set.

If you imagine an actual chair this is not a concept.

[merjet]

If you imagine an actual chair this is not a concept.

Any actual chair I imagine is a bit of my concept of chair. Think of a concept as a file folder. The folder has the label "chair". Inside the folder is lots of different information about chairs.

[tjohnson]

If you imagine an actual chair this is not a concept.

Any actual chair I imagine is a bit of my concept of chair. Think of a concept as a file folder. The folder has the label "chair". Inside the folder is lots of different information about chairs.

They are examples of a concept, not the concept itself. A better analogy is a class, in computer programming. You can instantiate an instance of the class but the instances are different form the class itself.

[merjet]

They are examples of a concept, not the concept itself.

Did I say an example, or even multiple examples, is (fully constitutes) the concept?

I'm not going to continue a bit-by-bit back-and-forth with you posting like you haven't even read ITOE. Have you?

Edited November 27, 2009 by Merlin Jetton

[tjohnson]

They are examples of a concept, not the concept itself.

Where did I say an example, or even multiple examples, is (fully constitutes) the concept?

I'm not going to continue a piecewise back-and-forth with you posting like you haven't even read ITOE. Have you?

Ah, the old "you haven't read ITOE" routine. You haven't read Science and Sanity, so what? Does that mean we cannot communicate with each other?

[merjet]

Ah, the old "you haven't read ITOE" routine. You haven't read Science and Sanity, so what?

Why do you twist so much of what I say?

Read the banner. It doesn't say "dedicated to Korzybski."

[Xray]

By the "nature" of "objective" and "facts". you mean precisely what?

That choice of words was MSK's, whose post I referred to in my reply.

So if it is a subjective decision to call an idea objective and a fact, what does that say about the nature of objective and facts? I say the standard for these things deserves a little bit more than oversimplification.

Edited November 27, 2009 by Xray

[tjohnson]

Read the banner. It doesn't say "dedicated to Korzybski."

Well, the way you behave I'm afraid it should also say "to the exclusion of everything else".

[Brant Gaede]

Is anyone learning how to think better for reading this thread?

--Brant

sees man in a woman (wo"man") and you can too: try real hard

sees woman on a ... "I get to be on top!" (Tom Hanks in "Big")

[Daniel Barnes]

She rejected convention as the primary standard because she chose tying definitions to reality. As the primary standard convention is a loser.

Merlin, once again, they're not mutually exclusive.

You keep acting as if they were. In fact, most, if not all conventional meanings can be said to be "tied to reality".

Like many Rand fans, and like Rand herself, you seem to think she has some kind of monopoly on reality!

Here is a conventional definition of "selfishness"

1. devoted to or caring only for oneself; concerned primarily with one's own interests, benefits, welfare, etc., regardless of others.

How is that not "tied to reality" and Rand's unconventional version is?

It's your chosen theory. Please demonstrate how that works.

The point being: "tied to reality" is not much of a standard because with this extremely vague turn of phrase just about everything can be said to be. Both "puppies" for example.

I'm still waiting for your answer to your puppy poser and what you might say about rules of definition.

Well I would have thought it was obvious by now!

You can't do it. If each wants to insist, a la Rand, that their meanings are somehow the "true" ones, and the other's is "false" communication breaks down. It's an obscurantist turn. If, on the other hand, they are genuinely interested in understanding each other, they can always agree on a meaning ie adopt a convention. Perhaps by looking in...the dictionary!

Secondly, I'm happy to stick to conventional rules of definition. Why would you think otherwise!

Edited November 27, 2009 by Daniel Barnes

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Um, anything that is referred to by a word is a referent of that word, Mike. Concept, object, whatever. If a concept then refers to another concept, or a physical state of affairs, that doesn't alter this.

Daniel,

We don't disagree. A grunt, for example, can refer to the emotional satisfaction of the grunter and that is not a concept. The grunt can be so similar each time it is made that it can be considered as a word.

I merely mentioned the conceptual chain of "word-->concept-->referent" because I have seen you equivocate this more than once in your arguments. Even above, you are insinuating that in Objectivism, a concept cannot be a referent, although you don't outright say that. I wonder, if there is no confusion on your part, why say it as if you are presenting something new? That's like me trying to explain to you that Popper has a falsification method for validation. Anyone who has read ITOE has read Chapter 3 - Abstraction from Abstractions. So they know that a lower level concept serves as a "virtual" (or mental) referent for a more complex concept.

No problem if you disagree. There is a problem is you don't get this right, then blame Objectivist epistemology for your own misunderstanding.

While I am on this issue, there are a few other points Rand makes that I believe are pertinent to a discussion of definitions, etc. Let's start with the purpose of a definition. I have seen a great deal of misinformation bandied about on what Rand is getting at.

The purpose of a definition is to distinguish a concept from all other concepts and thus to keep its units differentiated from all other existents.

Since the definition of a concept is formulated in terms of other concepts, it enables man, not only to identify and retain a concept, but also to establish the relationships, the hierarchy, the integration of all his concepts and thus the integration of his knowledge. Definitions preserve, not the chronological order in which a given man may have learned concepts, but the logical order of their hierarchical interdependence.

In her first statement, she obviously means mentally differentiated, as in classification. We should never forget that a concept is a mental tool for organizing our knowledge of reality, not a mental imposition on reality.

Speaking of classification, here is another quote that not only deals with it, but I believe deals with Popper's error in not considering hierarchy of knowledge in what he claims definitions are.

... concepts represent condensations of knowledge, which make further study and the division of cognitive labor possible.

Remember that the perceptual level of awareness is the base of man's conceptual development. Man forms concepts, as a system of classification, whenever the scope of perceptual data becomes too great for his mind to handle. Concepts stand for specific kinds of existents, including all the characteristics of these existents, observed and not-yet-observed, known and unknown.

It is crucially important to grasp the fact that a concept is an "open-end" classification which includes the yet-to-be-discovered characteristics of a given group of existents.

This means that a concept is not a full-fledged description of anything, but merely a means of classifying stuff. Like file folders. They include "observed and not-yet-observed, known and unknown" characteristics of existents, not because a person can somehow magically already know what he doesn't know, but simply because that "file folder" is where he is going to throw all future knowledge about that existent. The premise here is that the universe is organized and the mind can detect such organization in existents from the top down. Another premise is that we can learn new stuff about something and still refer to it.

A true definition properly classifies stuff. A false definition incorrectly describes the category (or classification).

If the file-system metaphor, or concept as a form of classification is not clear in this passage, let's let Rand state it even clearer in her own words below.

I have also seen you keep criticizing the "one true definition" idea as if this were a dogmatic Objectivist position, yet Rand's words below say precisely the opposite. She specifically says that the way a classification is described (definition) can be altered over time with new knowledge.

The definitions of concepts may change with the changes in the designation of essential characteristics, and conceptual reclassifications may occur with the growth of knowledge, but these changes are made possible by and do not alter the fact that a concept subsumes all the characteristics of its referents, including the yet-to-be-discovered.

Since concepts represent a system of cognitive classification, a given concept serves (speaking metaphorically) as a file folder in which man's mind files his knowledge of the existents it subsumes. The content of such folders varies from individual to individual, according to the degree of his knowledge—it ranges from the primitive, generalized information in the mind of a child or an illiterate to the enormously detailed sum in the mind of a scientist—but it pertains to the same referents, to the same kind of existents, and is subsumed under the same concept. This filing system makes possible such activities as learning, education, research—the accumulation, transmission and expansion of knowledge. (It is the epistemological obligation of every individual to know what his mental file contains in regard to any concept he uses, to keep it integrated with his other mental files, and to seek further information when he needs to check, correct or expand his knowledge.)

Notice that Rand even claims that stuff can be reclassified. In plain English, even though she implied the opposite, this actually means a concept can be wrong. The existents observed will remain the same, and the possibility of grouping them into a classification (concept) will remain the same, but the actual classification (concept) can become invalidated.

Here's where a point of confusion often arises with Rand critics, too. This kind of invalidation is not the same as what I have seen in typical arguments. Rand, in fact, describes that kind of argument quite well in her continuation of the above passage. (Incidentally, I have seen this kind of argument in abundance here on OL in the past.)

The extent of today's confusion about the nature of man's conceptual faculty, is eloquently demonstrated by the following: it is precisely the "open-end" character of concepts, the essence of their cognitive function, that modern philosophers cite in their attempts to demonstrate that concepts have no cognitive validity. "When can we claim that we know what a concept stands for?" they clamor—and offer, as an example of man's predicament, the fact that one may believe all swans to be white, then discover the existence of a black swan and thus find one's concept invalidated.

This view implies the unadmitted presupposition that concepts are not a cognitive device of man's type of consciousness, but a repository of closed, out-of-context omniscience—and that concepts refer, not to the existents of the external world, but to the frozen, arrested state of knowledge inside any given consciousness at any given moment. On such a premise, every advance of knowledge is a setback, a demonstration of man's ignorance. For example, the savages knew that man possesses a head, a torso, two legs and two arms; when the scientists of the Renaissance began to dissect corpses and discovered the nature of man's internal organs, they invalidated the savages' concept "man"; when modern scientists discovered that man possesses internal glands, they invalidated the Renaissance concept "man," etc.

If I wanted to be snarky, I might say that I have seen those who make this argument treat "certainty" and "true and false" as "closed, out-of-context omniscience" instead of treating these cognitive elements as stuff pertaining to living human beings and how they can know reality. Then they complain that Objectivism did not solve the problem.

Heh.

I guess I just said it.

Michael