Imagination and Causality in Quantum Physics

[Paul Mawdsley]

One implied difference I keep getting is that you seem to be attributing a characteristic to my "thing" that it has no components (which would be ridiculous if that were what was being proposed) and seem to be saying that the components of your "structure" are the sole source of the organizing principle of it.

Is that your meaning?

I find it hard to follow you here. But to answer your last question: yes, the components of the structure are the sole source of the organizing principle. Isn't that wonderful? I see no need to pose some extra "thing" (which to me means something physical, it doesn't seem the right term for an organization or a structure), just as there is no extra "thing" to explain a computer or a TV, which also may die by ceasing to function.

Dragonfly,

I've not had a chance to catch up on some of the previous posts so this might be out of context. The view of physics does "pose some extra 'thing.'" According to Newton, there is the stuff that acts-- i.e.: bodies in motion-- and the stuff that is transferred between the stuff that acts which determines the change in action-- i.e.: energy. While E=mc² suggests a mathematical relationship between the nature of bodies in motion and the nature of energy, suggesting we may be dealing with one stuff, we have never described HOW one becomes the other. We assume they have a common root but do not know the nature of this commonality. It's sort of like the mind/body problem. Maybe for the same reasons.

Michael,

Are you saying anything to do with the causally reciprocal relationship between the parts and the whole in a complex system. The actions of the parts give shape to the form of the whole and the form of the whole determines the degrees of freedom, and therefore the actions of, of the parts. This is why reductionism necessarily misses a part of the picture. It focuses on the parts and misses the role of the whole and the relationship between the whole and the parts. Quantum theory cannot be properly understood without this notion because the actions of a given quantum particle are intimately tied to the form of the quantum field. Also the form of the quantum field is determined by the nature and behaviour of the particles it contains and the relationships between those particles.

Paul

Edited September 17, 2006 by Paul Mawdsley

[Ellen Stuttle]

Dragonfly quotes me as saying (post 84) "but an athlete does try to jump the high jump" and asks:

Why would a robot not be able to try to jump the high jump?

A robot by definition (if you use the term "robot" in a sense which distinquishes a "robot" from a "non-robot" instead of losing any useful distinction) can't "try" to do anything. And your beloved Dennett, if he's being consistent, would have to say that neither can we, since what we are is (highly complex) robots and our experience of "trying" is a "user illusion."

I'll give an example which to me well illustrates what I'm talking about when I speak of an act of "trying." This example arose as a case of chance favoring the prepared mind.

I'm engaged in a series of consultations with a neurologist punctuated by various diagnostic tests to see if it can be figured out just what does cause the painful and irritating (life-interfering with) muscle twitchings and pullings problems that beset my left side.

Before I went to Europe I had an initial exam with the neurologist. He told me to sit on the examing table facing the edge, with my lower legs dangling over the edge; he then sat on a stool facing me. He proceeded through a series of tests: push my hands against the sides of his hands, try to push out against his palms, touch each first finger to nose, do I feel this (a sharp-pointed implement drawn across each palm in turn)?, try to push my toes up against pressure from his hands, etc., etc., etc. -- the standard series whereby neurologists test for coordination, extent of sensation, muscular atrophy.

I had explained the symptomatology to him as well as I can describe it (the symptoms are hard to describe though unmistakable in the way they feel). I'd said for instance that there was a pulling and tightening sensation seeming to originate as if there were internal pulleys, one in the hip area and one under the edge of the ribs, which were gathering tendons and making twitches occur. (There of course isn't anatomically any such internal "pulley.")

As the exam continued, some of the twitching started in the lower left leg -- a feeling of pulling along the outer muscles down the side, and my two outer toes (and to an extent the third toe, which is partly connected to the main tendon which operates the two outer toes) spasming and curling under. "Look," I told him; "it's happening there [pointing] now."

He watched while the twitches continued for awhile, and asked: "You aren't doing that?"

"No," I said, "it's happening by itself."

That, exactly, is what Dennett (if he's being consistent) has to say ALL muscular action is, action which is "happening by itself."

Contrast this to the action which occurs when I intend to curl my toes and have the feeling that my intending is necessary to the motion's occurring: In the latter case, there's a coordinated motion; I can feel muscular activity down the front of the leg and a sense of voluntary tightening of the calf muscles and (willed) motion and pressure in my toes curling them down and around the ball of the foot -- the leg/foot version of what the arm would be doing if I extended my forearm palm down and curled the fingers in and down around the palm.

In addition to the different feeling, there's a difference in appearance of the motions produced. In the twitching case, it looks jerky; in the deliberate-action case, it looks smooth and "all-together." Furthermore, I cannot, by an act of will, produce the exact motions which occur with the twitchings. I can, to an extent, curl down the two outer toes (with the third toe trailing along), but not produce that "jerk" and spasm of motion.

Still, Dennett is going to have to say that in the principles of mechanics, there isn't any essential difference between the two types, the unwilled and the willed motions. There would be differences in terms of what the entire neurologic/muscular system is doing, and those differences would be accompanied in the (apparently) willed case by whatever produces the "user illusion"; but "illusion" nonetheless is the correct term (according to Dennett) for my feeling that an act of will is causally necessary to the motion which results in the second type described.

My belief is that the feeling isn't illusory but instead a veridical experience of a causally required feature of intentional motion.

And, yes, Dragonfly, I think that there are glimmerings of will even in the motions of bacteria.

(I also think that if "user illusion" is what's operative in the human experience of willed behavior, then it's equally operative in the scientist's experience of setting up an experiement to test a theory. An instance of the "contradiction of determinism" problem which you pooh-pooh as not being a problem.)

Re your comment:

Further the universe is in a sense put together piece by piece; in the extremely hot soup at the beginning of the big bang there was hardly any structure, just elementary particles and radiation, all those complex structures didn't evolve until much later.

That implies an affirmative answer to something I've been meaning to ask you, if it's your view that the big bang (big initial expansion) really did happen. Sounds like you think, yes. And another question: Do you read Dennis May's physics_frontier list at all? You joined it back when I pointed you to it (April 12, 2005) but I don't think you've ever posted anything there. My suspicion is that you think Dennis is a bit nutsy -- although...Dennis is a more hard-nosed determinist than you are; even Dennett is too soft for him. ;-)

The subject of the big bang relates to another issue, origins of motion. Paul is proposing an idea -- contra Newton -- of motion originated from some inherent property of entities (am I getting you right, Paul?) An interesting point is that Newton himself, with his formulation of his First Law, didn't have the problem of where motion might have started to begin with (how the objects in motion got that way) because Newton believed in God, and thus that the initial set-up resulted from an act of God's will. I.e., he still has will in there as initiatory, only a divine will.

(Another aspect of Newton's own thought, as contrasted with what's come to be called "Newtonianism," is that he thought there were other powers beside vis intertia; he thought that there was an organismic power which he called, somewhat oddly, vis mortua -- "dead force," thus called because it was a power "dead to" in the sense of not being entirely subject to inertia.)

The big bang does provide an account of how motion might have started -- with some unknown original "kick."

Also, Paul, re a point you've made several times about seeing a problem with the motions inside an atom not fitting the Newtonian picture (again, if I've understood you correctly), Newton wouldn't have had that problem, though he thought there were atoms, since he thought of atoms as indivisibles (and linked together by some kind of "hook-and-eye" sort of arrangement).

And, a blip about "reductionism": Dragonfly, your comments on that seemed to me to conflate two different senses of "reductionism," one that of unification of theories (you write, "Newton's discovery that the movement of celestial bodies is described by the same laws as a falling apple is another example of the unifying effect of reductionism."), the other that of causal explanation, the belief that the behavior of the smallest entities is the basic explanatory level for everything which occurs.

Ellen

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Edited September 17, 2006 by Ellen Stuttle

[Paul Mawdsley]

Paul is proposing an idea -- contra Newton -- of motion originated from some inherent property of entities (am I getting you right, Paul?)

You have deciphered my code. At the level of fundamental particles, things in motion are just things in motion. We just need to figure out what that metaphysically intrinsic motion is.

Also, Paul, re a point you've made several times about seeing a problem with the motions inside an atom not fitting the Newtonian picture (again, if I've understood you correctly), Newton wouldn't have had that problem, though he thought there were atoms, since he thought of atoms as indivisibles (and linked together by some kind of "hook-and-eye" sort of arrangement).

I'm not referring to Newton's view so much as how his view has come to be seen and used in more modern times. I am referring to the view of classical physics.

Paul

[Ellen Stuttle]

At the level of fundamental particles, things in motion are just things in motion. We just need to figure out what that metaphysically intrinsic motion is.

Well, arch-hard-determinist Dennis May, whom I mentioned above, thinks that there wasn't a "big bang," that fundamental particles just are in motion as a brute fact and always have been ("world with no beginning"), and that the rest is collisions. (I once asked Dennis, trying to be sure if I was understanding him correctly, if he thought it was "collisions all the way down," to which he answered in the affirmative.) I'm afraid I'm not seeing what help to volition you'd discern in the idea that motion just is a property of fundamental particles.

Ellen

___

[Dragonfly]

As the exam continued, some of the twitching started in the lower left leg -- a feeling of pulling along the outer muscles down the side, and my two outer toes (and to an extent the third toe, which is partly connected to the main tendon which operates the two outer toes) spasming and curling under. "Look," I told him; "it's happening there [pointing] now."

He watched while the twitches continued for awhile, and asked: "You aren't doing that?"

"No," I said, "it's happening by itself."

That, exactly, is what Dennett (if he's being consistent) has to say ALL muscular action is, action which is "happening by itself."

Not so fast... First, what do you exactly mean by "happening by itself"? In the case of your toes the meaning is obvious: there is no correlation between your conscious thoughts and the movements of your toes. On the other hand, if you deliberately move your toes, you wouldn't say that it's happening by itself, because there is now a correlation and a causal relationship between your thoughts and the movements of your toes. But where does Dennett (and where do I) deny that there can be a causal relationship between your thoughts and the movement of your toes? The point is that this causal relationship also exists at the physical level, the intentional level is merely the language we can easily understand ("I want to wiggle my toes"), while we couldn't decipher the countless corresponding impulses in the brain. In the same way we can easily understand the command "print text", while it would be very awkward to decipher the same command by checking the voltages in the memory of the computer. Nevertheless it's one and the same thing, and it results in printing the specified text, on paper or on the screen. Your involuntary moving toes correspond to a glitch in the computer resulting in garbage on the screen, while a normal functioning computer can show you a clear and logical text, such as my posts. But in both cases there is a straightforward logical chain between the movements of the electrons in the hardware and that what you see on the screen. So why shouldn't there be a straighforward logical chain between the impulses in your brain and the movement of your toes? It is the simplest explanation and in accordance with our current knowledge of physics and chemistry; there is no reason why it could not be so, and we should therefore use Occam's razor to remove extra hypotheses.

And, yes, Dragonfly, I think that there are glimmerings of will even in the motions of bacteria.

Good! As such movements can be completely explained in terms of physics and chemistry this shows that will can be explained in terms of physics and chemistry. No miracle needed!

(I also think that if "user illusion" is what's operative in the human experience of willed behavior, then it's equally operative in the scientist's experience of setting up an experiement to test a theory. An instance of the "contradiction of determinism" problem which you pooh-pooh as not being a problem.)

No, there is no contradiction. The fact that the idea that our thoughts are sui generis and are not caused by the events in the brain is an illusion does not imply that those thoughts are necessarily wrong or that logical reasoning is impossible. Even a simple deterministic machine like a computer can draw correct conclusions from a set of data or even derive mathematical theorems. Determinism does not mean a fixed answer to any question regardless of all the other factors that may be relevant to that question. Our brains have evolved as very efficient and flexible machines to deal with such matters. Our brains are determined to weigh the available data; sometimes they may resist stubbornly to accept good arguments but at a certain moment the input will upset the balance in the brain which will finally arrive at the correct conclusion.

That implies an affirmative answer to something I've been meaning to ask you, if it's your view that the big bang (big initial expansion) really did happen. Sounds like you think, yes. And another question: Do you read Dennis May's physics_frontier list at all? You joined it back when I pointed you to it (April 12, 2005) but I don't think you've ever posted anything there. My suspicion is that you think Dennis is a bit nutsy -- although...Dennis is a more hard-nosed determinist than you are; even Dennett is too soft for him. ;-)

I had quite forgotten about that list. I remember now that I joined it when you mentioned it, but I've no idea why I didn't continue to follow it.

And, a blip about "reductionism": Dragonfly, your comments on that seemed to me to conflate two different senses of "reductionism," one that of unification of theories (you write, "Newton's discovery that the movement of celestial bodies is described by the same laws as a falling apple is another example of the unifying effect of reductionism."), the other that of causal explanation, the belief that the behavior of the smallest entities is the basic explanatory level for everything which occurs.

In fact it is the same kind of reductionism, even if Newton didn't know about atoms and elementary particles. His theory reduces all movements of bodies to the movements of matter points with a certain mass.

[Ellen Stuttle]

Dragonfly, LOL. First you caution me "Not so fast..." and then you spell out (in admittedly much more detail) just what I said Dennett would (consistently) say when I wrote:

"Dennett is going to have to say that in the principles of mechanics, there isn't any essential difference between the two types, the unwilled and the willed motions. There would be differences in terms of what the entire neurologic/muscular system is doing, and those differences would be accompanied in the (apparently) willed case by whatever produces the 'user illusion'; but 'illusion' nonetheless is the correct term (according to Dennett) for my feeling that an act of will is causally necessary to the motion which results in the second type described."

So let me put the issue in question form: Would or would not Dennett (consistently) say that there isn't any essential difference in the principles of mechanics in the two cases, and that my experience of willing being a necessary causal factor in the second case is an instance of "user illusion"?

[me]

(I also think that if "user illusion" is what's operative in the human experience of willed behavior, then it's equally operative in the scientist's experience of setting up an experiement to test a theory. An instance of the "contradiction of determinism" problem which you pooh-pooh as not being a problem.)

[Dragonfly]

No, there is no contradiction. The fact that the idea that our thoughts are sui generis and are not caused by the events in the brain is an illusion does not imply that those thoughts are necessarily wrong or that logical reasoning is impossible.

(1) I didn't address the issue of thoughts but of action.

(2) How are you going to test if your thoughts are correct or not? Conduct an experiment? But your feeling that you're taking actions to make a test trying to learn something is itself "user illusion" according to Dennett's theory. I don't see any way out of that box myself.

Re Dennis' list, ah, so that's why you've never said anything there, because you'd forgotten about it. ;-) I did wonder.

I'm going to leave aside the issue of types of "reductionism." I don't agree with your reply (at least as stated), but I haven't the pep for pursuing that.

Ellen

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[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen,

You just wrote to Dragonfly:

I don't see any way out of that box myself.

I saw it a long time ago. When faced with a question about how he actually explains will, he simply states that the brain's processes are too complex to know right now.

Later, maybe...

(And the door hits him on the way out of the box...)

Michael

[Paul Mawdsley]

Well, arch-hard-determinist Dennis May, whom I mentioned above, thinks that there wasn't a "big bang," that fundamental particles just are in motion as a brute fact and always have been ("world with no beginning"), and that the rest is collisions. (I once asked Dennis, trying to be sure if I was understanding him correctly, if he thought it was "collisions all the way down," to which he answered in the affirmative.) I'm afraid I'm not seeing what help to volition you'd discern in the idea that motion just is a property of fundamental particles.

Ellen,

I have never heard of Dennis May but I have always viewed Big Bang theory as resting on shaky epistemological, metaphysical, and physical ground. It is the view one arrives at when the fundamental physicality of existence is excluded and mathematics paints a picture of the universe unrestrained. Singularities assume mathematical point particles rather than something physical occupying a volume of space through time and making unfathomable the notion of a beginning of time. Our understanding of the nature of light does not consider how a physical basis might account for "tired light." Our understanding of the nature of gravitation does not consider how a physical basis might account for a relatively stable background radiation in all directions. Our understanding of the underlying physical variables does not consider that the electromagnetic forces studied in plasma physics might be more fundamental in shaping the large scale structure of the universe than gravitation.

You say May is a hard-determinist. I find this interesting. I have played with the idea of fundamental particles with kinetic energy built into their identity for some time but have never considered myself a determinist. I think my understanding of the nature of causality-- that has its roots in AR and NB's work and has continued to evolve through a reciprocating dynamic with my evolving worldview-- might be the reason for my difference with May. If he is using action-to-action causation or even a view of entity-to-action causation that does not account for non-local/non-linear effects (which make possible the reciprocal relationships between the parts and the whole), he will be stuck with determinism. I hold a view of existence that is non-deterministic and causal all the way down.

I have come to visualize, at the foundation of existence, physical particles that move in straight line motion at the speed of light. Collisions do not transfer energy or change the speed of the particles. They only change the trajectory. Dynamic systems with such particles, when visualized in the imagination, have some interesting little quirks that make subtle differences from the systems that were visualized from the basis of Newton's Laws. Because the particles are proactive instead of reactive, the picture of the underlying reality of the physical world is different from that which was arrived at in classical physics of the nineteenth century. Classical physics came to visualize the aether spread throughout space and representing the underlying reality of matter: a reality based on fundamental particles that behaved according to Newton's laws of motion.

A field of proactive particles always moving at a constant speed measured as that of light is very different. For one thing it would explain the Michelson-Morley experiment. I have found it can explain many other things also, including why Newton's laws of motion are what they are and how proactive particles-- who's dynamics form new, integrated entities that are the inert charged particles of matter-- give rise to the mathematical descriptions of Special Relativity. The dynamics of proactive particles can also explain why energy is quantized and what is the physical nature of gravitation that gives rise to General Relativity.

As for life and volition, that requires a very special dynamic of proactive particles. As we know, the inert charged particles that are the basis of matter are capable of forming very stable structures. They form atoms and molecules and rocks and trees and people. One set of stable molecules they form are amino acids. I have suggested elsewhere on this forum that amino acids might have an electromagnetic structure that can have a reciprocating effect with a plasma current. A helical amino acid structure could cause a current to form in the proactive particle field. Likewise, a proactive particle current (I think of it in terms of a force free plasma current) could cause, in circumstances with the right available molecules, amino acids to form and combine into a helical structure (eg: DNA self reproduction). These are the building blocks of life. These are also the building blocks of consciousness.

It is interesting to note that two side-by-side plasma currents pinch themselves, through the action of electromagnetic forces, into the shape of a double helix. This has been studied in the laboratory. Plasma physics studies the effects of plasma currents on charged particles. I have not looked into the nature of amino acids but I suspect they have a structure with an unbalanced charge which would allow them to attract, or be attracted to a plasma current.

What about consciousness and volition? If we imagine a current of proactive particles coming together with a stable structure of matter, we already have the basic principles to understand consciousness, volition and a solution to the mind/body problem. The amino acids, the cells, and the material structure of the body itself form around and maintain the complex structure of the proactive particle current. The dual nature of our existence is found in the dual natures of our structures of inert matter and our structures of proactive particle currents. The key here in visualizing the physical nature of volition is to recognize what it means to have a fundamentally kinetic entity– the complex proactive particle current that we could identify as the spiritual being and/or life force, and forms the basis of consciousness– integrated with a fundamentally inert entity– the material body. The activity of awareness is the effect the material structures of the body have on the proactive particle being. It is the ripple in the current, the apparent end to the causal chain and to deterministic rules. The activity of will is the effect of the proactive particle being on the material structures of the body. It is the apparent beginning to new causal chains unnecessitated by observed, material, antecedent conditions. The action of choosing is the effect of the electromagnetic forces from the proactive particle current have on the material body which act to maintain the integrated flow of the proactive particle current. The act of choosing operates on the principle of maintaining and increasing the integration of the organism. The action of creating new connections in the mind is the effect of increasing the integration in the flow of the proactive particle current because the current is generating patterns of flow outside of existing structures and is causing new structures to form as a result of its electromagnetic properties. This would be how new neural connections are formed with the branching out of dendrites.

Of course this proactive element to living things would bring to mind a whole other world of considerations in our understanding of evolution theory. Another discussion.

I have also considered where in the brain would be the focus of this proactive particle being we might call the soul or the seat of consciousness. In my early days of reading NB's work I was studying for an exam for an introductory psychology course. It was my usual approach to procrastinate until the last week and not have read the textbooks yet. I was engrossed in reading *Honoring the Self*. I was particularly focussed on the part where he discusses the ego as a basic element in the structure of the psyche:

"Ego (the Latin word for "I") is the unifying centre of consciousness, the irreducible core of self-awareness— that which generates and sustains a sense of self, of personal identity. Our ego is not our thoughts, but that which thinks; not our judgements, but that which judges; not our feelings but that which recognizes feelings; the ultimate witness within; the ultimate context in which our narrower selves or subpersonalities exist." (Branden, 1983.) (I can't get the damned indent to work right! )

When the images flying around in my head from Branden's words were brought together with a description of the properties of the reticular formation in the brain stem, I believed I was seeing the same entity from two different perspectives. I only found out much later that Wilder Penfield's drew a similar conclusion also. Of course current theories of the dynamics of the brain are based on a view of causation that does not allow for Penfield's conclusion. They are in alignment with Dragonfly and claim that the idea of a "seat of consciousness" is bad science. (When will they learn that they can't "dis" a good Canadian!)

I will need to write more about the nature of causation to show how this notion of proactive particles can be seen to generate all the phenomena we observe. There are bits and pieces strewn throughout my posts here but I need to tie everything together.

I hope I haven't said so much that I come off as some sort of nut bar. I know what I am saying is "out there" relative to established worldviews. I have pointed in the direction of some of my thoughts and have presented a little more detail on some others. I imagine you might find these ideas interesting. I have a lot more to say but have no desire to discuss any of this uninvited. Let me know if you are interested in the strange connections I have made in my imagination. Of course, let me know if you have any questions.

Thanks for asking, Ellen.

btw-- Does anyone here see AR and NB's "little stuff" in my proactive particles?

Roger, this is the beginning of my response to your discussion of NB's view of the solution to the mind/body problem. What I am starting to write now is the foundation of my perspective that I think is in alignment with NB's. I'll bring it back to your post after I have presented a more details.

Paul

Edited September 18, 2006 by Paul Mawdsley

[Dragonfly]

"Dennett is going to have to say that in the principles of mechanics, there isn't any essential difference between the two types, the unwilled and the willed motions. There would be differences in terms of what the entire neurologic/muscular system is doing, and those differences would be accompanied in the (apparently) willed case by whatever produces the 'user illusion'; but 'illusion' nonetheless is the correct term (according to Dennett) for my feeling that an act of will is causally necessary to the motion which results in the second type described."

So let me put the issue in question form: Would or would not Dennett (consistently) say that there isn't any essential difference in the principles of mechanics in the two cases, and that my experience of willing being a necessary causal factor in the second case is an instance of "user illusion"?

It depends on what you call an "essential difference". There is of course a difference in that in one case conscious thoughts are involved and in the other case not, which probably means that different parts in the brain are involved, or in some of the unwilled motions (reflexes) the brain is not involved at all, but everything is handled via the spinal chord. So at this level of detail there will certainly be a difference. But at a more fundamental level the principle is the same, in the sense that such motions are caused by normal physiological processes that are well understood. There is no contradiction with your statement that an act of will is causally necessary in the willed action, as this is merely a description at the intentional level of what happens at the physiological level. As I said in my previous post, we use this intentional level as this is where we can easily see the logic involved, while the physiological level is far too complex to decipher (no doubt Michael will scoff at this again, but the fact that a system is too complex for a complete analysis is no excuse to introduce mystical notions). But at the physiological level no doubt everything follows the same laws of physics and chemistry as in the unwilled motion.

[me]

(I also think that if "user illusion" is what's operative in the human experience of willed behavior, then it's equally operative in the scientist's experience of setting up an experiement to test a theory. An instance of the "contradiction of determinism" problem which you pooh-pooh as not being a problem.)

[Dragonfly]

No, there is no contradiction. The fact that the idea that our thoughts are sui generis and are not caused by the events in the brain is an illusion does not imply that those thoughts are necessarily wrong or that logical reasoning is impossible.

(1) I didn't address the issue of thoughts but of action.

But action isn't a problem at all, that is the easiest part. Every computer can generate actions which are caused at the intentional level by the software and at the physical level by the logic gates. I really don't see your problem, somehow you're seeing spooks.

(2) How are you going to test if your thoughts are correct or not? Conduct an experiment? But your feeling that you're taking actions to make a test trying to learn something is itself "user illusion" according to Dennett's theory. I don't see any way out of that box myself.

Again a non sequitur. Whether my feeling that I take actions is a user illusion or not has nothing to do with the validity of the experiment and the judgement of the results. Perhaps you're led astray by the word "illusion"; the term "user illusion" does not mean that your reasoning or your actions are an illusion, it only means that you have the feeling that your thoughts are uncaused, that your mind is something separate from your body. But the validity of the reasoning and the reality of the action have nothing to do with that question; as I said before, deterministic machines like computers can also draw logical conclusions and generate actions - deterministic systems can be self-consistent. So there isn't any box there, except in your imagination.

[Dragonfly]

I don't see any way out of that box myself.

I saw it a long time ago. When faced with a question about how he actually explains will, he simply states that the brain's processes are too complex to know right now.

As I've shown in my reaction to Ellen's post, there is no box, except in your imagination. You're reasoning like those ID creationists who use the argument that the theory of evolution is not valid if the scientists can't tell in detail how a certain feature has evolved. Like them you come up with some supernatural "explanation" which isn't an explanation at all, only the vague notion that there must be "something else", that apparently lies outside the scope of physics. Well, that is an extraordinary claim that should be backed up by extraordinary evidence. Where is your evidence? That current scientific theory can't give all the details is no argument for rejecting it, otherwise we would have to reject a large part of physics or biology. For what? For mystical insights?

[bmacwilliam]

Antimatter is real and physical sure, but the fundamental nature of what "physical" means is indeed strange to me when collisions in one case behave like Newtonian billiard balls but in another case annihilation happens with only perfectly opposing photons remaining.

Bob

Bob,

It sounds a little to me like you are trying to make intuitive sense of physical reality. It is clear you did not complete your training as a physicist. The fully trained physicist would know there is no need for explanations about the fundamental nature of matter beyond what observation and mathematical laws can describe. You have not come to see the world exclusively through the physicist's lens.

You seem to be wondering what is happening on a physical level that you might be able to picture in you imagination. What actions and interactions of things could account for "billiard ball" collisions, on the one hand, and annihilation on the other? There is a simple dynamic system, which we observe everyday, that can produce a hypothetical model suggesting a causal explanation: vortices.

<vortices stuff snipped for brevity>

Might the rotational direction of matter, that causes it to be matter rather than anti-matter, not be caused by some greater motion on a galactic or intergalactic scale? Might not this greater motion also keep matter and antimatter separate so we witness no annihilations?

Can we take any of this to be more than just a hypothetical model suggesting a causal explanation of the nature of matter and antimatter? NO. We have stepped purely into the realm of imagination here, and are disconnected from the evidence. This is the world of the aether. The view of matter being vortices in some material substrata is the view of aether theories of a bygone age. In the late nineteenth century the Michelson-Morley experiment demonstrated that the aether does not exist. In 1905 and in 1915, Einstein said we don't need it. As seductive as it might be, the aether theory was wrong. The aether theory still has a strong underground following because it can make sense of some things like charged particles. Unless it can overcome the results of the Michelson-Morley experiment, it is dead. And it can't.

When the aether theory died, so too did our belief in our ability to imagine the fundamental nature of reality. Imagination gives us aether and requires that we imagine physical entities in motion. Aether is wrong = imagination is wrong = physical entities in motion is wrong. All that is left is to stick to observation, measurement, mathematics, and logic.

Why do I continue to see vortices when I think about the physical world? And why do I continue to see causation beyond randomness? I guess I'm just too attached to my imagination. The aether is dead but my imagination has not given up on a causal understanding of an existence with physical entities in motion. The problem with the aether is rooted in a problem with Newton's Laws of Motion. Newton's Laws of Motion got causation wrong and made the failure of its baby, the aether theory, inevitable. The failure of aether theory was the failure of the epistemological principles of identity and causality behind Newton's Laws, not the failure of the imagination. We shouldn't give up on imagination. We should change causation.

Paul

Whew, it's been a while and there's lots of side topics going on but I'd like to comment a bit on the above - so little time.

"You seem to be wondering what is happening on a physical level that you might be able to picture in you imagination. "

Well, not exactly. My main point is that intuition/imagination is often wrong and even more to the point, that one must at least temporarily release macroscopic preconceptions to gain understanding. I am not trying to "grasp" fundamentaly physical reality other than to point out that it is complex. Assuming that simple causation is at work behind all of it (not accusing you of this, but others I have come across) is premature at bese.

Your vortex explanation is an example of this too. Matter is not what we think it is. Causality is a separate question. What makes us think that we can make definitive statements about causality when our imagination cannot even grasp matter very well?

So, all I'm saying now is that causality is a valid ENDPOINT of scientific investigation as Dragonfly has pointed out as well. We'd be arrogant I think to assume any causal model at this point.

More comments later.

Bob

Edited September 18, 2006 by Bob_Mac

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Dragonfly,

You are attributing something to my words that simply is not there: "supernatural."

In Dragonfly-speak, the opposite of reductionism might be faith in the supernatural, or reductionism might entail the whole of physics, but out here in the rest of the world, I assure you that is not the case.

Nowhere have I ever claimed one must suspend rational thought and accept something on faith. On the contrary, my concern is to bring knowledge about all things to a form I can rationally understand.

I use the Dragonfly Universal Exit Maneuver myself and claim that something like the mind-body connection is not yet known.

I see the laws of reductionist physics known up to now impacting strongly on the mind. I do not see them creating consciousness and free will yet. And I do see consciousness and free will in operation.

As I said in my previous post, we use this intentional level as this is where we can easily see the logic involved, while the physiological level is far too complex to decipher (no doubt Michael will scoff at this again, but the fact that a system is too complex for a complete analysis is no excuse to introduce mystical notions).

Scoffing? Mystical? Come on. If you are going to call well thought out ideas "ridiculous," "nonsense" and "trivial," you at least should expect a playful poke in the ribs when your own standards don't hold up.

If I may expound on your position above, reductionist "logic" must determine what exists, since it holds nothing else is possible. (What is the evidence of such a claim? The logic, of course.) Certainly the independent existence of entities is not on the table. And when called on it, when someone points to entities that are universally perceived by everybody, you say not enough is known yet to validate the logic.

In a certain sense, that itself sounds kinda mystical.

Michael

[Dragonfly]

You are attributing something to my words that simply is not there: "supernatural."

The problem is that what you say is so terribly vague, "a thing", "it", and you insist that it is something that is missed by science, so I can only conclude that it is something outside science, something supernatural. I've no use for such undefined notions and it confirms my idea that philosophical discussions are for me really a waste of time.

I use the Dragonfly Universal Exit Maneuver myself and claim that something like the mind-body connection is not yet known.

There is nothing mysterious about the mind-body connection, it is the software-hardware connection of our brains, the higher, intentional level aspect versus the lower physical/physiological level aspect of one and the same system. No skyhooks are needed.

If I may expound on your position above, reductionist "logic" must determine what exists, since it holds nothing else is possible. (What is the evidence of such a claim? The logic, of course.) Certainly the independent existence of entities is not on the table. And when called on it, when someone points to entities that are universally perceived by everybody, you say not enough is known yet to validate the logic.

I've no idea what you're talking about, I can't make head or tail of this.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Dragonfly,

The whole problem with your software/hardware example is that a software program is designed from the outside using the nature of the hardware as an element. It does not spring forth spontaneously from the nature of subparticles.

The part that you did not understand in my post is entirely logical and you certainly have the intelligence to "get it." You have to take off your reductionist glasses first, though. As the saying goes, you might not be getting light because your eyes are closed, not because there is no light.

The more I learn about reductionism, the more I appreciate it. Seriously. I see it as a lens, however, not a blind.

Michael

[Paul Mawdsley]

My main point is that intuition/imagination is often wrong...

Bob,

Welcome back!

You say, "intuition/imagination is often wrong." Judging by the history of science and philosophy, so are logic based and mathematics based theories of the nature of existence. My own view is that it is best to be able to switch between these approaches, making sure the view that is created from each is consistent with the information from all. Unfortunately, people tend to adopt one approach to knowledge as their own, disown the part of themselves that is represented by other approaches, and seek to understand the world through only one of the available avenues.

Take a look at Michael and Dragonfly's discussion. Michael is using the method of philosophy. He applies linguistic symbols that represent the various categories of phenomena with specific verbal definitions and attempts to find fundamental truths by making logical equations. Dragonfly is using the method of science. He applies numeric symbols to represent the various categories of phenomena with specific quantitative definitions and attempts to find fundamental truths by making mathematical equations. Both Michael and Dragonfly are having trouble communicating because their understanding is built from different languages.

I have been thinking about what Michael has said about axioms being an interface between the mind and reality. What I find truly interesting is that both logic and mathematics work the same way that a computer software program works to operate the hardware. Logic and mathematics act like an interface that simplifies the experience and manipulation of the underlying reality. In the same way Windows is much easier to understand and operate than binary, logic and mathematics is much easier to understand and operate than physical reality. The hard work is in the programming.

I have introduced the idea that we also need to think in terms of imagination and intuition. To continue the analogy, I suppose we could consider intuition more like Dos. Its code is more directly related to the underlying images and language of the computer than Windows. (Real computer geeks will start to see the gaps in my understanding of computers here. Actually, earlier versions of windows that worked as an overlay on the Dos system are better for this analogy.) Our intuitive perspective acts as an overlay on our experience of phenomena. We try to directly overlay reality with our logical and mathematical programs but we run into problems when we reach the points of reality that are beyond our abilities to observe, whether it is because we have reached the limits of technology or the limits of the physically observable. When this happens, we either overlay our programs onto our intuitive perspective or assume there is no more to reality than can be observed and measured. Modern physics (and Dragonfly) has assumed the latter. I have not.

If we are to overlay our programs onto our intuitive perspective, it is crucial that we understand how this perspective operates when we attempt to use it to extend our vision beyond what can be observed, other wise we end up with a universe full of gods and ghosts. Since the intuitive perspective is built from direct observations and constructed via the principles of identity and causality, understanding the nature of identity and causality is of primary importance if we do not assume the observable world is all there is. If light, matter, our bodies, and our consciousness ware made of the same fundamental particles, shining light on those things would never allow us to see the nature of those particles. Only the imagination can penetrate the barrier to direct observation. And only the imagination with the strict guidance of precise concepts of identity and causality, measured consistent with the evidence, can be trusted.

...and even more to the point, that one must at least temporarily release macroscopic preconceptions to gain understanding.

I agree. That is why I am advocating a view of causality more abstract and more precise than the view that shaped classical physics. It is also why I advocate an understanding of the nature of fundamental particles more abstract than those that were conceived from the principles of Newton's dynamics.

I am not trying to "grasp" fundamentaly physical reality other than to point out that it is complex. Assuming that simple causation is at work behind all of it (not accusing you of this, but others I have come across) is premature at bese.

Your vortex explanation is an example of this too. Matter is not what we think it is. Causality is a separate question. What makes us think that we can make definitive statements about causality when our imagination cannot even grasp matter very well?

You are right. Our ability to picture the nature of matter must evolve in unison with the development of our definition of causality. A causally reciprocal loop must develop. As we come to visualize the underlying dynamics of the physical universe more clearly, our definition of causality comes into clearer focus. As our definition of causality comes into clearer focus, we come to visualize the underlying dynamics of the physical universe more clearly. The same reciprocal principle also works with our philosophical and mathematical lenses. Shifting from lens to lens, allowing the insights of one to feed the direction of the others, allows one to overcome barriers in thought the way a good psychotherapist helps a client overcome blocks in self-discovery.

btw- Where, exactly, does the vortex model breakdown?

So, all I'm saying now is that causality is a valid ENDPOINT of scientific investigation as Dragonfly has pointed out as well. We'd be arrogant I think to assume any causal model at this point.

It would be arrogant to assume any particular causal model is right at this point. However, it would be irresponsible to not try to present and test the causal models that are available. To test a causal model we must see what picture of underlying reality is created from it so this picture can be tested. This is what I am trying to do by starting to present my little fiction about the nature of reality. I am presenting the consequences of proactive causation as a fiction to be assessed next to the other fictions created by other concepts of causation. I know physicists don't like to think of their view of causality (or their views of the universe) as a fiction. They have observed it in the motion and interactions of material bodies. But claiming that there is no more to the nature of causality than is contained in the dynamics of inert matter is where the physicist makes the leap of faith and creates the fiction he calls science rather than metaphysics. Claiming that causation derived strictly from observations of inert matter is the only true concept of causation is arrogance, especially when it creates the need to claim certain phenomena that do not fit this concept of causation are illusory, and when causality breaks down at the base of reality. Is it not possible that there is another concept of causation that can integrate phenomena with self-generated goal directed action, volitional consciousness and the apparently random action of quantum particles?

Btw– I think Michael is right. The phenomenon of life cannot be accounted for purely by reference to it being a causally reactive machine with a built-in battery. Where did the energy come from for life to build itself and build a battery? I suppose it could be said that it comes from the electromagnetic force that brings together the amino acids and the rest of the material structures. I see a basic principle of living and conscious entities that a causally reactive mechanism cannot account for: the principle of ACTING to increase the integration of the organism and, in so doing, the species. How do mechanical or electromagnetic forces do that? Or is that just another illusion?

Paul

Edited September 19, 2006 by Paul Mawdsley

[Ellen Stuttle]

Three personal comments:

First, Paul: Yes, I am interested in what you're saying but I hope you won't expect that I'll respond with, oh, sure, yeah, that's it! You're proposing a rather complicated schema partly metaphysical/epistemological, partly contra some accepted ideas in modern physics. Partly I have difficulties with the metaphysical aspects (the epistemological aspects I'm more in synch with) -- for instance, the importance in your thinking of that quote from Rand, "What an entity is determines what it does." I have just about as much trouble with this as Dragonfly does. It seems to me, too, either "trivial" or "empty," depending on how it's interpreted. So it gets in the way of my following your substantive proposals for reforming physics. As to those, I do have qualms of suspicion at various points -- an example is the "plasma" idea. I'm not a physicist, but I think I have a fairly good grasp of what might "work" and what might not. I hope we'll have a chance to explore your hypotheses as time goes on.

Second, Dragonfly: THE characteristic of Rand's which I personally disliked most was her penchant for labeling as "mystical" any ideas she didn't agree with. Sometimes you skate close to pushing buttons which still get my back up when you accuse those who aren't rapidly buying your views of touting mystical notions. If you want to discuss your and my divergences of viewpoint, please try to refrain from using such phrases as that you think I'm somehow seeing a spook. Though this is a fairly tame example compared to comments you've made to others, still, it's a type of comment which militates against my desire to talk.

And I'll ask you this: Suppose you're 100% right and I'm wrong, do you want me to accept that you're right because "science says it" or because I understand it? The question is meant as rhetorical, since I think I know your answer.

And third, to all: Please remember that I do have that "thing" (slightly teasing MSK) called "a life," included in which is a close, and beloved, relative who is slowly dying, along with my own state of progressively worsening (though not yet in a fatal way) health. I'm likely always to lag behind the curve in response time to anything which requires more than a few minutes of my sitting at a computer screen to answer.

Ellen

___

[Paul Mawdsley]

First, Paul: Yes, I am interested in what you're saying but I hope you won't expect that I'll respond with, oh, sure, yeah, that's it!

Do you mean your not going to say, "Oh, sure, yeah, that's it!" I thought I had a spell binding, mystical grip on all those who read my words.

Ellen, of course I don't expect or even hope for such a response. It would have no value. From all these discourses I hope for some friendly, even if opposing, discussion. My passion is to develop my ideas and to learn better how to express them so I can be understood by others. I would like others, yourself included (especially even), to help me understand what I am communicating effectively and what I am not. I like to read your responses because you seem to be able to appreciate elements of what I am saying and you cut to the heart of your disagreements and my confusions.

You're proposing a rather complicated schema partly metaphysical/epistemological, partly contra some accepted ideas in modern physics. Partly I have difficulties with the metaphysical aspects (the epistemological aspects I'm more in synch with) -- for instance, the importance in your thinking of that quote from Rand, "What an entity is determines what it does." I have just about as much trouble with this as Dragonfly does. It seems to me, too, either "trivial" or "empty," depending on how it's interpreted. So it gets in the way of my following your substantive proposals for reforming physics. As to those, I do have qualms of suspicion at various points -- an example is the "plasma" idea. I'm not a physicist, but I think I have a fairly good grasp of what might "work" and what might not. I hope we'll have a chance to explore your hypotheses as time goes on.

Here you are making my point above. This tells me where I need to focus my attention to communicate more effectively.

And third, to all: Please remember that I do have that "thing" (slightly teasing MSK) called "a life," included in which is a close, and beloved, relative who is slowly dying, along with my own state of progressively worsening (though not yet in a fatal way) health. I'm likely always to lag behind the curve in response time to anything which requires more than a few minutes of my sitting at a computer screen to answer.

I don't think anyone is forgetting this thing called life. I only have come to enjoy the part you are playing in mine. I don't expect any more than you are willing or able to give.

Thanks,

Paul

Edited September 19, 2006 by Paul Mawdsley

[Dragonfly]

Second, Dragonfly: THE characteristic of Rand's which I personally disliked most was her penchant for labeling as "mystical" any ideas she didn't agree with. Sometimes you skate close to pushing buttons which still get my back up when you accuse those who aren't rapidly buying your views of touting mystical notions.

I use it only for arguments that dismiss physics as the fundament of our knowledge about the world. I never used it against you. Although I think some of your arguments are wrong and weird, they are always in a language I also speak.

If you want to discuss your and my divergences of viewpoint, please try to refrain from using such phrases as that you think I'm somehow seeing a spook. Though this is a fairly tame example compared to comments you've made to others, still, it's a type of comment which militates against my desire to talk.

When I used that expression I didn't mean to accuse you of mystical tendencies, I wanted to say that you're seeing problems where none are to be found (a "spook", something that may seem frightening, but just is a figment of the imagination). I asked an English acquaintance of mine what the correct English expression for that is, and he told me "seeing lions in the way/path". I hope you have no problems with zoological terms?

And I'll ask you this: Suppose you're 100% right and I'm wrong, do you want me to accept that you're right because "science says it" or because I understand it? The question is meant as rhetorical, since I think I know your answer.

If you want to be sure: of course because you understand it. Science can also be wrong, but to accept that the arguments and the evidence must be very good, and not be based on metaphysical speculations (no, no, I'm not accusing you of that either...)

[Ellen Stuttle]

Dragonfly,

Thank you very much for your reply. I really appreciate it, and feel relieved by it.

In regard to the expression "seeing a spook," you wrote:

When I used that expression I didn't mean to accuse you of mystical tendencies, I wanted to say that you're seeing problems where none are to be found (a "spook", something that may seem frightening, but just is a figment of the imagination). I asked an English acquaintance of mine what the correct English expression for that is, and he told me "seeing lions in the way/path". I hope you have no problems with zoological terms?

I'm chuckling at that. Is your "English acquaintance" an English -- as in British -- Englishman? I've heard Brits use that expression, but I don't think I've ever heard an American use it. An American might say, as you did to start with, something about seeing spooks. In a different context, the comment probably wouldn't have struck me the way it did.

Thanks again,

Ellen

(And, Paul, thanks for your reply also.)

___

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Dragonfly,

Talking about supernatural and so forth, you wrote:

I use it only for arguments that dismiss physics as the fundament of our knowledge about the world.

I'll bite. Reason is the fundament of our knowledge about the world, not just physics. How is reason supernatural?

Michael

[Paul Mawdsley]

Reason is the fundament of our knowledge about the world, not just physics. How is reason supernatural?

Michael

I would say observation plus reason is the fundament of our knowledge. Logic is one mode of reasoning. Applied mathematics is another mode of reasoning. I would say causal intuition is another mode of reasoning. It does not have to be one or the other or the other. Managing all three works best. Supernatural is what occurs when we go beyond what can be supported by the evidence. The question is: how do we determine what can be supported by the evidence?

Paul

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen,

I noticed something you wrote, but only just now has it occurred to me what I could say.

Please remember that I do have that "thing" (slightly teasing MSK) called "a life," included in which is a close, and beloved, relative who is slowly dying...

This is off topic and I realize my following comments were not solicited, but I offer them anyway, just in case they might be of some value to you.

As you know, I wrote about a horrible situation I lived through where a person was terminally ill (Letter to Madalena ... An Homage to the Value of Valuing).

How I dealt with that was not to focus on what I could not do, but, instead, on what I could. If ever there was a concrete example in my life of choosing a sense of life, choosing joy over pain, this was it. I kept Madalena laughing. I made her comfortable. I deflected her complaints towards positive matters, even when the barbs were directed at me. I tried to share any shred of joy I had with her and I actively tried to find out what made her happy and provide those things as much as I could within reason.

I did not hide my negative feelings from her, but I put them on a very short leash on them - always deflecting them to the positive after allowing them a short existence. The only times I hid them was when the situation "got to me" and I had to cry. Then I would go somewhere else by myself and let it out.

What has remained are two very wonderful things in my life. Unfortunately, Madalena has not remained. I could not influence that anyway. But I know - know in the deepest part of my heart - that what time she did have with me was spent with as much happiness as was possible. Her life was not wasted nor was mine. That's all we had and we made the most of it.

And the second thing is that I have a backlog of memories of her laughter, her smiles, her teasing, the twinkle in her eye, and very intense moments like what I wrote about. I even remember taking her to a restaurant when she was starting to lose her capacity to walk correctly (her very last time) - and she had the time of her life. And I clearly remember so many small things like her pride in her cooking, her favorite brands of products at the supermarket, or her favorite TV programs - things like that.

I can't seem to remember too much of the bickering or complaining or suffering, although I know these things happened often. As I did a lot of positive things, there are a lot of good memories that are now with me.

It seems that the mind focuses on bad experiences when they happen, but filters out such memories over time.

Bad vibes can be fought with good ones when they occur. We can choose that. I did. I couldn't choose hardly anything else to do to help, but I am very glad I chose what I did. I am profoundly at peace in my the deepest parts of my soul about this. Within my sphere of limitations, I chose all the good I was able to discover and did the right thing with it. I have deep values - and that intense peace - in my soul to show for it.

I don't believe in an afterlife, but if there were one, I have no doubt Madalena would be smiling at me right now.

That's not much, Ellen, but that is all I can offer. I do hope you find - and provide - peace and loving value somewhere among the bewildering moments and facets of your situation with your relative. I feel for you.

Michael

[Dragonfly]

Reason is the fundament of our knowledge about the world, not just physics. How is reason supernatural?

Michael

I would say observation plus reason is the fundament of our knowledge.

And science is in fact observation plus reason. Reason may be an essential part of science, but that is not the same as the fundament of knowledge (at least not as I understand those words), without observation reason is powerless.

The question is: how do we determine what can be supported by the evidence?

I don't understand the "can" in this question. Observation and reason show what is supported by the evidence. Afterwards we may say that what "is" supported by the evidence "can" be supported by the evidence, but that doesn't make much sense to me.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

In Objectivism, at least the parts I read and studied, observation (input through the senses) is an essential part of reason.

There is no such thing as observation plus reason.

Michael

[Dragonfly]

In Objectivism, at least the parts I read and studied, observation (input through the senses) is an essential part of reason.

There is no such thing as observation plus reason.

Well, if you reason about the number of angels that can dance on the point of a needle, observation is no part of that reasoning.