Imagination and Causality in Quantum Physics

[Paul Mawdsley]

Perhaps the Newton's law we should be concentrating on is the one that says "an object in motion will remain in motion".

To complete the definition: "A body remains at rest or, if already in motion, remains in uniform motion with constant speed in a straight line, unless it is acted on by an unbalanced external force." (Understanding Physics, Asimov,1966.)

In principle, how does something, who's action can only be changed by an external force, change its own action? This is the root of the difficulties I have with modern physics. It ignores this problem. The patented modern physics answer to what I have just said is, "What problem?"

[Mikee]

Paul,

"In principle, how does something, who's action can only be changed by an external force, change its own action? "

By the programmed release of stored energy.

"This is the root of the difficulties I have with modern physics. It ignores this problem. The patented modern physics answer to what I have just said is, "What problem?"

Because this is a trivial question. It has been asked and answered to the satisfaction of those who have studied it in the most depth, the biological scientistists who are in the process, incidentally, of revolutionizing our world.

[Dragonfly]

Mikee, you're just ahead of me with your reply, which gave a succinct and efficient answer, while I was struggling to write down some story about an alarm clock and a rocket as an illustration of the use of stored energy... Your input is refreshing!

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Mike,

Clever, but still not on the point.

The problem with science recreating the original lifeform that started the whole process of evolution is that it is not completely understood exactly what that original lifeform was.

Does it really make any difference that a created lifeform would have to be the original lifeform that started evolution?

Any old lifeform for me would do. Science creates and recreates so many things and this qualification is not used for inert matter or energy.

Science simply can't do it the two things I mentioned: (1) give a start to life from non-living elements, and (2) revive the dead.

That makes the claim that life is ONLY "a very complex series of controlled chemical reactions" too all-inclusive right now as it discards the possibility that life might be a special form of existence (which I think it is). I do, however, think that all life INCLUDES "a very complex series of controlled chemical reactions," but I don't think that is the whole story. At least I see no reason to believe that so far.

Like I said, the denial of life as an existent has to be taken on faith at the present. That doesn't sound very scientific to me and, frankly, I get perplexed by the vehemence with which it is denied in the name of science.

I thought science was supposed to be based on proof and repeatable results.

Michael

[Paul Mawdsley]

Paul,

"In principle, how does something, who's action can only be changed by an external force, change its own action? "

By the programmed release of stored energy.

How does an entity that operates by the principle of "A body remains at rest or, if already in motion, remains in uniform motion with constant speed in a straight line, unless it is acted on by an unbalanced external force," in principle, program and release stored energy?

Paul

[Dragonfly]

How does an entity that operates by the principle of "A body remains at rest or, if already in motion, remains in uniform motion with constant speed in a straight line, unless it is acted on by an unbalanced external force," in principle, program and release stored energy?

One example: a star is born when a cloud of hydrogen molecules is dense enough to collapse due to the graviational attraction of the molecules. The density and the temperature increase until the hydrogen nuclei start a fusion reaction which releases energy and in which helium is formed (that's what the sun is doing now). Four protons (hydrogen nuclei) form together one helium nucleus in a series of reactions in which first deuterium is formed and where two of the protons are converted to neutrons. The total energy of the helium nucleus is smaller than that of the original four protons, the remaining energy is emitted as radiation (look at the sun). The reason that these reactions don't occur at lower densities and lower temperatures is that the protons repel each other due to the long-range Coulomb interaction, so they won't come together until the temperature is high enough. When the protons are close enough the short-range strong force overcomes the Coulomb repulsion and the two protons fuse to form a deuterium nucleus together with a positron and a neutrino etc. The energy that is released in the forming of the intermediate products and the final helium nucleus is an example of stored energy. The programming of this sequence of events is the result of the laws of physics. There is no need for mystical explanations. For billions of years no energy is released, until the fusion starts and then enormous amounts of energy are released during billions of years. If that isn't self-generated action I don't know what is.

[reason.on]

I am not aware of any theories which propose, directly or indirectly, that a moving electric charge IN a wire (generally, I believe, conceived of as moving, charged subatomic particles) is metaphysically identical to the consequential electromagnetic field, which is distributed AROUND the wire. As Velmans points out, the two are not in the same place, therefore can not be the same--ontologically speaking.

This is not a valid criterion. There is no single place for the current, it can be found at an infinite number of places along the wire. We don't say that the current in A is not the same as the current in B (where A and B are two positions along the wire) while they are not at the same place.

I don't understand how there can be an "infinite number of points" within the finite space of a wire. But regardless, how we conceive of the current, whether as a stream of discrete, charged subatomic particles moving in the wire, or as an "indivisible phenomenon" along the wire, is irrelevant to the point that the current and the resulting electromagnetic field, are not in the same place. If we are to pay any heed to basic geometry, IN (or along) is not the same space as AROUND.

The reason is that we consider the current as an indivisible phenomenon over the whole (single) wire, the current in B is necessarily the same current as the current in A.

It can only be considered "indivisible" without the variable of time included in the formulation. The current moves at a fixed pace, and in proportion to to the amps powering the current, so it follows that there would a point in time immediately following the connection of the circuit where the current/charge in the "front" of the wire <A> and the "back" of the wire <B> would not be equivalent.

RCR

[Paul Mawdsley]

I don't understand how there can be an "infinite number of points" within the finite space of a wire. But regardless, how we conceive of the current, whether as a stream of discrete, charged subatomic particles moving in the wire, or as an "indivisible phenomenon" along the wire, is irrelevant to the point that the current and the resulting electromagnetic field, are not in the same place. If we are to pay any heed to basic geometry, IN (or along) is not the same space as AROUND.

Christian,

Think in terms of the intuitive picture created by the mathematical equations that describe the phenomenon. Maxwell's equations only work if the system is described as a whole. The whole current and the magnetic field it generates act as a unit. If your metaphysical foundations were based on observation, measurement, quantification, and mathematical descriptions, and the whole current and magnetic field it generates must be described as a unit, the unity of the system would be metaphysically given. You are arguing from a different metaphysical foundation. If you argue in the domain of the physicist, he will always win. Dualism is alive and well in modern physics: the wave, or field properties, cannot be separated from the particle properties. The math doesn't lie. And dualism is what the math is telling us.

Paul

[Paul Mawdsley]

Mikee,

I just wanted to ask, are you a physicist or a scientist of some other specialty? When I first bumped into Dragonfly I was new to the internet and was feeling a little cocky. I said something about physics with less respect for my audience than I realized was warranted. Dragonfly blew me out of the water. Ever since I have tried to be acutely aware of the nature of my audience and I talk far less without thinking. Based on your responses to what I have said, you may think I still need to work on that thinking part.

Paul

[Mikee]

Michael,

I'm certainly not trying to be clever. I'm simply trying to explain as best I can what I believe to be. You use the word "only". I use the words "mind boggling" when referring to the complexity of living beings. I have been awed by the wonders of life and the universe for as long as I can remember. You're attitude towards science is "Is that all there is?"

It is not necessary to know exactly what life on earth evolved from to understand what life is. You insist that this is so, but it is not. Science will create primitive life forms, but it is not necessary that they do.

Even a single cell lifeform, if the machinery that sustains it is broken and the chemical reactions go out of control, it is impossible to reverse this. No more than it is possible to reverse the laws of entropy.

I have no idea even what you're getting at by your "special" form of existent. Life is. No one denies that life exists. It exists as a part of the physical universe. It is very, very interesting, how it all works. I know that what I don't know about it is far more than what I will ever know. But I know going in the direction that you seem to be going in is the opposite direction of where I want to go. I'm happy knowing what I know and also knowing what I'm ignorant of, rather than thinking I know everything and knowing nothing.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Mike,

You just confused me.

I am asking to keep both options open because I don't know something and I am tremendously bothered by people who say they know enough to dismiss it, but then can't deliver the proper information to do that.

You just insinuated that I think I know everything.

What's even worse is that there are highly qualified professionals in the field,, just as qualified as Dennet for example, who have the same doubts as I do. Please see the quotes by Christian along several posts above.

Then came this gem:

It is not necessary to know exactly what life on earth evolved from to understand what life is. You insist that this is so, but it is not.

Huh? I insist? Dayaamm! Where? You were the one saying that, not me. Anyway, the point was not to "understand what life is." It was to create life from non-living elements. I stated that science has not done this yet. You gave that statement above as the reason why. Now you are saying I am the one claiming this. On the contrary, my exact words were "Any old lifeform for me would do."

What gives?

I'm confused.

Seriously.

Michael

[Paul Mawdsley]

Like a man and a woman disagreeing over what constitutes foreplay, scientists and philosophers will not agree on what constitutes a valid argument. They each think in a different programming language. The only way to rise above the disagreements is to become more than our particular pattern of owned and disowned subselves so that we can see the world through and compare different programming languages. Philosophers need to get in touch with their inner scientist-self; and scientists need to get in touch with their inner philosopher-self; if they are truly going to create psychological visibility for one another. We each need to get in touch with the sage-self so we can see clearly and objectively the perspective of our different subselves.

Paul

(Just channelling my inner Nathaniel-Branden-cosmic-self.)

Edited September 26, 2006 by Paul Mawdsley

[Dragonfly]

I don't understand how there can be an "infinite number of points" within the finite space of a wire. But regardless, how we conceive of the current, whether as a stream of discrete, charged subatomic particles moving in the wire, or as an "indivisible phenomenon" along the wire, is irrelevant to the point that the current and the resulting electromagnetic field, are not in the same place. If we are to pay any heed to basic geometry, IN (or along) is not the same space as AROUND.

No, but if the total phenomenon is not limited to the wire, the choice to limit it to the wire is in a theoretical sense arbitrary, although it may be the practical thing to do. But the question here is not about what is practical, but what is essential.

It can only be considered "indivisible" without the variable of time included in the formulation. The current moves at a fixed pace, and in proportion to to the amps powering the current, so it follows that there would a point in time immediately following the connection of the circuit where the current/charge in the "front" of the wire <A> and the "back" of the wire <B> would not be equivalent.

In the example obviously a stationary current was meant and not a starting current, and in that case the current is the same everywhere in the wire and at different times.

[reason.on]

I've been reading the work of Carolyn Ray on and off for some time now, and recently revisited an interesting essay entitled "Edges, Entities and Existence"...I'm posting a few excerpts here as food for thought with regard to this discussion (the entire essay is well worth the read, and will obviously provide more ground for the argument).

Edges, Entities and Existence

an epistemological excursion

by Carolyn Ray and Tom Radcliffe

Date: 2000-06-01

Forum: TOC Advanced Seminar 2000

Copyright: Carolyn Ray and Tom Radcliffe

To what in reality does the concept ENTITY refer?

Consider the fact that there are many other things that are separable but that do not immediately appear to us as entities until we focus on them in a particular way: the drawers of a desk normally are considered by us to be mere parts of the desk--when asked to count the 'things' in the room, for example, most of us would count the desk but not the drawers. Even more so, a light bulb may normally be taken to be an integrated part of a lamp; yet we can unscrew the bulb, and easily count two entities. The things we at one time consider entities tend to blend back into the homogeneous background of the room when our focus is turned away from them. It is reasonable to conclude that it is not that these things are intrinsically separable that makes them entities, but that an act of conscious attention has separated them.

It is easy to confuse separability (RD: able to be discriminated and circumscribed by a conscious subject's act of attention) with separatedness (RD: the objective property characterizing the relationship between some portion of reality and the conscious subject that has discriminated and circumscribed it--we use the nominalized adjectival form to emphasize that someone has performed the act of separation) because it is impossible to focus on something without isolating it: to notice is to distinguish; to distinguish is to draw edges; to draw edges is to pick out entities. So it may seem to us, unreflectively, that any particular piece of reality that we want to call 'entity' was separate--intrinsically, independently, and before we noticed it.

But to conclude that this is the case is to reverse cause and effect, in much the same way that the conceptual realist reverses cause and effect by looking for metaphysical essences to explain our use of concepts. It is the focus of a conscious subject's attention on a given portion of reality that justifies and explains classifying that portion of reality as an entity, just as it is our active discrimination and mental integration that is the source of our concepts.

This discussion is one of the rare instances when reiterating Rand's axiom "Existence exists" is actually useful. There is not a lot we can say about existence in and of itself, independent of a conscious subject's objective relationship with it; when we start talking about the bits that we have picked out and named, we are also implicitly discussing our categorization of those bits of existence. It is our explicit awareness of this fact, that distinguishes Objectivists from conceptual realists. How we identify, the terms of description we use, the edges we choose to see, the entities we choose to discriminate and group under general names, will depend on our purpose.

Although all these processes can be done in any way, so long as the it is the purpose of the subject to know reality, some ways of discriminating and categorizing will prove better than others.

If all this is true, then by what principle do we decide whether something is, or is not, an entity? The question itself is misleading. Our language is realist through and through, and it is easy for the most radical Objectivist to lapse into real-speak. This is not just a question of style; the realist language to which we are all exposed every day can itself confuse the unwary and lead otherwise conceptualist thought astray. So it is important to emphasize that what we are concerned with is classification, not discovery, when we are engaged in epistemological decision-making.

The real question is how we are to categorize; it is not what some portion of "really is". Therefore, the criterion by which we ought to decide whether a given part of reality can be justifiably classified as an entity, is whether it has been separated by a conscious subject from the stuff around it on the basis of some metaphysical discontinuity. The existence of a metaphysical discontinuity is a necessary condition for an edge to exist. A subject focusing on this discontinuity is a sufficient condition for an edge to exist. The core of our argument is that the act of focusing itself turns out to fulfill both the necessary and sufficient conditions.

[snip]

...In general, any discontinuity or sudden change in the value along a given dimension can be the basis for drawing an edge.

For instance, scuba divers routinely encounter the thermocline, a layer of water where the temperature gradient is greater than that of the warmer layer above and colder layer below. The material properties of the water may be virtually identical across the thermocline, which can be quite sharp (it can be as little as 10 cm thick, so you can drift above it and stick your hand into the cold water below.) The sudden, large decrease in temperature over a very small increase in depth is the basis for drawing the edges of the thermocline. "Small" in this context means 'small relative to the scale on which a subject is interested in observing.'

A human body is materially discontinuous with the air around it. The thermocline is discontinuous with the water around it. A musical note is audibly discontinuous with the silence or other sounds that come before or after it. How sharp such a discontinuity has to be to count as an edge depends on the purposes of the observer. For example, a large amount of effort in digital signal processing is aimed at producing suitable definitions of "discontinuous" according to which edges of interest will then be drawn, on the basis of the signals they produce in various detection apparatus while ignoring all other sudden variations.

Now we begin to see the implications of what we claim is a more fully Objectivist view. Some reclassification is in order, and features of the world which were previously difficult to classify fall into place easily. The concept ENTITY can be applied to other objects of attention besides just material objects. A musical note might be considered an entity, with its start and end in time being its edges.

The discontinuities considered above, and the edges created on their basis, are experienced as static. There are no extra-mental actions required to create or sustain them. Not all edges are like this. A great many are the result of continuous activity, and as soon as the activity stops the discontinuity ceases to be, and takes the edge with it. These may be called "dynamic edges"--edges created by an action.

Now consider a beam of light directed at a wall. Where the light hits is where we normally draw the edge of the wall. From a physicist's point of view, however, this is where we could draw the edge of the spot of light itself: a circular volume close to the edge of the wall. The normal observer draws a two-dimensional circular edge, while the physicist can draw a three-dimensional one. The width of the circular edge can be measured against a scale of observation very different from our normal human context: the wavelength of the light. The discontinuities which prompt us to circumscribe the spot of light in just this way are caused by the continual, ever-renewed action of the light striking the wall and being scattered from it. In this case, continuous action external to the conscious subject is a necessary condition for the discontinuities; when the action stops, the discontinuities cease to exist.

Consider an ocean current-- the Gulf Stream, say. The Gulf Stream is a more or less fixed area in the Atlantic Ocean that is detectable by means of the discontinuity in the flow of water: within this location, water flows constantly between the continents from its gathering point in the Gulf of Mexico to its dispersing point in the North Atlantic. Again, the action is a necessary condition for the existence of the discontinuities that prompt us to draw an edge and so create an entity we call "The Gulf Stream": take away either the action or the conscious subject who circumscribes that action, and you have nothing but ocean.

[snip]

The examples of edges created by actions of otherwise homogeneous media are more interesting, as they raise the question of reification of actions. Can waves be justifiably classified as entities? We discriminate the phenomena we call 'waves' from everything else . But they can also be classified as activities of a medium. Is it legitimate to selectively attend to them as entities? To answer this question, we need to further explore the role of action in the creation of edges.

[snip]

It is worth emphasizing, to head off suspicions that this thesis is subjectivist, that the concept CREATION in this context refers to processes that do not metaphysically affect mind-independent reality. Edge and entity are created in the mind. Reality is what it is, regardless of how we think about it, categorize it, or circumscribe it. And that is just the point: that the carving up of reality, whether into categories or into entities, is a purely mental process that has no extra-mental, metaphysical efficacy or significance.

[snip]

[Anticipated] Objection 3:

But, a wave either is an entity or it is an action of the medium (or it is something else). It has to have a nature, an identity. You seem to be saying that it has no identity. What about that?

Reply to Objection 3:

A conceptualist [such as the author is] is happy to categorize a wave as either one or the other, depending on context and purpose. The claim that a wave must "really be" an entity or an action is a terrible problem for realists, because neither perspective tells the whole story. Most waves are actions of the underlying medium, but when viewed as entities they can be considered to have properties qua wave. Realists sometimes say that it is either metaphor or an error of convenience to treat a wave as an entity. We consider this a strength of our view that we don't have to make this sort of claim: a wave is what it is, and we are free to view it in any non-contradictory way.

[Anticipated] Objection 4:

Well, then, couldn't it be anything at all, on your view? This sounds like subjectivism.

Reply to Objection 4:

True, a subjectivist would say it could be anything at all. The thing that distinguishes conceptualism from subjectivism in this regard is that subjectivists take the lack of a single "real" nature of the wave to mean that all identifications are equally good, whereas we, as conceptualists, recognize that understanding reality is the guiding principle of philosophy, and this limits the range of acceptable identifications. It wouldn't make sense, for instance, to identify a wave as a brunfelsia, or as a mammal, or even as a photon, given the rest of the conceptual scheme; and recall that fitting into the rest of the conceptual hierarchy is one of the requirements.

RCR

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Christian,

I am posting this without giving your previous post a thorough read (time constraint right now). I found another essay by Carolyn Ray you linked to to in another thread represents accurately what I have been trying to say in language Dragonfly and Mike might understand. It was an essay of comments on a Binswanger work, The Biological Basis of Teleological Concepts. You linked to Ray's comments on Chapter 4 - Self-Generation. The following quote is from there (with my highlight in bold at the end).

The idea of self-generation as an emergent property I found to be quite slippery, since he said things like, "The issue here, as in every other case of 'emergent properties,' is simply one of complexity of organization....The self-generated aspect [of cellular respiration] comes about from the highly ordered integration of these [chemical] reactions" (p. 51). I did not think it was simply a matter of complexity; I thought it was a matter of there being some property of the whole that the parts do not have.

I understand Dragonfly and Mike to be saying that life - and even other structures like stars and so forth - emerges from the complexity of organization of subparticles. I understand such "complexity" to exist, but also include a property they refuse to look at. Scratch that. Dragonfly goes so far as to deny the existence of such property (along with Dennet). I don't know where Mike is on this yet, but his leanings so far are in that direction.

Note that I am not saying that life is a property of subparticles. I am saying that there is a property to living entities - in addition to the properties of subparticles - that brings a living entity into existence - that causes such organization. It is not an either/or thing. It is a this-plus-that thing.

I admit to feeling a bit resentful when I try to express this and hear it dismissed as "supernatural" and "mystical" and so forth all the time. I fully understand what they feel when they try to explain themselves and get beat over the head with "A is A." I also think they err by resorting to the same rhetorical method.

Michael

[Dragonfly]

The idea of self-generation as an emergent property I found to be quite slippery, since he said things like, "The issue here, as in every other case of 'emergent properties,' is simply one of complexity of organization....The self-generated aspect [of cellular respiration] comes about from the highly ordered integration of these [chemical] reactions" (p. 51). I did not think it was simply a matter of complexity; I thought it was a matter of there being some property of the whole that the parts do not have.

That the whole can have properties that the parts do not have is of course a trivial statement. Any working machine (computer, car, radio, phone, etc.) does have properties that its parts do not have. The point is that those properties can be explained by the specific organization and interrelations of those parts. The same is true of life, ask any biologist. There is no aspect of life that cannot in principle be explained by science; that is of course not to say that we know everything, no doubt we've barely scratched the surface of what we still can learn, but there are no essential mysteries, there isn't any reason to invoke some mysterious extra-physical factors. Theories that pose something "extra", something that can't be explained by physics and its derivatives, are by definition supernatural.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Dragonfly,

Where on earth have I talked about excluding physics to explain something? That something "extra" you disdain or find "trivial" has to be a part of physics to make any sense.

Maybe your definition of physics is too restrictive to include a property that doesn't reduce beyond mid-range.

Michael

[Dragonfly]

Where on earth have I talked about excluding physics to explain something? That something "extra" you disdain or find "trivial" has to be a part of physics to make any sense.

Maybe your definition of physics is too restrictive to include a property that doesn't reduce beyond mid-range.

Then you should be specific and tell us what aspect of life you think cannot be explained by current physics/chemistry/biology. Otherwise the statement that "there must be something extra" is an arbitrary assertion that isn't supported by any evidence.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Draqgonfly,

This is easy.

Then you should be specific and tell us what aspect of life you think cannot be explained by current physics/chemistry/biology.

Emergence.

Michael

[Dragonfly]

And you call that specific? Emergence of what? Why are you always so terribly vague?

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Dragonfly,

Emergence of a life form from non-living matter.

Any old life form will do.

I looked up kingdoms of life a while back in answer to a question from Hong on another forum. I remember her only asking me for three, but the standard seems to be 5 or 6, depending on where you want to put archaebacteria. What she asked me seemed to pertain to "superkingdoms" or "domains" or whatever they want to call it. There is disagreement on all this.

I recently looked it up again and found the same situation:

Prokaryotic: Monera,

Eukaryotic: Protista, Plantae, Fungi, Animalia

More recently Archaebacteria (prokaryotes in extreme environments)

It is hard for a layman like me to specify one for an emergence experiment. My gut tells me to suggest a simple archaebacteria, which appears to have the greatest diversity for things like nutrition, is asexual and is suited to extreme environments. To someone like me, that seems to make it easier. The idea is to put together a righteous mix of oxygen, hydrogen, carbon dioxide, sulfur, sulfide and other elements to taste. Pepper it with some choice subparticles to form a membrane. Then zap the little sucker and make it come alive.

But I don't really know enough to say. You choose.

Michael

[Mikee]

Paul,

I missed your post that was just before my last one. I am not a scientist, I am an electronics engineer. I love the sciences and engineering.

I'm sorry if I seemed rude with my "because it's a trivial question" reply. You are correct in your later post, it's a matter of different perspectives. I have a very matter of fact point of view about everything and I find discussing semantics tiresome. I like understanding how things work, problem solving, and fixing what's broken. The following post on RoR describes my perspective (which I evidently do not live up to) on philosophical discourse:

http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/GeneralForum/0789.shtml#0

Michael,

I know that this "emergence" that you speak of is perfectly natural phenomenon. The fact that exactly how it occurs is not completely understood does not concern me. I think the "mystery" will involve an unlikely juxtaposition of many elements in just the right environment. It's possible that this "juxtaposition" is so unlikely that scientists will not be able to reproduce it for a very long time, perhaps never. Then it will seem possible that life in our universe may not be as common as I personally think it is. I don't see how it is important or profound that creating this "emergence" has not been done by scientists up 'til now. But that's my point of view. I don't think I have anything helpful to say, though I did think so a couple of days ago.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Mike,

My problem is not in asserting a blind point of view that excludes another. My problem is the exact contrary. You mentioned that emergence is "perfectly natural phenomenon." We fully agree on this. Things start getting "off" when I check a premise or two about what "natural" means, then start reading a certain type of rhetoric.

You stated that you find little importance in creating emergence. Maybe it isn't important to create it. But if a person is going to point a finger and call any other reasonable hypothesis "supernatural," "trivial" and whatnot, that importance changes drastically. The person will have to show why such is "supernatural" or "trivial" in order to back those evaluations up. Creating emergence of life from non-living elements would do the trick nicely and convince everybody. It would be rational.

Backing up a bit, though, I highly respect and enormously admire what reductionist-type science has produced. In addition to all the marvelous wonders we live with today, I highly value Dragonfly's views. They are extremely challenging and thought-provoking and generally I learn much from interacting with him. In no way do I want my position to be held as disrespect for that. (Rand did enough demeaning for all of us.) The only evaluative thing my position means is that I am not convinced when I am not convinced (i.e, when rational proof has not been presented or I have not understood correctly) - and even then, it extends only to the specific point. Not to a whole field. I even find the issue of declaring philosophy more important than science, or science more important than philosophy, to be downright silly. They are both important.

On a side note, I consider Dragonfly as a good friend (as I do you). When OL started, I had to defend Dragonfly's presence several times during misunderstandings. I did it gladly because I respect and admire his intelligence and talent. Frankly, he is smarter than me. (Not more talented, though.) The problem was always flare-ups in discussions due to leftover resentments from being cussed out on other forums where this kind of behavior was/is tolerated and even valued - and this problem was on all sides.

That does not mean that I take everything Dragonfly says as law, though. We disagree strongly at times. It comes from what I call "first-hand minds." I am very stubborn until I am convinced. So is he. We both stay true to our minds as best we use them. Which of us is dishonest or stupid? I say neither.

On a personal note, I will say that I can even fall out with Dragonfly and vice-versa (and that extends to all OL members of goodwill). Such "fall-outs" will always be shown to be honest misunderstandings and they are very rare (and never vicious). But let a snarky SOB show up and start demeaning Dragonfly in that arrogant ignorant manner of aping Rand, I will have his ass on a platter, then have him out of here in short order. That might be a bit tribal, but there it is. I hold great value for good friendships. I am pretty protective of those I value.

Mike, I read your RoR-linked post in your message to Paul. You ended it with what could be a motto for OL. It is very beautifully and eloquently stated:

A disagreement is the energy source that fuels discussions. Add goodwill to disagreement and great progress can be made. It is not a game of “snuff out disagreement in the least time”. Try to find a single point of agreement, check premises and try to add points of agreement. No matter how long it takes people of goodwill and reason and patience should be able to eventually agree.

I couldn't state that better myself. That was one very helpful thing you said. I know for a fact you have much more.

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

If we look at the moon, is our experience on the moon or in our brain?

I started to quip, Surely you're joking, Mr. FlyMan. But I don't think you were asking the question in jest, since you continued with a serious-sounding explication. So I'll try this to see if it succeeds at getting through the point I'm making about the experience not being identical to the physiological activity. You've said that you play the piano, so I'll substitute in your question above: If you play a sonata, is the music on the printed score or in your fingers?

Ellen

___

[Paul Mawdsley]

Ellen,

Of course, the brain/mind, the fingers, and the written music are part of an indivisible system, if it were to be mathematically described.

Paul