Imagination and Causality in Quantum Physics

[Paul Mawdsley]

Antimatter is real and physical sure, but the fundamental nature of what "physical" means is indeed strange to me when collisions in one case behave like Newtonian billiard balls but in another case annihilation happens with only perfectly opposing photons remaining.

Bob

Bob,

It sounds a little to me like you are trying to make intuitive sense of physical reality. It is clear you did not complete your training as a physicist. The fully trained physicist would know there is no need for explanations about the fundamental nature of matter beyond what observation and mathematical laws can describe. You have not come to see the world exclusively through the physicist's lens.

You seem to be wondering what is happening on a physical level that you might be able to picture in you imagination. What actions and interactions of things could account for "billiard ball" collisions, on the one hand, and annihilation on the other? There is a simple dynamic system, which we observe everyday, that can produce a hypothetical model suggesting a causal explanation: vortices.

We create a vortex every time we stir our coffee or pull the plug on our sink. On a larger scale, we observe tornados and hurricanes circling a point of low air pressure. On a larger scale again, solar systems and galaxies can be viewed as matter vortices circling a point of high gravitation (low space pressure? ).

Vortices have some interesting properties. Simple vortices with the same spin direction tend to repel each other. Simple vortices, with opposite spin directions, tend to be attracted to each other. This attraction and repulsion is easily explained by a billiard ball account of the particles that make up the vortices. Two vortices with the same spin behave like a pair of electrons. If these vortices approach one another the vectors of their circling particles on the sides that meet will be directionally opposite. This creates greater than normal particle collisions than when separated. The net-effect of this is to create a pressure away from each other. Two similar vortices with opposite spin will behave like an electron-positron pair. As these vortices approach each other the vectors of their circling particles on the sides that meet will be directionally similar. This creates fewer than normal collisions with a reduced variance from there original trajectories. The net-effect of this is to have a reduction in environment (atmospheric) pressure relative to the rest of the surroundings. The lower pressure acts to pull the opposite vortices together.

What about the annihilation? When the two opposite spinning vortices exist apart, they are stable and are attracted to one another. When they come together, overlap, and come to occupy the same space, the reality of there opposite spin causes annihilation. Two similar vortices with opposite spin, in the same space, have particle velocities that are completely directionally opposite. The system is destroyed by particle collisions with particles, ultimately, creating a pressure wave outward from the annihilation.

Another interesting point is that tornados and hurricanes of opposite spin never meet. All tornados and hurricanes in the northern hemisphere spin counterclockwise. In the southern hemisphere, they all spin clockwise. If we did not know about the Coriolis effect (the rotation of the earth determines the spin direction of tornados and hurricanes and moves them away from the equator), and we saw only northern hemisphere tornados and hurricanes, we might wonder why we never see anti-tornados and anti-hurricanes.

Might the rotational direction of matter, that causes it to be matter rather than anti-matter, not be caused by some greater motion on a galactic or intergalactic scale? Might not this greater motion also keep matter and antimatter separate so we witness no annihilations?

Can we take any of this to be more than just a hypothetical model suggesting a causal explanation of the nature of matter and antimatter? NO. We have stepped purely into the realm of imagination here, and are disconnected from the evidence. This is the world of the aether. The view of matter being vortices in some material substrata is the view of aether theories of a bygone age. In the late nineteenth century the Michelson-Morley experiment demonstrated that the aether does not exist. In 1905 and in 1915, Einstein said we don't need it. As seductive as it might be, the aether theory was wrong. The aether theory still has a strong underground following because it can make sense of some things like charged particles. Unless it can overcome the results of the Michelson-Morley experiment, it is dead. And it can't.

When the aether theory died, so too did our belief in our ability to imagine the fundamental nature of reality. Imagination gives us aether and requires that we imagine physical entities in motion. Aether is wrong = imagination is wrong = physical entities in motion is wrong. All that is left is to stick to observation, measurement, mathematics, and logic.

Why do I continue to see vortices when I think about the physical world? And why do I continue to see causation beyond randomness? I guess I'm just too attached to my imagination. The aether is dead but my imagination has not given up on a causal understanding of an existence with physical entities in motion. The problem with the aether is rooted in a problem with Newton's Laws of Motion. Newton's Laws of Motion got causation wrong and made the failure of its baby, the aether theory, inevitable. The failure of aether theory was the failure of the epistemological principles of identity and causality behind Newton's Laws, not the failure of the imagination. We shouldn't give up on imagination. We should change causation.

Paul

[MBM]

Quoting Paul:

"As epistemological principles identity and causality are a posteriori concepts not a priori axioms. The principles of identity and causality have to be abstracted from the particulars in our experience of reality. We have to look at the evidence to figure out what are things and why they behave as they do. Our statements about identity and causality have to be precisely defined to not allow into our models elements not supported by the evidence and must be inclusive enough to not leave out any aspect of reality. “What a thing is determines what it does,” does not go far enough."

As usual, I've come late to this discussion, and I am responding to an early post without having read the later ones (it will take me a while to get to them). So maybe this point is already covered/discussed... but be that as it may:

I am having a little bit of difficulty with the above quote. It seems to me that "before you can look at the evidence to figure out what are things and why they behave as they do", you have to already be assuming that things *are* something and that they *do* behave in a certain way (the principle of identity), and that their *is* a reason why they behave the way that they do (the principle of causality).

So, I guess I think that the principles of identity and causality *are* axioms without which you can't begin to explore the world.

Now, to read the rest of the thread and see if my mind gets changed. And hopefully, by the time I've finished reading this thread, I will know whether or not God plays dice with the universe.

MBM

Edited September 12, 2006 by MBM

[MBM]

Where I have seen the a posteriori and a priori get terribly mixed up is in Objectivist discussions of determinism. Consider randomness, which I have seen argued mightily by some serious hairsplitting. Why can't randomness just be part of a thing's identity? How that thing acts is randomly. Just like another thing acts in a standard manner. That is what it does. When we deal with the random thing, we take randomness into consideration because we have to. We observe it. Randomness is part of its identity. That goes for causality too. That thing, which has a specific identity, will cause a random effect because that is what we see it do.

Michael --

Again, commenting on an early post in the thread without having read the rest of the thread, and hoping that I'm not being redundant.....

I have always thought that "randomness" is an epistemological concept, not a physical concept. "Random" more or less means the opposite of "predictable". We say something is random when we don't know enough about the factors and forces involved to predict the outcome. Throwing dice is random because we don't know enough about the initial conditions (direction, speed, and spin) of the dice, the air currents and surface imperfections of the table they are thrown onto, etc. Even if we made a concerted effort to measure all of these factors, due to complexity we could probably never be precise enough to pin them down completely, so the throw of the dice would still remain at least partly random (i.e., the butterfly effect). But thats because of what we don't (and maybe can't) know, not because of the underlying nature of the physical world.

As to whether "randomness can just be part of a thing's identity"....I think I understand what you're trying to say, but if I'm correct that randomness is an epistemological concept, then it would have to be said another way that doesn't have implications for what is or can be known. I think that a correct way to express what you're trying to say is "it *can* be the case that part of a thing's identity is that its behavior is non-deterministic" -- i.e., the later state is not a unique function of the earlier state.

I don't understand quantum physics well enough to participate meaningfully in a discussion of whether there are quantum entities that behave non-determinsitcally -- but I admit I am biased toward the Einsteinian view.

But be that as it may, if there truly *is* non-deterministic behavior at the quantum level, then (if I'm correct that "random" is an epistemological concept), I'm not sure that the word "random" would apply to this behavior, because in that case its not because of some factor or set of conditions we don't know that we can't predict it. Rather, there is nothing *to* know, that *could* be known, that would make it predictictable.

But having said that, I'm not sure what word to use in place of "random" for this situation. Or maybe I do -- do we need a word other than "non-determinstic"?

MBM

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

MBM,

The context of the discussion was quantum physics, but the principle also applies to consciousness - free will to be exact.

All randomness I can possibly conceive of occurs within some limitations. The only unlimited randomness I can even imagine is God and I really have a hard time with that particular concept.

So, consciousness-wise, within the limitations of what a brain (and body) can do, what will be chosen is completely random according to the will of a "soul" or "ego" within that brain. Look at what people do with leisure time for a good example of randomness.

Random actions within the parameters of a primate with a rational faculty living on the planet earth is simply part of its identity.

I do not know enough about quantum physics to make an intelligent opinion about specific subparticles. The arguments for determinism I have seen so far deal with time travel. They treat the future as if it were now and use the same standards.

As to your idea of not knowing enough about something to be able to predict the outcome, that is entirely true, but it is another concept of randomness. It is not of the same nature as what I was talking about.

Michael

[MBM]

On randomness, I asked Paul if "life" could be a fifth dimension. The element of randomness could be an attribute. There is one random thing I see perfectly in life. That is the question of free will. I have no problem at all in including randomness in a definition of free will at the fundamental level - not randomness of existence, but randomness in what the organism can and often will do.

This thread is very interesting to me... I continue to feel compelled to "travel back in time" to enter the conversation that took place a couple of weeks ago.

I don't think free will is a manifestation of "randomness". If I exercise my will, I hope that there will be some correlation between my deliberations and my actions....if my action turns out to be "random", it can't very well be said to have been chosen (willed) by me.

But, to you, my actions may *appear* random. That is, if you don't know enough about me, my character, the factors I consider in choosing my action, you would not have a basis to *predict* what I am going to do.

That goes back to what I said a couple of posts ago about "random" being an epistemological, not a physical concept.

Assuming (for the sake of argument, but I don't really believe it) that there *are* quantum processes that are non-determinstic, then it would become a scientific question whether such processes do or could have any effect on human mental and/or physioogical processes. But even if they did, that doesn't necessarily mean that there is any connection between that and volition.

I believe that some of these supposedly indeterministic quantum effects are presently harnessed in electronics devices (someone may correct me if I am mistaken). At any rate, I've heard talk about a possible future technology called "quantum computing". But that doesn't mean that said electronics

devices behave randomly. Much less have volition.

These are my "random" musings.

MBM

P.S. Thats it for me today, I hope to pick up reading the rest of this thread tomorrow. Boy, this sure beats reading the daily news. This site could be addicting.

[Paul Mawdsley]

I am having a little bit of difficulty with the above quote. It seems to me that "before you can look at the evidence to figure out what are things and why they behave as they do", you have to already be assuming that things *are* something and that they *do* behave in a certain way (the principle of identity), and that their *is* a reason why they behave the way that they do (the principle of causality).

I think you are right and not. When I think about these things, I have to keep in mind what lens I am using to process the information. Am I looking through the lens of philosophy-- trying to identify the patterns I observe in reality symbolically by defining my concepts and making logical connections; or am I looking through a scientific lens-- trying to identify the patterns I observe in reality by fitting it within the framework of established evidence, theories and laws; or am I looking through an intuitive lens-- trying to identify the patterns in reality by isolating the images in my imagination of the elements of those patterns and creating models of the underlying structures and processes that make those patterns exist. By the time each of us starts to form and apply our philosophical or scientific lenses, the intuitive lens is well developed and is profoundly influencing the development of our philosophical and scientific perspectives. In this sense, yes, our principles of identity and causality are already developed on an intuitive (some might say subconscious) level before they are developed on an explicit philosophical or scientific level. Identity and causality might be axiomatic concepts in philosophy and science, acting as an "interface" between the mind and reality, but these principles find their origin in our intuitive perspective.

It is not quite right to say that the principles of identity and causality must already be assumed before we look at and process the evidence. I would find it hard to believe a newborn already has these principles established. I would say a baby has the capacity to isolate the elements of patterns contained in its qualitative experience of the world and manipulate these elements to create his or her intuitive perspective, but this is not the same as having pre-existing categories. The categories develop because they represent real patterns in the child's experience of the world. The brain may even be predisposed by evolution to process the information in a way that is related to these categories because they are shaped by reality but this is not the same as saying that the categories necessitate how we process the information contained in our experience. The patterns contained in our experience of existence predispose us to form our categories as individuals and as a species. The specific nature of these categories, of our principles of identity and causality, are open for us to create and evaluate. They are the broadest of abstractions, precision instruments, that we must craft and test carefully because they are the means of building our intuitive view of the world from which our more specialized perspectives (eg- philosophy and science) evolve and are evaluated. The development of our intuitive perspective precedes our specialized perspectives and does not require preestablished principles of identity and causality.

We discover our principles of identity and causality within the information contained in our experience. All we need to do so is the ability to isolate patterns in our experience, retain this information, and manipulate it. This is how we are self programmers. We do not require a preexisting program. In fact, we need to be able to reevaluate our programming by getting back to its root: to our intuitive perspective. This is why I, who readily admits I am not qualified to judge the quality of the evidence presented by physicists, thinks I am qualified the judge their interpretations. The perspective that shapes the scientists interpretations, ultimately, is the intuitive perspective that has developed from birth and has largely gone unquestioned. In particular, the concepts of identity and causality that have shaped a scientists intuitive perspective are variable, malleable, determine the nature of his or her interpretations, and have been left unevaluated. I think its time we brought our "searchlight of consciousness" to bare on the intuitive concepts of identity and causality that have shaped the sciences. I believe we will find our precision instruments are not so precise.

Paul

[Paul Mawdsley]

This thread is very interesting to me... I continue to feel compelled to "travel back in time" to enter the conversation that took place a couple of weeks ago.

So do I.

I don't think free will is a manifestation of "randomness". If I exercise my will, I hope that there will be some correlation between my deliberations and my actions....if my action turns out to be "random", it can't very well be said to have been chosen (willed) by me.

But, to you, my actions may *appear* random. That is, if you don't know enough about me, my character, the factors I consider in choosing my action, you would not have a basis to *predict* what I am going to do.

I agree.

That goes back to what I said a couple of posts ago about "random" being an epistemological, not a physical concept.

I see what you are saying. Physicists will disagree though. I see reality as being composed of entities acting and interacting and the net-effects of these acting and interacting entities. As such, I see randomness as being in the eye of the beholder too.

Assuming (for the sake of argument, but I don't really believe it) that there *are* quantum processes that are non-deterministic, then it would become a scientific question whether such processes do or could have any effect on human mental and/or physioogical processes. But even if they did, that doesn't necessarily mean that there is any connection between that and volition.

Would non-necessitated but causal actions be non-deterministic? And are such things possible given our understandings of causality? Isn't that essentially what we mean by "free will"--non-necessitated causal action? When I say something is an act of my will, I mean it was not necessitated by any prior actions except the action of this inner force I call my will. The core of my being has the power to initiate observable causal chains without being necessitated by observable causal chains. How can we account for such actions?

Paul

[MBM]

In what's called algorithmic randomness, there is no "law" or explanation, or formula, or "algorithm" that is substantially simpler than the data. This is an english summary of a precise mathematical definition of algorithmic randomness that I once understood. I think I have this right so far. There's no way I could remember the math, but I don't think it's important right now. Basically, what we have is a situation where nothing simpler than the data explains what's going on. In other words, nothing that could be called a "law" explains what's going on. That is randomness - the mathematically and fundamentally unexplainable.

I've think I've encountered the same concept as "algorithmic randomness" before, but not under the same name. I think the word used was "uncomputeable" or something like that. For example, a computer program to generate the sequence of even numbers would be very small and simple. But a computer program to generate a truly random sequence of numbers would be at least as long, if not longer, than the sequence itself. In effect, the entire sequence would have to be embedded within the program itself, rather than being generated by an algorithm (This is not to be confused with what are called "pseudo-random number generators", which produce a sequence which appears random upon casual inspection, but is really generated by a formula and is completely deterministic.)

Here's the kicker. Quantum randomness is not a mathematical deduction of the standard model of QM. So we're left with trying to figure out what the nature of the randomness is. If I remember correctly, we have no mathematical proof that the randomness is algorithmic but we do have tons of data. Some good arguments conclude that quantum randomness is algorithmic. Or in other words, physical reality is irreducibly random. Of course there is opposition to this too.

Could you refer me to a book that discusses quantum phenomena in these terms? (Hopefully it wouldn't be too dense with mathematical formulas).

Fundamental causality goes out the window if quantum randomness is algorithmic.

I'm out of my depth here, but ....is it necessarily "fundamental causality" that goes out the window? Maybe its just that the cause isn't economically expressible in the form of a succinct law or principle. It could be *metaphysically* deterministic, but not *epistemological* predictable.

JMHS (Just my humble speculation)

MBM

[MBM]

Paul Mawdsley --

Darn, I wish I had more time. I'd like to respond to this post at length and in detail, but can't right now. Just a short response to one small part of it for now...

It is not quite right to say that the principles of identity and causality must already be assumed before we look at and process the evidence. I would find it hard to believe a newborn already has these principles established....

It is of course true that the newborn baby doesn't have these principles established *conceptually*.

I may have to think some more about this, but I do think that in some implicit way, the newborn *does* have these principles established -- they are part of the "toolset" he is born with. If that were not the case, why would the "blooming buzzing confusion" (as one of my philosophy professors in college referred to it, I think quoting one of the 16th or 17th century philosophers) that confronts the newborn's sensory organs ever even begin to resolve itself into separable and identifiable percepts(entities)?

MBM

[Paul Mawdsley]

It is of course true that the newborn baby doesn't have these principles established *conceptually*.

I may have to think some more about this, but I do think that in some implicit way, the newborn *does* have these principles established -- they are part of the "toolset" he is born with. If that were not the case, why would the "blooming buzzing confusion" (as one of my philosophy professors in college referred to it, I think quoting one of the 16th or 17th century philosophers) that confronts the newborn's sensory organs ever even begin to resolve itself into separable and identifiable percepts(entities)?

MBM

Of course, since we have no way of directly observing the dynamics involved, any interpretation of these processes will be completely dependent on the principles of identity and causality you are starting with. My own experience of my principles of identity and causality shows me that these principles are malleable, not fixed. We may start with the mental/physiological structures to process information into categories of identity and causality but the nature of these categories is not set. The fact that our interaction with our world has caused evolution to create structures around these categories does not change the fact that they must be chosen/created. Again we are back to "free will." Our view of causality determines whether or not we can integrate such a concept. The commonly accepted action-to-action view of causality leads us to the conclusion that free will is an illusion. I don't think so. We are not simply products of our evolutionary/environmental programming. We are proactive agents in the formation of our identities, not just reactive machines.

Paul

Edited September 14, 2006 by Paul Mawdsley

[Dragonfly]

We are not simply products of our evolutionary/environmental programming. We are proactive agents in the formation of our identities, not just reactive machines.

Those "proactive agents" are the products of evolutionary/environmental programming. That is no contradiction, the term "programming" may perhaps suggest some fixed behavior pattern, but there is no reason to assume that a programmed entity cannot behave purposeful in an adaptive way, in other words behave intelligently and creatively. The option of self-(re)programming can be prewired in the organism. Why shouldn't the blind algorithmic mechanism of evolution be able to produce such a machine, in view of the fantastic results of evolution, those millions of different incredibly complex and efficient organisms?

It is an interesting psychological phenomenon that many people have a problem with this idea. Probably they think that the notion that we are the result of a blind, mechanistic process is somehow degrading, that we only can be worth something if we are the creation of some big Santa Claus in the sky, or if we've outgrown that primitive notion, that there at least should be some mystery, something not explained by our down-to-earth physics, or in Dennett's words: a skyhook. I think that's nonsense, it's quite the opposite: what can be more fascinating and exciting to observe that such creative machines can evolve by such a blind mechanism and that they even can reflect on their own development and evolution!

Is there any argument against this view other than "I just can't believe it"? (See also my article about Searle, who in fact admits that he rationally should accept this view, but that it "is literally incredible".) I haven't seen it. A term like "proactive causality" means nothing, it is an "explanation" by creating a new term, admitting defeat in finding a real explanation. In that regard it's quite similar to the term "élan vital" that once was used to "explain" the phenomenon of living beings. If there is no way to test such a theory it is cognitively empty.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Dragonfly,

I have no problem with things being what they are and producing what they produce.

Where I do have a problem is when life gets defined out of existence by comparing it with subparticles. The simple fact is that living things are born, they grow and mature and age (if they are lucky) eating other living and nonliving things, they reproduce, but in mutated copies, and they die.

You may not like the term "élan vital" but life as a state of being does exist - and it exists individually for every living thing.

I also have that little issue with man trying to limit existence to fit only his sense organs instead of the contrary - using his sense organs (and brain to process the data) to perceive what parts of existence he can.

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

It is an interesting psychological phenomenon that many people have a problem with this idea. [....]

Is there any argument against this view other than "I just can't believe it"? [....]

A big problem, Dragonfly, is that just what "this idea" is is hardly fleshed out by statements that of course "It could work!" (I'm thinking of a scene from Young Frankenstein). The details which seem so clear to you just are not so clear without one hell of a lot of study and acquired background knowledge. I think that the "picture" you try to indicate is, little by little, coming clear to me -- but through a process which has been long and difficult and has been on-going in my musings for now something like 6 years (a process not started by you but instead by Dennis May on Old Atlantis). It isn't that people, at least those you're talking to here, are trying to hold onto "mystery" or whatever, but that actually imagining how the mechanics of evolution can end up producing, e.g., Beethoven's Ninth Symphony is really hard. I more and more suspect that you're right, but I only succeed at "seeing the picture" in clear detail every now and then, and I couldn't yet describe to my own satisfaction what I'm "seeing" when I feel that I am "seeing the picture."

Ellen

___

[reason.on]

I more and more suspect that you're right, but I only succeed at "seeing the picture" in clear detail every now and then, and I couldn't yet describe to my own satisfaction what I'm "seeing" when I feel that I am "seeing the picture."

ACH LIEB! DDennett is corrupting what you are "seeing"! (btw, with a heafty reserve I bought "Consciousness Explained" a few months ago, haven't cracked it open yet...but, will soon).

I'm not up, at the moment, for discussing the many pitfalls of evolutionary psychology (where I see Dragonfly going), or more generally the pit falls of any sort of deterministic, reductionist, or verificationist take on the problem of free will (or more accurately described, volition)...but, I will say that it is quite an

interesting psychological phenomenon that many people have a problem with the notion that a third-person "scientific method" may simply not be sufficient to deal with the complexities of the human (at least) MIND.

:-)

RCR

Edited September 14, 2006 by R. Christian Ross

[Dragonfly]

Where I do have a problem is when life gets defined out of existence by comparing it with subparticles. The simple fact is that living things are born, they grow and mature and age (if they are lucky) eating other living and nonliving things, they reproduce, but in mutated copies, and they die.

How is life defined out of existence by comparing it with subparticles? All those things like being born, growing, maturing and dying can perfectly be explained by the behavior of those "subparticles". Of course there will always remain many details to be filled in, but there is no longer an essential mystery in how life works. So instead of defining away life, we can now explain it. Three cheers for reductionism!

You may not like the term "élan vital" but life as a state of being does exist - and it exists individually for every living thing.

If you really think that "élan vital" has any meaning, you'll have to brush up your biology. Élan vital is the biological equivalent of phlogiston in physics, it's a completely outdated concept. Now phlogiston was still based on a theory, only that theory was false, but élan vital was a non-explanation, comparable to "God did it", or as Pauli would have said: "it isn't even wrong". And of course life does exist (did I deny that anywhere?) and so does DNA.

I also have that little issue with man trying to limit existence to fit only his sense organs instead of the contrary - using his sense organs (and brain to process the data) to perceive what parts of existence he can.

Now you've lost me, I've no idea what you mean here.

[Dragonfly]

ACH LIEB! DDennett is corrupting what you are "seeing"! (btw, with a heafty reserve I bought "Consciousness Explained" a few months ago, haven't cracked it open yet...but, will soon).

Hmmm... You haven't opened Dennett's book yet, but you know that it may corrupt what you're seeing... Is that why you haven't opened it yet? Perhaps it might even corrupt you! Dennett's Dangerous Idea!

I'm not up, at the moment, for discussing the many pitfalls of evolutionary psychology (where I see Dragonfly going), or more generally the pit falls of any sort of deterministic or verificationist take on the problem of free will (or more accurately described, volition)...but, I will say that it is quite an

interesting psychological phenomenon that many people have a problem with the notion that a third-person "scientific method" may simply not be sufficient to deal with the complexities of the human (at least) MIND.

I see you need a healthy dose of Dennett...

Let me tell you a secret: it may be fun to be corrupted!

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Dragonfly.

I am not well-versed enough in quantum physics or reductionism to be able to give those three cheers yet (but I am getting better).

How do you "explain" life, death and reproduction? All I have seen so far is understanding greater details of these things, not any real "explaining." You have mentioned Big Blue before and AI. There is a critical difference between them and living organisms. I think it is wonderful to notice the similarities, but it is a mistake to fog over the differences. I read many arguments that do precisely that, too.

As I understand induction, in order to "explain" life, you simply observe and identify, then tack on words and symbols to stand for what you observed.

On the issue of possible extrasensory stuff (in the strictest meaning of the term), this was in relation to an ongoing discussion in another thread, specifically a post I made.

Michael

[reason.on]

Hmmm... You haven't opened Dennett's book yet, but you know that it may corrupt what you're seeing... Is that why you haven't opened it yet? Perhaps it might even corrupt you! Dennett's Dangerous Idea!

Ughhhhh... Please keep in mind that my first comments were directed (as gallows humour) to Ellen. We (she and I) have a bit of history with Dennett as well as with Evolutionary Psychology (and their respective disciples).

Btw, you'll notice that I pegged the influence of Dennett in your thinking without him being mentioned in this thread. While I have not read any of his books, I am quite familar with his ideas (which, at this point in time, I find highly dubious) through his online essays, discussions, as well as through other professional thinkers reviewing his efforts (including, Searle and Max Velmans) .

As much as Dennett and others may wish to think so, the question of volition and how exactly it fits into the wider universe is far from having been determined.

RCR

[Ellen Stuttle]

Dragonfly is one of the Dennett admirers we've had previous encounters with, Christian. Who do you think "Dragonfly" is? (Broad hint: initials P. S.)

ES

___

[reason.on]

Dragonfly is one of the Dennett admirers we've had previous encounters with, Christian. Who do you think "Dragonfly" is? (Broad hint: initials P. S.)

LOL!! I have privately specuated on and off that this was the case ever since I ran into "Cal" on RoR. In fact, I was planning to write you an offlist email today to ask you if PS and Dragonfly were indeed one and the same.

Hi, Dragonfly.

B)

RCR

[Paul Mawdsley]

LOL!! I have privately specuated on and off that this was the case ever since I ran into "Cal" on RoR. In fact, I was planning to write you an offlist email today to ask you if PS and Dragonfly were indeed one and the same.

I made a similar discovery by connecting the dots. See here.

Dragonfly gets around. I must say, his presence has had a great effect on my thinking, for the better. A strong and consistent perspective that is in disagreement with my own raises my game. I just wish he would express his criticisms of what I write more often and in more detail. What he wrote above was certainly clear and to the point. I am learning a lot by sorting out why I disagree with Dragonfly. I must say, however, sometimes it would be nice to have discussions with people who see things in a similar light so discussions can proceed further. I can understand the motivation for the actions taken against Dragonfly on RoR. But I strongly disagree with the act of will that put those motives into action.

It's good to see you here Christian.

Paul

Edit: Sorry about the bad link. I've corrected it now.

Edited September 15, 2006 by Paul Mawdsley

[Paul Mawdsley]

I more and more suspect that you're right, but I only succeed at "seeing the picture" in clear detail every now and then, and I couldn't yet describe to my own satisfaction what I'm "seeing" when I feel that I am "seeing the picture."

Ellen,

Don't go into the light! Don't go into the light! It is really a speeding train coming at you at 100 mph.

Dragonfly isn't right and I am trying like hell to work out a way to meet his challenge. I think of you as a quiet ally who may just understand more of what I am talking about than anyone else. At least, I like to think you don't see me as being completely off my rocker. Don't go over to the dark side, please. He already has all of modern physics and most of the rest of the history of science on his side. I need to think someone understands some of the crazy stuff I am saying.

Paul

Just having an anxiety attack!

[Paul Mawdsley]

A term like "proactive causality" means nothing, it is an "explanation" by creating a new term, admitting defeat in finding a real explanation. In that regard it's quite similar to the term "élan vital" that once was used to "explain" the phenomenon of living beings. If there is no way to test such a theory it is cognitively empty.

Peter,

The role of a concept of causation is to integrate the information, contained in our experience, about the underlying nature of entities and their actions. The test for such a concept is whether or not it does a better job of integrating the evidence than a competing concept. Consistency and inclusivity is the measure. This means I have to present a well developed worldview integrated from the principle of proactive causation in order to test the theory and demonstrate it to not be "cognitively empty." I will grant that the worldview you present is consistent. I think, however, that it maintains consistency by systematically excluding certain types of information and by reducing the value of certain mental processes. I am quite convinced that the concept of proactive causation can also produce a consistent worldview but without the need for systematically excluding certain types of information and reducing the value of certain mental processes. Simply put, I think proactive causation produces a more inclusive worldview than reactive causation.

Every time I have sat down to write about my own worldview in any detail, I have been daunted by the immensity of the task with the little time I have available. I'm going to try to break it down into smaller components and keep it informal. I suggest you look at it as a first draft of a work of fiction-- not fantasy, fiction-- so it is judged, not from the perspective of current worldviews, but from the perspective of internal consistency, consistency with the evidence, and inclusiveness of the evidence. If it is possible to produce two consistent worldviews, then the most inclusive must be the better one. Let's see if proactive causation can produce a consistent worldview. And let's see which worldview is, in principle, more inclusive. What do we have to loose? From my point of view, I might discover where I have made an error. Or we might discover that proactive causation is not cognitively empty.

Paul

(Edit: In case anyone is wondering about the etiquette of using Dragonfly's real first name, I ask for permission in a previous discussion. I wanted this post to be more personal. Using his first name strikes me as being more personal.)

Edited September 15, 2006 by Paul Mawdsley

[Dragonfly]

Dragonfly.

How do you "explain" life, death and reproduction? All I have seen so far is understanding greater details of these things, not any real "explaining."

Then explain to me what you mean by "real explaining".

As I understand induction, in order to "explain" life, you simply observe and identify, then tack on words and symbols to stand for what you observed.

Where did you get such an utterly caricatural view of science? Let's take just one biological example: genetic engineering. Do you mean to imply that you can do genetic engineering without being able to explain the mechanisms that are involved?

On the issue of possible extrasensory stuff (in the strictest meaning of the term), this was in relation to an ongoing discussion in another thread, specifically a post I made.

I think that the idea that there is a part of reality for which there is no human sense organ is, depending on the interpretation, either a trivial statement or nonsense. If the meaning is that we can't perceive some parts of reality directly, then it is of course a trivial statement, as it's obvious that we for example only can perceive directly a small part of the electromagnetic spectrum. But if the meaning is that there is a part of reality that is in principle inaccessible (i.e. we can get no information at all from that part of reality) by the human senses directly or indirectly by using measuring instruments, then it's nonsense, as it contradicts any sensible definition of "reality" in the sense of "physical reality".

[Dragonfly]

Hi, RCR! ;)