David Harriman's Book

[Ellen Stuttle]

Permit me to interject some child-rearing reality

How many children conclude that dirt isn't a good thing to eat on the basis of experience?

What are adult guardians for?

Ellen

I've raised three so far, it's actually pretty hard to stop 'em. The contents of the sandpit become the contents of the diapers without fail...;-)

Yes, I know. I partly raised several myself (younger brothers and sisters). Doesn't change the point.

Also, as a side issue, adult guardians of one sort or another also regularly teach children the meanings of words - a fact not much dwelt upon in the theory of concept formation, despite its common occurrence.

A fact not needing any dwelling upon in the context of the monograph.

Ellen

[Ellen Stuttle]

Copying my post #115 from the "New Developments re Harriman Induction book" thread.

===

[....]

During her lifetime, Rand farmed portions of her epistemology out to Leonard Peikoff.

I am reasonably sure that he is responsible for:

— Much of what she said about Kant (she didn't read Kant, Peikoff did)

— The critique of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy

— The doctrine of contextual certainty

— The doctrine of the arbitrary assertion (actually originated by Nathaniel Branden, but in a much more modest form than Peikoff's rendition)

[....]

I think we all wish for verbatim quotes on the issue of contextual certainty from Peikoff's 1965 (at Denver) / 1966 (first given in NYC) course on "Objectivism's Theory of Knowledge."

In one of the comments about Norsen's Amazon review of The Logical Leap a poster named "R. Schwarz" provides a few snippets from Peikoff's 1976 course "The Philosophy of Objectivism." Rand was in attendance at that course.

link

"True" and "false" are assessments within the field of human cognition: they designate a relationship [of] correspondence or contradiction between an idea and reality. . . . The false is established as false by reference to a body of evidence and within a context, and is pronounced false because it contradicts the evidence.

Leonard Peikoff, "The Philosophy of Objectivism"

lecture series (1976), Lecture 6

"Certain" represents an assessment of the evidence for a conclusion; it is usually contrasted with two other broad types of assessment: "possible" and "probable." . . .

Idea X is "certain" if, in a given context of knowledge, the evidence for X is conclusive. In such a context, all the evidence supports X and there is no evidence to support any alternative . . . .

You cannot challenge a claim to certainty by means of an arbitrary declaration of a counter-possibility, . . . you cannot manufacture possibilities without evidence . . . .

All the main attacks on certainty depend on evading its contextual character . . . .

The alternative is not to feign omniscience, erecting every discovery into an out-of-context absolute, or to embrace skepticism and claim that knowledge is impossible. Both these policies accept omniscience as the standard: the dogmatists pretend to have it, the skeptics bemoan their lack of it. The rational policy is to discard the very notion of omniscience. Knowledge is contextual-it is knowledge, it is valid, contextually.

Leonard Peikoff, "The Philosophy of Objectivism"

lecture series (1976), Lecture 6

[Ellen Stuttle]

Copying my post #116 from the "New Developments re Harriman Induction Book" thread.

===

I find the exchange on Amazon between Norsen and the poster "R. Schwarz," from a post of whose I quoted above, intriguing re interpretations of "contextual certainty."

Norsen concludes after some lengthy back and forth that Schwarz is rejecting the correspondence theory of truth.

link

Last edited by the author on Aug. 26, 2010 2:20 PM PDT

[i've used a quote box for a quote from Norsen.]

[Emphasis added.]

...but surely a proper theory of induction won't advocate forming all kinds of wrong generalizations and justify this on the grounds that their wrongness will be identified in due course. That's just absurd.

Is it? AR would respond with a "check your premises" here. On what grounds are you estimating that a child's generalization that "all balls sing" was improper? There are two distinct (not different) estimations here, one for "process" and one for "content". You are confusing the second for the first. There is a valid distinction between estimating the validity of the "process" of the generalization and estimating the validity of the "content" of the generalization. You are using an out of context estimation that the generalization "all balls sing" is false, which is an estimation of the "content" given your adult context of knowledge, and applying it to your estimation of the "process" itself and then throwing the baby out with the bathwater because you cannot separate the package deal you have made for yourself.

Certainly "all balls sing" would be a valid and proper generalization under the contextual conditions that I have described. You know it's content is factually wrong because your range of knowledge is larger than a child's. You have observed more balls and are therefore able to qualify the generalization as something like "only *electronic* balls can sing" but since the child's experience only encompasses singing balls, to him the content of his generalization is true, he made a completely proper generalization that is true within his limited context, which, given some time and experience he would be forced by the facts of reality to self-correct. This is the essence of Peikoff's and Harriman's theory of the "process" of induction.

[...] the contextual nature of knowledge which is a cornerstone of objectivist epistemology.

[BaalChatzaf]

Copying my post #116 from the "New Developments re Harriman Induction Book" thread.

===

I find the exchange on Amazon between Norsen and the poster "R. Schwarz," from a post of whose I quoted above, intriguing re interpretations of "contextual certainty."

Norsen concludes after some lengthy back and forth that Schwarz is rejecting the correspondence theory of truth.

link

Last edited by the author on Aug. 26, 2010 2:20 PM PDT

[i've used a quote box for a quote from Norsen.]

[Emphasis added.]

...but surely a proper theory of induction won't advocate forming all kinds of wrong generalizations and justify this on the grounds that their wrongness will be identified in due course. That's just absurd.

Is it? AR would respond with a "check your premises" here. On what grounds are you estimating that a child's generalization that "all balls sing" was improper? There are two distinct (not different) estimations here, one for "process" and one for "content". You are confusing the second for the first. There is a valid distinction between estimating the validity of the "process" of the generalization and estimating the validity of the "content" of the generalization. You are using an out of context estimation that the generalization "all balls sing" is false, which is an estimation of the "content" given your adult context of knowledge, and applying it to your estimation of the "process" itself and then throwing the baby out with the bathwater because you cannot separate the package deal you have made for yourself.

Certainly "all balls sing" would be a valid and proper generalization under the contextual conditions that I have described. You know it's content is factually wrong because your range of knowledge is larger than a child's. You have observed more balls and are therefore able to qualify the generalization as something like "only *electronic* balls can sing" but since the child's experience only encompasses singing balls, to him the content of his generalization is true, he made a completely proper generalization that is true within his limited context, which, given some time and experience he would be forced by the facts of reality to self-correct. This is the essence of Peikoff's and Harriman's theory of the "process" of induction.

[...] the contextual nature of knowledge which is a cornerstone of objectivist epistemology.

In short an inductive conclusion is always correct except when it is incorrect.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[George H. Smith]

George, I think it is you who has not got it here. For who denies the law of non-contradiction calls that law into question. So a person denying the law makes clear that he/she does not think of non-contradiction as absolutely essential in philosophy.

I assume you think the passage you wrote here has a meaning. Let us call that meaning M. If the Law of Non-Contradiction does not hold, then your passage can mean both M and Non-M -- the latter signifying the opposite of what you intended to say. In short, your remarks would mean nothing.

Moreover, I assume you believe that your assertions are true rather than false. But if the Law of Non-Contradiction does not hold, then the distinction between true and false vanishes, and "true" loses its meaning. Your assertions could be both true and false at the same time and in the same respect.

Eastern philosophy for example is not focused that much on "either-or", but also allows "both - and".

Any philosophy, eastern or otherwise, that claims that two contradictory propositions can both be true is promoting gibberish -- literally.

Rand's hunt for "stolen concepts" led Rand to assert that some vile philosophers actually regard "nothing" is a thing, "as a special, different kind of existent." (ITOE, p. 60)

She quotes Heidegger who wrote "Das Nichts nichtet or "Nothing noughts". (ITOE, P. 60)

Can't blame Rand for ridiculing it. But imo her "Consciousness is conscious" sounds every bit as strange.

Imagine a meeting between Heidegger and Rand had taken place: "Mr. Nothing Noughts meets Miss Consciousness is Conscious - wouldn't that have been a good title for an article? ;)

You obviously don't understand why Rand used the tautology "Consciousness is conscious," even though she explains the reason very clearly. You are playing childish games again. This is almost all you ever do on this list.

Ghs

[kiaer.ts]

Are you saying that you cannot explain what a stolen concept is in your own words?

What Rand says in ITOE about the stolen concept can hardly be called enlightening imo. She is quick to rant about those who allegedly apply "stolen concepts", but mostly fails to provide examples together with an analysis.

ITOE, p. 214: "Only in regard to issues as the "stolen concept", where somebody will claim that some concept exists while denying the concept on which it depends." (Rand )

No examples given for illustration purposes, and therefore no analyis of anything.

But maybe you can shed light on the matter by providing an example which we are then going to analyze?

Cute. I don't play with tar babies.

So, as I thought, your answer is yes, you cannot explain the concept in your own words.

I find it interesting that like General Semanticist, who cannot explain what the Objectivist position on the problem of universals is - yet he criticizes it, you cannot explain what a stolen concepts is - yet you criticize the notion. Both of you have spent a lot of time here. To what end?

[Xray]

I assume you think the passage you wrote here has a meaning. Let us call that meaning M. If the Law of Non-Contradiction does not hold, then your passage can mean both M and Non-M -- the latter signifying the opposite of what you intended to say. In short, your remarks would mean nothing.

How do you apply the Law of Non-Contradiction to propositions like: "Every proposition made by a Cretan is false", says the Cretan.

Suppose you asked a member of a society allowing polygamy who lives in the US: "How many wives do you have?", and he answers "One wife and four wives", how do you apply the LNC here?

You obviously don't understand why Rand used the tautology "Consciousness is conscious," even though she explains the reason very clearly.

Ghs

Rand's explanations don't change the oddness of the expression. "Consciousness" cannot be conscious, just like "hunger" can't be hungry and "thirst" can't be thirsty.

Edited September 11, 2010 by Xray

[Xray]

But maybe you can shed light on the matter by providing an example which we are then going to analyze?

Cute. I don't play with tar babies.

You can't provide any example, can you.

So, as I thought, your answer is yes, you cannot explain the concept in your own words.

I was curious with what you would come up with but you preferred evasion.

It looks like the "stolen concept" thing refers to something very simple: to contradictions in argumentation.

Example: if X states that objective morality does not exist, but then would try to make his/her case by using arguments which do contain the notion of objective morality, the Objectivist would accuse X of having "stolen" the concept.

But there is also an ideological message behind the notion of the SC: whatever concepts the opponent "steals", those concepts are all considered as valuable by the Objectivist who believes that they serve to to perceive objective reality.

Ths can be clearly felt throughout N. Branden's article on the SC:

N. Branden: "It is rational to ask: “How do the senses enable man to perceive reality?” It is not rational to ask: “Do the senses enable man to perceive reality?”—because if they do not, by what means did the speaker acquire his knowledge of the senses, of perception, of man and of reality?" http://www.nathanielbranden.com/catalog/articles_essays/the_stolen_concept.html

But of course it is rational to ask “Do the senses enable man to perceive reality?" It is one of THE questions to ask imo. The "reality" a dog perceives via its senses looks different from what we perceive. Is the dog's perception of smells more "objective" than our perception of smell which is far less developed? Or do we declare only that as objective reality which fits into what we as biological survival systems need in the macroscopic world? Isn't it precisely there where a philosophical discourse should start instead of calling the case closed, as Objectivists seem to do?

We are biological systems whose brains have adapted to the environment, selecting that which we need for survival.

To what degree our brain constructs "reality" can be seen how easily it is deceived by optical illusions.

No, I don't "attack the senses" (another reproach by Rand). I merely reflect to what degree our senses limit what we can say about any "objective" reality.

I find it interesting that like General Semanticist, who cannot explain what the Objectivist position on the problem of universals is - yet he criticizes it, you cannot explain what a stolen concepts is - yet you criticize the notion. Both of you have spent a lot of time here. To what end?

The problem of universals is about simple categorizing and subcategorizing in language. I think it was GS who called it "much ado about nothing", and I couldn't agree more. It takes more conscious mental effort for a six-year-old child to learn to tie a shoelace than it does to distinguish between e. g. the categories "toy" and "furniture".

Both of you have spent a lot of time here. To what end?

I can't answer for GS of course, but I have found OL to be a very inspiring place, and several great minds posting here have got me to delve into subjects I did not have much interest in before. So the "end" is really an "open end" ...

When debates get rough and too personal, I mostly shrug it off. Most of the emotion can be explained by the passionate commitment a poster has to his/her cause.

I also think debating with opponents is important because an opponent won't hesitate to point out the weak points in one's argumentation.

Edited September 11, 2010 by Xray

[kiaer.ts]

It looks like the "stolen concept" thing refers to something very simple: to contradictions in argumentation.

Example: if X states that objective morality does not exist, but then would try to make his/her case by using arguments which do contain the notion of objective morality, the Objectivist would accuse X of having "stolen" the concept.

But there is also an ideological message behind the notion of the SC: whatever concepts the opponent "steals", those concepts are all considered as valuable by the Objectivist who believes that they serve to to perceive objective reality.

Not even close. If you don't understand the fallacy of the stolen concept, you understand absolutely nothing of Objectivism.

[anthony]

Are you saying that you cannot explain what a stolen concept is in your own words?

What Rand says in ITOE about the stolen concept can hardly be called enlightening imo. She is quick to rant about those who allegedly apply "stolen concepts", but mostly fails to provide examples together with an analysis.

ITOE, p. 214: "Only in regard to issues as the "stolen concept", where somebody will claim that some concept exists while denying the concept on which it depends." (Rand )

No examples given for illustration purposes, and therefore no analyis of anything.

But maybe you can shed light on the matter by providing an example which we are then going to analyze?

Do you really think that the Stolen Concept Argument has something to do with individuals "owning" concepts?

Of course not. I deliberately transferred Rand's metaphor to the concrete realm to get the comic effect I wanted in order to point out the absurd premise underlying the idea of a "stolen concept".

People who take metaphors literally always make me laugh.

Me too. The comic effect was intentional.

Read NB's article "The Stolen Concept" in The Objectivist Newsletter (Jan. 1963).

I have read it a good while ago and commented on it here on OL if memory serves.

"All property is theft" may be a mere value judgement based on an unjust generalization, but where does epistemology kick in? When you consider the issue radically enough, a good deal of "property" was (and is) indeed based on theft. Just think of the "conquests" in history. And what please is "rightfully" owned? Who has the "right" to land for example? Those who have populated the area for milleniums like eg. g. native Americans or the conquerors who took it from them and then declared themselves the rightful owners?

So you see that the proposition "All property is theft" can lead to political and ideological debates, but it is no epistemological issue; as for linguistics, all one needs to know is that the speaker indicates what he/she connotes with the term "property". That is all there is to it. A proposition like e. g. "Capitalism is always beneficial" would be on the same level.

I also have a lengthy discussion of the Stolen Concept in ATCAG (Chapter 5, "The Skepticism of Faith), where I give many examples. Here is a brief summary from p. 140:

"To say that the skeptic commits the Fallacy of the Stolen Concept is to say that the skeptic "steals" concepts to which he has no epistemological right. The skeptic presents an argument which, if valid, would undercut the logical foundations that the skeptic himself must use in presenting the argument. Most skeptical arguments cannot be maintained with presupposing the truth of that which they are attempting to invalidate, which forces the skeptic into the mire of self-contradiction."

I just looked up the chapter myself and will discuss it in detail later. I'm not at all sure if the skeptic's position is as fallacious as you present it.

Imo the very characteristic of skeptical arguments is that they don't presuppose the truth of that which they are attempting to invalidate.

Aristotle's point about the Law of Non-Contradiction was essentially as follows: This principle states that a proposition cannot be both true and false (at the same time and in the same respect). To deny this principle is to claim that the proposition is false. But if the Law of Non-Contradiction is false, then it can also be true, and to utter propositions that can be both truth and false (at the same time an in the same respect) is to speak nonsense. The person who denies the Law of Non-Contradiction is therefore reduced to the cognitive status of a vegetable who can say nothing intelligible whatsoever.

The stolen "concept" in the vegetable argument is the Law of Non-Contradiction. Anyone who claims that a proposition is true must presuppose the truth of the Law of Non-Contradiction in order for his assertion to have meaning.

Got it?

Ghs

George, I think it is you who has not got it here. For who denies the law of non-contradiction calls that law into question. So a person denying the law makes clear that he/she does not think of non-contradiction as absolutely essential in philosophy.

Eastern philosophy for example is not focused that much on "either-or", but also allows "both - and".

Rand's hunt for "stolen concepts" led her to assert that some vile philosophers actually regard "nothing" as a thing, "as a special, different kind of existent." (ITOE, p. 60)

She quotes Heidegger who wrote "Das Nichts nichtet or "Nothing noughts". (ITOE, P. 60)

Can't blame Rand for ridiculing it. But imo her "Consciousness is conscious" sounds every bit as strange.

Imagine a debate between Heidegger and Rand had taken place: "Mr. Nothing Noughts versus Miss Consciousness is Conscious" - wouldn't that have been a good title for an article in a philosophical magazine? ;)

Xray,

The Fallacy of the Stolen Concept is merely a basic logical fallacy, only illustrated by this one example:

Man A -"ALL PROPERTY IS THEFT!!"

Man B - "Who was it stolen from?"

A- "The People!"

B- "So it was their property?"

A- "Yes!"

B- "And who did they steal it from?"

Or something like that - I don't recall the full exposition.

That you see this as a political-ideological-linguistic argument is sheer embroidery. It is simple logic.

[George H. Smith]

My copy of Harriman's book arrived today from Amazon. Since a friend will be visiting me from out of town tomorrow, I am going to try to read the book today, if only superficially, in between reluctant rounds of house cleaning.

I will post a brief comment afterwards so you will all know what to think of the book. This will settle this matter once and for all, and no more discussion will be necessary -- unless you wish to ask me questions.

Ghs

[Xray]

It looks like the "stolen concept" thing refers to something very simple: to contradictions in argumentation.

Example: if X states that objective morality does not exist, but then would try to make his/her case by using arguments which do contain the notion of objective morality, the Objectivist would accuse X of having "stolen" the concept.

But there is also an ideological message behind the notion of the SC: whatever concepts the opponent "steals", those concepts are all considered as valuable by the Objectivist who believes that they serve to to perceive objective reality.

Not even close. If you don't understand the fallacy of the stolen concept, you understand absolutely nothing of Objectivism.

Typical believer response to a critic of an ideology/philosophy/religion: "You don't understand". Followed by (the also typical) silence when it comes to correcting the alleged error.

In short, "You don't understand" is a rhetorical device to keep a critic at bay. But keep in mind that this device is pretty ineffective, since it usually only works with and impresses people who are inexperienced in debates.

I will post a brief comment afterwards so you will all know what to think of the book.

This will settle this matter once and for all, and no more discussion will be necessary --

unless you wish to ask me questions.

You mean "Faber locutus, causa finita?" ;)

(Excuse me for using the Latin translation of your last name for the pun).

I also have a lengthy discussion of the Stolen Concept in ATCAG (Chapter 5, "The Skepticism of Faith), where I give many examples. Here is a brief summary from p. 140:

Ghs, TCAG, p. 140:

To say that the skeptic commits the Fallacy of the Stolen Concept is to say that the skeptic "steals" concepts to which he has no epistemological right. The skeptic presents an argument which, if valid, would undercut the logical foundations that the skeptic himself must use in presenting the argument. Most skeptical arguments cannot be maintained with presupposing the truth of that which they are attempting to invalidate, which forces the skeptic into the mire of self-contradiction.

Can you demonstrate with an example?

Edited September 11, 2010 by Xray

[George H. Smith]

My copy of Harriman's book arrived today from Amazon. Since a friend will be visiting me from out of town tomorrow, I am going to try to read the book today, if only superficially, in between reluctant rounds of house cleaning.

I will post a brief comment afterwards so you will all know what to think of the book. This will settle this matter once and for all, and no more discussion will be necessary -- unless you wish to ask me questions.

Ghs

I just finished reading Chapter 1, "The Foundation," which Harriman describes as "taken nearly verbatim from Dr. Peikoff's lectures." Some minor quibbles aside (e.g., in regard to Aristotle's position), it's excellent.

My only major objection is to the assertion that the problem of induction has not hitherto been solved. In terms of fundamentals, it has been solved -- many times. I passed over this remark as just another example of the Columbus Complex exhibited by many Objectivists.

True, this chapter is not a technical analysis of the problem of induction, but it's not meant to be. Rather, it is a clear exposition of the foundations of induction, and it contains some perceptive remarks about levels of generalization. Based on what I have read so far, I would easily recommend this book.

Ghs

[BaalChatzaf]

My only major objection is to the assertion that the problem of induction has not hitherto been solved. In terms of fundamentals, it has been solved -- many times. I passed over this remark as just another example of the Columbus Complex exhibited by many Objectivists.

What does "Columbus Complex" mean in this context?

Ba'al Chatzaf

[kiaer.ts]

It looks like the "stolen concept" thing refers to something very simple: to contradictions in argumentation.

Example: if X states that objective morality does not exist, but then would try to make his/her case by using arguments which do contain the notion of objective morality, the Objectivist would accuse X of having "stolen" the concept.

But there is also an ideological message behind the notion of the SC: whatever concepts the opponent "steals", those concepts are all considered as valuable by the Objectivist who believes that they serve to to perceive objective reality.

Not even close. If you don't understand the fallacy of the stolen concept, you understand absolutely nothing of Objectivism.

Typical believer response to a critic of an ideology/philosophy/religion: "You don't understand". Followed by (the also typical) silence when it comes to correcting the alleged error.

In short, "You don't understand" is a rhetorical device to keep a critic at bay. But keep in mind that this device is pretty ineffective, since it usually only works with and impresses people who are inexperienced in debates.

You have not questioned or even identified any belief of mine. You cannot refute an idea you do not understand.

You do not rise to the level of a critic.

It is not my job to educate you, or, worse, as others have been doing, to help you pretend, like yet another pet misfit, that you are educated.

As of now you have nothing of value to offer - if you did, you could offer it without my help.

It is no kindness to overlook a student's failure. Too many well-meaning people here have been doing you the misfavor of taking you seriously.

[George H. Smith]

My only major objection is to the assertion that the problem of induction has not hitherto been solved. In terms of fundamentals, it has been solved -- many times. I passed over this remark as just another example of the Columbus Complex exhibited by many Objectivists.

What does "Columbus Complex" mean in this context?

Ba'al Chatzaf

The label refers to people who falsely claim to have discovered something that in fact was "discovered" many times before. In the context of Objectivism, it refers to the claim that Rand (or Peikoff) was the first to arrive at certain philosophic truths and insights when essentially the same points had been made by earlier philosophers.

I don't use the label when the predecessor was some obscure philosopher that few people have heard of. Anyone, including people who know a lot about philosophy, can be excused for not knowing everything. I apply the label when originality is claimed for an idea that in fact was relatively common.

I first heard the term "Columbus Complex" during the 1970s, when it was sometimes applied to Andrew J. Galambos. People with the Columbus Complex are not content with being right; they must also be strikingly original.

Let me be clear about exactly what Harriman says. He writes (p. 8), "The central theme here is the failure of philosophers to offer a solution to what has been called 'the problem of induction.'" Harriman (p. 1) also refers to Peikoff's "new theory of induction."

I suspect these claims are based on the fact that Peikoff links induction to Rand's theory of concepts, and it is indeed true that no previous philosopher has approached induction in precisely this way. Nevertheless, the basic explanation of why inductive reasoning is valid has been stated many times. One needn't agree with every detail of Rand's epistemology in order to vindicate induction.

I have read a couple more chapters of this book since my last post. It is well worth reading. Harriman provides many detailed examples of inductive reasoning in the history of science, and he gives plausible explanations of when the canons of inductive reasoning were correctly applied and when they were not. Peikoff is correct when, in the Introduction, he says that Harriman's book "shows the reader, rather than telling him, what induction is in essential terms and on what it is based."

I know some readers have criticized some of Harriman's historical accounts -- but in matters of history, including the history of science, this is par for the course. Historians often disagree over such matters. But I have read a lot of history over the years, and I can tell when a historian knows his stuff. Harriman knows his stuff.

Ghs

[kiaer.ts]

My only major objection is to the assertion that the problem of induction has not hitherto been solved. In terms of fundamentals, it has been solved -- many times. I passed over this remark as just another example of the Columbus Complex exhibited by many Objectivists.

What does "Columbus Complex" mean in this context?

Ba'al Chatzaf

The label refers to people who falsely claim to have discovered something that in fact was "discovered" many times before. In the context of Objectivism, it refers to the claim that Rand (or Peikoff) was the first to arrive at certain philosophic truths and insights when essentially the same points had been made by earlier philosophers.

I don't use the label when the predecessor was some obscure philosopher that few people have heard of. Anyone, including people who know a lot about philosophy, can be excused for not knowing everything. I apply the label when originality is claimed for an idea that in fact was relatively common.

I first heard the term "Columbus Complex" during the 1970s, when it was sometimes applied to Andrew J. Galambos. People with the Columbus Complex are not content with being right; they must also be strikingly original.

Let me be clear about exactly what Harriman says. He writes (p. 8), "The central theme here is the failure of philosophers to offer a solution to what has been called 'the problem of induction.'" Harriman (p. 1) also refers to Peikoff's "new theory of induction."

I suspect these claims are based on the fact that Peikoff links induction to Rand's theory of concepts, and it is indeed true that no previous philosopher has approached induction in precisely this way. Nevertheless, the basic explanation of why inductive reasoning is valid has been stated many times. One needn't agree with every detail of Rand's epistemology in order to vindicate induction.

I have read a couple more chapters of this book since my last post. It is well worth reading. Harriman provides many detailed examples of inductive reasoning in the history of science, and he gives plausible explanations of when the canons of inductive reasoning were correctly applied and when they were not. Peikoff is correct when, in the Introduction, he says that Harriman's book "shows the reader, rather than telling him, what induction is in essential terms and on what it is based."

I know some readers have criticized some of Harriman's historical accounts -- but in matters of history, including the history of science, this is par for the course. Historians often disagree over such matters. But I have read a lot of history over the years, and I can tell when a historian knows his stuff. Harriman knows his stuff.

Ghs

Galambos, Columbus - you can't really say you are surprised.

I concur with George's statements so far. The book makes some overblown claims, and Harriman's objections to modern physics are enough to discredit him personally with serious and philosophically sophisticated scientists, but the book is well worth reading as food for thought.

[George H. Smith]

I concur with George's statements so far. The book makes some overblown claims, and Harriman's objections to modern physics are enough to discredit him personally with serious and philosophically sophisticated scientists, but the book is well worth reading as food for thought.

What objections to modern physics are you thinking of?

Harriman (p. 248) sings the praises of quantum theory as "a mathematical formalism," calling it "enormously successful." What he calls into question are some of the kooky metaphysical interpretations of it, such as Bohr's claim that "elementary particles have no identity." Harriman (p. 250) also criticizes the "failure to properly integrate the wave and particle models."

I see nothing in these and other critical comments (e.g., about Big Bang theory) that renders Harriman philosophically unsophisticated. In fact, he is far more philosophically sophisticated than your run-of-the-mill physicist. This doesn't mean he is right, of course, but at least he understands the need for coherent explanations of the findings of physics.

I have been known to insist on this point myself.

Ghs

[Philip Coates]

Did you guys not get my memo on making -your words- in a post longer than what you are quoting, so people don't have to go thru the damn thing six times?

Communication and Posting Skills 101.

And get rid of the goddamn "nesting".

Any idiot can remember the general ideas if he's already been reading the thread.

Rule #2: People who abuse that silly quote function should be shot.

[George H. Smith]

Did you guys not get my memo on making -your words- in a post longer than what you are quoting, so people don't have to go thru the damn thing six times?

Communication and Posting Skills 101.

And get rid of the goddamn "nesting".

Any idiot can remember the general ideas if he's already been reading the thread.

Rule #2: People who abuse that silly quote function should be shot.

More procedural advice from Mr. Anal Retentive.

Aren't you supposed to have killed yourself by now?

Ghs

[sjw]

Did you guys not get my memo on making -your words- in a post longer than what you are quoting, so people don't have to go thru the damn thing six times?

Communication and Posting Skills 101.

And get rid of the goddamn "nesting".

Any idiot can remember the general ideas if he's already been reading the thread.

Rule #2: People who abuse that silly quote function should be shot.

Reminds me of an old email list by Bob Stubblefield. I note that it does not seem to be around anymore. Perhaps people prefer a bit more looseness of style. Like watch me flout Brant's request for less spaces until my name:

Shayne

--I'm such a rebel.

[Ellen Stuttle]

Like watch me flout Brant's request for less spaces until my name:

Shayne

--I'm such a rebel.

Fewer spaces (not less).

Ellen

[Ellen Stuttle]

My only major objection is to the assertion that the problem of induction has not hitherto been solved. In terms of fundamentals, it has been solved -- many times. [....]

Please state what you think "the problem of induction" is which you think "has been solved -- many times."

I have read a couple more chapters of this book since my last post. It is well worth reading. Harriman provides many detailed examples of inductive reasoning in the history of science, and he gives plausible explanations of when the canons of inductive reasoning were correctly applied and when they were not.

I haven't yet gotten to those parts of the book, so I'm going on the basis of a lecture course of Harriman's I heard ten years ago combined with reviewers' indications of what Harriman said in the book. My anticipation is that he force fit the history of science into the mold of his canons.

Ellen

[sjw]

Like watch me flout Brant's request for less spaces until my name:

Shayne

--I'm such a rebel.

Fewer spaces (not less).

Ellen

Phil?

Shayne

-- Even more spaces.

[George H. Smith]

My only major objection is to the assertion that the problem of induction has not hitherto been solved. In terms of fundamentals, it has been solved -- many times. [....]

Please state what you think "the problem of induction" is which you think "has been solved -- many times."

I've covered this several times on other threads -- most recently on the "dirt" thread. I don't want to go through it again.

Ghs