David Harriman's Book

[George H. Smith]

I think that what maybe confuses people of O'ist orientation is the term "valid."

It's a stolen concept..;-)

An equivocation (the frequent O'ist employment of "valid") between the formal-logic meaning and the soft meaning "legitimate." The equivocation lulls the O'ist unwary into becoming righteously indignant against those who, strictly meaning the formal logic sense, assert that induction isn't valid.

Ellen

Stolen concept arguments, in substance if not in name, have been common throughout the history of philosophy. In the 20th century they were especially popular among ordinary language philosophers. Perhaps the most famous argument along these lines is Aristotle's remark that anyone who denies the Law of Non-Contradiction reduces himself to the cognitive status of a vegetable.

Ghs

[Ellen Stuttle]

ITOE

Expanded 2nd edition, 1990

hardcover

pg. 28

Thus the process of forming and applying concepts contains the essential pattern of two fundamental methods of cognition: induction and deduction.

The process of observing the facts of reality and of integrating them into concepts is, in essence, a process of induction. The process of subsuming new instances under a known concept is, in essence, a process of deduction.

Deletion of that statement is #1 on my list of wished-for corrections of Rand's publications.

It's a throw-away statement, a tack-on which could have been deleted without loss.

It's at variance with her own theory of how concepts are formed (by abstraction from pattern recognition).

It's conducive to confusion in the views of her followers on the historic meaning of "induction" and how that relates to concept-formation.

It's one of the two statements which provided basis and license for Peikoff's Project on Induction.

(The other is her saying in the ITOE workshop, pg. 304, after saying that she "[hasn't] worked on that subject enough to even begin to formulate it," that "it would take an accomplished scientist in a given field to illustrate the whole process in that field." Ta-da! Peikoff/Harriman duo answer the call.)

Ellen

I don't see how you're concluding that there's a necessary contradiction between Rand's different descriptions of the use and formation of concepts. You list the two perspectives, and indeed they are different perspectives, but different perspectives is not the same as contradictory perspectives.

Shayne

I don't think it's an outright contradiction -- which is why I chose "at variance" as the wording. It doesn't "jibe," since "induction" and "deduction" typically refer to formal logical methods using propositional logic. If all she meant by "induction" and "deduction" in the statement was a loose meaning of learning from experience and then applying experience, that's ok -- but then it's misleading and confusion-producing to use terms which have a formal meaning which people might think she meant.

The comment wasn't needed if what she meant was merely "learning from and applying experience." It's wrong if she meant formal propositional logic. She does say "in essence," which might have been fudge language, i.e., indicating that she didn't mean "induction" and "deduction" defined as a logician would define them. But then it would have been better if she'd clarified that she was doing that. But this would need extra sentences.

So, all in all, I just wish she hadn't included that 3-sentence statement. It raises questions about what she meant without answering them and allows the possibility of interpreting it as meaning the technical meaning, which isn't accurate.

Ellen

[sjw]

I don't think it's an outright contradiction -- which is why I chose "at variance" as the wording. It doesn't "jibe," since "induction" and "deduction" typically refer to formal logical methods using propositional logic.

I think it's quite silly to expect Rand to constrain her terminology in such a manner. Perhaps about as silly as formal logic methods. I think she added an interesting and insightful angle with those remarks and am glad you didn't have final editorial authority.

Shayne

[Daniel Barnes]

If we conjecture that bread is food but dirt is not, how do we test -- i.e., attempt to falsify -- the latter point? It might be said that we tried eating dirt as children, spat it out, and decided it wasn't fit to eat. Okay, but how do we know that no dirt is fit to eat? Why do we stop after a few instances of eating dirt? Why don't we keep sampling dirt in an effort to falsify the hypothesis that no dirt is fit to eat?

We don't do this for a simple reason: From our experience with a few cases of eating dirt, we conclude, via inductive reasoning, that those unpleasant experiences will repeat themselves in any future attempts to eat dirt. We reach a conclusion about the nature of dirt from a limited number of particular cases.

In other words, if inductive reasoning is never valid, there would be no way to falsify a hypothesis or even render it improbable. For just because x was incompatible with our hypothesis in the past would be no reason to assume that instances similar to x would be incompatible with our hypothesis in the future. We would be required to "test" our hypothesis over and over again, indefinitely, with additional instances of x, and then we could only say that this particular x is compatible or incompatible with a hypothesis. We could never (legitimately) generalize about all x's. We could only say that the dirt we have eaten so far is not food. We could never justifiably say that dirt we haven't tried yet is not food. We could never learn from experience. We would need to keep eating dirt over and over again in an effort to falsify our hypothesis that dirt is not food, and, logically speaking, this process would never end.

Now, this is an infinite regress.

Just returning to this issue now I have a moment, as you seem to think this is a good argument against Popper's hypothetico-deductive theory.

It isn't. In fact it is just another typical example of why enumerative-induction doesn't work. As my previous reply obviously wasn't very clear, I will go through it point by point to show exactly where and how it goes wrong. This may also help other interested readers who are not as familiar with Popper as you are, so I will write it accordingly.

You start with a conjecture:

If we conjecture that bread is food but dirt is not, how do we test -- i.e., attempt to falsify -- the latter point?

You then propose a simple test:

It might be said that we tried eating dirt as children, spat it out, and decided it wasn't fit to eat.

So far, so Popperian. But here's where it goes off the rails:

Okay, but how do we know that no dirt is fit to eat?

Ah ha. But according to the problem of induction, we can never know for sure that the universal theory "no dirt is fit to eat" is true. And just as well, because it turns out that it's false anyway - see here, and here. Further, part of the problem is the way your hypothesis has been framed. As it stands - "no dirt is fit to eat" is in any practical sense unfalsifiable - you'd effectively be trying to prove a negative, as you'd indeed have to sample all dirt that ever existed or will exist in order make such a proof. This is irrelevant, as Critical Rationalism never tries to prove anything - only to falsify. So it turns out your example is just standard fallacious proof-by-enumerative-induction coming in via the back door. Now, an important part of Popper's recommendation is to avoid these sorts of problems in the first place by trying to frame hypotheses so they are more easily falsifiable; that is, by making them testable. So you could just as easily make your hypothesis "all dirt is food", for this could just as well be the infant's vague, unspoken hunch when she puts the dirt in her mouth rather than "no dirt is food." This hypothesis now becomes testable, and can be falsified by modus tollens as only a single counterexample - one taste - is necessary from a logical point of view ( though if you want to try more, that's up to you...). More about that below.

You then wonder:

Why do we stop after a few instances of eating dirt? Why don't we keep sampling dirt in an effort to falsify the hypothesis that no dirt is fit to eat?

As I mention above, the answer is in Popper's well-known adoption of the logical form modus tollens, which he built his notion of falsifiability around. Using the modus tollens, we only need one counter example - a single black swan - to falsify the universal claim that "all swans are white". Likewise "all dirt is food". Thus the scenario of tasting dirt forever is not entailed by, nor has anything to do with, the Popperian approach. We can now replace our falsified hypothesis "all dirt is food" with a new one - for example, "some dirt is not food" - and act with the appropriate caution, or with an appropriate sense of exploration and adventure :-) in future. And all this is achieved without any recourse whatsoever to any enumerative-induction approach. So the rest of your post is naturally incorrect.

Hopefully that clears that up.

As for clinging to one's beliefs, do you cling to your belief that Popper was right in this area? Do you believe that Popper's arguments are justified? Have you attempted to falsify them? If so, by what means?

No, I hold them lightly as ever. No, but they have withstood many tougher tests than yours above, so so far so good :-). Yes, many times; by debating them in places like this that are not likely to easily accept them, for just one example.

PS: I have tried to make this explanation as clear as possible. If you still profoundly disagree with it and want to debate it at length, I propose starting another thread so Robert's thread doesn't get hijacked.

Edited September 9, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[George H. Smith]

If we conjecture that bread is food but dirt is not, how do we test -- i.e., attempt to falsify -- the latter point? It might be said that we tried eating dirt as children, spat it out, and decided it wasn't fit to eat. Okay, but how do we know that no dirt is fit to eat? Why do we stop after a few instances of eating dirt? Why don't we keep sampling dirt in an effort to falsify the hypothesis that no dirt is fit to eat?

We don't do this for a simple reason: From our experience with a few cases of eating dirt, we conclude, via inductive reasoning, that those unpleasant experiences will repeat themselves in any future attempts to eat dirt. We reach a conclusion about the nature of dirt from a limited number of particular cases.

In other words, if inductive reasoning is never valid, there would be no way to falsify a hypothesis or even render it improbable. For just because x was incompatible with our hypothesis in the past would be no reason to assume that instances similar to x would be incompatible with our hypothesis in the future. We would be required to "test" our hypothesis over and over again, indefinitely, with additional instances of x, and then we could only say that this particular x is compatible or incompatible with a hypothesis. We could never (legitimately) generalize about all x's. We could only say that the dirt we have eaten so far is not food. We could never justifiably say that dirt we haven't tried yet is not food. We could never learn from experience. We would need to keep eating dirt over and over again in an effort to falsify our hypothesis that dirt is not food, and, logically speaking, this process would never end.

Now, this is an infinite regress.

Just returning to this issue now I have a moment, as you seem to think this is a good argument against Popper's hypothetico-deductive theory.

It isn't. In fact it is just another typical example of why enumerative-induction doesn't work. As my previous reply obviously wasn't very clear, I will go through it point by point to show exactly where and how it goes wrong. This may also help other interested readers who are not as familiar with Popper as you are.

You start with a conjecture:

If we conjecture that bread is food but dirt is not, how do we test -- i.e., attempt to falsify -- the latter point?

You then propose a simple test:

It might be said that we tried eating dirt as children, spat it out, and decided it wasn't fit to eat.

So far, so Popperian. But here's where it goes off the rails:

Okay, but how do we know that no dirt is fit to eat?

Ah ha. But according to the problem of induction, we can never know for sure that the universal theory "no dirt is fit to eat" is true.

In my discussion the statement "no dirt is fit to eat" did not function as a universal theory. It was a generalization based on particular experiences of attempting to eat dirt. Generalizations can have exceptions. Generalizations function as presumptions -- in some cases very strong presumptions -- that serve as cognitive shortcuts. They enable us to form reasonable -- not infallible -- expectations without having to repeat past experiences over and over again.

And just as well, because it turns out that it's false anyway! - see here, and here. Further, part of the problem is the way your hypothesis has been framed.

This is an old tactic. After an inductivist states a generalization based on particular instances, the critic points to exceptions, or apparent exceptions, to falsify the generalization. But a generalization is not the same thing as a theory, and inductive generalizations, which can be accepted with varying degrees of probability, often remain accurate despite a few exceptions.

Popper often uses this tactic. For example, he takes Hume's example that "bread nourishes" and claims that this generalization "was tragically refuted when bread baked in the usual way practically wiped out a French village, due to an outbreak of ergotism." (Objective Knowledge, p. 97)

This shows a failure to understand the nature of generalizations, in contrast to "theories" or "hypotheses." To generalize that "bread nourishes" does not mean that we never regard bread and other foods as unfit to eat in some circumstances. We wouldn't normally eat spoiled food, for example, or raw pork. Popper's obsession with viewing every inductive generalization as a universal theory of some kind led him into a number of unnecessary problems.

Another common tactic used by Popper is illustrated in the following passage:

It is a common fact (whatever philosophers may say) that we are commonsensically certain that the sun will rise over London tomorrow. Yet we do not know it for certain. There are millions of possibilities which may prevent it....But even a necessary hope is not objective knowledge, though it may dispose us to belief.

In other words, those rules which are still used by philosophers as standard examples of inductive rules (and of reliability) are all false, even when they are quite good approximations to the truth.

So the rules of induction can yield "quite good approximations to the truth"? I will settle for this, as would most other inductivists, especially since Popper himself sometimes says that approximations of truth are the most we can ever hope to attain.

Popper's discussion here is very confusing, and things get even more confusing when Popper goes on to say:

Genuine induction by repetition does not exist. What looks like induction is hypothetical reasoning, well tested and well corroborated and in agreement with common sense.

Note that Popper refers to "induction by repetition." This is often called induction by mere enumeration, and this is precisely the sort of thing that Harriman, along with virtually every other inductivist, rejects. If Popper believes that induction consists of adding up particular cases and then, with no additional reasoning (whether implicit or explicit), forming a generalization, then he is attacking a type of "induction" that no one has ever defended.

Let's return to Popper's example of the sun rising tomorrow. Does any reasonably intelligent person who makes this inductive generalization really not understand that certain cosmic events could occur that would prevent the sun from rising tomorrow? No, of course not. When people say this, they are not proposing a "theory," much less a scientific theory; rather, they are expressing a reasonable expectation based on a generalization from past experiences.

There are a number of other things I would need to discuss to show how confused Popper's approach is, but I will confine myself to a few brief remarks.

1) According to Popper (OK, p. 34), "all science, and all philosophy, are enlightened common sense." This is wrong. Although philosophy typically relies on "common sense," science, especially physics, does not. This is why the specific methods of verification used in science differ dramatically from the methods used in philosophy. Popper's confusion in this matter leads him in a futile quest to explain how a formal method of verification used in science -- Daniel calls it the hypothetico-deductive model, but this can be misleading when applied to Popper -- applies to philosophy and even everyday life as well. This is a serious error.

2) Popper's remarks about "objective knowledge" sometimes conflict. At times he suggests that objective knowledge is possible, whereas at other times he says that objective knowledge is merely an ideal that can only be approximated to one degree or another. The problem here is that Popper often equates "knowledge" with absolute certainty, or even infallible certainty. Thus if we don't know something for certain, we don't have any knowledge at all. This is one reason he can say that we often form reasonable beliefs based on induction (only he doesn't want to call this "induction," even though everyone else under the sun has) and still not have "knowledge."

(3) To add to the confusion, Popper has some excellent discussions where he criticizes the old notion, which goes back to the ancient Greeks, that knowledge must be "certain" before it can qualify as knowledge. Indeed, he makes a number of comments that could easily be translated into the language of Rand's contextualism. (These are among my favorite discussions by Popper.)

(4) The upshot of all this is that the problem of induction -- which Popper claims to have solved, "though negatively" (OK, p. 94) -- is inextricably tied to his theory of objective knowledge, and the confusion exhibited in the latter seeps into his discussion of the former. (Daniel: Please don't tell me that Popper distinguishes between the questions "How can we justify induction?" and "Is induction at all justifiable?" I know this, but I have to cut some corners to keep this post to a reasonable length. This distinction is not relevant to the points I am making here.)

(5) At various times, when Popper comes very close to defending the traditional theory of induction, merely restating it in a different form, he sometimes calls attention to the similarity, only to seek refuge in his favorite excuse, viz., that he doesn't want to quibble over the meaning of words. At some point he even says, in effect, Well, if you want to call my approach "induction," then call it induction. Okay, I call it not only induction in some instances but also the traditional theory of induction. As noted previously, Popper focuses on induction by mere enumeration, and no inductivist that I can recall ever defended this approach.

Now back to Daniel's post:

As it stands - "no dirt is fit to eat" is in any practical sense unfalsifiable - you'd effectively be trying to prove a negative, as you'd indeed have to sample all dirt that ever existed or will exist in order make such a proof.

Earlier you gave two links to show dirt that apparently is fit to eat, yet now you claim that "no dirt is fit to eat" cannot be falsified, an least not in any practical sense. So what were your counter-examples? -- impractical falsifications?

I will need to continue this later.

Ghs

[Daniel Barnes]

I will need to continue this later.

Ghs

Can we do this on another thread, for the reasons I suggested upstream?

[Brant Gaede]

Ask Michael to split it off. In the meantime just continue. That should work.

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

I will need to continue this later.

Ghs

Can we do this on another thread, for the reasons I suggested upstream?

Fine with me, but I would like the new thread to at least begin with the last two lengthy posts -- the first by you, the second by me. Michael will need to do this, and we should continue on this thread until he does.

Ghs

[Rich Engle]

It's a horrible word that has been gotten to in the first place (dirt), right? It doesn't take that much to see it, either.

Here: Let's all agree to go out tomorrow, and scoop up whatever kind of dirt we have out there in our respective places we live, and stick it in our mouths, and start chewing.

Then, it will all be agreed. Dirt doesn't usually taste real good.

And that is not what "dirt" is for, in the first place. Soil is to grow things. You know, on the Earth.

I misuse and morph and occasionally defile words (themselves) on a regular basis. That is for sure. This here has started on the wrong image.

First off, dirt (soil) is often compared, in bad writing, to some form of "filth."

Yeah, well try living without it.

There are better, er, "metaphors" to make use of. The whole "chewing dirt" thing is, well, you can't even get a good phrase for it without using that term itself. "Crap?"

Some things are beyond words, and some know that, others do not.

The dirt is Holy. This isn't about Popper, or any of that. Not really.

Something in me, dark and sticky

All the time it's getting strong

No way of dealing with this feeling

Can't go on like this too long

This time you've gone too far

This time you've gone too far

This time you've gone too far,

I told you, I told you, I told you, I told you

Don't talk back, just drive the car

Shut your mouth, I know what you are

Don't say nothing, keep your hands on the wheel

Don't turn around, this is for real

Digging in the dirt

Stay with me I need support

I'm digging in the dirt

Find the places I got hurt

Open up the places I got hurt

The more I look, the more I find

As I close on in, I get so blind

I feel it in my head, I feel it in my toes

I feel it in my sex, that's the place it goes

Digging in the dirt, to find the places we got hurt...

Maybe go plant something. You know, it is very common these days for people to be separated from Nature. I am very fortunate to not have that problem in that I live in it, and work in preserves and so forth. Others here will know what I am talking about because they do it as well. I think this is very key. If you are not there, and you can find your way back to it, somewhere where you live, maybe do that.

That is not rambling, that is not just Transcendentalist speaking. It is just healthy human nature.

It is amazing how fast argruments like these dispell themselves when people get the chance to go do such simple things. And then, an amazing thing happens: you get to talk about what's really going on. As humans.

Blessed Be,

rde

Waiting for the Atheists and Linguists and Whoever To Come For Him.

Arms Open, Folks, and that is a Good Thing.

Edited September 9, 2010 by Rich Engle

[Daniel Barnes]

I will need to continue this later.

Ghs

Can we do this on another thread, for the reasons I suggested upstream?

Fine with me, but I would like the new thread to at least begin with the last two lengthy posts -- the first by you, the second by me. Michael will need to do this, and we should continue on this thread until he does.

Ghs

I've done a hopefully acceptable version here.

Edited September 9, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[George H. Smith]

So far, so Popperian. But here's where it goes off the rails:

Okay, but how do we know that no dirt is fit to eat?

...Further, part of the problem is the way your hypothesis has been framed. As it stands - "no dirt is fit to eat" is in any practical sense unfalsifiable - you'd effectively be trying to prove a negative, as you'd indeed have to sample all dirt that ever existed or will exist in order make such a proof. This is irrelevant, as Critical Rationalism never tries to prove anything - only to falsify.

You have completely shifted the context in which I originally offered the generalization "no dirt is fit to eat."

I was discussing how we learn that some things, which we call "food," are fit to eat, whereas some things (e.g., dirt) are not. I contended that we form inductive generalizations based on our past experiences, and that these generalizations are reliable. We have tried eating certain things, such as apples, and found that they satisfy our hunger and will keep us alive (or at least not hurt us), whereas we have tried, perhaps as children, eating dirt and concluded that no dirt is fit to eat. Each of these can be construed as value judgments, viz., that apples are good to eat, and dirt is bad to eat. (For the sake of convenience and simplicity, I will sometimes use this terminology.)

My main argument is that it is quite absurd to construe this inductive reasoning in the Popperian manner of conjectures and refutations. We do not form a hypothesis that applies are good and then attempt to refute this, nor do we form a hypothesis that dirt is bad and attempt to refute that. This Popperian model of scientific reasoning is not how we usually reason in everyday life, and the latter is no less reasonable and reliable because of this.

I highlighted a particular problem with dirt on the Popperian model, namely, that if inductive reasoning is never justified, then we could never legitimately generalize that dirt is bad. If "dirt is bad" (or, per my original formulation, "no dirt is fit to eat") is construed as a Popperian theory, then it could never be falsified. This means that a rational person could not rely on his previous experiences of eating dirt as a child, since it might be the case that some dirt, including dirt of exactly the same kind as the dirt we had sampled previously, is good. And in this event we would need to keep sampling dirt throughout out lives in order to reassure ourselves that no dirt is fit to eat. Never, on the Popperian model, would we reach the point where we could rationally conclude that we shouldn't eat dirt. All we could say is that the dirt we had eaten in the past was bad, but we could not generalize about dirt we have never tried.

In the passage quoted above, Daniel objects to how my "hypothesis" about dirt is framed, but keep in mind that I do not regard "dirt is bad" (or "no dirt is fit to eat") as a hypothesis at all. This is an empirical generalization based on a limited number of previous experiences, not a hypothesis or theory. My generalization does not propose an explanation of why dirt is not fit to eat, nor it is a universal law that claims to subsume each and every possible case, without exception.

Daniel makes a couple odd claims. First, he claims that "no dirt is fit to eat" is not falsifiable in any practical sense (even though he himself gave some apparent counter-examples). Yet this was exactly my point. Construed as a theory instead of as an empirical generalization, "no dirt is fit to eat," is not (normally) falsifiable, and this is why, on the Popperian model, we would need to keep sampling dirt for the rest of out lives.

Things get curiouser and curiouser as Daniel goes on to say: "Critical Rationalism never tries to prove anything - only to falsify." Exactly. The inability, as a practical matter, to falsify the theory that "no dirt is fit to eat" means that we would never have a good reason not to try eating dirt again, and again, and again....

Permit me to interject some common sense here:

Why do we generalize that dirt is bad to eat on the basis of a few samples? Upon eating dirt as children, did we merely think, in effect: This dirt is bad; that dirt is bad; therefore all dirt is bad? No, we did not merely enumerate instances. Rather, after a few samples, we thought, "This stuff is dirt, and it is not good to eat. So when I encounter other samples of the same kind , I will know that it is also dirt and not fit to eat." In other words, we made a conceptual identification of the substance we call "dirt" and rationally concluded that other substances with the same nature will have the same negative effects.

In sum: We reasoned from particular instances to a generalization about the nature of dirt, and we then applied this generalization to instances as yet untried. This is pretty much what J.S. Mill had in mind when he said that induction consists of reasoning from particulars to particulars by means of an intervening generalization. (I discussed the problem of exceptions in my last post.)

Given these explanations, I don't see the need to respond to the remainder of Daniel's post. I would merely end up repeating myself.

Ghs

[Daniel Barnes]

Daniel makes a couple odd claims. First, he claims that "no dirt is fit to eat" is not falsifiable in any practical sense (even though he himself gave some apparent counter-examples). Yet this was exactly my point. Construed as a theory instead of as an empirical generalization, "no dirt is fit to eat," is not (normally) falsifiable, and this is why, on the Popperian model, we would need to keep sampling dirt for the rest of out lives.

I made a blunder, which has, as luck would have it, revealed we are rather at cross purposes. I explain over at the other thread.

[George H. Smith]

Daniel makes a couple odd claims. First, he claims that "no dirt is fit to eat" is not falsifiable in any practical sense (even though he himself gave some apparent counter-examples). Yet this was exactly my point. Construed as a theory instead of as an empirical generalization, "no dirt is fit to eat," is not (normally) falsifiable, and this is why, on the Popperian model, we would need to keep sampling dirt for the rest of out lives.

I made a blunder, which has, as luck would have it, revealed we are rather at cross purposes. I explain over at the other thread.

This is getting way too complicated. Everything should be kept on this thread until Michael is able to transfer everything en masse. I don't want to switch back and forth between threads. It's too confusing.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

A few general comments about Popper and then I need to get some sleep....

I have been reading Popper for many years, and I am still frequently unclear about the status of his Conjectures and Refutations Model -- or CRM for short.

Specifically, is CRM a prescription for how we should reason? Or is it a description of how we actually do reason when we reason correctly?

At times Popper prescribes CRM not only a valid method of reasoning but as the only valid method of reasoning. This gives rise to a major objection that I have stated before, namely, that even if CRM is the only proper method for experimental science -- and that's a big "if" -- it does not follow that CRM is the only proper method for other fields, or even an appropriate method. (In The Poverty of Historicism, Popper attempts to extend CRM to history and the social sciences, and he does some serious tap dancing in the process.)

At other times, especially in his discussions of induction, Popper presents CRM as a description of how people actually do reason, whether they know it or not. Thus, when Popper claims to have solved the problem of induction, he means that he has shown that inductive reasoning has never played a role in the justification of knowledge -- for one thing, we never "justify" knowledge at all -- so induction is irrelevant. Although induction has served as a method of discovery (we sometimes get good ideas from it), it has never served as a method of justification or even of corroboration. What inductivists thought they were doing in the latter case was not really induction at all but some version of CRM.

This approach can get extremely bizarre at times. It verges on a type of cognitive psychoanalysis, to wit: In arriving at sound conclusions, you thought you were doing x, but I know better. I know that you were actually doing CRM. We see shades of this approach in my current debate with Daniel.

It is Popper's fixation on CRM as overarching grand theory, one applicable to every case and every discipline, that sometimes imparts a cult-like quality to his followers, who will twist and turn to show how every type of valid reasoning is ultimately a variant of CRM.

I may have simplified matters a bit here, but not by much.

Ghs

[Ellen Stuttle]

Permit me to interject some common sense here:

Why do we generalize that dirt is bad to eat on the basis of a few samples? Upon eating dirt as children, did we merely think, in effect: This dirt is bad; that dirt is bad; therefore all dirt is bad? No, we did not merely enumerate instances. Rather, after a few samples, we thought, "This stuff is dirt, and it is not good to eat. So when I encounter other samples of the same kind , I will know that it is also dirt and not fit to eat." In other words, we made a conceptual identification of the substance we call "dirt" and rationally concluded that other substances with the same nature will have the same negative effects.

Permit me to interject some child-rearing reality

How many children conclude that dirt isn't a good thing to eat on the basis of experience?

What are adult guardians for?

Ellen

[Ellen Stuttle]

I don't think it's an outright contradiction -- which is why I chose "at variance" as the wording. It doesn't "jibe," since "induction" and "deduction" typically refer to formal logical methods using propositional logic.

I think it's quite silly to expect Rand to constrain her terminology in such a manner. Perhaps about as silly as formal logic methods. I think she added an interesting and insightful angle with those remarks and am glad you didn't have final editorial authority.

Shayne

I think she led to troubles that might never get straightened out with O'ists going down garden paths and looking like idiots to, and being antagonistic toward, just the folks with whom they should be allies -- i.e., those left who are real scientists.

Ellen

[sjw]

I don't think it's an outright contradiction -- which is why I chose "at variance" as the wording. It doesn't "jibe," since "induction" and "deduction" typically refer to formal logical methods using propositional logic.

I think it's quite silly to expect Rand to constrain her terminology in such a manner. Perhaps about as silly as formal logic methods. I think she added an interesting and insightful angle with those remarks and am glad you didn't have final editorial authority.

Shayne

I think she led to troubles that might never get straightened out with O'ists going down garden paths and looking like idiots to, and being antagonistic toward, just the folks with whom they should be allies -- i.e., those left who are real scientists.

Ellen

She should write assuming the audience is independent and intelligent, not assuming some idiot is going to take something the wrong way.

Shayne

[George H. Smith]

Permit me to interject some common sense here:

Why do we generalize that dirt is bad to eat on the basis of a few samples? Upon eating dirt as children, did we merely think, in effect: This dirt is bad; that dirt is bad; therefore all dirt is bad? No, we did not merely enumerate instances. Rather, after a few samples, we thought, "This stuff is dirt, and it is not good to eat. So when I encounter other samples of the same kind , I will know that it is also dirt and not fit to eat." In other words, we made a conceptual identification of the substance we call "dirt" and rationally concluded that other substances with the same nature will have the same negative effects.

Permit me to interject some child-rearing reality

How many children conclude that dirt isn't a good thing to eat on the basis of experience?

What are adult guardians for?

Ellen

This is obviously a hypothetical example; any number of similar examples could be used. Daniel had no problem with the example, so I stayed with it.

That's quite an eye for essentials that you have there....

Ghs

[Ellen Stuttle]

I don't think it's an outright contradiction -- which is why I chose "at variance" as the wording. It doesn't "jibe," since "induction" and "deduction" typically refer to formal logical methods using propositional logic.

I think it's quite silly to expect Rand to constrain her terminology in such a manner. Perhaps about as silly as formal logic methods. I think she added an interesting and insightful angle with those remarks and am glad you didn't have final editorial authority.

Shayne

I think she led to troubles that might never get straightened out with O'ists going down garden paths and looking like idiots to, and being antagonistic toward, just the folks with whom they should be allies -- i.e., those left who are real scientists.

Ellen

She should write assuming the audience is independent and intelligent, not assuming some idiot is going to take something the wrong way.

Shayne

I think she should write in a way that makes as clear as she can what she means. If she's going to use "induction" and "deduction" in a non-technical way in a work on epistemology, then she should say how she's using these terms instead of leaving people legitimately wondering what she does mean. After many ponderings of the passage over many years, I still don't know which of two alternate meanings she meant, and I don't consider myself an idiot -- although of course you're welcome to a contrary opinion.

Ellen

[Daniel Barnes]

Permit me to interject some child-rearing reality

How many children conclude that dirt isn't a good thing to eat on the basis of experience?

What are adult guardians for?

Ellen

I've raised three so far, it's actually pretty hard to stop 'em. The contents of the sandpit become the contents of the diapers without fail...;-)

Also, as a side issue, adult guardians of one sort or another also regularly teach children the meanings of words - a fact not much dwelt upon in the theory of concept formation, despite its common occurrence.

Edited September 9, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[sjw]

I think she should write in a way that makes as clear as she can what she means. If she's going to use "induction" and "deduction" in a non-technical way in a work on epistemology, then she should say how she's using these terms instead of leaving people legitimately wondering what she does mean. After many ponderings of the passage over many years, I still don't know which of two alternate meanings she meant, and I don't consider myself an idiot -- although of course you're welcome to a contrary opinion.

It's less important what she meant than that it stimulated your thought about the issue. No I don't consider you an idiot.

Shayne

[Xray]

Stolen concept arguments, in substance if not in name, have been common throughout the history of philosophy. In the 20th century they were especially popular among ordinary language philosophers. Perhaps the most famous argument along these lines is Aristotle's remark that anyone who denies the Law of Non-Contradiction reduces himself to the cognitive status of a vegetable.

Ghs

The stolen concept always makes me laugh. It is my pet O'ist term - it sounds so, so full of suspense, like the title of a detective story "The Mystery of the Stolen Concept".

But looking for 'whodunit' will pose certain problems: since no one can "own" concepts, the idea that they can be stolen always makes me laugh.

If person X uses an audiovisual symbol with a connotation person Y does not happen to agree with, this makes X no linguistic "thief".

Would you please give some examples of what you think are stolen concepts? The Artistotle example is not convincing imo. For where do you see any of 'conceptual theft' in a denial of the "Law of Non-contradiction"?

Edited September 10, 2010 by Xray

[kiaer.ts]

Stolen concept arguments, in substance if not in name, have been common throughout the history of philosophy. In the 20th century they were especially popular among ordinary language philosophers. Perhaps the most famous argument along these lines is Aristotle's remark that anyone who denies the Law of Non-Contradiction reduces himself to the cognitive status of a vegetable.

Ghs

The stolen concept always makes me laugh. It is my pet O'ist term - it sounds so, so full of suspense, like the title of a detective story "The Mystery of the Stolen Concept".

But looking for 'whodunit' will pose certain problems: since no one can "own" concepts, the idea that they can be stolen always makes me laugh.

If person X uses an audiovisual symbol with a connotation person Y does not happen to agree with, this makes X no lingisticic "thief".

Woud you please give some examples of what you think are stolen concepts? The Artistotle example is not convincing imo. For where do you see any of 'conceptual theft' in a denial of the Law of non-contradiction?

Are you saying that you cannot explain what a stolen concept is in your own words?

[George H. Smith]

Stolen concept arguments, in substance if not in name, have been common throughout the history of philosophy. In the 20th century they were especially popular among ordinary language philosophers. Perhaps the most famous argument along these lines is Aristotle's remark that anyone who denies the Law of Non-Contradiction reduces himself to the cognitive status of a vegetable.

Ghs

The stolen concept always makes me laugh. It is my pet O'ist term - it sounds so, so full of suspense, like the title of a detective story "The Mystery of the Stolen Concept".

But looking for 'whodunit' will pose certain problems: since no one can "own" concepts, the idea that they can be stolen always makes me laugh.

If person X uses an audiovisual symbol with a connotation person Y does not happen to agree with, this makes X no linguistic "thief".

Would you please give some examples of what you think are stolen concepts? The Aristotle example is not convincing imo. For where do you see any of 'conceptual theft' in a denial of the "Law of Non-contradiction"?

Do you really think that the Stolen Concept Argument has something to do with individuals "owning" concepts? People who take metaphors literally always make me laugh.

Read NB's article "The Stolen Concept" in The Objectivist Newsletter (Jan. 1963).

I also have a lengthy discussion of the Stolen Concept in ATCAG (Chapter 5, "The Skepticism of Faith), where I give many examples. Here is a brief summary from p. 140:

To say that the skeptic commits the Fallacy of the Stolen Concept is to say that the skeptic "steals" concepts to which he has no epistemological right. The skeptic presents an argument which, if valid, would undercut the logical foundations that the skeptic himself must use in presenting the argument. Most skeptical arguments cannot be maintained with presupposing the truth of that which they are attempting to invalidate, which forces the skeptic into the mire of self-contradiction.

I quoted John Hospers regarding the argument that the laws of logic are verbal conventions:

If the principles of logic weren't already true before you established any verbal conventions, you couldn't even establish any conventions. If a convention could also be a non-convention, what would it mean to say that it was a convention after all? Don't you see how the truth of the principle [of non-contradiction] is presupposed in the very attempt to say anything at all -- whether about conventions or about anything else? Reality lays down these First Principles....If we don't follow them, we talk nonsense.

Aristotle's point about the Law of Non-Contradiction was essentially as follows: This principle states that a proposition cannot be both true and false (at the same time and in the same respect). To deny this principle is to claim that the proposition is false. But if the Law of Non-Contradiction is false, then it can also be true, and to utter propositions that can be both truth and false (at the same time an in the same respect) is to speak nonsense. The person who denies the Law of Non-Contradiction is therefore reduced to the cognitive status of a vegetable who can say nothing intelligible whatsoever.

The stolen "concept" in the vegetable argument is the Law of Non-Contradiction. Anyone who claims that a proposition is true must presuppose the truth of the Law of Non-Contradiction in order for his assertion to have meaning.

Got it?

Ghs

[Xray]

Are you saying that you cannot explain what a stolen concept is in your own words?

What Rand says in ITOE about the stolen concept can hardly be called enlightening imo. She is quick to rant about those who allegedly apply "stolen concepts", but mostly fails to provide examples together with an analysis.

ITOE, p. 214: "Only in regard to issues as the "stolen concept", where somebody will claim that some concept exists while denying the concept on which it depends." (Rand )

No examples given for illustration purposes, and therefore no analyis of anything.

But maybe you can shed light on the matter by providing an example which we are then going to analyze?

Do you really think that the Stolen Concept Argument has something to do with individuals "owning" concepts?

Of course not. I deliberately transferred Rand's metaphor to the concrete realm to get the comic effect I wanted in order to point out the absurd premise underlying the idea of a "stolen concept".

People who take metaphors literally always make me laugh.

Me too. The comic effect was intentional.

Read NB's article "The Stolen Concept" in The Objectivist Newsletter (Jan. 1963).

I have read it a good while ago and commented on it here on OL if memory serves.

"All property is theft" may be a mere value judgement based on an unjust generalization, but where does epistemology kick in? When you consider the issue radically enough, a good deal of "property" was (and is) indeed based on theft. Just think of the "conquests" in history. And what please is "rightfully" owned? Who has the "right" to land for example? Those who have populated the area for milleniums like eg. g. native Americans or the conquerors who took it from them and then declared themselves the rightful owners?

So you see that the proposition "All property is theft" can lead to political and ideological debates, but it is no epistemological issue; as for linguistics, all one needs to know is that the speaker indicates what he/she connotes with the term "property". That is all there is to it. A proposition like e. g. "Capitalism is always beneficial" would be on the same level.

I also have a lengthy discussion of the Stolen Concept in ATCAG (Chapter 5, "The Skepticism of Faith), where I give many examples. Here is a brief summary from p. 140:

"To say that the skeptic commits the Fallacy of the Stolen Concept is to say that the skeptic "steals" concepts to which he has no epistemological right. The skeptic presents an argument which, if valid, would undercut the logical foundations that the skeptic himself must use in presenting the argument. Most skeptical arguments cannot be maintained with presupposing the truth of that which they are attempting to invalidate, which forces the skeptic into the mire of self-contradiction."

I just looked up the chapter myself and will discuss it in detail later. I'm not at all sure if the skeptic's position is as fallacious as you present it.

Imo the very characteristic of skeptical arguments is that they don't presuppose the truth of that which they are attempting to invalidate.

Aristotle's point about the Law of Non-Contradiction was essentially as follows: This principle states that a proposition cannot be both true and false (at the same time and in the same respect). To deny this principle is to claim that the proposition is false. But if the Law of Non-Contradiction is false, then it can also be true, and to utter propositions that can be both truth and false (at the same time an in the same respect) is to speak nonsense. The person who denies the Law of Non-Contradiction is therefore reduced to the cognitive status of a vegetable who can say nothing intelligible whatsoever.

The stolen "concept" in the vegetable argument is the Law of Non-Contradiction. Anyone who claims that a proposition is true must presuppose the truth of the Law of Non-Contradiction in order for his assertion to have meaning.

Got it?

Ghs

George, I think it is you who has not got it here. For who denies the law of non-contradiction calls that law into question. So a person denying the law makes clear that he/she does not think of non-contradiction as absolutely essential in philosophy.

Eastern philosophy for example is not focused that much on "either-or", but also allows "both - and".

Rand's hunt for "stolen concepts" led her to assert that some vile philosophers actually regard "nothing" as a thing, "as a special, different kind of existent." (ITOE, p. 60)

She quotes Heidegger who wrote "Das Nichts nichtet or "Nothing noughts". (ITOE, P. 60)

Can't blame Rand for ridiculing it. But imo her "Consciousness is conscious" sounds every bit as strange.

Imagine a debate between Heidegger and Rand had taken place: "Mr. Nothing Noughts versus Miss Consciousness is Conscious" - wouldn't that have been a good title for an article in a philosophical magazine? ;)

Edited September 10, 2010 by Xray