Can morality be objective?

[Xray]

Why not? He does achieve his purpose, doesn't he? It may not be good for his health, but was Rational Rand's heavy smoking good for her health?

Rand quit smoking when she was confronted with objective evidence that smoking was damaging her health. You can make the argument that she was guilty of evasion for many years, but she eventually came to the rational conclusion.

Rand had "rationally" downplayed the dangers of smoking in all the years before.

Does one have to make the experience of running into a truck first to then come to the 'rational' conclusion that it is dangerous?

Interesting that she did not want the public to know why she had stopped smoking. Was it because she could not admit she had been wrong?

Her decision to smoke and how much was her own business, but it looks like she advocated smoking to her followers as a value to be sought.

Dragonfly: And who decides what are the "proper" ends? Are these the ends you happen to agree with?

John Day: Reality decides. The rational man survives and flourishes. The irrational man is wiped out, unless he receives assistance from the rational man (or steals from him).

'Reality' can't decide. People decide.

And if it were true that "the rational man survives and flourishes", no one would ever have been imprisoned or killed for stating unwelcome truths.

Bill P:

If you want to be taken seriously, you will do better if you don't engage in such amazing distortion and misunderstanding of rather clear statements.

Imo "life is a value to be bought" makes no sense, hence my ironic comment about it.

If you think I'm in error, then please give me an illustrative example of the transaction of "buying the value life" with "thinking as the only coin noble to buy it". How does one go about it?

Edited December 25, 2009 by Xray

[BaalChatzaf]

Ever since Socrates (nearly 2300 years now) morality has been defined in a social context. Has the mass of thinking men been deluded all these years? Why all of a sudden is Ayn Rand right and the rest of the human race wrong? She simply made some blunt assertions and never offered any empirical evidence to support her view on morality. Some of Ayn Rand's views do not hold up under empirical scrutiny. In particular, her view of morality.

Bob Kolker

What is the significance of it when you sign your real name as opposed to your screen name?

Brain fart.

[Alfonso Jones]

Bill P:

If you want to be taken seriously, you will do better if you don't engage in such amazing distortion and misunderstanding of rather clear statements.

Imo "life is a value to be bought" makes no sense, hence my ironic comment about it.

If you think I'm in error, then please give me an illustrative example of the transaction of "buying the value life" with "thinking as the only coin noble to buy it". How does one go about it?

You would do better to be serious. This flippancy from you isn't earning you credibility. Many gave you, for a long time, the benefit of the doubt. That's the nature of the OL community. But more and more seem to be seeing right through you.

I urge you: come back to planet earth. The occasionally serious questions you ask (accidentally or on purpose? Impossible to know, given the number of ridiculous questions such as the one above.) have been thoroughly addressed. If you were actually interested in a discussion you would respond in a meaningful way.

But we're still waiting on that sort of response from you. With declining expectation that you will ever respond meaningfully.

Bill P

[Xray]

Bill P:

If you want to be taken seriously, you will do better if you don't engage in such amazing distortion and misunderstanding of rather clear statements.

Imo "life is a value to be bought" makes no sense, hence my ironic comment about it.

If you think I'm in error, then please give me an illustrative example of the transaction of "buying the value life" with "thinking as the only coin noble to buy it". How does one go about it?

You would do better to be serious. This flippancy from you isn't earning you credibility. Many gave you, for a long time, the benefit of the doubt. That's the nature of the OL community. But more and more seem to be seeing right through you.

I urge you: come back to planet earth. The occasionally serious questions you ask (accidentally or on purpose? Impossible to know, given the number of ridiculous questions such as the one above.) have been thoroughly addressed. If you were actually interested in a discussion you would respond in a meaningful way.

But we're still waiting on that sort of response from you. With declining expectation that you will ever respond meaningfully.

Bill P

Who does that collective "we" refer to? You make it appear as if everyone here held the same thoughts.

'Morality' is based on a set of values. I am by no means the only one who has stated here at OL that values are subjective.

If you read this thread, you will come across substantial criticism (not only by me) of Galt's idea what constitues morality. Why don't you adress that criticism as well?

I asked you to give me an example of "buying life as value".

If you think Rand's statements make sense, why not explain it here to me and all those to whom it makes no sense either?

Or do you just "feel" that Rand must be right?

Edited December 25, 2009 by Xray

[Alfonso Jones]

Bill P:

If you want to be taken seriously, you will do better if you don't engage in such amazing distortion and misunderstanding of rather clear statements.

Imo "life is a value to be bought" makes no sense, hence my ironic comment about it.

If you think I'm in error, then please give me an illustrative example of the transaction of "buying the value life" with "thinking as the only coin noble to buy it". How does one go about it?

You would do better to be serious. This flippancy from you isn't earning you credibility. Many gave you, for a long time, the benefit of the doubt. That's the nature of the OL community. But more and more seem to be seeing right through you.

I urge you: come back to planet earth. The occasionally serious questions you ask (accidentally or on purpose? Impossible to know, given the number of ridiculous questions such as the one above.) have been thoroughly addressed. If you were actually interested in a discussion you would respond in a meaningful way.

But we're still waiting on that sort of response from you. With declining expectation that you will ever respond meaningfully.

Bill P

Who does is that collective "we" refer to? You make it appear as if everyone here held the same thoughts.

'Morality' is based on a set of values. I am by no means the only one who has stated here at OL that values are subjective.

If you read this thread, you will come across substantial criticism (not only by me) of Galt's idea what constitues morality. Why don't you adress that criticism as well?

I asked you to give me an example of "buying life as value".

If you think Rand's statements make sense, why not explain it here to me and all those to whom it makes no sense either?

Or do you just "feel" that Rand must be right?

Xray -

Let us know if you ever decide to return to planet earth and discuss meaningfully. That time has obviously yet to arrive.

Bill P

[anthony]

"...life is a value to be bought, and that thinking is the only coin noble enough to buy it."

I like most of Rand's metaphorical illustrations in her novels, and even the ones that I thought a little 'labored' are enjoyable and original.

OK, so the "coin" is thought. Galt says (implicitly) that human life is not merely automatic - it is a personal aspiration, that must be identified first, and then firmly grasped and retained, constantly and consistently, all through rational thought.

A high value, the highest, not just of existing, but of 'flourishing', requires a large payment of that "coin".

This is what I read into this, (granted, with add-ons from other O'ist sources.)

Xray, imo there isn't an "example" to give of this; it is the most fundamental action man or woman can take, and precedes all other actions.

Tony

[Brant Gaede]

If all moralities are subjective you cannot know that without objective criteria. With these you can make an objective morality. In fact you have to have one to know the others aren't. Is Xray amoral? She is claiming her own morality is also subjective value preference. However, how can she know that any other one is also subjective rather than truly objective? She can't so she starts with an implicit, artificial axiom of subjectivity. Ergo, without examining all moralities she can claim via mere asseveration that objective morality does not and cannot exist also solving the problem of induction. If she were honest she would search out what is right and what is wrong and why with reference of course to human beings and human being. Human beings have objective characteristics and those demand objective morality. Do they demand subjective morality? Or do those characteristics slip and slide one day to the next? Today fish, tomorrow plant, today after tomorrow dog?

--Brant

objective morality is a work in progress

[Brant Gaede]

Morality is the foundation of the scientific method. Objectivity demands objectivity. Right demands truth; truth demands reason, reason demands reality. Reality is indifferent.

--Brant

Edited December 26, 2009 by Brant Gaede

[Xray]

In his # 1 post on this thread, Christopher has offered definitions of "objective" and "subjective" which can provide a frame of reference for the discussion.

It looks like Christopher intends to prove that "objective morality" exists. Before getting into the "proof", let's look at a simple example:

A large bucket of water is dumped on a small wood fire. The fire is extinguished. If the fire is threatening to ignite and burn down a valued house and you want the threat removed, the action is suited to this purpose, therefore, called good. If the intent is to cook with the fire, the action is unsuited to the purpose, therefore, is called bad.

Same entities. Same action. Same end result. Cause and effect are the objective constants. Purpose is the subjective variable; meaning, whether the result of putting out the fire is called good or bad is in reference to personal preference. Or to put it another way, good or bad refers to the evaluation of means (suited/unsuited) with respect to a subjectively chosen purpose. (The terms, 'good' and 'bad' could be eliminated altogether since they are the same as saying suited/unsuited to personal preference).

This leaves the designation of an action or reaction as 'good' or 'bad' dependent upon volition and valuing or disvaluing.

(Christopher): "I have engaged in several discussions in which people argue that any moral assertion must be subjective. I disagree, and (to put it succinctly) here's why:

The basis for claiming that morality is always subjective stems from two main points:

1. Morality necessarily reflects an evaluation of good and bad

2. Morality is dependent on volitional choice"

If Christopher intends to prove that morality is objective, the first order of business is to define the term, morality. He did not do this. He speaks of what "morality reflects", but does not say what "morality" is.

According to Webster’s, morality is: "conformity to ideals of right human conduct"

How is one to judge what is moral or immoral without knowing the "ideals of right human conduct"? What are these "ideals?" Just exactly how and by whom is the "right human conduct" determined? Right for what? Suited to what purpose? What is the volitional source of this purpose? Can there be purpose without a volitional source? If so, how? Value without a valuer?

Christopher has not even tried to define the operative premise(s).

C: "Morality is dependent on volitional choice"

Christopher now has "morality" connected to volition and choice. How is he going to get from variable choice to a fixed "objective morality"? If morality is a matter of volition and choice, it cannot be objective.

C: Are "good" and "bad" always subjective, always separate from the objective universe even in the absence of volition?

What kind of question is that? Looks like a floating abstraction. He didn’t define the term, morality, nor the terms, good and bad. Once again, he acts like good and bad exist in and of themselves with no connection to anything to be designated as good or bad. Now he speaks of "good and bad" in "the absence of volition".

C:: They sure seem to be subjective in that every living organism has a unique perspective of what is good and what is bad.”

Didn’t he just say, "Morality is dependent on volitional choice"?

Is he now saying that all organisms are volitional? Now we have "moral or immoral" plants?

If he is not equating "good and bad" with "moral and immoral", what is his equation? Is he now saying that "good and bad" are something apart from "moral and immoral?"

It looks like a premise is stated, then dropped with no notice of obvious contradiction.

C: " In fact, referencing the definition of objective (#4) below, anything that is not independent of the observer is not objective...."

"4. of or pertaining to something that can be known, or to something that is an object or a part of an object; existing independent of thought or an observer as part of reality."

He presents an actual definition of 'objective'.

In other words, existing independent of mind; immutable and not subject to alteration by mind. So, by Christopher’s own words and correct definition of the term, objective, value judgements, certainly dependent on mind, cannot be definitively called objective. So, the whole "objective value" thing goes down the drain.

Now Christopher tries to get away from his own conclusion:

C: ... Yet, per the definition of subjective (#1), simple biological evaluations are not necessarily subjective either. The twist I believe ultimately arises from whether or not we consider life to be part of "reality."

1. existing in the mind; belonging to the thinking subject rather than to the object of thought (opposed to objective ).

Finally, here from an "Objectivist" is a definition of the term, objective, AND a definition of the term, subjective, "as opposed to objective"

In short, objective = independent of mind and subjective = dependent on mind.

Christopher, having scuttled the idea of objective value, now tries to escape his own conclusion:

"The twist I believe ultimately arises from whether or not we consider life to be part of "reality." (Christopher)

If "life" is not considered a part of reality, what is there left to say?

Isn't Christopher pulling the rug from under his feet by injecting this variable into his own argumentation?

Christopher has looked truth right into the face, but imo he runs away from it again because it might conflict with objectivist doctrine.

Does he want to avoid the truth by the absurdity that there is a self-negating "twist" to make wrong what he has set forth as right?

What on earth are "biological evaluations?" I understand evaluations and valuations OF the biological, but "biological evaluations????" Non volitional "automatic values" again?

C: If we choose to divorce life from the matter upon which life exists, if we choose to say that life is not part of the factual universe, then the products of life (such as automatic evaluations) are indeed subjective....

"Automatic evaluations" are not subjective. They are non existent.

And what does "choose to divorce life from the matter upon which life exists" mean?

Does he think subjective choice alters objective reality?

Edited December 27, 2009 by Xray

[Brant Gaede]

Right or wrong is what we should be talking about, not subjective/objective. The basis of individualism is the thinking that goes on in an individual brain. From that comes moral choice. Wrong is the interjection of physical force which traduces that choice. That is why freedom is right, basically, and everything else socially speaking, wrong. This is the objective basis of morality and also why it is so easy to say all moralities are subjective because it is subjective moralities that make or let the bad guys go. We live in a sea of subjectivism and force initiation. It is disingenuous to state that therefore objective values, objective morality and by implication political freedom are ipso facto impossible. Disingenuous and a profound giving up to things that are as opposed to fighting for things that should be.

--Brant

[Selene]

Right or wrong is what we should be talking about, not subjective/objective. The basis of individualism is the thinking that goes on in an individual brain. From that comes moral choice. Wrong is the interjection of physical force which traduces that choice. That is why freedom is right, basically, and everything else socially speaking, wrong. This is the objective basis of morality and also why it is so easy to say all moralities are subjective because it is subjective moralities that make or let the bad guys go. We live in a sea of subjectivism and force initiation. It is disingenuous to state that therefore objective values, objective morality and by implication political freedom are ipso facto impossible. Disingenuous and a profound giving up to things that are as opposed to fighting for things that should be.

--Brant

Precisely.

For example, in the following example, the results of the action are not "good" or "bad", but effective or ineffective. The goal was to save the house. It is either effective or not. The goal was to cook. It is either effective or not.

"A large bucket of water is dumped on a small wood fire. The fire is extinguished. If the fire is threatening to ignite and burn down a valued house and you want the threat removed, the action is suited to this purpose, therefore, called good. If the intent is to cook with the fire, the action is unsuited to the purpose, therefore, is called bad."

Good and bad do not enter into Ms. Xray's example as she stated the example.

Adam

[Xray]

For example, in the following example, the results of the action are not "good" or "bad", but effective or ineffective. The goal was to save the house. It is either effective or not. The goal was to cook. It is either effective or not.

"A large bucket of water is dumped on a small wood fire. The fire is extinguished. If the fire is threatening to ignite and burn down a valued house and you want the threat removed, the action is suited to this purpose, therefore, called good. If the intent is to cook with the fire, the action is unsuited to the purpose, therefore, is called bad."

Good and bad do not enter into Ms. Xray's example as she stated the example.

Your point being? The result (extinguished fire) is deemed "good" from the perspective of the person whose goal it is to save the house. It is not the goal which is "effective/ineffective", it's the actions performed to reach it which are either effective or ineffective.

Edited December 27, 2009 by Xray

[Xray]

Therefore, if morality is structured upon a pro-life foundation (such as Objectivism) aimed at maximizing the health and survival of the organism, then moral evaluations are indeed objective.

The issue is morality, not biology.

But if you insist, just put that Objectivist premise to the test with some examples, and see how far it will take you.

"Pro-life foundation" as a criterion for morality? Then everyone practicing contraception would be immoral since this clearly does not 'promote life'. That's what the Catholic church has been preaching all along - somewhat amusing, isn't it? This example was just for starters.

What is completely missing in Rand's idea of morality are empathy, kindness and consideration. It looks like these concepts are not in her psychological makeup.

Empathy is the ability to project self into the psychological/emotional position of another individual.

With Rand, I have the impression that her sole evaluation of another individual was based on "intelligence", "heroic intelligence."

"Morality" in this mind is reserved for:

"The standard of value of the Objectivist ethics—the standard by which one judges what is good or evil—is man's life, or: that which is required for man's survival qua man." (Rand)

"Since reason is man's basic means of survival, that which is proper to the life of a rational being is the good; that which negates, opposes or destroys it is the evil. Since everything man needs has to be discovered by his own mind and produced by his own effort, the two essentials of the method of survival proper to a rational being are: thinking and productive work." (Rand)

Rand has a fixation on her belief in the abstract, "ideal man", i.e., "man qua man." "Morality" is whatever she feels embraces and promotes this ideal. Other individuals do not enter into, nor are contemplated in, this personal mental realm.

Edited December 27, 2009 by Xray

[Selene]

Ms. Xray:

Once again, it is impossible to get past the first point you ineptly fail to make.

"To these organisms, heat is "good" (pro-life) and cold is "bad" (anti-life)."

"Pro-life foundation" as a criterion for morality? Then everyone practicing contraception would be immoral since this clearly does not 'promote life'. That's what the Catholic church has been preaching all along - somewhat amusing, isn't it?

You steal a phrase, "pro-life" and the author's intent that "pro-life" is the "standard" of morality, then you transpose the phrase "pro-life" into a reductio ad absurdum criticism of the christian anti abortion concept and then somehow bringing it to a contraception as being anti pro-life is proof to me that you should not be allowed to teach any six (6) year old ever.

Apparently, you are not worthy of contributing to this forum in a constructive manner. Why would you intentionally distort what Chris advanced?

Adam

[Christopher]

Rationality is not just used to decide how to achieve an end, a rational man has to determine what the proper ends are to begin with.

I really like this point.

It kind of reminds me about the whole discussion of ways to define morality. Seems to me that ultimately, ultimately... morality is an assertion regarding a set of internal experiences. We humans can clearly differentiate between moral intuitions, social-normative intuitions, and personal preferences. Each intuition feels distinctly different:

Is it ok to kill? No... why? Morals

Is it ok to take food before everyone is sitting down? No... why? Social etiquette

Is pink the best color in the whole wide world? Yes... why? Personal preference

So somewhere at the core of all things that initiate moral experiences, we have something. That something is what we mean by morality. Since it is an inborn psychological process, logically we must assume that the roots of morality are based in evolution. Even if expressions of moral behavior vary culture to culture, the moral experience itself remains.

Whereas some philosophies (religions) have attempted to deal with morality by compiling individual moral experiences into a codex - seems rather subjective -, Rand's view is more along the lines of rational structuring of what morality could/should be.

We also recognize that we all on this forum are able to believe that Rand's views on morality do feel moral, and we should assume that Rand probably felt her views were moral as well. Therefore, there exists an intersection of (1) the probable logical origin of moral intuition, (2) Rand's philosophy, and (3) our own internal experiences. So when people claim that Rand's vision of morality is equally arbitrary as other moral definitions, well no... that's not really true. Many other moral codes lack an intersection with science and evolution. Therefore, other moral codes have a subjective tint inherent in what the authors of those codes believed.

Christopher

[Brant Gaede]

Rationality is not just used to decide how to achieve an end, a rational man has to determine what the proper ends are to begin with.

I really like this point.

It kind of reminds me about the whole discussion of ways to define morality. Seems to me that ultimately, ultimately... morality is an assertion regarding a set of internal experiences. We humans can clearly differentiate between moral intuitions, social-normative intuitions, and personal preferences. Each intuition feels distinctly different:

Is it ok to kill? No... why? Morals

Is it ok to take food before everyone is sitting down? No... why? Social etiquette

Is pink the best color in the whole wide world? Yes... why? Personal preference

So somewhere at the core of all things that initiate moral experiences, we have something. That something is what we mean by morality. Since it is an inborn psychological process, logically we must assume that the roots of morality are based in evolution. Even if expressions of moral behavior vary culture to culture, the moral experience itself remains.

Whereas some philosophies (religions) have attempted to deal with morality by compiling individual moral experiences into a codex - seems rather subjective -, Rand's view is more along the lines of rational structuring of what morality could/should be.

We also recognize that we all on this forum are able to believe that Rand's views on morality do feel moral, and we should assume that Rand probably felt her views were moral as well. Therefore, there exists an intersection of (1) the probable logical origin of moral intuition, (2) Rand's philosophy, and (3) our own internal experiences. So when people claim that Rand's vision of morality is equally arbitrary as other moral definitions, well no... that's not really true. Many other moral codes lack an intersection with science and evolution. Therefore, other moral codes have a subjective tint inherent in what the authors of those codes believed.

Christopher

This seems to be something of a mixture of Xray and Robt. Campbell. "Moral experiences" begs the question of right and wrong and why. If there is no or can be no objective morality there is no Objectivism.

--Brant

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Christopher,

Be careful with terminology. Morality for Rand entailed conceptual volition. It is "a code of values to guide man's actions," but within the context that those actions are motivated by concepts and choices. (She defined man as a "rational animal," which to her included conceptual volition.)

The idea of moral intuition belongs to a different meaning of morality. There might be points of intersection between what you are talking about and Rand's meaning, but essentially it is a different animal.

Incidentally, that the part you are talking about is what I call man's mental nature—the prewired stuff, like affects (which later become emotions). The capacity to feel guilt, for instance, feels a lot like morality and influences people to do stuff that over time can become traditional within a culture, but guilt and these traditions are ultimately elements to take into account when devising an ethical code in Rand's sense. They are not the actual code until formalized according to an identifiable standard (man's nature, God, society, or whatever).

By a stretch, a seemingly causeless tradition (say a gesture of atonement, like not eating a certain food in a particular situation, that started with an act long since forgotten) could be used as such a standard, but it would be a stretch. This would be more properly identified as a social habit than something belonging to a code of values.

People do it because it was always done, but if someone does not do it, there is a feeling of wrongness pattern-wise, but not a sense of committing evil.

Back to the mind's underbelly (the stuff you and I like). Unfortunately, Rand did not have too high a regard for the prewired stuff in the subconscious, believing that you could reprogram just about everything with your conscious mind. And she flat-out denied that humans have instincts (see "instinct" in the Lexicon for example). This was by proclamation, too. There is a lot of scientific evidence to the contrary.

Fortunately, these positions did not invalidate the code she devised. But they did cause gaps that need filling.

Also, we often need to scrap Rand's scope to keep the good stuff. At least I do to maintain logical validity, given my own premises. But I don't see that as bad since her good stuff is really, really good.

Michael

[BaalChatzaf]

By a stretch, a seemingly causeless tradition (say a gesture of atonement, like not eating a certain food in a particular situation, that started with an act long since forgotten) could be used as such a standard, but it would be a stretch. This would be more properly identified as a social habit than something belonging to a code of values.

People do it because it was always done, but if someone does not do it, there is a feeling of wrongness pattern-wise, but not a sense of committing evil.

Back to the mind's underbelly (the stuff you and I like). Unfortunately, Rand did not have too high a regard for the prewired stuff in the subconscious, believing that you could reprogram just about everything with your conscious mind. And she flat-out denied that humans have instincts (see "instinct" in the Lexicon for example). This was by proclamation, too. There is a lot of scientific evidence to the contrary.

I have a feeling the Ayn Rand would have objected strongly to the writings of Steven Pinker (-The Blank Slate-, -The Language Instinct-), had she lived long enough to read and understand them. But Pinker makes a better case for "pre-wired" capacities than Rand made against them.

You are onto something here. There is a component of morality that is genetically "wired in" to members of our species and to some extent to other primate species (Bonobo's for example). It is not morality, but it is the stuff out of which morality emerges. I believe it has been sufficiently shown that no moral code is predetermined logically or biologically by this genetic predisposition (that is why there are so many moral codes) any more than any specific language is predetermined by the genetic disposition to speech and language (see Pinker -The Language Instinct-). Virtually all of mankind blabbers away in the various tongues and language develops at just about the same stage in overall development in humans in all lands, in all "races", over all of human time (some 150,000 to 250,000) years. We are born to blabber. We are also born with a general tendency to develop cannons of fairness, at least with the people in our kins, families and tribes.

So yes, there is a biological disposition to be moral according to some code and canon, but the specific content of morality is partly and matter of chance and partly a matter of situation in which a human family grows up and partly a matter of environmental circumstance. The morality of grain growers is somewhat different than the morality of hunters. The prior tends to be propertarian and the latter tends to co-operative effort and sharing. Hunters were "socialistic" in the sense no one hunter could reasonably expect to take down large animals and feed his children all on his own effort.

Thus there are constraints on morality that are biological and develop in interaction with the local environment (hence physical). To that extent morality is objective.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[anonrobt]

There is another aspect regarding morals developments -

TWO WORLD VIEWS - THE TAKING AND TRADING SYNDROMES

Jane Jacobs, in Systems of Survival, points out that there are only two methods of survival. In addition, she points out that humans are unique in possessing both -- all other animals have only one. The first method is the one common to all animals, the agonic way of responding to strangers: to take what is wanted -- just simply to take it, depending, of course, on not only what is available to be taken, but on the difficulty in obtaining it. The second method is the unique one of humans: the capacity of being able to trade -- to exchange goods and services for other goods and services, depending again, on what is available. This method is unique -- it is non-coercive, with trading done by voluntary agreement, with mutual assent. Indeed, that is the central essence of trading, and the trading mentality. There is yet another aspect to note -- it is the other major expression of the eccentricity of the aquatic ape, for it is an expression of dealing as equals, more or less, and not as members of a hierarchy. Which is to say trading is done, primarily, individual to individual.

These two methods of survival are, as Jacobs notes, fundamentally different outlooks on life. As such, they have profoundly different consequences. Originating in very different contexts, these outlooks each evolved into a set of syndromes that encompass a whole range of notions congruent with each particular view of the world. To better understand these syndromes, I list their components as Jacobs has them -- along with, in parentheses, addenda of my own.

The Trading Syndrome [individualist virtues]

Shun force

Come to voluntary agreements

Be honest

Collaborate easily with strangers

Compete

Respect contracts

Use initiative and enterprise

Be open to inventiveness and novelty

Be efficient

Promote comfort and convenience

Dissent for the sake of the task

Invest for productive purposes

Be industrious

Be thrifty

Be optimistic

The Taking Syndrome [Tribal virtues]

Shun trading

Exert prowess

Be obedient and disciplined

Adhere to tradition

Respect hierarchy

Be loyal

Take vengeance

Deceive for the sake of the task

Make rich use of leisure

Be ostentatious

Dispense largesse

Be exclusive

Show fortitude

Be fatalistic

Treasure honor

These are lists of virtues that Jacobs found were esteemed throughout the centuries, moral precepts beyond those considered as universal in all walks of life. These precepts were divided this way because specific ones were observed to be repeatedly associated with others -- consider, for instance, loyalty with obedience and respect for hierarchy, or industriousness with thrift and efficiency. The precepts, in other words, came in clusters -- and the clusters overlapped. Combining the overlaps resolved the clusters into the two syndromes.

Note that neither list is internally contradictory. Each has, in effect, its own integrity. Note, too, that each syndrome is opposed to the other -- there are two separate sets of moral values being expressed here. Since these virtues have been esteemed since before historical times (they were already in place at the beginning of recorded history, and are even found in the legends about times before recorded history), they must be considered as having strong survival value, or as having had survival value at one time.

One of the things which Jacobs did not notice (or chose to ignore) is that each syndrome lists virtues of either individualism or tribalism, (hence my addenda). Likewise, she made no notice that these syndromes are outgrowths of the agonic and hedonic modes of social structures. This latter note is very important because, the recognition that the agonic evolved into the taking syndrome, and the hedonic into the trading, marks the understanding that civilization is indeed the process whereby man is freed from man -- that is, the development of the sense of the individual as apart from the group, to the ultimate recognition that the human world is composed of individuals only, and that a group is merely an aggregate of individuals because individuals are, by their nature all different from each other.

What kind of conjectures, then, can be made about these ancient societies -- what can be said about the kind and quality of life enjoyed by the societal members? A trader society, for one, is a peaceful society -- as the syndrome indicates, they "shun force." Archaeological evidence backs up this assertion. Trader cities did not have fortifications, walls built around to keep out the unwanted and protect those within. There was no evidence of the implements of massive war, such as shields and so forth, that would have been used by soldiers -- in other words, there were no standing armies. What weaponry was there was more of a defensive kind utilized more for hunting than anything else. There was, of course, a basic reason for this -- warfare, being destructive, disruptive, and an impetus for theft, is not good for trade.

Trading emphasizes trust, which is an offshoot of honesty. It is non-coercive because there must be a continual series of voluntary agreements, else there'd be no trading -- and this also requires respect for contracts. The contacts and stimulus with others of different cultures allows an openness to inventiveness and novelty, to newness and difference for that expand the market.

The virtues listed by Jacobs in the trading syndrome arose out of practical necessity (just as did the virtues listed in the taking syndrome ... each list contains the major attributes required to maintain the respective syndromes). The trading societies began as matters of practicality, without much thought to possible theories, only the empirical evidence that trading worked better and was, for more persons, more rewarding than theft. Wealth, creative wealth, came from trading, in a sum-plus series of situations. It was, in other words, an obvious choice. And it is possible that it never occurred to anyone that there might be a need to justify it, especially in the light of its being around as part of the matriarchal lineage for several millennia. Moreover, it was a rational endeavor, a mindful notion, which needed not be argued with another because of its obviousness, and could not be argued with the mindlessness of the barbarians encountered in the outlying areas of the trading influence, because those barbarians were, for the most part, little more than human animals, limited as such to not much more than the range of the moment.

[from my manuscript,ETHICS AND AESTHETICS]

Edited December 28, 2009 by anonrobt

[anthony]

anonrobt,

Could it be that the the entire process of one man's self-upliftment (or that of Man, in general) is the process of super-imposing the "trading syndrome" over the "taking syndrome"? The latter 'morality' is certainly far inferior to the first, which requires volition and rationality to develop.

The trading (individualist) syndrome does not, like its counterpart, come 'naturally' hard-wired, but must be consciously selected and nurtured, doesn't it? Anyhow, that's how I see it.

These two groupings of Jacobs you have presented help me answer some puzzles about the majority of people I've known, and just by the way,(!) go a long way to confirming O'ist ethics. That you have identified the divide as tribalist/individualist is an important addition.

(Interesting that several pillars of industry, our Capitalist 'traders', appear to match the Taking Syndrome morality, rather than the Trading : vengeful,deceptive,ostentatious. Or at least those I've met and heard about.)

Thanks for this, and for your clarity.

Tony

[BaalChatzaf]

^

^

The traders are the bonobos.

The takers are the chimpanzees.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Christopher]

People do it because it was always done, but if someone does not do it, there is a feeling of wrongness pattern-wise, but not a sense of committing evil.

Hmmm...

There are different aspects to morality as you say, and I would assert that all of them can be linked to objective premises. There are morals rooted in intuitions and morals rooted in cognitive beliefs. You are right to distinguish that Rand was more focused on cognitive beliefs, which we can link to rational considerations and denote as "objective." Even so, I think we can't fully escape inner experience when discussing morality. With conscious beliefs, we still make evaluations of right and wrong... these evaluations do elicit an experience. Perhaps rational cognitive convictions are the experience of a "moral sense" to Rand. However, I was not speaking of these conviction experiences when I made my midnight musings yesterday, so you clarified correctly.

To address more on the objectivity of intuitions I spoke of (perhaps what Ba'al is getting at?), even our emotions are not arbitrary per se. The source of our moral emotions are evolutionary, and to the degree that evolution overlaps with healthy survival and survival with Ayn Rand's philosophy, moral intuitions can be placed into an objective sphere. That's not to say that emotions aren't subjective, but rather that the subjectivity only arises when those emotions take on person-specific characteristics (i.e. it is not subjective to have love for a caretaker, but it is subjective to love my mother).

We could observe (for example) that arbitrarily and intentionally harming others causes moral-emotional pain and unhealthiness to the organism who harms. Therefore, we could assert that it is objectively immoral to arbitrarily and intentionally harm others. The objectivity is rooted in the observed hard-wiring of man's psychology, the morality is rooted in the type of experience that regulates pain in regards to causing harm. Subjectivity arises when cultures or philosophers assert who should not be harmed (neighbors, nice-looking people, the French), and these assertions are usually formulated from observations based on only a small handful of people's experiences.

Chris

[Xray]

It kind of reminds me about the whole discussion of ways to define morality.

That was missing in your # 1 post: you did not define morality.

C: Seems to me that ultimately, ultimately... morality is an assertion regarding a set of internal experiences.

Are you aware that with "set of internal experiences", you have entered the realm of subjectivity?

We humans can clearly differentiate between moral intuitions, social-normative intuitions, and personal preferences. Each intuition feels distinctly different:

"Personal preference" is clear, but what please is moral "intuition"? A social normative "intuition"?

C: Is it ok to kill? No... why? Morals

Imo what you call "intuition" is a mere feeling on your part that it may not be right to kill. But "intuition" is actually the mental capacity to grasp what others think and feel, regrdless of whether one approves of it or not.

You seem to confuse intuition with empathy, 'empathy' meaning you actually feel with the person.

Have you seen the Peikoff video where he yells and screams that fighting the enemy should not shy away from killing children as well? Peikoff cleary has no empathy but thinks what he propagates is "morally right".

Now a person capable of intuition will realize at once what makes that guy tick. That's what intuition is about.

Remember the scene in AS where Dagny cold-bloodedly shoots the guard? So much for "is it okay to kill". She could as well have let the three men who were with her (Francisco, Rearden and Danneskjöld) bind and gag that guard as they had done with the other three guards. But Rand wanted that scene. She wanted her heroine to commit this act:

Calmly and impersonally, she who woud have hesitated to fire at an animal, pulled the trigger and fired straight at the heart of a man who had wanted to exist without the responsibility of consciousness. (AS, p. 1148)

THIS is the Ayn Rand we are talking about, an individual who condoned such acts. There you can look right into her soul, Christopher. Tell me, what is it that you see?

Imo this is one of the most shocking scenes in AS.

The guard btw did not exist without "responsibility of consciousmess" at all, on the contrary. He was, confronted with the situation, in a panic and undecided what to do, which is perfectly understandable.

According to Rand, morality is "a code of values to guide man's actions". That scene is AS has given illustrative evidence of how that code of hers looks like. Of what is to be expected in case others happen not to share that code.

C: Is it ok to take food before everyone is sitting down? No... why? Social etiquette

Still, you would not call a person "immoral" who does not behave at table according to the social etiquette, would you? These etiquettes vary strongly anyway, dependent on the respective cultures.

As strongly as moral standards. Just take a short look at what some cultures consider as "immoral" and you will get the picture.

Is pink the best color in the whole wide world? Yes... why? Personal preference

Ths poses the least problem. For the personal preference aspect is as clear here as in John telling Jane "You are the most wonderful woman in the whole wide world!"

The problems arise when people try to impose their subjective preferences on others as alleged "objective values".

C: So somewhere at the core of all things that initiate moral experiences, we have something. That something is what we mean by morality. Since it is an inborn psychological process, logically we must assume that the roots of morality are based in evolution. Even if expressions of moral behavior vary culture to culture, the moral experience itself remains.

What is based in evolution is that we as group animals, in order to survive, need to interact with each other. For milleniums, the rules of behavior have been strongly directied by that need to survive. Today, far more variations exist, but still we react to many things like our biological ancestors did, or like our closest relatves in animal kingdom, the chimps. When my colleague brings me cup of coffe at lunchtime, it is an act of grooming creating a positive social atmosphere we both enjoy. Rand was totally igorant of that aspect of 'doing for others': the pleasure the giver can derive from giving.

Every individual has his/her personal set of moral values (I personally prefer to call them ethical values; to me, "morality" connotes too much of 'bigotry', with finger-pointing at those not fitting the official code "decent citizens" allegedly have to observe).

An individual's personal standard may clash with what is offically 'accepted'. But every 'officially accepted' standard is based on subjective, arbitrary choice as well.

For example, I grew up at a time time where homosexuality was still considered "immoral", and the practicing of it considered a criminal offense in German law (the infamous paragraph $ 175).

Morality simply can't be "objective", Christopher. There is no getting around this fact.

Morality for Rand entailed conceptual volition. It is "a code of values to guide man's actions," but within the context that those actions are motivated by concepts and choices. (She defined man as a "rational animal," which to her included conceptual volition.)

Would you please give an example of this "conceptual volition". TIA.

Edited December 29, 2009 by Xray

[Selene]

Ms. Xray:

"Are you aware that with 'set of internal experiences', you have entered the realm of subjectivity?"

Disregarding the condescension, your statement is not necessarily true. Therefore, your assertion of the statement as a certainty is not established.

By the way, are you aware that Chris is not a six (6) year old?

Adam

[Alfonso Jones]

Ms. Xray:

"Are you aware that with 'set of internal experiences', you have entered the realm of subjectivity?"

Disregarding the condescension, your statement is not necessarily true. Therefore, your assertion of the statement as a certainty is not established.

By the way, are you aware that Chris is not a six (6) year old?

Adam

Adam -

You ask Xray a question which begins with "Are you aware?"

Oh, I get it - - - a purely rhetorical question.

Bill P