Can morality be objective?

[Christopher]

GS,

The choice to use reason on a problem, say, like feeding yourself on a desert island, or of going "Uga uga!" and hoping for food to miraculously appear from the gods being uga-pleased are moral choices.

One type of morality results in choosing the first and another kind of morality results in choosing the second.

Most people are mixed bags morally speaking, but those extreme choices are accurate poles of the value of reason and whether to choose to use it or not.

Michael

You seem to be conflating morality with rationality. An immoral person can be perfectly rational. An irrational person can be moral.

People who consistently chose those actions which preserved their life and health are manifesting rational (reason based, fact recognizing) behavior.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Ba'al, you're definitely context dropping here. To Rand, I believe morality requires volition to depend on rationality. You're also mixing popular terms for moral/immoral rather than using what an Objectivist might assert as moral or immoral.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Dragonfly,

Strawman?

Heh.

Deity religions in Brazil still practice animal sacrifices (mostly goats and chickens, but sometimes oxes) to gain good harvests, money, love and all kinds of goodies from the gods. I watched some of this with my own eyes.

Some Santaria cultures here in the USA do this stuff.

Uga uga.

Michael

[jeffrey smith]

Actually the desert island scenario is useful in exposing the fundamental flaw in Objectivist morality.

In brief, Rand declares "life" to be the standard of value--which implies that "life" is itself not a value, but something inherent in reality by which value choices can be measured and judged.

If I declare that a meter is to be the standard of length, does that imply that a meter is not a unit of length?

But (here is the flaw) she then declares that "life" is something chosen (or at least, sought after), meaning that "life" is itself a "value": the most important value but still a value which must be chosen.

The Objectivist counter to this problem is, as far as I understand it, not a good counter. "You have to choose life because otherwise you will die, therefore life is the objective standard of value."

And if I do not care whether I live or die?

Or suppose I value life only as a means to another goal: suppose I am a musician who lives for the sake of playing my music, and not, as Objectivism has it, playing my music for the sake of living.

Here, you have identified the correct question to ask. Although Rand pointed the way to the correct answer to this question, I don't think her answer was 100% satisfactory. Providing a complete answer to this question is a difficult proposition. In fact, I started writing an essay on the subject some time ago, but haven't had a chance to finish it.

In a nut shell, I would argue that if your chosen, long-range goal, for which life is a subordinate goal, causes you to act in any manner that is substantially incompatible with the requirements of your life, you will substantially increase your probability of death and, therefore, will substantially reduce your odds of achieving your primary goal. Therefore, it is impossible to choose any goal that is substantially different from the maintenance of your life. That does not mean that you cannot maintain your life by different and various means. Rather, it implies that the maintenance of your life can never be subordinate to any other long-range goal, at least not in any substantial manner.

In other words, not only is life not an "objective standard of value" but simply another value which I can freely choose.

This is why the "indestructible robot" scenario fails to establish what Rand wants it to establish, since the robot is free to choose something else as its ultimate value.

The "indestructible robot" is free to choose any goal at all. A human is not. A human cannot achieve any long-range goal that is substantially at odds with the maintenance of his own life.

Darrell

1) In reference to the meter, perhaps you need to pick a different example. The meter itself is defined by relation to a physical existent--originally, a proportion of the distance between the North Pole and the Equator; for part of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, a specially made bar kept in Paris; next, the wavelength of the radiation emitted by a certain isotope, and for the last twentyfive years or so, the distance light will travel in a vacuum during a set interval of time (a very small fraction of a second, just over one three hundred millionth of a second). So the meter is not itself the standard.

2) Your proposed argument fails to take into account the possibility that people will choose goals that are directly in conflict with living (suicide bombers, for instance) or choose goals which are attainable only at direct risk to themselves (climbing Mt. Everest, for example). It also does not take into account goals which emphasize quality. If my goal is to produce tasty croissants every time I bake a batch of croissants, keeping myself alive is not really relevant--as long as I have produced tasty croissants each time I bake, the goal will be attained, whether I live one year or one century. Furthermore, you apparently are trying to claim that maintaining life is the primary goal, even when it is cleary subordinated--in other words, trying to have your cake and eat it too.

3) According to Rand, that indestructible robot

would not be able to have any values; it would have nothing to gain or to lose; it could not regard anything as for or against it, as serving or threatening its welfare, as fulfilling or frustrating its interests. It could have no interests and no goals.

(from the Objectivist Ethics, as printed in The Virtue of Selfishness]

So the robot is not free to choose any goal if can have no goals. But I think it's easy to visualize specific goals that the robot could choose (for instance, ensuring it inventor never lacks for money), exactly the opposite of what Rand claims.

Jeffrey S.

[BaalChatzaf]

Ba'al, you're definitely context dropping here. To Rand, I believe morality requires volition to depend on rationality. You're also mixing popular terms for moral/immoral rather than using what an Objectivist might assert as moral or immoral.

No. I am not context dropping at all. I recognize full well that Objectivists habitually hijack other people's terminology, change definitions and then dump on the others for not going along with the change in definitions. This mode of argumentation is bogus and pure hokum. The implicit assumption is Rand is Right and those who disagree are Wrong, or even worse (gasp!) Social Metaphysicians!

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I recognize full well that Objectivists habitually hijack other people's terminology, change definitions and then dump on the others for not going along with the change in definitions. This mode of argumentation is bogus and pure hokum. The implicit assumption is Rand is Right and those who disagree are Wrong, or even worse (gasp!) Social Metaphysicians!

Bob,

This sometimes happens. And it is a method I see often used by Rand's critics

But what about that gun pointed at you in package-deal meanings?

Rand's excuse is to deal with—and get rid of—that gun.

What's the excuse of her critics?

To say she was wrong?

Gasp!

Michael

[BaalChatzaf]

I recognize full well that Objectivists habitually hijack other people's terminology, change definitions and then dump on the others for not going along with the change in definitions. This mode of argumentation is bogus and pure hokum. The implicit assumption is Rand is Right and those who disagree are Wrong, or even worse (gasp!) Social Metaphysicians!

Bob,

This sometimes happens. And it is a method I see often used by Rand's critics

But what about that gun pointed at you in package-deal meanings?

Rand's excuse is to deal with—and get rid of—that gun.

What's the excuse of her critics?

To say she was wrong?

Gasp!

Michael

Which is a good thing if she was wrong. As in the case of morality on a Desert Island. She was dead wrong there.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[tjohnson]

Which is a good thing if she was wrong. As in the case of morality on a Desert Island. She was dead wrong there.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Well, she was wrong if you use the widely accepted meaning of 'morality' but not if you use the Objectivist meaning. The more I think about this the more I think that she had an agenda against traditional religious/altruistic dogma which uses people's conception of 'morality' to control their lives. By hijacking the term she can actively fight against this dogma. It's like saying "that's not morality, this is!"

Edited December 23, 2009 by general semanticist

[BaalChatzaf]

Which is a good thing if she was wrong. As in the case of morality on a Desert Island. She was dead wrong there.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Well, she was wrong if you use the widely accepted meaning of 'morality' but not if you use the Objectivist meaning. The more I think about this the more I think that she had an agenda against traditional religious/altruistic dogma which uses people's conception of 'morality' to control their lives. By hijacking the term she can actively fight against this dogma. It's like saying "that's not morality, this is!"

Ever since Socrates (nearly 2300 years now) morality has been defined in a social context. Has the mass of thinking men been deluded all these years? Why all of a sudden is Ayn Rand right and the rest of the human race wrong? She simply made some blunt assertions and never offered any empirical evidence to support her view on morality. Some of Ayn Rand's views do not hold up under empirical scrutiny. In particular, her view of morality.

Bob Kolker

[tjohnson]

Ever since Socrates (nearly 2300 years now) morality has been defined in a social context. Has the mass of thinking men been deluded all these years? Why all of a sudden is Ayn Rand right and the rest of the human race wrong? She simply made some blunt assertions and never offered any empirical evidence to support her view on morality. Some of Ayn Rand's views do not hold up under empirical scrutiny. In particular, her view of morality.

Bob Kolker

What is the significance of it when you sign your real name as opposed to your screen name?

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

The more I think about this the more I think that she had an agenda against traditional religious/altruistic dogma which uses people's conception of 'morality' to control their lives. By hijacking the term she can actively fight against this dogma. It's like saying "that's not morality, this is!"

GS,

Sometimes you surprise me and this is one of them.

You got it.

That's not the whole story, but that is a good part of it.

You take a package-deal concept (like Rand did with morality) and break off the bad parts. Then you show people that they are essentially good for being and feeling certain self-related things although they have been taught the contrary by those who want to control them by guilt. Then you go after the labels those control-freaks and power mongers have used to induce such guilt and you pull the teeth out of them.

Sometimes you have to dispute the same term to do that effectively within a culture.

Later, this process unfortunately got abused in the Objectivist subcommunity (including by Rand herself) and swung the other way. The word "morality" became once again a package-deal term used to induce guilt and control people.

But that doesn't negate the legitimacy of reclaiming the concept of morality as being a code of values that you can choose rationally instead of a set of rules others tell you that you have to follow.

Michael

[Alfonso Jones]

Which is a good thing if she was wrong. As in the case of morality on a Desert Island. She was dead wrong there.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Well, she was wrong if you use the widely accepted meaning of 'morality' but not if you use the Objectivist meaning. The more I think about this the more I think that she had an agenda against traditional religious/altruistic dogma which uses people's conception of 'morality' to control their lives. By hijacking the term she can actively fight against this dogma. It's like saying "that's not morality, this is!"

Ever since Socrates (nearly 2300 years now) morality has been defined in a social context. Has the mass of thinking men been deluded all these years? Why all of a sudden is Ayn Rand right and the rest of the human race wrong? She simply made some blunt assertions and never offered any empirical evidence to support her view on morality. Some of Ayn Rand's views do not hold up under empirical scrutiny. In particular, her view of morality.

Bob Kolker

Ba'al -

Based on your prior comments and discussion, I think this is a very thoughtful question.

Here's the deal, as I understand it:

Rand was absolutely determined to reclaim the notion of morality from people who would impose "oughts" on individuals from outside. Historically most of them, of course, have been operating from a religious point of view. She wanted to articulate the notion of morality as a tool for living. This is the magnificient achievement, in my view, of her essay "The Objectivist Ethics," found as the lead essay in The Virtue of Selfishness. This is very fundamental for Rand's radical individualism.

My view: She most emphatically DOES NOT WANT to separate morality into a morality(1) which has to do with the interpersonal, and a morality(2) which has to do with an individual making decisions "on a desert island." Hence her statement about morality being needed MOST on a desert island - no separation of private/public.

I do not think it is just some unintentional use of an existing term. She wants to reclaim the term (and the entire notion of morality) from "the mystics" of all kinds.

Bill P

[Christopher]

Which is a good thing if she was wrong. As in the case of morality on a Desert Island. She was dead wrong there.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Well, she was wrong if you use the widely accepted meaning of 'morality' but not if you use the Objectivist meaning. The more I think about this the more I think that she had an agenda against traditional religious/altruistic dogma which uses people's conception of 'morality' to control their lives. By hijacking the term she can actively fight against this dogma. It's like saying "that's not morality, this is!"

Ever since Socrates (nearly 2300 years now) morality has been defined in a social context. Has the mass of thinking men been deluded all these years? Why all of a sudden is Ayn Rand right and the rest of the human race wrong? She simply made some blunt assertions and never offered any empirical evidence to support her view on morality. Some of Ayn Rand's views do not hold up under empirical scrutiny. In particular, her view of morality.

Bob Kolker

Ba'al -

Based on your prior comments and discussion, I think this is a very thoughtful question.

Here's the deal, as I understand it:

Rand was absolutely determined to reclaim the notion of morality from people who would impose "oughts" on individuals from outside. Historically most of them, of course, have been operating from a religious point of view. She wanted to articulate the notion of morality as a tool for living. This is the magnificient achievement, in my view, of her essay "The Objectivist Ethics," found as the lead essay in The Virtue of Selfishness. This is very fundamental for Rand's radical individualism.

My view: She most emphatically DOES NOT WANT to separate morality into a morality(1) which has to do with the interpersonal, and a morality(2) which has to do with an individual making decisions "on a desert island." Hence her statement about morality being needed MOST on a desert island - no separation of private/public.

I do not think it is just some unintentional use of an existing term. She wants to reclaim the term (and the entire notion of morality) from "the mystics" of all kinds.

Bill P

Well spoken. What might be an interesting consideration is that Rand's definition of morality still springs from something that can actually feel moral. Isn't that interesting! Biologically we are wired to feel that certain things are moral. People seem to make guesses as to what those triggers are. Mystics talk about interpersonal, God, etc. etc. as pertaining to morality. Rand talked about individual life as pertaining to morality. Why? Why did Rand feel life was important? Why do all people feel life is important? Why not call the color green "moral" and build a philosophy around that?

It is likely that the mystics and Rand are essentially tapping into the same psychological system of moral-elicitation, but perhaps as it's being said by many on this thread: she's distilling it into a rational form.

Chris

[Dragonfly]

Deity religions in Brazil still practice animal sacrifices (mostly goats and chickens, but sometimes oxes) to gain good harvests, money, love and all kinds of goodies from the gods. I watched some of this with my own eyes.

Sure. But do these people then just wait until the food falls miraculously into their laps (that was the straw man part in your description of the Uga Uga man)? I don't think so. And would those people necessarily be worse survivors on a desert island than, say, Leonard Peikoff?

[Dragonfly]

The more I think about this the more I think that she had an agenda against traditional religious/altruistic dogma which uses people's conception of 'morality' to control their lives. By hijacking the term she can actively fight against this dogma. It's like saying "that's not morality, this is!"

GS,

Sometimes you surprise me and this is one of them.

You got it.

In other words, Rand said that the common definition of morality was wrong and that her definition was right. That's what I said all along.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Dragonfly,

She did not say other definitions of morality per se are false. She said that other kinds of morality (ones based on irrational fundamental values) are evil. Both are morality.

That's the meaning I get and that's a huge difference.

Michael

[Christopher]

Dragonfly,

She did not say other definitions of morality per se are false. She said that other kinds of morality (ones based on irrational fundamental values) are evil. Both are morality.

That's the meaning I get and that's a huge difference.

Michael

This is the key point. For example, both Christians and Rand say life is important. The difference is that Christians hold pro-life values that are also embedded with anti-life behavior (self-sacrifice), meaning that pursuing moral values according to scripture both supports and undermines the core moral standards from a logical standpoint. Hence, these moral values are irrational because they are internally conflictual.

If A=A in the universe but A = (not A) in a moral code, then it's probably not the universe that needs fixing.

[RightJungle]

Would some of you who are posting on this topic tell me what, if anything, you think about Tara Smith's "Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics" or "Viable Values"?

Mary Lee

Edited December 24, 2009 by Mary Lee Harsha

[John Day]

Sure. But do these people then just wait until the food falls miraculously into their laps (that was the straw man part in your description of the Uga Uga man)? I don't think so. And would those people necessarily be worse survivors on a desert island than, say, Leonard Peikoff?

To the extent that those cultures are able to survive, it's because they perform rational acts. (Hunting and gathering, and perhaps even a limited form of agriculture.) I'll admit that people from a primitive culture would be more likely to survive on a desert island because they come from a culture that rewards people with survivor skills, whereas modern civilization reward people of more abstract abilities. Peikoff probably wouldn't not survive in the savage's civilization, but I would venture that the savage would not survive in Peikoff's civilization (except through the generosity of the productive). Different societies value different things. It is not until the basic means of survival are met that civilization is possible. For example, things like philosophy and literature weren't possible until agriculture freed up people's time and allowed them to focus on questions other than "Where's my next meal coming from?"

[John Day]

2) Your proposed argument fails to take into account the possibility that people will choose goals that are directly in conflict with living (suicide bombers, for instance) or choose goals which are attainable only at direct risk to themselves (climbing Mt. Everest, for example). It also does not take into account goals which emphasize quality. If my goal is to produce tasty croissants every time I bake a batch of croissants, keeping myself alive is not really relevant--as long as I have produced tasty croissants each time I bake, the goal will be attained, whether I live one year or one century. Furthermore, you apparently are trying to claim that maintaining life is the primary goal, even when it is cleary subordinated--in other words, trying to have your cake and eat it too.

The suicide bomber is clearly irrational, he is working for his own destruction and the destruction of others. The case of a man wishing to climb Mount Everest is more complex. He's not actively working for his destruction, but he engaging in a potentially deadly activity. To him, the feeling the achievement and/or exhilaration that he will find on the top of mountain is worth the potential risk of losing his life. My uncle, who has climbed Mt. McKinley, has said that he would never climb Everest because it's too dangerous (and too expensive). His life was more valuable than the feeling that would be achieved by climbing Everest.

As is noted in Galt's speech, "achieving life is not the equivalent of avoiding death." To achieve life, we must be happy, and in order for us to be happy, we may have engage in activities that have some risk to them. One must carefully analyze the risks and then decide whether it's worth it.

[Dragonfly]

The suicide bomber is clearly irrational, he is working for his own destruction and the destruction of others.

That we may loathe the purpose of a suicide bomber doesn't make him irrational. His goal is to destruct others and to die for his purpose. If he succeeds, it is thanks to his rationality. He would be irrational if he prayed to his God and expected that thereby he could destruct others - that method doesn't work. That's one of the typical errors in Objectivism: the fact that rationality is desirable doesn't imply that someone who does things that we detest cannot be rational (with the fallacious conclusion that "evil" is impotent). The two concepts are certainly not equivalent. Being rational makes us efficient in what we want to achieve, but we may disagree strongly with what some people want to achieve.

[syrakusos]

Actually the desert island scenario is useful in exposing the fundamental flaw in Objectivist morality.

In brief, Rand declares "life" to be the standard of value--which implies that "life" is itself not a value, but something inherent in reality by which value choices can be measured and judged. But (here is the flaw) she then declares that "life" is something chosen (or at least, sought after), meaning that "life" is itself a "value": the most important value but still a value which must be chosen. ... In other words, not only is life not an "objective standard of value" but simply another value which I can freely choose. ... This is why the "indestructible robot" scenario fails to establish what Rand wants it to establish, since the robot is free to choose something else as its ultimate value. -- Jeffrey S.

Pardon me for not getting back to you on this. Allow me to state your thesis as a positive.

Life is not an "objective standard of value." Life is another value. I am free to choose life or not.

1. On what basis do you make that choice?

2. Ayn Rand's Objectivism uses the word life in a special sense, especially when discussing morality. It is true that "life" could mean the wildlife in Yosemite or life on Earth or even more generally and abstractly, as when cosmologists theorize which limits of which physical constants are necessary for life as we know it. When discussin morality, life means human life in general and YOUR LIFE in particular in its fullest expression, working from its highest potential.

3. If you decide to "choose" randomly, tossing dice or whatever at every junction, you would not be acting with your life as your standard. Your choices would not be moral. They would be immoral even if they accidentally benefited you.

At least, that's how I understand it.

[tjohnson]

The suicide bomber is clearly irrational, he is working for his own destruction and the destruction of others.

That we may loathe the purpose of a suicide bomber doesn't make him irrational. His goal is to destruct others and to die for his purpose. If he succeeds, it is thanks to his rationality. He would be irrational if he prayed to his God and expected that thereby he could destruct others - that method doesn't work. That's one of the typical errors in Objectivism: the fact that rationality is desirable doesn't imply that someone who does things that we detest cannot be rational (with the fallacious conclusion that "evil" is impotent). The two concepts are certainly not equivalent. Being rational makes us efficient in what we want to achieve, but we may disagree strongly with what some people want to achieve.

Now the question is are there any suicide bombers who are not fanatics of some sort? ie. not irrational? The act of committing suicide seems very irrational to me. Whatever circumstances leading up to suicide have resulted in a thoroughly irrational person, IMO. Of course this depends on one's concept of irrationality.

[Dragonfly]

Now the question is are there any suicide bombers who are not fanatics of some sort? ie. not irrational? The act of committing suicide seems very irrational to me. Whatever circumstances leading up to suicide have resulted in a thoroughly irrational person, IMO. Of course this depends on one's concept of irrationality.

Do you think the soldier who throws himself on a live grenade to save his comrades is irrational? A mother who choses to die to save her child?

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Dragonfly's point above about the suicide bomber shows why it is necessary to define your meanings and contexts.

A person can be irrational about a fundamental choice (like accepting a book or the word of another person as the word of God simply because such a book or person and some other people say so), but perfectly rational in planning and executing tasks in the service of that choice.

Calling him a rational or irrational person will depend on which part you are talking about.

Michael

[BaalChatzaf]

1. On what basis do you make that choice?

Examples: Is another day going to be a pleasure, or is it going to be a pain or burden. A person suffering unremitting pain, could very well prefer the peace of death to going on in pain. Or a person just may have enough of life and another day would be extremely tedious for him. There are lots of sensible reasons for not wishing to go on. But a Shi'ite Objectivist will have none of these, for Rand has spoken.

Ba'al Chatzaf