Two Kinds of "Induction": Important similarities and trivial differences

[Daniel Barnes]

Vague?

Dude, as far as your Measurement Omission=vagueness/Rand=Popper essay goes, I can only say: bring it on!

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Vague?

Dude, as far as your Measurement Omission=vagueness/Rand=Popper essay goes, I can only say: bring it on!

Daniel,

I certainly will. Don't expect it tomorrow, though. Popper's works are long and I want to do a good job. And puhleeze do not oversimplify. I am talking about specific issues, not full systems of thought. Notice that I always say similarities and differences when mentioning Popper and Rand. Don't forget that I said "differences" too. Pretty please...

For the record and benefit of anyone confused about the contextual certainty issue, in Objectivism, one is taught to think through a philosophical lens, so to speak. So if one is talking metaphysically (or ontologically), this will shade the meanings of words in one direction. They will often mean something different than when one is talking epistemologically. Obviously, these are issues of focus and not stand-alone categories, since for a human being one (metaphysics) cannot exist without the other (epistemology).

What happens with "contextual certainty" is that this phrase is used in an epistemological manner and those critical of Rand do not want to accept that the word "absolute" can be used through an epistemological lens. They want it to be metaphysical, cut off from human perception altogether, and that's that. This seems to be an exception to the virtue of accepting vagueness of words they normally extol as Popper's gift to mankind. I find it funny that they do not practice what they preach when it comes to bashing Rand.

Metaphysically, "absolute" means for all times, past present and future, and in all contexts. "Contextually absolute" is epistemological with a metaphysical component and means nothing more than 100% accurate within the confines of knowledge and procedures at the moment. Even when knowledge is later superceded by other knowledge, should one go back to the original context, no other conclusions would be possible, or at least effective.

An example is the flat earth of ancient times. Within the scope of knowledge and the procedures of those people, the earth was flat. The earth was simply what they could see. In terms of metaphysical completeness, what they called the earth was perceived in a vastly different manner than what we do today. But if we were able to time travel to back to then and see the world as they did, forgetting our present knowledge, we would simply see the earth as flat and that would be correct for that context. The things they developed predicated on the flat earth theory, such as demarcation of boundaries, etc., worked and they will work today on the same basis of accuracy as used back then. In that sense, i.e., within those confines, this knowledge is absolute and works every time to produce the same results. It is contextually absolute. The ever-sacred forecasting of the future of Rand critics is fully functional within those confines. Where forecasting the future goes haywire is when NEW considerations become involved, not when OLD well-known and proven considerations are tested.

In metaphysical terms (with no time or space contexts, or any other for that matter), probably everything we know is incomplete and wrong. Tomorrow, the earth might not even be seen as a globe, but instead in relation to the spaces between subparticles or the billions of other worlds in one of the quantum theories. In that sense (the metaphysical sense), what we know about the earth is not absolute (i.e., complete and accurate for all contexts). But in epistemological terms, within the confines of our present knowledge, we know, for example, that the earth is a globe. We send satellites up to circle it and this works every time (presuming there are no mechanical mishaps or accidents). This knowledge is contextually absolute in the meaning given in Objectivist epistemology. If quantum physics ends up proving that what we perceive is not a globe at all, we will STILL BE ABLE to send up satellites to circle the earth within the present levels of precision and the presumption that the earth is a globe is all we will need to know on that score to send the satellites up. If we want to do something that is more advanced than send up satellites, we will have to use the new knowledge. The fact that the new knowledge can possibly improve the precision of what used to be done does not alter this principle.

Rand critics are uncomfortable with this for some reason. I have not yet been able to discern this reason.

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

Vague?

Dude, as far as your Measurement Omission=vagueness/Rand=Popper essay goes, I can only say: bring it on!

Daniel,

I certainly will. Don't expect it tomorrow, though. Popper's works are long and I want to do a good job. And puhleeze do not oversimplify. I am talking about specific issues, not full systems of thought. Notice that I always say similarities and differences when mentioning Popper and Rand. Don't forget that I said "differences" too. Pretty please...

For the record and benefit of anyone confused about the contextual certainty issue, in Objectivism, one is taught to think through a philosophical lens, so to speak. So if one is talking metaphysically (or ontologically), this will shade the meanings of words in one direction. They will often mean something different than when one is talking epistemologically. Obviously, these are issues of focus and not stand-alone categories, since for a human being one (metaphysics) cannot exist without the other (epistemology).

What happens with "contextual certainty" is that this phrase is used in an epistemological manner and those critical of Rand do not want to accept that the word "absolute" can be used through an epistemological lens. They want it to be metaphysical, cut off from human perception altogether, and that's that. This seems to be an exception to the virtue of accepting vagueness of words they normally extol as Popper's gift to mankind. I find it funny that they do not practice what they preach when it comes to bashing Rand.

Metaphysically, "absolute" means for all times, past present and future, and in all contexts. "Contextually absolute" is epistemological with a metaphysical component and means nothing more than 100% accurate within the confines of knowledge and procedures at the moment. Even when knowledge is later superceded by other knowledge, should one go back to the original context, no other conclusions would be possible, or at least effective.

An example is the flat earth of ancient times. Within the scope of knowledge and the procedures of those people, the earth was flat. The earth was simply what they could see. In terms of metaphysical completeness, what they called the earth was perceived in a vastly different manner than what we do today. But if we were able to time travel to back to then and see the world as they did, forgetting our present knowledge, we would simply see the earth as flat and that would be correct for that context. The things they developed predicated on the flat earth theory, such as demarcation of boundaries, etc., worked and they will work today on the same basis of accuracy as used back then. In that sense, i.e., within those confines, this knowledge is absolute and works every time to produce the same results. It is contextually absolute. The ever-sacred forecasting of the future of Rand critics is fully functional within those confines. Where forecasting the future goes haywire is when NEW considerations become involved, not when OLD well-known and proven considerations are tested.

In metaphysical terms (with no time or space contexts, or any other for that matter), probably everything we know is incomplete and wrong. Tomorrow, the earth might not even be seen as a globe, but instead in relation to the spaces between subparticles or the billions of other worlds in one of the quantum theories. In that sense (the metaphysical sense), what we know about the earth is not absolute (i.e., complete and accurate for all contexts). But in epistemological terms, within the confines of our present knowledge, we know, for example, that the earth is a globe. We send satellites up to circle it and this works every time (presuming there are no mechanical mishaps or accidents). This knowledge is contextually absolute in the meaning given in Objectivist epistemology. If quantum physics ends up proving that what we perceive is not a globe at all, we will STILL BE ABLE to send up satellites to circle the earth within the present levels of precision and the presumption that the earth is a globe is all we will need to know on that score to send the satellites up. If we want to do something that is more advanced than send up satellites, we will have to use the new knowledge. The fact that the new knowledge can possibly improve the precision of what used to be done does not alter this principle.

Rand critics are uncomfortable with this for some reason. I have not yet been able to discern this reason.

Michael

Who needs this for what? If your knowledge is wrong or incomplete it's not the fault of reality. Go ye and seek some more. Michael, you seem to be attacking both science and cognitive efficacy with an implicit premise of unknowable reality. It's not Rand's critiics who are uncomfortable.

--Brant

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Brant,

Who said it is the fault of reality? Who said reality is unknowable?

What on earth are you talking about?

Let me use Objectivist jargon for you to understand. Rand said that man is not omniscient so his knowledge is contextual. Now do you get it?

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

Brant,

Who said it is the fault of reality? Who said reality is unknowable?

What on earth are you talking about?

Let me use Objectivist jargon for you to understand. Rand said that man is not omniscient so his knowledge is contextual. Now do you get it?

Michael

"...probably everything we know is incomplete and wrong." You said it.

--Brant

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

"...probably everything we know is incomplete and wrong." You said it.

Brant,

I qualified that by saying "in metaphysical terms (with no time or space contexts, or any other for that matter)," meaning if we were omniscient. In other words, there will always be something new to learn that will overturn something we know, but for future applications, not past ones.

Here, chew on this for a while. ITOE, 2nd, p. 47:

Only when and if some discovery were to make the definition "rational animal" inaccurate (i.e., no longer serving to distinguish man from all other existents) would the question of expanding the definition arise. "Expanding" does not mean negating, abrogating or contradicting; it means demonstrating that some other characteristics are more distinctive of man than rationality and animality—in which unlikely case these two would be regarded as non-defining characteristics, but would still remain true.

Remember that concept-formation is a method of cognition, man's method, and that concepts represent classifications of observed existents according to their relationships to other observed existents. Since man is not omniscient, a definition cannot be changelessly absolute, because it cannot establish the relationship of a given group of existents to everything else in the universe, including the undiscovered and unknown. And for the very same reasons, a definition is false and worthless if it is not contextually absolute—if it does not specify the known relationships among existents (in terms of the known essential characteristics) or if it contradicts the known (by omission or evasion).

This same principle applies to knowledge in general when the existents designated by the definitions remain the same over time. The known is still the known, even when new knowledge is added. The known in the past does not—for them in the past—suddenly become the unknown to them in the future, but known by us. In simpler terms, look at it from their angle and try to figure out how they ever managed to get anything done. According to your professed standard just now ("if your knowledge is wrong or incomplete it's not the fault of reality"), they couldn't. They would have to know everything first so they wouldn't be wrong. And they would simply be wrong because we are right today. You also cut off new knowledge with that standard, although it sounds like you don't.

The plain fact is that we are not omniscient and that actually is the fault of reality.

The way to properly understand this is to be clear when you are talking about fact (metaphysics) and when you are talking about truth (epistemology). Fact qua fact is always sought in science from some kind of projected virtual omniscient perspective. You aim at it. That is why we always discover new information. But truth exists. It is made up of facts that are known within relationships that are known. That is what Rand means by "contextually absolute." Those facts within those relationships do not become untrue when something new is discovered. Within those relationships, those facts are still true.

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

I qualified that by saying "in metaphysical terms (with no time or space contexts, or any other for that matter)," meaning if we were omniscient. In other words, there will always be something new to learn that will overturn something we know, but for future applications, not past ones.

"Incomplete and wrong" is also self-contradictory for "wrong" is never incomplete, it's just wrong. I don't understand your first sentence above. The second sentence is patronizing and trite. Ayn Rand wrote in plain English and she can be explained and evaluated in plain English.

--Brant

Edited October 9, 2007 by Brant Gaede

[Ellen Stuttle]

Michael,

In your post #331, your asked for pointers on how your could learn "what Popper is talking about [in his "Two Kinds of Definition" article]."

Interestingly, some posts later (here), you quoted a passage from ITOE which is a good example of what Popper is talking against.

You recommend to Brant that he "chew on this for a while. ITOE, 2nd, p. 47". I suggest chewing on it yourself and noticing what Rand is requiring, viz., that a definition has to correctly situate an existent in relationship to all other existents by "specify[ing] the known relationships among existents (in terms of the known essential characteristics)" in the context of all knowledge to date, and she's asserting that if a definition doesn't perform this (I would say quite impossible) feat, then it is "false and worthless" (my emphasis). She does acknowledge that we aren't omniscient and thus she allows for change in definitions with increased knowledge, but do you not see the impossibility of meeting and the futility of attempting to meet the requirement she says a definition must fulfill to be of value?

Only when and if some discovery were to make the definition "rational animal" inaccurate (i.e., no longer serving to distinguish man from all other existents) would the question of expanding the definition arise. "Expanding" does not mean negating, abrogating or contradicting; it means demonstrating that some other characteristics are more distinctive of man than rationality and animality—in which unlikely case these two would be regarded as non-defining characteristics, but would still remain true.

Remember that concept-formation is a method of cognition, man's method, and that concepts represent classifications of observed existents according to their relationships to other observed existents. Since man is not omniscient, a definition cannot be changelessly absolute, because it cannot establish the relationship of a given group of existents to everything else in the universe, including the undiscovered and unknown. And for the very same reasons, a definition is false and worthless if it is not contextually absolute—if it does not specify the known relationships among existents (in terms of the known essential characteristics) or if it contradicts the known (by omission or evasion).

Ellen

___

Edited October 9, 2007 by Ellen Stuttle

[Ellen Stuttle]

What happens with "contextual certainty" is that this phrase is used in an epistemological manner and those critical of Rand do not want to accept that the word "absolute" can be used through an epistemological lens.

Michael, the word "absolute" can be used with whatever meaning you stipulate, but there are those of us who find equating lack of omniscience with "absolute knowledge" deuced weird. Sure does sound like an oxymoron to some of us, however it's twisted and explained.

Rand critics are uncomfortable with this for some reason. I have not yet been able to discern this reason.

I was unable to discern what it is you're saying "Rand critics" (as if everyone who criticizes Rand does for the same reasons) "are uncomfortable with." If it's with our theories changing over time in the light of new discoveries, I feel no discomfort whatsoever on that score. If it's with your explanation of how it used to be true that the earth was flat (I think that's what you're saying), I see no sense in the contention.

Ellen

___

Edited October 9, 2007 by Ellen Stuttle

[tjohnson]

And if you have so much trouble with the words "right" or "wrong" -- are you hearing moral overtones or something? -- substitute "correct" and "incorrect" if that will help.

How about [structurally] similar or dissimilar? This allows for 00-valued determinism for there are in principle an infinite number of choices between similar, at one end of the spectrum, and dissimilar at the other. Simply saying 'true' and 'false', 'correct' and 'incorrect', etc. represents outdated, 2-valued thinking which, I should add, still retains it's value in mathematics.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen,

It is simple if you keep in mind that "known relationships among existents" are measurable. Even Popper would concede that. And that "measurable" quality is where Rand derives her "essence." That is not the same place from where Aristotle derived it. To him it was a quality like a primitive god (the God of Tree, the God of River, the God of Boulder, The God of Table, etc.). He simply called it "essence" and said you grasp it mentally through intuition (like the primitives did with faith).

On the basis of measurement, I will try to explain the flat earth thing. The way the ancients were able to measure distance back then was essentially with raw eyesight. (Let's leave the invention of telescopes aside for the moment since this happened late and was very rudimentary at the start.) Do your eyes alone tell you that the earth is round? They do not. They tell you that it is flat, with hills, valleys, etc. You only find out about the globe later with more sophisticated measurements and instruments of observation. When man only had raw eyesight as the basis for measuring and the earth appeared flat to him, did he do anything based on that assumption that ended up being false? For instance, he thought the world was up/down and a flat plane and he sailed ships according to this standard. Did he sail them wrong? No. On the contrary, he actually was able to sail them and the ships went places. When he was able to map places, he could always sail to those same places over and over based on the presumption that the earth was flat. It was only later when NEW knowledge (new worlds) was discovered that he needed to revise his presumption.

Could anyone today presume that the earth is flat, use ancient ships, and sail to the same places the ancients did over and over and get to those places? Of course. That part of the earth according to that level of measurement (raw eyesight) is flat. Nowadays, we say it "appears flat." We do not contradict that part with new knowledge. We build on it. That is Rand's point.

As to Rand critics, my problem is that they hold up the need for vagueness as some kind of metaphysical proof of the superiority of science over philosophy, or Popper over Rand, or something like that (there is always some silly competition at root), then do not use the same standard for judging Rand. When the term denigrates her, it suddenly becomes carved in stone and can only have the meaning with the worst possible connotation, even when Rand clearly defined her term and context differently (as in the word "absolute"). I don't find that habit to be a true attempt at understanding and I don't find it to be scientific. I find it to be a double standard.

Normally, since intelligent people are involved and the tone is always critical of Rand, never complimentary, I cannot see this refusal to acknowledge defined terms as lack of intelligence. (There actually are people who simply don't have a clue because they are stupid, but I don't see this with intelligent Rand critics.) Thus, I presume that the main value and goal is to bash Rand, not arrive at understanding.

Michael

[John Dailey]

~ If no one has a prob with (as Aristotle distinguished) an Absolute Absolute with a Relative Absolute, why there then be a prob with 'Contextual' Certainty (or Truth), but, not with the idea of Absolute ('omniscient'?) Certainty/Truth - other than arguing its impossibility? Granted, he was talking about Ethics and not Epistemology, still...there's meaning to the distinctions in both cases, no?

'Relative' Absolutes-I

~ Indeed, the more I've checked into the 'meaning' of ABSOLUTE (as used by noted philosophers), given the presumedly implicit TOTALLY-'unconditional' aspect of its meaning, the more I find that (ironically!) caveats need be applied re the 'domain' the term's used on; this implies that outside that domain...the term is irrelevent.

~ Shades of the word...'context.'

LLAP

J:D

Edited October 10, 2007 by John Dailey

[John Dailey]

Addendum:

~ Let me try to be more clear here: I'm not talking about 'relative' facts; but, yes, 'relative' truths (ergo belief-'certainties'). --- Consider a simple contemporary situation: I tell the police "I did not see a terrorist crossing that street; I saw merely a woman with a baby". They blow up at the corner on Broadway. I told a 'truth' of my knowledge, but without complete (ahem!) identification of the whole situation. Did my 'truth' contradict 'the fact'? I say no, regardless a 'conflict' there seem to be.

~ Fact-truth-certainty-context (meaning 'identification'...or its lack), and how 'absolute'-vs-'relative' (or, 'omniscient'-vs-'contextual') should not be glossed over here, especially as the term 'context' has been hinted (not argued!) as being arbitrarily used.

~ I mean...consider Popper's context for his arguments (or, are they merely conjectures?)

LLAP

J:D

[John Dailey]

I have a question:

~ If Popper's primary argument is about describing and defending 'what scientists do' as imaginative conjecture and then testing for falsifiability of it, but his merely secondary one is that 'induction' is really never used (or useable), and, since all makes irrelevent any discussion on 'induction' as explicated by Hume, Russell, J.S.Mill, etc, then, since induction is what this thread is supposedly about...why is Popper even mentioned? --- Merely to establish that 'induction' (however defined according to whichever historical figure one accepts as clarifying it) is useless/un-used? That's it?

LLAP

J:D

Edited October 10, 2007 by John Dailey

[BaalChatzaf]

Ellen,

It is simple if you keep in mind that "known relationships among existents" are measurable. Even Popper would concede that. And that "measurable" quality is where Rand derives her "essence." That is not the same place from where Aristotle derived it. To him it was a quality like a primitive god (the God of Tree, the God of River, the God of Boulder, The God of Table, etc.). He simply called it "essence" and said you grasp it mentally through intuition (like the primitives did with faith).

That is not what Aristotle meant by ousia (which is mistranslated as essence). Ousia is the existence of a thing as a -this-, a unique entity in and of itself, of which predicates may be asserted, but is not merely the the list of predicates which apply to it. Aristotle would have disagreed with the Leibniz Law that an entity is the set of attributes it possesses. You have oversimplified grievously. Aristotle was wrong about a lot of things, but he was never, ever, ever simpleminded. His arguments are sophisticated and subtle. You have made a cartoon of his philosophy which is an unjust and ill informed thing to do. Shame!

I am currently taking a course on Aristotle, and I have come to appreciate why he is the Super Star of Philosophers. The Islamic and the Jewish sages and scholars of the period following 700 C.E. referred to him as THE Philosopher. Islamic and Jewish scholars used Aristotelean tropes to justify their religious beliefs and their theology. Later on, Thomas, got in on this process to defend and justify Catholicism and is justly famous for his Summa Theologica.

I am still perplexed (and annoyed) why someone as brilliant as Aristotle (he is super duper -smart-!) could have missed out on checking some of his pronouncements on matter and motion as put forth in -The Physics- and -On Meteorology- (De Coelo). I am seeking some professional insight on this lacuna from my course instructor Dr. Hendrick Lorentz who knows Aristotle stone cold and in the original Greek too. I will report on his opinion when I get it.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

That is not what Aristotle meant by ousia (which is mistranslated as essence). Ousia is the existence of a thing as a -this-, a unique entity in and of itself, of which predicates may be asserted, but is not merely the the list of predicates which apply to it. Aristotle would have disagreed with the Leibniz Law that an entity is the set of attributes it possesses. You have oversimplified grievously.

Bob,

If my comment is read as a description of Aristotle's mature thought, I agree with your charge of oversimplification. But that is not what I was saying (so please read carefully). I was showing where his idea came from—the roots. That is what I meant by "place from where Aristotle derived it." Your passage actually confirms my comment. Predicates may be asserted about any pantheistic god but such a god is not "the list of predicates which apply to it."

From what you are saying, though, ousia can be directly translated as "entity." I will have to read up on this. I do not believe Rand or Popper would object to the proposition that entities exist (mainly because they do ). But they both are against intrinsic essences that must be perceived through intuition. Essences described as thus are so similar to how pantheistic gods were perceived that the lineage is easy to see.

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

Michael,

Along with being very occupied with other issues, I didn't want to respond to your post #361 while you were writing your Atlas-50th report. Plus, as I've said, I have too much to do to be engaging in list debates until December. Thus I'll content myself with only three remarks in reply:

(1) I think that you still don't understand what Rand herself wrote pertaining to the crucial (in her opinion) role of true definitions (let alone what Popper said contrary the general category of such a thesis).

(2) Re the flat-earth belief: So is it your contention that the earth really was flat in the context of knowledge of anyone who thought it was back before advancing "measurement" capacities demonstrated the error of the belief? (I'm using "measurement" there in a mathematical sense, not in AR's omnibus meaning. I'll add that the context "back then" didn't include everyone's frame of reference. There were observational contraindications which could have been noticed -- and were noticed by some -- especially those living on sea coasts or on extensive plains. Columbus, for one, noticed.) The idea that those who thought the earth was flat were propounding truth -- in their context -- is what's objected to in the O'ist theory of "contextual certainty," not the idea that people might have had intelligent grounds for being mistaken.

(3) Re "Rand bashing": It sure does seem to me that you take any stringent intellectual critique of Rand as being "Rand bashing" -- whereas you're accepting of personal critique, within bounds. I by contrast classify intellectual critique which takes her ideas seriously, and thus as worth detailed examining, as what any philosopher is/should be subject to.

Ellen

___

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

(2) Re the flat-earth belief: So is it your contention that the earth really was flat in the context of knowledge of anyone who thought it was back before advancing "measurement" capacities demonstrated the error of the belief? (I'm using "measurement" there in a mathematical sense, not in AR's omnibus meaning. I'll add that the context "back then" didn't include everyone's frame of reference. There were observational contraindications which could have been noticed -- and were noticed by some -- especially those living on sea coasts or on extensive plains. Columbus, for one, noticed.) The idea that those who thought the earth was flat were propounding truth -- in their context -- is what's objected to in the O'ist theory of "contextual certainty," not the idea that people might have had intelligent grounds for being mistaken.

Ellen,

I am surprised I still have not been able to make this clear. What people meant by "earth" in ancient times actually was flat to them because what they meant by it was only what they knew. I contend that if we eliminate all we know and use ancient standards, we will arrive at the same conclusion.

What we mean by earth nowadays still refers to the same entity (earth), except the entity kinda got bigger and took on a form from a macro view (because of instruments). Thus when we say "earth," what comes to mind is a globe spinning and floating in space and kept on a course by gravity. What the ancients visualized was the ground or water under their feet and what they could see around them.

I think modern people who say the ancients were wrong do not take into account that the ancients, when they talked about the whole earth, were projecting from what they knew. The part that they knew, i.e., "the ground or water under their feet and what they could see around them," was correct (as it is for us). Projecting from that was wrong (but they had no way of knowing it at the time). Essentially we build on the knowledge (the truth) of the ancients, not on their projections (speculations). Within the standards of observation and ensuing measurement, what they saw and measured was true.

In Objectivist concept formation, the knowledge is kept and one adds to it. The projection from known facts (speculation) is the part that gets overturned. The modern tendency to oversimplify and simply say "the ancients were wrong, the earth is not flat," does not take the first steps of concept formation into account. It throws out the actual knowledge from observation (the truth) with the speculations projected from limited impressions (the part that gets overturned) and paints a picture that the ancients were a bunch of idiots. It also implies that EVERYTHING the ancients knew about the shape of the earth was wrong. Yet, as I pointed out, they were able to go to distant places time and time again, so they got something right.

In an experiment, a scientist sets strict limitations on what he is testing. I don't know why this same attitude is not understood by (some) scientific minds in trying to see through the eyes of ancients. The only difference is that they were not the ones who set the limitations on what they tested and used. The limitations were already in place at the time and we can only call them limitations because we built on them. We expanded the limitations by increasing the scope of our observation and measurements.

I am surprised that after complaining that "back then" not everyone had the same frame of reference you mentioned Columbus. There was a hell of a lot of human history before him and most all of the people in it believed that the earth was flat. He was the at the start of a new understanding of the shape of the earth. How can you acknowledge that a projection from known facts was overturned if you don't even acknowledge that it existed?

Michael

[Dragonfly]

I am surprised that after complaining that "back then" not everyone had the same frame of reference you mentioned Columbus. There was a hell of a lot of human history before him and most all of the people in it believed that the earth was flat. He was the at the start of a new understanding of the shape of the earth.

That is quite wrong. Even the ancient Greeks knew already that the Earth was round (Aristotle 330 BC); in 240 BC Erathostenes even calculated the circumference of the Earth with amazing accuracy. See for example here. The theory that the Earth is flat is wrong and always has been wrong.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Dragonfly,

From the Wikipedia article you just linked:

Belief in a flat Earth is found in mankind's oldest writings. In early Mesopotamian thought, the world was portrayed as a flat disk floating in the ocean, and this forms the premise for early Greek maps like those of Anaximander and Hecataeus of Miletus.

It even goes on. It is a shame those people could not time-travel, isn't it?

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Mike:

It also implies that EVERYTHING the ancients knew about the shape of the earth was wrong. Yet, as I pointed out, they were able to go to distant places time and time again, so they got something right.

This goes to my point that our knowledge does not necessarily have to be true to be useful. Even the ancients' false conjectures approached the truth, albeit from a great distance.

But just how true we can reasonably call this depends on your standards for truth. Objectivism (according to Mike) says the flat earth theory was "absolutely true" in its day*. Now the oblate spheroid theory is "absolutely true." No doubt it the earth is discovered to be cubical tomorrow Objectivism will say this is too "absolutely true".

Once again, it shows you can call anything "absolutely true" if you set your standards low enough.

The modern tendency to oversimplify and simply say "the ancients were wrong, the earth is not flat," does not take the first steps of concept formation into account.

ROFLMAO! So, saying the ancients were wrong and that the earth is not flat is, according to you, merely "the modern tendency to oversimplify"!!! What utter and complete nonsense.

However, I suppose this nonsense does demonstrate how easily the old-fashioned tendency to overelaborate can be used to defend even blatant absurdities; like, for example, the ancients were right and the earth is flat!

This "old-fashioned tendency" is called sophistry, Michael. Beware it.

*however this opinion seems to clash with Roger's earlier claims that civilisations of some early stage of scientific development have no "warrant" to claim "absolute truth." But this "warrant" appears rather ad hoc, to say the least.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

But just how true we can reasonably call this depends on your standards for truth.

Daniel,

This is one of the most intelligent things you have ever written (but probably not according to your intent).

Truth in Objectivism is correspondence of concept to reality according to a standard. So in measuring truth, one must state the standard (i.e., limitations). Apparently you agree that truth can be measured since you use the phrase "just how true."

The modern tendency (among some) is to see ancient perspectives through modern standards, then pretend the ancient perspectives contained no truth whatsoever. This is the error that led to you misunderstanding my words in the rest of your post and your derision against that misunderstanding. Unfortunately, you were only mocking your own misunderstanding, not me.

From what I have seen, Popper's standard of absolute truth is an omniscient perspective, i.e., true for all standards. In some cases, I note you use this view, especially when you like to mock, and in other cases you use truth as a commensurable quality. You kinda flip-flop at whim. It would be good someday to settle on one or the other in specific passages, or at least be clear about which you mean at the time. Or is that not vague enough for your kind of thinking?

Michael

[Dragonfly]

Belief in a flat Earth is found in mankind's oldest writings. In early Mesopotamian thought, the world was portrayed as a flat disk floating in the ocean, and this forms the premise for early Greek maps like those of Anaximander and Hecataeus of Miletus.

It even goes on. It is a shame those people could not time-travel, isn't it?

They had just a wrong theory. Other people did have the correct theory. A theory is correct (corresponds to reality) or it is wrong (does not correspond to reality). We can never be sure that a theory is correct, but we can be sure that a theory is wrong. In the course of history many theories have been proven wrong (which according to Objectivism would be impossible!). Scientific progress means that confidence we have that our latest theories are correct increases with time. But we never can be sure that we've reached the point where we can be absolutely sure that our theories are correct.

[Ellen Stuttle]

I think modern people who say the ancients were wrong do not take into account that the ancients, when they talked about the whole earth, were projecting from what they knew. The part that they knew, i.e., "the ground or water under their feet and what they could see around them," was correct (as it is for us). Projecting from that was wrong (but they had no way of knowing it at the time).

Well, you just said it yourself. The projection -- the theory -- that the earth is flat was wrong.

In Objectivist concept formation, the knowledge is kept and one adds to it. The projection from known facts (speculation) is the part that gets overturned.

Even in Objectivist concept formation, the concept would have been something like your description above, "the ground or water under their feet [i hope they're in a boat, not walking on water!] and what they could see around them," or more like, "the world where we live," not the specifics of the theory, that is, if the concept was correctly formed according to her strictures.

The modern tendency to oversimplify [...] paints a picture that the ancients were a bunch of idiots. It also implies that EVERYTHING the ancients knew about the shape of the earth was wrong.

That's what you say is the picture painted. Sure isn't what I say. I hardly consider the ancients a bunch of idiots, or that everything they thought about the shape of the earth was wrong. However, I do believe that the belief that the earth was flat, was wrong.

Re the ancients not being so dumb, I'm reminded of a favorite quote from one of my favorite books I edited, A Field Guide to Conservation Archaeology in North America -- cumbersome though informative title; wonderful book. At one place, I forget off-hand exactly why, the issue arose of the marvels of construction certain ancient civilizations performed. Van Daaniken's Chariots of the Gods thesis was a popular topic of the time; he argued that such feats as the pyramids had to have required extra-terrestrial help to construct. Georgess McHargue, who wrote most of the text (her archaeologist husband Michael Roberts did the charts, graphs, diagrams, etc., as well as providing the expert knowledge) wryly quipped: "Just because we, with our modern technology, can't figure out how they built them [the pyramids] doesn't mean that they couldn't figure out how they did it." I have no disrespect for the abilities of the ancients, Michael. Nevertheless, the flat-earth theory, according to our best evidence today, has been falsified -- which means it never was correct.

Ellen

___

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Nevertheless, the flat-earth theory, according to our best evidence today, has been falsified -- which means it never was correct.

Ellen,

I think I summed up the apparent conflict in a recent post above with the commensurability of truth and pegging it to a standard.

There is the simple fact that the way the flat-earth theory is falsified today (or better, was falsified over time) was impossible to do back then. I am very comfortable with the statement "within the context of today's knowledge, the flat-earth theory has always been false." Take away the qualifier, and I see more questions than answers.

Michael