Two Kinds of "Induction": Important similarities and trivial differences

[Brant Gaede]

I can't comment on technical issues in epistemology. Do we need these issues?

Brant,

Who are the "we"? The issues are rather crucial to scientific epistemology; and the fate of the scientific approach to understanding the world, I very deeply believe, is rather crucial to what becomes of "civilization as we know it." But that's no reason for anyone who isn't interested in the issues to take an interest. I would strenuously object, however, were you to say that because you don't find the subject compelling, I therefore shouldn't and shouldn't talk about it. Not that you would say this. ;-) I'm merely pointing out the pitfall in asking what "we" need.

Ellen

___

But just how important is the field of scientific epistemology to the actual practice of science? That is one question I've not seen addressed at all on any of these threads. Ever since the discovery of the modern scientific method, do philosophers really have anything to teach scientists that they don't already know?

Suppose we divide scientists into the following three groups:

1) Scientists who have extensively studied the writings of Ayn Rand on objectivist epistemology.

2) Scientists who have extensively studied the writings of Karl Popper on scientific methodology.

3) Scientists who have never read anything by either Rand or Popper.

Should we expect that, on average, the scientific methodology employed by scientists in these three groups should be any different? If so, what differences in scientific methodology practiced by scientists in each of these three groups should we expect to see?

Martin

You left out 4) Scientists who have been influenced by other scientists who have been influenced by 1 and/or 2.

You left out 5) Scientists who have been influenced by scientists who have been influeced by 4).

You left out 6) Scientists who have been ...

And of course you left out who influenced the philosophers.

--Brant

Any response to Martin's serious question? That is, how does epistemology actually effect scientific enquiry?

Alfonso

That wasn't his question. That's your question. We are talking about "scientific epistemology." Do you deny that there is any such thing or assert that if there is it's worthless? If there is such what's the contradiction or difference regarding Objectivist epistemology? I bet we'll end up with a chicken or egg debate. What came first: the (scientific) discovery or the epistemology?

--Brant

[Ellen Stuttle]

[....] We are talking about "scientific epistemology." Do you deny that there is any such thing or assert that if there is it's worthless? If there is such what's the contradiction or difference regarding Objectivist epistemology? I bet we'll end up with a chicken or egg debate. What came first: the (scientific) discovery or the epistemology?

I signed on to post the next post, but saw Brant's post.

Brant, surely, after all this discussion, you aren't claiming that "Objectivist" epistemology is the scientific epistemology -- unless you're using "Objectivist" in the way you sometimes do of meaning correct (in your view) philosophy versus Rand's Objectivism?

Ellen

___

[Ellen Stuttle]

(This is what I signed on to post.)

Late-night personal comment:

Unending* Quest, the title of Popper's "autobiography" (as presented first in the Popper volume of The Living Philosophers series and then expanded) versus Rand's trying to Wrap It Up (borrowing Bob K.'s style). This difference encapsulates why so many scientists, and I, reverberate to Popper's approach to thought in ways we don't to Rand's.

Someplace on a (long) previous thread, I don't even remember which, I talked of my understanding of the history of philsophy as "The Great Conversation," the title of the introductory volume of The Great Books series. I always thought of philosophy that way, not as good-guys versus bad-guys (or, borrowing from George Smith, white hats versus black hats; he says that he sees the history of philosophy as much more white hats whereas Rand saw it as predominantly black hats).

An "undending quest": that's so much the way scientists think. Tennyson's "Ulysses": "to follow knowledge..." It was the poem which to me, as to the era of his writing, spoke so much to my feeling of what life was all about.

Ellen

PS: The actual title is Unended* Quest. I keep misremembering it as "Unending."

___

Edited October 7, 2007 by Ellen Stuttle

[tjohnson]

But just how important is the field of scientific epistemology to the actual practice of science? That is one question I've not seen addressed at all on any of these threads. Ever since the discovery of the modern scientific method, do philosophers really have anything to teach scientists that they don't already know?

Suppose we divide scientists into the following three groups:

1) Scientists who have extensively studied the writings of Ayn Rand on objectivist epistemology.

2) Scientists who have extensively studied the writings of Karl Popper on scientific methodology.

3) Scientists who have never read anything by either Rand or Popper.

Should we expect that, on average, the scientific methodology employed by scientists in these three groups should be any different? If so, what differences in scientific methodology practiced by scientists in each of these three groups should we expect to see?

Martin

Interesting question, Martin. The idea of 'falsifiability' I think evolved in physics independent Popper's work. In one one of my textbooks in Quantum Mechanics (may have been Rolf G. Winter) he several times stated that one can't make propositions in a meaningful way unless one has the opportunity to observe an actual instance of it - or something to that effect. This sounds very similar to Popper. I think having this epistemological stance can greatly effect the direction that a physicist might take in his work. A good example is Einstein and his work in later years trying to find the Unified Field Theory and his distrust of QM because of the explicit role of the observer in it. There is paradigm shift involved when you one day realize that there is a relationship between the observer and the observed and old fashioned 2-valued determinism breaks down.

But for the most part I think scientists handle these issues without philosophers and , as Korzybski says, most philosophy represents a confusion in orders of abstraction..

[tjohnson]

Seriously. ITOE would certainly be appropriate reading for participating in discussions in this section (Objectivist Philoxophy > 2 - Epistemology).

If for no other reason, for insulation from the sort of reaction which someone in a Popper discussion forum would get if they proceeded to declare all sorts of failings they had discerned in Popper - based on isolated quotes from a few people and reading an article or two.

However someone else reacts is their problem. I have been reading posts in this list for several months now from people who have apparently read EVERYTHING Rand wrote and they quote extensively her words and argue incessantly about what they mean. I am satisfied to read what the experts quote and think she means and comment on that. After all we can never question Rand anymore as to what she meant and so it is up to the people who come after to interpret and put into practice.

[Brant Gaede]

[....] We are talking about "scientific epistemology." Do you deny that there is any such thing or assert that if there is it's worthless? If there is such what's the contradiction or difference regarding Objectivist epistemology? I bet we'll end up with a chicken or egg debate. What came first: the (scientific) discovery or the epistemology?

I signed on to post the next post, but saw Brant's post.

Brant, surely, after all this discussion, you aren't claiming that "Objectivist" epistemology is the scientific epistemology -- unless you're using "Objectivist" in the way you sometimes do of meaning correct (in your view) philosophy versus Rand's Objectivism?

___

Ellen,

The question wasn't rhetorical. I am not an expert on any kind of epistemology, Objectivist or otherwise. However, I see what scientists do (scientific epistemology) to be based on the more generally applied philosophical epistemology. They are all various kinds of reasoning and inquiry. The scientific method is only part of what scientists use but eventually fall back on to buttress their theories. Philosophical epistemology is essentially contentless while the scientific is concerned with what is actually "out there." Objectivist ethics and politics are based on Objectivist epistemology only to the extent that they can be reasonably demonstrated to be valid which demands inquiry--investigation--not just deductive jumping from stone to stone across a river of ignorance: metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, politics. Sociological inquiry, like scientific, is tentative searching for and application of knowledge, not the bulldozer of Objectivist absolutism.

If Objectivist epistemology is knowingly wrong in this or that way then it can't be Objectivism until the philosophy is corrected. This is different from Objectivism, the philosophy of Ayn Rand cast in bronze, albeit with some articulated parts, and put on public display for purposes of worship and control (and war against "the enemies of Objectivism").

--Brant

Edited October 7, 2007 by Brant Gaede

[BaalChatzaf]

But for the most part I think scientists handle these issues without philosophers and , as Korzybski says, most philosophy represents a confusion in orders of abstraction..

An example of this is the late Richard P. Feynman, one of the top ten physicists of the 20th century. In the well known three volume set -Lectures on Physics-, Feynman states Popper's position without any help from Popper. Feynman says a scientific theory "must stick its neck out", which is to say the theory (or hypothesis) is posited with the possibility of falsification by later factual findings. In short, if a scientific theory does not run the risk of being wrong, then it has nothing to offer us.

This should be pretty clear from the nature of theories, particularly theories in physics. As soon as the theory goes beyond the finite set of facts that were used to found it, it is in danger of being falsified. Many theories of the past met that fate, not the least of which was Newtonian Mechanics and Gravitation which we know to be false as a -general theory- of the phenomena which it deals with. Mechanics is about the motion of bodies and Gravitation is, well, it is about gravitation. We know from experiment that the effective (relativistic) mass of a body measured in an inertial frame depends on the velocity of the body in that frame. Ditto for momentum. The momentum of a body with rest mass m_0 is m_0*v/sqrt(1 - v.v/c^2) where v is the velocity vector of the body. It is this momentum that is conserved in interactions.

Newton defined "motion" (the archaic term for momentum) as m*v where m is the mass (which is the rest mass, since mass is invariant in Newtonian physics). This is not conserved. Newton "stuck his neck out" and his physics served us well for over 200 years. But it is not right in the context of very high speeds (speeds approximating the speed of light). Newton's Law of Gravitation is not correct either although it gives a good approximation. What makes it wrong is that Newton assumes time and space are absolute and that gravitational interaction is instant.

It was Einstein and Lorentz that wielded the ax to Newton's theory by proposing a better one that fit the facts.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited October 7, 2007 by BaalChatzaf

[Alfonso Jones]

Seriously. ITOE would certainly be appropriate reading for participating in discussions in this section (Objectivist Philoxophy > 2 - Epistemology).

If for no other reason, for insulation from the sort of reaction which someone in a Popper discussion forum would get if they proceeded to declare all sorts of failings they had discerned in Popper - based on isolated quotes from a few people and reading an article or two.

However someone else reacts is their problem. I have been reading posts in this list for several months now from people who have apparently read EVERYTHING Rand wrote and they quote extensively her words and argue incessantly about what they mean. I am satisfied to read what the experts quote and think she means and comment on that. After all we can never question Rand anymore as to what she meant and so it is up to the people who come after to interpret and put into practice.

Again - I would not presume to critique Kant without reading Kant - not just by reading quotes from Rand. Nor someone else. It would not be intellectually responsible. Think - primary sources.

Alfonso

[Brant Gaede]

Newton defined "motion" (the archaic term for momentum) as m*v where m is the mass (which is the rest mass, since mass is invariant in Newtonian physics). This is not conserved. Newton "stuck his neck out" and his physics served us well for over 200 years. But it is not right in the context of very high speeds (speeds approximating the speed of light). Newton's Law of Gravitation is not correct either although it gives a good approximation. What makes it wrong is that Newton assumes time and space are absolute and that gravitational interaction is instant.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Does it matter whether gravitational interaction is instant or not? If more matter could come into existence spontaneously then, yes. Of course gravity gets weaker with distance which is why many physicists are saying the universe is flying apart and won't come back together again.

--Brant

[BaalChatzaf]

Does it matter whether gravitational interaction is instant or not? If more matter could come into existence spontaneously then, yes. Of course gravity gets weaker with distance which is why many physicists are saying the universe is flying apart and won't come back together again.

--Brant

Yes is does matter. GPS will not work well used according to Newtonian Gravitation which does not and cannot correctly predict the gravitational red shift. If GPS is used in "Newtonian" mode, the locations given can be off thousands of meters at the end of the daily clock interval. During a war it makes the difference between hitting a target and missing a target. During peacetime it means a plane cannot be landed in a totally automatic manner.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Dragonfly]

But Peikoff&Harriman tell us that "his gravitational theory is extremely unphysical", it is "rationalistic" and if they say so it must be true. A is A!

[Brant Gaede]

Does it matter whether gravitational interaction is instant or not? If more matter could come into existence spontaneously then, yes. Of course gravity gets weaker with distance which is why many physicists are saying the universe is flying apart and won't come back together again.

--Brant

Yes is does matter. GPS will not work well used according to Newtonian Gravitation which does not and cannot correctly predict the gravitational red shift. If GPS is used in "Newtonian" mode, the locations given can be off thousands of meters at the end of the daily clock interval. During a war it makes the difference between hitting a target and missing a target. During peacetime it means a plane cannot be landed in a totally automatic manner.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Can't the GPS be programmed using "Newtonian" mode plus a compensating factor (if Einstein's theories were yet to be discovered)? Are Einstein's theories used that way?

--Brant

[BaalChatzaf]

Can't the GPS be programmed using "Newtonian" mode plus a compensating factor (if Einstein's theories were yet to be discovered)? Are Einstein's theories used that way?

--Brant

The Schwartzschild approximation to the Einstein field equations is what is used. There is really no good post-Newtonian fix. Either you have a model that accounts for the gravitational red shift or you don't. This requires a locally Lorentz invariant theory which Newton's is not.

There are post-Newtonian approximations to the solution to the Einstein field equations (which are extremely difficult so solve, they are very non-linear). But it will still be the Einsteinian theory that is approximated, not the Newtonian.

Newton's theory is categorically flawed. It is based on absolute space and absolute time. Neither is the case. Furthermore in Newton's theory gravitational interaction is at a distance and instantaneous.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited October 8, 2007 by BaalChatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Mike:

The mention of buggy methodology above is a perfect example. The methodology for Popper is buggy precisely because it is based on intuition, not observation and comparison (filtered through deductive logic). Yet this is downplayed as if it were not important ("intuitionism is criticised in passing"). Would one say of a critique of a preacher, "faith is criticised in passing" as if the belief in God were unrelated to faith?

How many posts have you written on this now? And how many times have I said, the main point of Popper's critique is against the big A's essentialist methodology of definitions, not his essentialist metaphysics.

Daniel,

If there is no objection to the metaphysics, there can be no real objection to the methodology since it relies on the metaphysics to even exist. The definitions are of "essences."

Objectivist definition of concepts is the same thing as defining categories and I cannot see where Popper would object to specifying a category based on measurement (i.e., what is being measured), and even relate it to similar categories that included the feature(s) being measured. In other words, differentia and genus. You, yourself, never answered how Popper arrives at a category in such a manner so that, for instance, the word "wind," although vague, is not so vague as to include a foot or a tree. Yet you accept that it is precise enough to exclude those items. If you can present some kind of standard for this, I am all ears. If not, I will stick with measurement of a specific feature or features.

You will probably be appalled to learn that I just returned from the TAS 50th anniversary of Atlas Shrugged conference and I presented my idea of comparing the two (Popper and Rand) in the manner I have explained in my former posts to some of the really intelligent people there. In all cases, they got that sudden "light bulb turned on" expression in their eyes when I mentioned that all of Popper's examples showing vagueness of a term included measurements, and said something to the effect of, "Very interesting."

I intend pursue this line in a more technical paper and submit it for publication somewhere. I will need to read more Popper first, so that, at least should please you. My conclusions might not, though.

Probably one of the highlights of the event I attended in terms of our own discussions was when Tibor Machan was asked in an Q&A about the is/ought problem. He mentioned Hume's argument and stated that Hume basically was claiming that one cannot deduce a conclusion regarding a fact that is not given in the premises, so in this instance he is correct. There is no ought in the premises, so no ought can be deduced from them (as in a syllogism). However, there is a big difference between deducing is from ought, which can't be done, and deriving is from ought, which not only can be done but should be done.*

Rand never claimed anyone can deduce is from ought, but she did claim that one can derive is from ought.*

I happen to agree with Tibor in this matter (and I even think Rand would have, although she has accused Hume of denying causality and I have to still work my way through that by reading more Hume to see if she was oversimplifying to the point of error). So I guess we are merely left with different interpretations of what "solving Hume's problem" means and, possibly, tracing where a misunderstanding of Hume's argument (replacing "deduce" with "derive") has led to poor effects in philosophical systems based on such a misunderstanding.

Also (to the relief of Bob K., I am sure), I got David Kelley's book The Art of Reasoning, which deals with standard logic and is widely used as a college text. (It was an expensive little item, too, but at least I got it autographed in a very nice and personal manner.) After a while, I will be able to fluently speak the language of those who have studied logic formally.

Michael

* EDIT - As was pointed out to me by Roger Bissell, I made a serious mistake and the order is wrong here. (The reason was being tired when I posted, not lack of understanding.) It should read as follows:

There is a big difference between

deducing

ought from is, which can't be done, and

deriving

ought from is, which not only can be done but should be done.

Rand never claimed anyone can

deduce

ought from is, but she did claim that one can

derive

ought from is.

[John Dailey]

~ One thing I've discovered in this thread, upon a couple re-readings no less, is how easy it's been to get caught up in actually different subjects presumably talking about the same thing(s). Maybe this thread should be re-titled "Important differences and trivial similarities."

~ 'Induction' is the ostensible subject, its method(s), definition-according-to-whom, usefulness/uselessness, etc. Yet this subject has segued into concept-formation/development (with no referencing to Piaget), definitions proper, definitions usefulness/uselessness, what scientists do (and innuendedly presumably, for some strange reason, should continue to [!]), and finally ostensive defining debates seguing into a translation/communication prob which is a whole separate subject-prob on its own.

~ Of course they're all related subjects, but, why is it so hard to stay focused on one topic?

LLAP

J:D

Edited October 8, 2007 by John Dailey

[Dragonfly]

Rand never claimed anyone can deduce is from ought, but she did claim that one can derive is from ought.

Huh? What is the difference? All the dictionaries that I've checked confirm that "deduce" and "derive" are synonyms.

[Daniel Barnes]

Dragonfly:

Huh? What is the difference? All the dictionaries that I've checked confirm that "deduce" and "derive" are synonyms.

But, my dear Dragonfly, conceptually and philosophically speaking, there is a world of difference between deduce and derive. For to "deduce" is a mere triviality, the sort of careless mistake the likes of David Hume might make, unequipped as he was with a full theory of concept formation. However, to "derive" is something else altogether; an act of powerful integration reuniting logic and reality, fact and value, that unites the endlessly warring dualisms at last in a kind of Simon-and-Garfunkel Reunion Tour kind of way.

Or perhaps, you simply have the wrong concept for "synonym"...

[BaalChatzaf]

Dragonfly:

Huh? What is the difference? All the dictionaries that I've checked confirm that "deduce" and "derive" are synonyms.

But, my dear Dragonfly, conceptually and philosophically speaking, there is a world of difference between deduce and derive. For to "deduce" is a mere triviality, the sort of careless mistake the likes of David Hume might make, unequipped as he was with a full theory of concept formation. However, to "derive" is something else altogether; an act of powerful integration reuniting logic and reality, fact and value, that unites the endlessly warring dualisms at last in a kind of Simon-and-Garfunkel Reunion Tour kind of way.

Or perhaps, you simply have the wrong concept for "synonym"...

The likes of David Hume showed that no one has ever -perceived- a necessary connection between objects or events. He was like the little boy who pointed out the the emperor was bare ass naked. Some people thank him and others speak of "the likes" of David Hume. And others still, persist in doing metaphysics.

David Hume's only non-intentional sin was begetting the insanity of Immanuel Kant. If Kant had not awakened from "his dogmatic slumbers" we probably would not be having this conversation.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Ellen Stuttle]

Rand never claimed anyone can deduce is from ought, but she did claim that one can derive is from ought.

Huh? What is the difference? All the dictionaries that I've checked confirm that "deduce" and "derive" are synonyms.

Besides, as was discussed ad infinitum on one (or more) of the threads, if she didn't mean "derive"** in the sense of arrive at by logical entailment in the context in which she said it, she wasn't addressing the point of "those philosophers" at whom the off-hand dismissal was purportedly aimed, so what was the relevance of the remark?

Ellen

** Correction: She didn't use the word "derive" in the paragraph which starts "In answer to those philosophers [...]." She used "determines," which is highly nebulous as to meaning. Also "validation," which again is nebulous. "Derive," if MSK is quoting Tibor correctly, is Tibor's interpretation, and was also the interpretation of some in the dicussions here. Later in the same work, she said, "to a living consciousness, every "is" implies an "ought". Again, the wording is nebulous; she doesn't explicitly say "entails," but neither does she say "provides a conditional [if you want X, doing Y is required]." I think that the two most plausible options in "parsing" these passages are: Either to conclude that she was claiming to have established entailment of an "ought" statement from an "is" statement, or to conclude that she was writing masterly weasel-wording. (The other option is to conclude that she was writing carelessly and wasn't clear herself on what she was saying, but I think that's less likely.)

___

Edited October 8, 2007 by Ellen Stuttle

[Ellen Stuttle]

[...] what scientists do (and innuendedly presumably, for some strange reason, should continue to [!]), [...].

I'll state explicitly -- never mind "innuendedly presumably" -- borrowing one of Bob K.'s refrains: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." It would be excellent to counteract the politicization of certain current areas of science, but the Rand/Peikovian (and nowadays Harriman) contention that modern physics has been "corrupted" by bad philosophy and that O'ist epistemology cum a return to "Newtonianism" (or rather, their notion of "Newtonianism") is what the doctor ordered, is off base. Instead, O'ists would stand to learn a thing or several from "what scientists do."

Ellen

___

[Roger Bissell]

[...] what scientists do (and innuendedly presumably, for some strange reason, should continue to [!]), [...].

I'll state explicitly -- never mind "innuendedly presumably" -- borrowing one of Bob K.'s refrains: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." It would be excellent to counteract the politicization of certain current areas of science, but the Rand/Peikovian (and nowadays Harriman) contention that modern physics has been "corrupted" by bad philosophy and that O'ist epistemology cum a return to "Newtonianism" (or rather, their notion of "Newtonianism") is what the doctor ordered, is off base. Instead, O'ists would stand to learn a thing or several from "what scientists do."

Ellen

___

Well, I wouldn't assume -- as you do -- that Objectivists are impervious to "what scientists do," or that they have an unshakeable faith in Newton as against Einstein et al.

1. As Rand noted in the early 1960s in her review of John Herman Randall's book Aristotle, Einstein correctly rejected the absolute time/absolute space framework of Newton, actually returning to the relative time/relative space framework asserted by the much-maligned Aristotle, who supposedly impeded the development of modern science. (As is often the case, the effects of any given philosopher are a mixed bag, and a case can be made on either side for whether they helped humanity progress or not. I personally think it's a cheap shot, condemning Aristotle for some of his wackier scientific views, considering what he did for us in terms of logical methodology and conceptual clarity of ideas such as causality, space, and time.)

2. As Peikoff noted more recently, in his lectures on "Induction in Physics and Philosophy":

It’s possible to make honest errors in applying any one of these rules [of induction], errors which don’t involve any philosophic corruption. But the fact is that, so long as you know the proper principles explicitly and conscientiously seek to follow them, these errors will fairly quickly show up, simply by the continued use of the proper method. And this is why science by its nature is self-corrective. For instance, over-generalizations, in which limitation to a specific context has been over-looked, are soon enough shown to have exceptions in some new context. And you know that Einstein was supposed to have shown that Newton holds only when you deal with speeds that don’t approach the speed of light, if I dare say that Newton over-generalized, which I hate to say, especially in favor of somebody in the 20th century.

REB

P.S. -- Skeptics about the Objectivist theory of knowledge would do well to study and re-study the second point, in lieu of listening to the entire lecture series. "Context" is not just some kind of weasel word that Objectivists use to get out of being wrong, when their provisional, qualified conclusions need to be revised. It is part of the identity of knowledge. (There ya go, Daniel -- the sacred, holy, omnipotent power of Identity. You'd better believe it!)

[BaalChatzaf]

2. As Peikoff noted more recently, in his lectures on "Induction in Physics and Philosophy":

It’s possible to make honest errors in applying any one of these rules [of induction], errors which don’t involve any philosophic corruption. But the fact is that, so long as you know the proper principles explicitly and conscientiously seek to follow them, these errors will fairly quickly show up, simply by the continued use of the proper method. And this is why science by its nature is self-corrective. For instance, over-generalizations, in which limitation to a specific context has been over-looked, are soon enough shown to have exceptions in some new context. And you know that Einstein was supposed to have shown that Newton holds only when you deal with speeds that don’t approach the speed of light, if I dare say that Newton over-generalized, which I hate to say, especially in favor of somebody in the 20th century.

REB

P.S. -- Skeptics about the Objectivist theory of knowledge would do well to study and re-study the second point, in lieu of listening to the entire lecture series. "Context" is not just some kind of weasel word that Objectivists use to get out of being wrong, when their provisional, qualified conclusions need to be revised. It is part of the identity of knowledge. (There ya go, Daniel -- the sacred, holy, omnipotent power of Identity. You'd better believe it!)

Newtonian physics is wrong at any speed. But it is close enough to right at low velocities and in a weak gravitational field to be of use in bridge building and celestial navigation. Newtonian Gravitation is a dead looser in the context of the GPS. It simply does not account for or deal with the Gravitational Red Shift (time variation in weak and strong gravitational fields). Also its fundamental incorrectness, the absoluteness of space and time does not go away at any scale.

In the non-gravitational aspects of reality classical mechanics and thermodynamics does not get specific heat and black body radiation correctly at all. It isn't even close. Nor does classical electrodynamics account for the persistence atoms of atomic spectra. In these areas it is dead wrong. Not even close.

The reason why quantum physics was developed in the first place was to give us a correct account of the interaction of radiation and matter. Classical physics failed -completely- in that area.

The only context the really counts is what the experiments tell us. Those are the FACTS.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Ellen Stuttle]

2. As Peikoff noted more recently [...]. For instance, over-generalizations, in which limitation to a specific context has been over-looked, are soon enough shown to have exceptions in some new context. And you know that Einstein was supposed to have shown that Newton holds only when you deal with speeds that don’t approach the speed of light, if I dare say that Newton over-generalized, which I hate to say, especially in favor of somebody in the 20th century.

REB

P.S. -- Skeptics about the Objectivist theory of knowledge would do well to study and re-study the second point, in lieu of listening to the entire lecture series. "Context" is not just some kind of weasel word that Objectivists use to get out of being wrong, when their provisional, qualified conclusions need to be revised. It is part of the identity of knowledge. (There ya go, Daniel -- the sacred, holy, omnipotent power of Identity. You'd better believe it!)

Sure does look like a weasel word in the context, since, no, Newton wasn't right within certain boundary conditions and only over-generalizing. As Bob detailed above, he was wrong. Magnificently wrong. I mean no disrespect to Newton in saying that he got it wrong. I consider Newton's work in physics a really incredible intellectual achievement. But he wasn't contextually correct; he was just wrong.

Ellen

___

[BaalChatzaf]

Sure does look like a weasel word in the context, since, no, Newton wasn't right within certain boundary conditions and only over-generalizing. As Bob detailed above, he was wrong. Magnificently wrong. I mean no disrespect to Newton in saying that he got it wrong. I consider Newton's work in physics a really incredible intellectual achievement. But he wasn't contextually correct; he was just wrong.

Ellen

___

Mistakes and all, Isaac Newton -invented- theoretical physics as we know it. He struck the coin and we are living on the interest. As it says in the Rabbinical Literature: Look unto the Rock from which you were hewed.

Aristotle was also magnificently wrong about many things. But we cannot even criticize Aristotle without using terminology that Aristotle invented. Right or Wrong, both Aristotle and Newton left their mark on how we think about the world. The Lion is known by his Claw.

PS: I am taking a course, at Princeton, on Aristotle's Ethics, in particular the Nichomachean Ethics. We will also be studying De Anima. I find this work to be much more sensible than Aristotle's Physics. It is very much -this worldly-. Aristotle had a very good grasp of human psychology. A much better grasp, than he had of matter and motion (both terms that Aristotle refined).

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited October 8, 2007 by BaalChatzaf

[tjohnson]

It’s possible to make honest errors in applying any one of these rules [of induction], errors which don’t involve any philosophic corruption. But the fact is that, so long as you know the proper principles explicitly and conscientiously seek to follow them, these errors will fairly quickly show up, simply by the continued use of the proper method. And this is why science by its nature is self-corrective. For instance, over-generalizations, in which limitation to a specific context has been over-looked, are soon enough shown to have exceptions in some new context. And you know that Einstein was supposed to have shown that Newton holds only when you deal with speeds that don’t approach the speed of light, if I dare say that Newton over-generalized, which I hate to say, especially in favor of somebody in the 20th century.

Another view of this is that Newton unconsciously assumed that the speed of light was infinite, indeed, in the transformation equations when you let the term for the speed of light go to infinity the equation reverts to Newtonian form. Now, does this mean he made an error of induction?