Two Kinds of "Induction": Important similarities and trivial differences

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Kelley's monograph is not complete, so it is hard to judge, but from what I have seen so far his argument is no less feeble than Peikoff's.

That's interesting. I haven't seen the monograph, but I wouldn't expect David to be overly enlightening on the subject -- with all due credit to David's intellect, but science isn't his...native territory, shall we say.

It is my contention that the main value of some posters is to bash Rand and/or Objectivism, not to understand. Notice here that both Daniel and Ellen are bashing Kelley's ideas without any real familiarity with them.

Incidentally, The Art of Reasoning (1998) is used almost exclusively in college courses throughout the country in places that are mostly not very Objectivism-friendly. It is a book on formal logic and is in its third edition, since it is being more and more adopted as a standard university text. (He mentioned at the 50th Atlas Shrugged anniversary celebration a funny story as to why it was not adopted at one college. The administrative faculty person rejecting it said something to the effect that "No, it is an excellent text, but I hear he is a Rand nut. We can't afford to give those people money.")

I wonder what these present critics of Kelley's knowledge and ideas (without needing to do anything mundane like actually read his text) have written so far that is in the third edition in the academic world. I hold to my observation that the value is bashing, not true understanding. This is one incontestable item of proof.

I don't mind criticism, but reading the text is the bare minimum for being taken seriously. Standards like that are important and it is embarrassing to see otherwise intelligent people ignore them.

Michael

[Martin Radwin]

The problem of induction is, When do you know your empirical generalizations are correct? (That's how AR states the problem as well, btw.) The answer is, You don't, ever. That's actually the same answer Leonard Peikoff gives; only he calls never being sure "contextual certainty."

Then what are the objectivists and Popperians spending so much time debating about on these threads? This really seems like an argument about semantics. What is the substantive difference between saying that a theory, no matter how often its predictions have been successful, may still be subsequently falsified, and saying that the theory, having many successful predictions, is something we may be contextually certain of, acknowledging that the context may change with further data, ultimately falsifying the theory?

Has any reputable philosopher, objectivist or not, argued that induction can absolutely prove any generalization? If not, then pointing out that induction cannot accomplish this seems like attacking a straw man. Who has argued that it can?

Martin

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Then what are the objectivists and Popperians spending so much time debating about on these threads? This really seems like an argument about semantics.

Martin,

It is mostly semantics.

But there is another element (and I hate to keep sounding like an Randroid): Rand/Objectivism bashing. I would even say Popper bashing if Dykes is involved, but that is not where I am coming from. I perceive that my stated intent of making a study about where Poppers's ideas align with Rand's is treated as a threat. If it so happens that someone can show that both Rand and Popper were talking about the same universal problems and offering similar solutions with different jargon, then Rand will have to be accepted as a respectable philosopher by these people. For some reason that bothers the dickens out of them.

I have merely kept going in this debate because I decided to not let the issue be buried once again by voluminous repetition and intimidation (their favorite forms of argument).

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Mike:

You used to be good. I don't know what in hell happened. Noting your current rhetoric and high level of error, why on earth would I take your advice on anything—especially charging tigers?

But you haven't shown my "high level of error." AFAICS you haven't shown any errors in my arguments. I'm surprised that you can come out with this kind of claim.

But enough with the he-said-she-said. What I suppose will eventually persuade people, Mike, is when you actually front up with your so-called "technical" essay on the similarities between Popper and Rand - y'know, the one about "vagueness" that you're going to put up for publication. Then we'll be able to see if you really do know what you're talking about, or whether this is just another example of the style of argument David Ramsay Steele called "bluff, buttressed by abuse of all critics."

Perhaps it will eventually emerge. But there was also that major essay you kept promising us all back in Solo days - y'know, the one that was going to "blow the covers" off the mind/body problem? Even tho you'd never heard the term "determinism" prior to that particular debate? That never saw the light of day either.

Look: For some reason you want to have very strong opinions on subjects like this that you have taken little or no trouble to inform yourself of. Moreover this simple lack of knowledge does not hinder you in the slightest from holding forth on them at extraordinary length. A few of us who are better informed have tried to put you straight, but, Canute-like, it has been to little avail. Why don't you either 1) do a bit of donkey work and get up to speed, or 2) stick to territories you have better familiarity with, like music, or perhaps psychology? I honestly think it would be a far better use of both your energies, and ours.

Edited October 13, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Why don't you either 1) do a bit of donkey work and get up to speed, or 2) stick to territories you have better familiarity with, like music, or perhaps psychology? I honestly think it would be a far better use of both your energies, and ours.

Daniel,

I appreciate your repeated advice and concern for my intellectual welfare, but it ain't gonna' happen. Telling me to stop is a lost cause if there ever was one. That's worse than telling you to stop, and that is really really lost.

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

Epistemologically stuck. Just like Peikoff with his DIM. Semantical tail-chasing. Where goest thouth reality? Bring me a scientist, Ayn Rand, please!

--Brant

[Daniel Barnes]

Mike:

I appreciate your repeated advice and concern for my intellectual welfare, but it ain't gonna' happen.

Oh well, I look forward to reading your essay then.

[Daniel Barnes]

Martin:

Then what are the objectivists and Popperians spending so much time debating about on these threads? This really seems like an argument about semantics.

You have struck on an important point, one I have myself argued on this thread and elsewhere. The difference is merely terminological - and rhetorical.

What is the substantive difference between saying that a theory, no matter how often its predictions have been successful, may still be subsequently falsified, and saying that the theory, having many successful predictions, is something we may be contextually certain of, acknowledging that the context may change with further data, ultimately falsifying the theory?

Nothing! You are on the money. I have argued all along that "contextual certainty" is merely Objectivist terminology for what everyone else calls uncertainty. Fred Seddon has also argued* - correctly in my view - that Rand's actual position on knowledge is merely the familiar skeptical proposition that we can know P but P may be false. (There are other areas where Rand makes the same purely verbal switcheroos, such as in her discussion of "absolute precision" in the ITOE)

*where Seddon goes wrong is trying to suggest that this was somehow Rand's intention all along. I think, like many philosophers, she was unaware that the actual consequences of her arguments ended up in a different place from where she intended.

Edited October 13, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I had, for the upteenth time, just taken this to rest when I came across a very funny post on another forum (see here). I burst out laughing when I read it.

My impression that Popper merely gave the same universal problems new names is corroborated by at least one other published thinker: Martin Gardner. I do not know enough to fully embrace or reject this article (and I have already seen one defense against it by a Popperian). Also, the magazine does seem to be a more popular-oriented vehicle although it is internationally refereed, but at least I do know that I am not alone in my thinking.

A Skeptical Look at Karl Popper

by Martin Gardner

(published in Skeptical Inquirer, 2001).

Here are a few choice quotes (to bash a bit in order to balance the Rand/Objectivism bashing ):

I believe that Popper's reputation was based mainly on this persistent but misguided efforts to restate common-sense views in a novel language that is rapidly becoming out of fashion.

. . .

Popper's critics insist that "corroboration" is a form of induction, and Popper has simply sneaked induction in through a back door by giving it a new name. David Hume's famous question was "How can induction be justified?" It can't be, said Popper, because there is no such thing as induction!

There are many objections to this startling claim. One is that falsifications are much rarer in science than searches for confirming instances. Astronomers look for signs of water on Mars. They do not think they are making efforts to falsify the conjecture that Mars never had water.

. . .

Popper recognized — but dismissed as unimportant — that every falsification of a conjecture is simultaneously a confirmation of an opposite conjecture, and every conforming instance of a conjecture is a falsification of an opposite conjecture.

. . .

To scientists and philosophers outside the Popperian fold, science operates mainly by induction (confirmation), and also and less often by disconfirmation (falsification). Its language is almost always one of induction. If Popper bet on a certain horse to win a race, and the horse won, you would not expect him to shout, "Great! My horse failed to lose!"

. . .

I am convinced that Popper, a man of enormous egotism, was motivated by an intense jealousy of Carnap. It seems that every time Carnap expressed an opinion, Popper felt compelled to come forth with an opposing view, although it usually turned out to be the same as Carnap's but in different language. Carnap once said that the distance between him and Popper was not symmetrical. From Carnap to Popper it was small, but the other way around it appeared huge. Popper actually believed that the movement known as logical positivism, of which Carnap was leader, had expired because he, Popper, had single-handedly killed it!

. . .

Popper's great and tireless efforts to expunge the word induction from scientific and philosophical discourse has utterly failed. Except for a small but noisy group of British Popperians, induction is just too firmly embedded in the way philosophers of science and even ordinary people talk and think.

Confirming instances underlie our beliefs that the Sun will rise tomorrow, that dropped objects will fall, that water will freeze and boil, and a million other events. It is hard to think of another philosophical battle so decisively lost.

But the real thing that jumps out at me is the number of similarities in that article between him and Rand, both in ideas and on a personal level (for whatever this is worth). Here are a few quotes. Some discount needs to be given to adjectives like "feeble" in "feeble minds," but if one looks behind the words at the concepts involved, there are striking similarities to Rand.

To Popper's credit he was, like Russell, and almost all philosophers, scientists, and ordinary people, a thoroughgoing realist in the sense that he believed the universe, with all its intricate and beautiful mathematical structures, was "out there," independent of our feeble minds. In no way can the laws of science be likened to traffic regulations or fashions in dress that vary with time and place.

. . .

Scholars unacquainted with the history of philosophy often credit Popper for being the first to point out that science, unlike math and logic, is never absolutely certain. It is always corrigible, subject to perpetual modification. This notion of what the American philosopher Charles Peirce called the "fallibilism" of science goes back to ancient Greek skeptics, and is taken for granted by almost all later thinkers.

. . .

In later books he attacks what he calls "historicism," the belief that there are laws of historical change that enable one to predict humanity's future. The future is unpredictable, Popper argued, because we have free wills.

. . .

In later years he liked to distinguish between what he called three "worlds"—the external physical universe, the inner world of the mind, and the world of culture. Like Carnap and other members of the Vienna Circle, he had no use for God or an afterlife.

. . .

His parents were Jewish, his father a wealthy attorney, his mother a pianist.

. . .

He continually accused others of plagiarism, but rarely acknowledged his own intellectual debts. (quoted from Papineau)

I guess now is the time to duck.

Michael

[BaalChatzaf]

I guess now is the time to duck.

Michael

A theory is the logical conjunction of postulates at least one of which is universally quantified. The logical denial of a theory is the disjunction of the negation of the of the postulates (De Morgen's Law). Such a disjunction will not produce general predictions that can be tested. In short the negation of a scientific theory is NOT a scientific theory.

If a theory can be refuted by having one of its predictions (which is really an implication) falsified empirically, then a -contrary- to the theory (of which there are an infinite set) must be chosen to replace it. A contrary is NOT a negation. A (not THE) contrary of p is a proposition q such that both p and q conjoined is false. q is generally not the negation of p. That is Gardener's error. Which is surprising, since Martin Gardener is very sharp.

The fact of the matter is that an application of Modus Tolens by way of an empirically refuted prediction either shows one of the auxiliary hypothesis that that led to the prediction is false or one of the core postulates of the theory is false. Which is all that Popper asserted. If the auxillary hypotheses that the theory required for its prediction (these will consists of boundary values or initial conditions) hold, then one of the postulates of the core theory is false. Scientists were using this approach long before Popper stated it as a philosophical doctrine. For example the negative outcome of the Michelson Morley experiment killed the aether hypothesis dead before Popper was born. It took a while before the corpse stopped breathing. That is because ad hoc hypotheses such as the Lorentz Contraction were applied to keep the corpse alive. Einstein finally "pulled the plug" with his special theory of relativity put forth in his 1905 paper -On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies-.

Falsification is not a one shot proposition, but the principles of falsification are as Popper set forth. Quine pointed out that a theory is really an extensive web of interlocking assumptions and principles and when a prediction does not quite work out, the first thing done is not the abandonment of the theory but some kind of minimal adjustment to the core principles or an explanation for the bad prediction by an examination of the auxiliary hypotheses. This is exactly what happened when Uranus was not "moving right". Rather than abandon Newton's Law of Gravitation an effort was made to explain the anomalies and sure enough an explanation was found -- to wit -- a hitherto unknown planet, Neptune. The same trick was tried to explain the anomaly in Mercury's perihelion precession but no soap. No new planets or bodies were found to do the job. Which is why the way was cleared for a new and different theory of gravitation -- Einstein's theory. It is interesting to note that if the Brans Dickie theory were proposed in 1915 it would have explained the motions of Mercury and the light bending around the sun to within the error bounds that existed in 1915. That theory would have replaced Newton's Theory. Which gets back to what I told you about the large number of contrary theories to a given theory. It turns out the the Brans Dickie theory won't work, but it is not off by much. For the background on this, read -Was Einstein Right?- by Clifford Wills. It presents the facts, but does not require heavy mathematical background.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited October 13, 2007 by BaalChatzaf

[tjohnson]

Then what are the objectivists and Popperians spending so much time debating about on these threads? This really seems like an argument about semantics. What is the substantive difference between saying that a theory, no matter how often its predictions have been successful, may still be subsequently falsified, and saying that the theory, having many successful predictions, is something we may be contextually certain of, acknowledging that the context may change with further data, ultimately falsifying the theory?

Has any reputable philosopher, objectivist or not, argued that induction can absolutely prove any generalization? If not, then pointing out that induction cannot accomplish this seems like attacking a straw man. Who has argued that it can?

Martin

Very well put, Martin, I feel the same way - this seems like a gigantic argument about nothing.

1. Induction means reasoning from the particular to the general - so making theories, conjectures, hypothesis, (whatever you want to call them)

2. Deduction is reasoning from the general to the particular - applying a theory to a particular case

We all use both these activities in our daily lives so what are you people arguing about?

[tjohnson]

Also, the magazine does seem to be a more popular-oriented vehicle although it is internationally refereed, but at least I do know that I am not alone in my thinking.

Is this some sort of appeal to popularity? See http://www.esgs.org/uk/log1b.htm

I regard Gardner a leech or bottom feeder making a living shooting down people's ideas with "colourful, lively" language being the main attribute. Sort of reminds me of hunting for the pleasure of killing.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Also, the magazine does seem to be a more popular-oriented vehicle although it is internationally refereed, but at least I do know that I am not alone in my thinking.

Is this some sort of appeal to popularity? See http://www.esgs.org/uk/log1b.htm

GS,

No. I mentioned it because the magazine started with a focus on ESP, UFO's, etc. It later began to take on more standard scientific subjects. Thus, there might be some bias against the vehicle by academics. I wanted to make sure it was clear that I was aware of this.

I regard Gardner a leech or bottom feeder making a living shooting down people's ideas with "colourful, lively" language being the main attribute. Sort of reminds me of hunting for the pleasure of killing.

I know nothing about him. Here is what I found on Wikipedia: Martin Gardner. From the article:

Martin Gardner (b. October 21, 1914, Tulsa, Oklahoma) is a popular American mathematics and science writer specializing in recreational mathematics, but with interests encompassing magic (conjuring), pseudoscience, literature (especially Lewis Carroll), philosophy, and religion. He wrote the "Mathematical Games" column in Scientific American from 1956 to 1981 and has published over 60 books.

This doesn't sound like a bottom feeder.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Mike:

I know nothing about him. Here is what I found on Wikipedia: Martin Gardner. From the article:

Look, at some point you're going to have to stop bluffing your way thru this by appeals to the mighty Google and then cut-and-pasting whatever phrases catch your eye. It's like trying to argue with a random sentence generator.

Gardner is a famous science writer, a fact that almost guaranteed that you would not have heard of him.

However, once again, to "inductively" assume that because he has done good work in the past, he will always do good work is the very fallacy we are trying to cure you of. Gardner's article is nonsense, replete with basic errors (like his treatment of observed instances and unobserved instances as if they were the same thing!)

Here Critical Rationalist Jan Lester nicely replies: "It is an irony to attack a more sceptical epistemology than one’s own in the name of scepticism and defend, instead, an epistemology that is positively illogical. And yet that is what Martin Gardner has done in his "A Skeptical Look at Karl Popper...” and concluding "...Gardner has not dealt seriously with any of Popper’s arguments...It is much to be regretted that Gardner, who years ago published an excellent book critically dissecting Fads and Fallacies in the Name of Science, has now reached the stage of uncritically genuflecting to fads and fallacies in philosophy."

[Daniel Barnes]

GS:

Very well put, Martin, I feel the same way - this seems like a gigantic argument about nothing.

1. Induction means reasoning from the particular to the general - so making theories, conjectures, hypothesis, (whatever you want to call them)

2. Deduction is reasoning from the general to the particular - applying a theory to a particular case

We all use both these activities in our daily lives so what are you people arguing about?

The problem, GS, is that 2) says 1) is invalid.

Think about it!

This is one of the most important intellectual problems around, GS, and potentially leads to the destruction of the basis of rational belief. Bertrand Russell, in his History of Western Philosophy put it thus:" It is therefore important to discover whether there is any answer to Hume within the framework of a philosophy that is wholly or mainly empirical. If not, there is no intellectual difference between sanity and insanity. The lunatic who thinks he is a poached egg is to be condemned soley on the ground that he is in a minority, or rather - since we must not assume democracy - on the ground that the government does not agree with him. This is a desperate point of view, and it is to be hoped that there is some way of escaping from it."

[BaalChatzaf]

Martin Gardner (b. October 21, 1914, Tulsa, Oklahoma) is a popular American mathematics and science writer specializing in recreational mathematics, but with interests encompassing magic (conjuring), pseudoscience, literature (especially Lewis Carroll), philosophy, and religion. He wrote the "Mathematical Games" column in Scientific American from 1956 to 1981 and has published over 60 books.

This doesn't sound like a bottom feeder.

Michael

Martin Gardner is one of the most brilliant science popularizers ever. The reason why he is so good is because he knows his shit stone cold.

Ba'al Chafatz

[Brant Gaede]

This thread is an implicit assault on reason itself. If there's a problem with the scientific method this wouldn't be true. Is there? Has that been posited?

--Brant

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Daniel,

Research and reading is not bluffing. It is research and reading. Isn't it a shame people can read other views than your own, especially with this magnificent tool called Google that you find so inconvenient, and you cannot control their thinking? That you have to persuade them with a tad more than opinions and arguments only you select? I have seen ARI-friendly people bothered by that, too.

I had already read through Lester's defense when I posted the Gardner thing. Lester's article had the same kind of tone I have seen the orthodoxy using in defending criticisms of Rand (hairsplitting, etc.), as, ironically, your own need to "cure" me. To be fair about Popper, I am still analyzing. Bluffing is hard work, you know.

Bob just wrote:

Martin Gardner is one of the most brilliant science popularizers ever. The reason why he is so good is because he knows his shit stone cold.

That's a pretty good endorsement from a science-oriented person. Thank you Bob. That provided good contrast to Daniel's sudden hysteria.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Mike:

Research and reading is not bluffing. It is research and reading. Isn't it a shame people can read other views than your own, especially with this magnificent tool called Google that you find so inconvenient, and you cannot control their thinking? That you have to persuade them with a tad more than opinions and arguments only you select? I have seen ARI-friendly people bothered by that, too.

Ho ho! Yes, I'm really just like the ARI orthodoxy, trying to control the iconoclastic insights Mike unveils through his magnificent Google technology.

I had already read through Lester's defense when I posted the Gardner thing. Lester's article had the same kind of tone I have seen the orthodoxy using in defending criticisms of Rand (hairsplitting, etc.), as, ironically, your own need to "cure" me.

Yes, the problem with Lester's reply is its "tone." He's just like the ARI-othodoxy too!

Seems to me you eventually end up accusing everyone who consistently disagrees with you of this, Mike. It's just a schtick. It seems to me also that "tone" is another thing you always complain about - there is nothing wrong with Lester's tone, BTW - but you never actually address any arguments therein.

That's a pretty good endorsement from a science-oriented person. Thank you Bob. That provided good contrast to Daniel's sudden hysteria.

What "hysteria"? Sadly Gardner did not know his shit on this one.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Daniel,

Do you have any actual ideas to discuss? (That would be a nice break.)

Michael

[tjohnson]

The problem, GS, is that 2) says 1) is invalid.

Think about it!

This is one of the most important intellectual problems around, GS, and potentially leads to the destruction of the basis of rational belief. Bertrand Russell, in his History of Western Philosophy put it thus:" It is therefore important to discover whether there is any answer to Hume within the framework of a philosophy that is wholly or mainly empirical. If not, there is no intellectual difference between sanity and insanity. The lunatic who thinks he is a poached egg is to be condemned soley on the ground that he is in a minority, or rather - since we must not assume democracy - on the ground that the government does not agree with him. This is a desperate point of view, and it is to be hoped that there is some way of escaping from it."

I'm sorry Daniel but I don't see what you mean "that 2) says 1) is invalid.", perhaps you can explain that. As for 'sanity', Korzybski has produced the only theory of sanity that I am aware of and he did think highly of Russell and Whitehead, although I believe he was able to use their work and go a step further.

[Daniel Barnes]

Mike:

Do you have any actual ideas to discuss? (That would be a nice break.)

A number of us have tried in vain to interest you in the ideas involved. But you only seem interested in skimming the topic on Google, complaining about "tone", appealing to whatever it is "respectable people" say, and inevitably comparing those who disagree with your musings with the ARI.

While you often try to round off debates with this line, in practice "the ideas" seem to be a poor last in your own priority list.

But you are working on your essay, perhaps you will have got your head around it by the time it emerges. We will see.

[Dragonfly]

Gardner is well-known for his Mathematical Games column in the Scientific American in the days that this still was an excellent magazine. I remember the article in which he introduced Conway's game of life. The same day that I read that article I wrote a (rather primitive and inefficient) computer program for "life" on the mainframe at the university, almost certainly the first "life" program in The Netherlands. At the time there were no fancy monitors, so I had to print the output on paper, representing the cells by "o"s. I still have somewhere a pile of computer paper with "life" configurations. In another article he introduced the programmed worms which could also generate fantastic patterns, and I also wrote a "worm" program, with output on a pen plotter. His stories about the famous Dr. Matrix and his daughter Iva were delicious - I remember that I at first thought that they were real persons...

Gardner is also famous for his skeptical articles and books; his friend James Randi and he are probably the best-known skeptics of our time. He was (AFAIK he's still alive, but no longer publishes) feared for his sharp attacks on all kinds of pseudoscience, spoonbenders, channelers and other charlatans, relentlessly unmasking their pretensions. One of his best books on this subject is "Science: Good, Bad and Bogus" - highly recommended!

If you ever want to (re)read Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass you should buy Gardner's Annotated Alice, which gives a wealth of background information.

However, Gardner is a lousy philosopher, who has little to nothing to contribute in that field. How he for example can square his skepticism with a belief in God escapes me. And Objectivists had better not rely too much on his authority in these matters, as he has a very low opinion of Ayn Rand.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Daniel,

How about that idea of falsification being induction sneaking in through the back door? I do not have an opinion yet, but it does seem intriguing since I like to look behind the words.

Michael

[BaalChatzaf]

Daniel,

How about that idea of falsification being induction sneaking in through the back door? I do not have an opinion yet, but it does seem intriguing since I like to look behind the words.

Michael

Falsification makes use of Modus Tolens which involves an empirical falsification of a consequence, but that is not induction. Induction is deriving a universally quantified proposition from a finite set of particular propositions.

Ba'al Chatzaf