SCORECARD! Can't tell the players without a scorecard!

[John Dailey]

DB:

~ In the same post you assert a 'counter-argument' to REB's argument about there being no basis to challenge [the worth of induction] with...

...such evidence is always available, and from a fully approved [?] source - that is, our experience.

...and go on to point out specifics (granted, here's where REB went wrong: using the term 'generalization', discussed on this thread by moi with RC earlier. 'Induction' and 'generalization' are not synonymous, LP's useage nwst) re a counterfactual to a 'generalized' observation (all canaries I've seen are yellow, ergo...) to establish *your own*, er, 'generalization (?) about deduction.

~ Now, about your...'generalization'...about deduction's usefulness and worth in using one-more-time? Is there any experiential reason (like Russell's concern about the sun rising tomorrow) to doubt the worth of THAT view?

LLAP

J:D

Edited September 17, 2007 by John Dailey

[Daniel Barnes]

JD:

>~ In the same post you assert a 'counter-argument' to REB's argument about there being no basis to challenge [the worth of induction] with...

...such evidence is always available, and from a fully approved [?] source - that is, our experience.

"Approved" by Objectivism is what I meant.

>...and go on to point out specifics (granted, here's where REB went wrong: using the term 'generalization', discussed on this thread by moi with RC earlier. 'Induction' and 'generalization' are not synonymous) re a counterfactual to a 'generalized' observation (all canaries I've seen are yellow, ergo...) to establish *your own*, er, 'generalization (?) about deduction.

>~ Now, about your...'generalization'...about deduction's usefulness and worth in using one-more-time? Is there any experiential reason (like Russell's concern about the sun rising tomorrow) to doubt its worth?

The argument I supplied is just one such argument from experience but, I think, validly applied. It uses an example from our experience to falsify Peikoff's contention, thus is not an inductive generalisation itself.

Here is another one from Popper's essay on the problem, which demonstrates that induction is even inductively invalid!

"...It is this kind of consideration which makes Hume's and my own negative reply so important. For we can now see very clearly why we must beware lest our theory of knowledge proves too much....

Even if we assume that we have been successful - that our physical theories are true - we can learn from our cosmology how infinitely improbable this success is: our theories tell us that the world is almost completely empty, and that empty space is filled with chaotic radiation. And almost all places which are not empty are occupied either by chaotic dust, or by gases, or by very hot stars - all in conditions which seem to make the application of any physical method of acquiring knowledge impossible...There are many worlds, possible and actual worlds, in which a search for knowledge and for regularities would fail. And even in the world as we actually know it from the sciences, the occurrence of conditions under which life, and a search for knowledge, could arise - and succeed - seems to be almost infinitely improbable. Moreover, it seems that if ever such conditions should appear, they would be bound to disappear again, after a time which, cosmologically speaking, is very short.

It is in this sense that induction is inductively invalid, as I said above. That is to say, any strong positive reply to Hume's logical problem (say, the thesis that induction is valid) would be paradoxical. For, on the one hand, if induction is the method of science, then modern cosmology is at least roughly correct (I do not dispute this); and on the other, modern cosmology teaches us that to generalize from observations taken, for the most part, in our incredibly idiosyncratic region of the universe would almost always be quite invalid. Thus if induction is 'inductively valid' it will almost always lead to false conclusions; and therefore it is inductively invalid."

(ital DB)

[John Dailey]

DB:

~ In your post #199, you quoted me asking a question at the end of my quote.

~ You responded re what you see as REB's agreement that LP 'agrees with Hume'...but...you didn't answer my question. I notice that you have a propensity for...not noticing...what I consider 'hard' (or, at least unresponded-to) questions.

~ Would you answer my question therein, pretty please? While you're at it (if you do), might's well cover the other I have at the end of *my* post #201.

LLAP

J:D

[John Dailey]

DB:

~ So, 'induction' is not only 'deductively invalid'...it's now also 'inductively invalid' (whatever that means, given ass-u-me-dly inherent invalidity in it anyways).

~ OK. I shan't argue this...with you...anymore, just getting clear your...deductive and experiential perspective.

~ That leaves 'deduction' as being...what? 'Deductively' valid? Uh-h-h...from what premises (as I'm now tired of asking)? --- This reminds me of discussions with you on RoR, btw.

LLAP

J:D

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

~ That leaves 'deduction' as being...what? 'Deductively' valid? Uh-h-h...from what premises (as I'm now tired of asking)?

John,

In addition to the "rules of deductive logic," the premises come from isolated concrete observations added to random speculations and a dose of common sense. That's how I see the underlying organization of this view so far.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

JD:

>~ In your post #199...You responded re what you see as REB's agreement that LP 'agrees with Hume'...but...you didn't answer my question.

Which was:

>...you say that 'induction is deductively invalid', such depends on what your 1st beginning assumptions/premises are, no?

No. X number of white swans =All swans are white is an invalid inference according to the rules of logic. Nothing to do with "beginning assumptions/premises."

>And, I must ask: what would logically justify them?

Well, you tell me! Who says it is logically justifiable? I say it can't be done.

>~ Would you answer my question therein, pretty please? While you're at it (if you do), might's well cover the other I have at the end of *my* post #201.

You mean this question?:

>Now, about your...'generalization'...about deduction's usefulness and worth in using one-more-time? Is there any experiential reason (like Russell's concern about the sun rising tomorrow) to doubt the worth of THAT view?

I'm not sure I understand what you are asking. Can you clarify?

>I notice that you have a propensity for...not noticing...what I consider 'hard' (or, at least unresponded-to) questions.

Like what? What "hard" questions am I supposedly constantly ducking? Actually I go to some trouble to answer fully.

Examples of this "propensity" or withdraw, please.

Edited September 17, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[John Dailey]

Mike:

~ No offense, but, you're not helping here.

LLAP

J:D

[Daniel Barnes]

JD:~ So, 'induction' is not only 'deductively invalid'...it's now also 'inductively invalid' (whatever that means, given ass-u-me-dly inherent invalidity in it anyways).

Yes. Double whammy!

>~ OK. I shan't argue this...with you...anymore, just getting clear your...deductive and experiential perspective.

Now you know.

>~ That leaves 'deduction' as being...what? 'Deductively' valid?

Yes.

>Uh-h-h...from what premises (as I'm now tired of asking)? ---

By the rules of logic, such as the fact that the truth of the conclusion cannot exceed the truth of the premises.

You want to change the rules of logic? If not, then you know all you need to know.

Edited September 17, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

John,

I was serious. That is my honest best evaluation after oodles of discussion and reading. (Has Daniel said anything substantially different?)

Michael

[Roger Bissell]

IMO, it makes no sense to say that ~either~ induction or deduction is "deductively valid" or "deductively invalid."

But since some seem to regard deduction as the superior mode of cognition, let's look at it.

How could you establish that deduction is "deductively valid"? If you use a deductive argument, you are assuming what you want to prove in order to attempt to prove it. I.e., you are begging the question.

The best you can do is to observe that attempting to deductively ~deny~ the validity of deduction as a form of knowledge has to use deduction in the attempt to do so. In other words, the validity of deduction is inescapable in any attempt to use it or refute it. This is Aristotle's Reaffirmation Through Denial, which is the basic method of validating axioms and similar principles.

But note: in demonstrating the validity of deduction, we did not use a deductive argument. So, it is not correct to say that deduction is "deductively valid." But that doesn't mean it is "deductively invalid" either. It just means that deduction does not establish the validity (or invalidity) of deduction.

And deduction does not establish the validity (or invalidity) of ~induction~ either.

Induction, like deduction, is a valid form of knowledge. You see this by noting that any attempt to deny the validity of induction relies on conclusions already reached through induction (and some deduction as well).

Valid does not mean infallible. Deduction can be used to reach valid knowledge; errors are possible, but they can be corrected by applying the appropriate deductive methodology, including checking the coherence of one's deductive process and checking the correspondence to reality of one's premises. Given the conscientious application of this methodology, deduction is self-correcting.

The same is true for induction, as I already mentioned Peikoff has explained.

REB

P.S. -- Daniel, I'll lay off the ad hominems if you stop putting words in my and Peikoff's mouths (in re Hume).

[Ellen Stuttle]

Valid does not mean infallible. Deduction can be used to reach valid knowledge; errors are possible, but they can be corrected by applying the appropriate deductive methodology, including checking the coherence of one's deductive process and checking the correspondence to reality of one's premises. Given the conscientious application of this methodology, deduction is self-correcting.

The same is true for induction, as I already mentioned Peikoff has explained.

Roger,

For one thing, I think you're using "valid" with two different meanings, that of correct reasoning according to the procedures of deductive logic and correct in the sense of "true."

In deductive logic, what's being claimed is that IF the premises are true, and if the reasoning is valid reasoning, then the conclusion is true. But the problem of induction (broadly stated) is whether or not one can ever be certain that one's premises are true. It's "checking the correspondence to reality of one's premises" which is the big problem in any claim of having arrived at certainty. This is the problem which I'm not seeing any way could ever be solved except in the case of definitionly true statements. And, no, saying that one can never know for sure one has a true generalization about the way reality is doesn't fall prey to self-exclusion, since any such claim would involve a contradiction (that of both being here after all of reality is over, so you have available to check EVERY instance, on the one hand, and your continued existence contradicting reality's being over on the other; you could only know beyond question that you'd correctly assessed every fact of the universe if the universe were finished, but if you were still here, the universe wouldn't be finished; this is a straightforward A and non-A).

Ellen

___

[Ellen Stuttle]

Yes, I know that passage. All she is saying that experts in particular fields use specialised terms in their definitions, and ordinary people don't.

Daniel,

I hate to sound Randish, but since you still have it wrong, check your premises. It's been spelled out more than once.

Michael

Daniel's description is what she's saying, i.e., that experts in particular fields use specialized -- and narrower -- definitions. This isn't what Popper was talking about. He was talking about two different kinds, not two degrees of generality, of definitions.

Notice, too, she says:

Philosophical vs. Specialized Definitions

[my emphasis added]

Prof. A: Then would it be wrong for a biologist to define man as "a rational primate," or would that be correct in his context?

AR: It would be correct in his context, if he remembers that he is speaking here from a professional context. And, as you know, they subdivide even further. Any subdivision within a given science is proper provided it is not substituted for the basic philosophical definition which is valid for all men in all stages of knowledge.

Just to take a prominent example, if physicists had been stuck with not substituting definitions of "mass" and "energy" for "basic philosophical definition" which the man on the street would even be expected to understand (let alone such an idea as "valid for all men in all stages of knowledge"), you wouldn't have a computer on which to be quoting AR.

Ellen

___

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen,

You just surprised me, but from your last post, you don't understand what Rand means either.

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

Dragonfly to Mike:

>You're missing the point of the discussion, which was about Rand's claim that man's rationality gives the essential characteristic of man.

Yes. To elaborate further, Rand claimed that an "essential" characteristic was the thing on which all other characteristics depend.

But this definition, superficially plausible, turns out to be functionally useless. For we could say, following Ba'al, man's rationality depends upon his DNA (try constructing a brain without it). Or we could also say it depends on breathing; for if a man cannot breathe he does not stay rational for very long....;-) And so forth. So we could say that DNA, or even breathiing, is more essential than rationality, as the latter depends on the former, and still be perfectly consistent with Rand's definition.

The criticism fails. The relevant definition of man is "rational animal". The animal part is essential, too, and encompasses DNA and respiration.

I don't think that Rand would agree with you about the animal part being "essential," Merlin, given that she says this (and similar wording other places) about her meaning of "essential":

ITOE, pg. 68

[my emphasis added]

Objectivism holds that the essence of a concept [elsewhere called the "essential characteristic"] is that fundamental characteristic(s) of its units on which the greatest number of other characteristics depend, and which distingushes these units from all other existents within the field of a man's knowledge.

She goes on, btw, to say that the essence "may be altered with the growth of man's knowledge."

I don't think she'd have considered animality to distinguish humans from "all other existents within the field of a man's knowledge."

(I don't agree with her theory of a concept having an "essential" characteristic -- or with quite a bit else in her theory of concept formation. I'm here just pointing out that I think, on her own terms, she wouldn't have considered "animal" "essential" in her meaning to the concept "man" (human).)

Ellen

___

[Ellen Stuttle]

I'm way behind in reading posts which have accumulated since I last was on-line. I've just answered above a few which I particularly noticed during a quick run-through.

Btw, I've been hearing some reports from cosmologists recently which lead me (and some others) to think that a big shake-up might soon -- in a near tomorrow -- occur regarding a certain amount we currently take as "well established" re cosmology.

Cheers,

Ellen

___

[Daniel Barnes]

Roger:

>P.S. -- Daniel, I'll lay off the ad hominems if you stop putting words in my and Peikoff's mouths (in re Hume).

My apologies if I put words in yours and Peikoff's mouths, Roger. Here's what you said at your #100:

Roger: Huh? Are you simply saying that induction is not deduction, and that induction is not deductively valid? If so, Peikoff agrees with this (emphasis DB), and he points out in his IPP lectures that one of the biggest mistakes theorists have made in trying to validate induction is to try to reduce it to a form of deductive logic.

And here's what I wrote in my #199 (among others):

According to Roger Bissell, Leonard Peikoff agrees with Hume that induction in the usual sense of the word is deductively invalid, JD.

I honestly do not see how I have misrepresented you and Peikoff, but if I have, I apologise. (I have added the part about Hume, but that is of course beyond dispute, surely!)

So can we just clarify: Does Peikoff consider induction to be deductively invalid? (with "induction" referring to the standard version of the problem, eg: x number of birds fly=all birds fly, and "valid" meaning according with standard logical deductive procedures)

(I'll turn to your question of whether deductive logic is deductively valid in a moment,)

Edited September 17, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Daniel Barnes]

I wrote:

To elaborate further, Rand claimed that an "essential" characteristic was the thing on which all other characteristics depend.

Brant replied:

Unless you get some serious Rand quotes in here, you aren't being fair or valuable.

Now I have a moment, I see Ellen has already supplied the relevant quote (among others)

"Objectivism holds that the essence of a concept [elsewhere called the "essential characteristic"] is that fundamental characteristic(s) of its units on which the greatest number of other characteristics depend, and which distingushes these units from all other existents within the field of a man's knowledge." - ITOE, p68

Of course, man's DNA could easily the "essence" of man by this definition, as the greatest number of human characteristics depend on it, and it is distinguished from all other existents by it. Likewise, though it is not as superb an example, one could easily make a case for man's particular breathing apparatus as being "essential" to his rational faculty at least; for if you were to replace it with anything less than the minimum equivalent one would be brain dead; or if dependent on a fish's gills for oxygen human brains may never have evolved intelligence in the first place. (As I said to Merlin, I do not think these are very good arguments myself, and only use them to demonstrate the weakness of the essentialist method)

So you can see these comments are far from unfair; and may even be valuable.

I hope you now agree.

Edited September 17, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Daniel Barnes]

Ellen wrote to Merlin:

I don't think she'd have considered animality to distinguish humans from "all other existents within the field of a man's knowledge."

I agree, Ellen. Usually I find Merlin is on the right side of most debates, but this is perhaps an exception.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen,

You just surprised me, but from your last post, you don't understand what Rand means either.

I don't think that Rand would agree with you about the animal part being "essential," Merlin, given that she says this (and similar wording other places) about her meaning of "essential":

ITOE, pg. 68

[my emphasis added]

Objectivism holds that the essence of a concept [elsewhere called the "essential characteristic"] is that fundamental characteristic(s) of its units on which the greatest number of other characteristics depend, and which distingushes these units from all other existents within the field of a man's knowledge.

She goes on, btw, to say that the essence "may be altered with the growth of man's knowledge."

I don't think she'd have considered animality to distinguish humans from "all other existents within the field of a man's knowledge."

Ellen,

That confirms my observation. You really do misunderstand Rand's theory of concept formation. "Essential characteristic" and "essential part of the definition" are two different things.

A definition without a genus is not a definition in Objectivism and it includes the CDD (Conceptual Common Denominator—basis of measurement). The CDD is essential because without it, a differentiating (essential) characteristic cannot be identified. Also, a concept includes all knowledge of the integrated material. Every bit of it is essential.

Michael

[merjet]

I don't think that Rand would agree with you about the animal part being "essential," Merlin, given that she says this (and similar wording other places) about her meaning of "essential":

ITOE, pg. 68

[my emphasis added]

Objectivism holds that the essence of a concept [elsewhere called the "essential characteristic"] is that fundamental characteristic(s) of its units on which the greatest number of other characteristics depend, and which distingushes these units from all other existents within the field of a man's knowledge.

She goes on, btw, to say that the essence "may be altered with the growth of man's knowledge."

I don't think she'd have considered animality to distinguish humans from "all other existents within the field of a man's knowledge."

(I don't agree with her theory of a concept having an "essential" characteristic -- or with quite a bit else in her theory of concept formation. I'm here just pointing out that I think, on her own terms, she wouldn't have considered "animal" "essential" in her meaning to the concept "man" (human).)

Ellen

Why don't you think she'd have considered animality to distinguish humans from non-animals such as plants and non-living things?

I did only a brief search and did not find her explicitly endorsing the species-genus model of definition, but think she endorsed it implicitly. So I agree with MSK's last point in #219. Distinguishing is evident on two levels in the genus-species model. The genus distinguishes the members (animals in the case of 'man') from non-members in general. The species (rationality in the case of 'man') distinguishes the members from non-members within the genus.

P.S. Rand explicitly uses the genus-differentia model of definition on p. 41 of ITOE (2nd ed.). I take it as equivalent to the genus-species model.

Edited September 17, 2007 by Merlin Jetton

[BaalChatzaf]

P.S. Rand explicitly uses the genus-differentia model of definition on p. 41 of ITOE (2nd ed.). I take it as equivalent to the genus-species model.

One and the same. Species = special. Genus = general.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Roger Bissell]

Roger:

>P.S. -- Daniel, I'll lay off the ad hominems if you stop putting words in my and Peikoff's mouths (in re Hume).

My apologies if I put words in yours and Peikoff's mouths, Roger. Here's what you said at your #100:

Roger: Huh? Are you simply saying that induction is not deduction, and that induction is not deductively valid? If so, Peikoff agrees with this (emphasis DB), and he points out in his IPP lectures that one of the biggest mistakes theorists have made in trying to validate induction is to try to reduce it to a form of deductive logic.

And here's what I wrote in my #199 (among others):

According to Roger Bissell, Leonard Peikoff agrees with Hume that induction in the usual sense of the word is deductively invalid, JD.

I honestly do not see how I have misrepresented you and Peikoff, but if I have, I apologise. (I have added the part about Hume, but that is of course beyond dispute, surely!)

To say that induction is not a form of deduction is ~not~ to say that it is "deductively invalid." This suggests that induction, to be a valid form of cognition, requires some deductive argument to support or establish it, and that since none is possible, therefore induction must not be valid. Non sequitur.

It also suggests that applications of induction, in order to be valid, require a supplemental deductive argument to secure them, and that since deduction cannot be used to "prove" inductive conclusions, therefore applications of induction must not be valid. Non sequitur.

So can we just clarify: Does Peikoff consider induction to be deductively invalid? (with "induction" referring to the standard version of the problem, eg: x number of birds fly=all birds fly, and "valid" meaning according with standard logical deductive procedures)

There you go again! (With the putting-words-in-mouth again. You did this in a previous post, too.) I said ~nothing~ about birds in general flying. I was talking about swans, who do fly, having two basically different kinds of attributes: color, which all entities have, and wings, which birds have.

Induction is NOT enumeration. You can validly induce from one or two examples, if you have observed accurately, grasped the causal connections involved, and integrated your observations to other observations and conclusions. -- and you can amass thousands of examples that do not validly add up to a generalization. (50 million Frenchmen "can't be wrong.") Enumeration is not a valid form of deduction. But I would not thereby conclude that induction is "deductively invalid." Enumeration is not a valid form of ~induction~ either! So, it is "inductively invalid" as well.

As for whether induction (OTHER THAN ENUMERATION, i.e., as Peikoff discusses it and as physicists use it) is "deductively invalid"? Well, of course, but only in the same sense that deduction is "inductively invalid." Induction is not a valid form of deduction, and deduction is not a valid form of induction. Duh. Hearing is not a valid form of seeing, and seeing is not a valid form of hearing. This is not useful or illuminating.

And I disagree with your implication that enumerative "induction" is "the usual sense of the word 'induction'". Induction ~integrates~ observations; it does not merely amass them and assume that they belong together because of the sheer numbers. Peikoff advocates integrative induction -- and he points out that doubting your integrations without a basis is arbitrary and disintegrative, and that this is what Hume does.

If your methodology-guided, observation-based inductions/integrations/generalizations lead to further, broader generalizations, and they are non-contradictory and integrable with the rest of your knowledge, they are valid. If they crash and burn, you have an error, and you need to check your premises and your methodology, just as in deduction. But absent such conflicts, you have no basis for doubting them, and to ask arbitrary "what if's" is to undercut integration in toto, which is what Hume did.

That is my and Peikoff's real beef with Hume -- not the "induction is deductively invalid" or "I cannot perceive causality or necessary connections" bits, but his massive undercutting of the validity of conceptual integration. He was a skeptic and cynic, and skeptics and cynics seem to gravitate to his style of arguing without realizing that they are cutting out the ground that they stand on.

(I'll turn to your question of whether deductive logic is deductively valid in a moment,)

Still waiting. :-)

REB

[Roger Bissell]

REB:

>You have to have some basis in evidence for doubting or questioning a generalization and the integrated body of observations and conclusions you have inductively formed. If there is no basis to a challenge, it is not rational to entertain it.

The counter argument to this is simple: that in fact such evidence is always available, and from a fully approved source - that is, our experience. For all of us have experienced times when we have no facts to suggest a generalisation is false; yet it nonetheless later turns out to be false for reasons we did not suspect. From this fact of our experience (and the similar experiences of all humankind) we may quite reasonably therefore doubt the validity of such generalisations in other situations.

I disagree.

There is an equivocation here between considering that one ~can~ be in error and considering that one ~may~ be in error. As humans, we are fallible; we know this as a...generalization...from experience. But it does not follow that we have made an error in a given circumstance. What is the evidence for this supposed error? Peikoff distinguishes these as metaphysical possibility (of error) and epistemological possibility (of error). Is it possible for the plane to crash? Yes. Is it possible (in the absence of evidence) that the plane will crash? No. You cannot infer epistemological possibility from metaphysical possibility.

If you have evidence of error, you have epistemological possibility of error, and you are entitled to doubt the correctness of your conclusion. Otherwise, not.

REB

[BaalChatzaf]

That is my and Peikoff's real beef with Hume -- not the "induction is deductively invalid" or "I cannot perceive causality or necessary connections" bits, but his massive undercutting of the validity of conceptual integration. He was a skeptic and cynic, and skeptics and cynics seem to gravitate to his style of arguing without realizing that they are cutting out the ground that they stand on.

Hume was not a complete skeptic. He never once doubted that objects could be contiguous or similar. He was cautious. He asked the question: when have we ever observed (as in perceived) necessary connection? Necessary connection is inferred, not perceived. He pointed out that from contiguity and similarity we could infer cause. But cause is -inferred- not perceived. What is wrong with that?

And is cautiously noting that inferring is NOT perceiving undercutting anything? Perception is immediate. Inference takes some brain work and is always done a posteriori.

I guess I am one of those skeptics and cynics that gravitate to Hume's style of arguing. He is a WYSIWYG philosopher. What you see is what you get. His only "sin" is that his rational, reasonable doubts begat Kant and his philosophy. I am a Missourri Thinker. Show me.

Ba'al Chatzaf (skeptic, cynic, doubting pragmatist and mytic of muscle)

[Roger Bissell]

DB:

~ In the same post you assert a 'counter-argument' to REB's argument about there being no basis to challenge [the worth of induction] with...

...such evidence is always available, and from a fully approved [?] source - that is, our experience.

See my reply in my post preceding this:

...and go on to point out specifics (granted, here's where REB went wrong: using the term 'generalization', discussed on this thread by moi with RC earlier. 'Induction' and 'generalization' are not synonymous, LP's useage nwst) re a counterfactual to a 'generalized' observation (all canaries I've seen are yellow, ergo...) to establish *your own*, er, 'generalization (?) about deduction.

In what way did I "go wrong," John? Here's what I wrote:

About 10 years ago, in "Objectivism Through Induction," Peikoff defined "induction" as: "the process of reaching principles from concretes...generalization from perception." (And he referred to the latter phrase as being the "dictionary definition" and that that was all he meant by the term.)

More recently, in "Induction in Physics and Philosophy," Peikoff said that the "essence of induction is the process of inferring generalizations from perceived instances." And he defines "generalization" as: "a proposition that ascribes a characteristic to every member of an unlimited class, however it is positioned in space and time."

Now, granted induction and generalization are not synonymous, but what is wrong with this? Isn't deduction the act of inferring a more specific conclusion from more general propositions -- and induction the act of inferring a more general proposition from more specific propositions?

The product of an act of induction is...a generalization! In fact, induction is the only method by which you can validly obtain a more general proposition from more specific ones.

REB