SCORECARD! Can't tell the players without a scorecard!

[Barbara Branden]

Roger, well said!

Barbara

[Jonathan]

P.S. -- Whoever it was that said (in this thread?) that Rand's aesthetics views were based ?mainly/solely? on her personal artistic tastes, I suggest you read/re-read my essay "Art as Microcosm," posted here on Objectivist Living. I am sick to death of hearing this claim.

If Rand's personal preference for literature over all other art forms counts as "personal artistic taste," which I think it does, then I think that her theory of aesthetics was based "mainly/solely" on her personal artistic tastes, and your essay could even be seen as a sort of confirmation of that: the Romantic Manifesto is a theory of literature applied to all art forms, sometimes quite clumsily and inappropriately, and your ideas seem to follow that tradition -- that bias -- of wanting narrative and mimesis to be the essence or means of all art forms.

I think there's value in your approach, but it doesn't explain everything, nor do I think it ever will. The nature of most architecture, painting and music, as art, is not necessarily that it is a "world in miniature" just because some buildings, paintings and songs might have some strong microcosmic qualities.

How thoroughly did Rand investigate theories of architecture, visual art and music which differed from her own theory of literature as art? How familiar was she with the ideas of those who wrote primarily about art forms that she wasn't particularly interested in? I don't remember her ever mentioning the aesthetic ideas of anyone but Aristotle -- no Kandinsky, Klee or Kooning; no Rosenberg, Greenberg, Pollock, Dewey or even Kant. Is there any reason to believe that it ever occurred to her to research the views of those who were as passionate about their own favorite art forms as she was about hers?

Regardless of her various errors in stating, and misapplications of, her own theory, the theory itself is well enough grounded in her writings to allow for a conscientious thinker to see that it is far from a mere rationalization of her personal biases.

If Rand's aesthetic theory were to be consistently applied to every individual work of art, I think that there would be very little beyond literature that would qualify as art. Her literature-based requirement of intelligibility alone removes a lot of non-literature from the realm of art.

J

[Roger Bissell]

P.S. -- Whoever it was that said (in this thread?) that Rand's aesthetics views were based ?mainly/solely? on her personal artistic tastes, I suggest you read/re-read my essay "Art as Microcosm," posted here on Objectivist Living. I am sick to death of hearing this claim.

If Rand's personal preference for literature over all other art forms counts as "personal artistic taste," which I think it does, then I think that her theory of aesthetics was based "mainly/solely" on her personal artistic tastes, and your essay could even be seen as a sort of confirmation of that: the Romantic Manifesto is a theory of literature applied to all art forms, sometimes quite clumsily and inappropriately, and your ideas seem to follow that tradition -- that bias -- of wanting narrative and mimesis to be the essence or means of all art forms.

Please support this claim. Where does Rand state a "personal preference for literature over all other art forms"?

Referring to her three principal theoretical essays on aesthetics (essays 1-3 in Romantic Manifesto), please explain how her theory is based "mainly/solely" on her literary preferences. That is, please tell me how you explain ~away~ her numerous references to art forms ~other~ than literature.

Is the application to other art forms of concepts such as subject and style and sense of life and emotional abstraction and metaphysical value-judgment necessarily ~clumsy and inappropriate~?

I think there's value in your approach, but it doesn't explain everything, nor do I think it ever will. The nature of most architecture, painting and music, as art, is not necessarily that it is a "world in miniature" just because some buildings, paintings and songs might have some strong microcosmic qualities.

Some...might? Honestly, I find it impossible to look at ~any~ artworks without seeing this aspect of them. I approach each artwork, in each artform, with the perspective that the artist has given me a "window" on another world. I don't feel that I am ~forcing~ this perspective. I feel that the artworks ~compel~ me to take it. I realize that some people don't (can't? won't?) approach art in this way. I also suspect that many people implicitly approach it this way, without realizing or conceptualizing it.

I'm not interested in debating people who don't (can't? won't?) experience art this way, any more than I am in debating the merits of music with those who are tone deaf. If you don't already grasp that all art has microcosmic qualities and that this is tantamount to art's being a "world in miniature," nothing I say is going to convince you. I'm interested in reaching those who already agree with this viewpoint, but perhaps haven't clearly realized it yet.

How thoroughly did Rand investigate theories of architecture, visual art and music which differed from her own theory of literature as art? How familiar was she with the ideas of those who wrote primarily about art forms that she wasn't particularly interested in? I don't remember her ever mentioning the aesthetic ideas of anyone but Aristotle -- no Kandinsky, Klee or Kooning; no Rosenberg, Greenberg, Pollock, Dewey or even Kant. Is there any reason to believe that it ever occurred to her to research the views of those who were as passionate about their own favorite art forms as she was about hers?

Funny you should mention Kant. In the Critique of Judgment, he gives a definition or characterization of art that sounds (in his own words) amazingly like Rand's definition of "art." I have for some time suspected she cribbed her concept of art from him.

Kant has some very interesting things to say about various art forms, but his view of music is very naive and simplistic, though perhaps understandable, given that the enormous development of music's dramatic potential had barely begun at that time.

But fundamentally, I don't see why Rand ~needed~ to canvass all those various artists or theorists. I think she penetrated to the very essence of art as a "presentational" symbol (Susanne Langer's term for what I call aesthetic imaginal symbols). The fact that she understood best and was most familiar with literature, and so wrote the greatest number of elaborative essays about how her theory applies to literature, does not invalidate or limit the usefulness of the theory. In fact, I think something ~like~ her approach to literature is needed to help make sense out of the dramatic nature of a great deal of music.

Regardless of her various errors in stating, and misapplications of, her own theory, the theory itself is well enough grounded in her writings to allow for a conscientious thinker to see that it is far from a mere rationalization of her personal biases.

If Rand's aesthetic theory were to be consistently applied to every individual work of art, I think that there would be very little beyond literature that would qualify as art. Her literature-based requirement of intelligibility alone removes a lot of non-literature from the realm of art.

J

I disagree. Taking "consistent application" to mean interpreting art as microcosm, as I suggest in my JARS essay, I think that there is very little beyond literature that would NOT qualify as art. Rand's criterion of intelligibility is not "literature-based." (Read/re-read "Art and Cognition.") It is based on the standard that our senses and conceptual faculty grasp reality as an intelligible realm populated by entities that have certain characteristics and do certain things. (In the static arts, "doing certain things" is implied rather than portrayed.) "Intelligible" simply means discernable and graspable by the senses or intellect. Even a great deal of modern music and abstract art fits underneath this umbrella.

REB

P.S. -- Thank you, Barbara!

[Roger Bissell]

Sure, predictions can "come out wrong" and theories can "turn out false," if they are based on over-generalization, which is basically a form of context-dropping. There is a world of difference between saying:

All swans are winged

and

All swans are white

It takes very little experience, at least on the adult level, to realize that its particular means of locomotion is an essential characteristic of any animal, while its particular color is not, and that the non-essential characteristics are subject to variation while the essentials are not, and that predictions about non-essentials are so iffy, while predictions about essentials are trustworthy. And that is why the white/black swan example of the supposed invalidity of induction is so pernicious. It is utterly reliant on the failure of some theorists to think in terms of essentials. But this is not a flaw or shortcoming of induction.

Peikoff does NOT agree with Hume. Hume's rejection of the validity of induction is basically a rejection of the integration of our observations of similarities and differences. Hume says any predictions about the future are only lucky guesses, and that it is reasonable to wonder "what if it's different tomorrow?" Hume posits such skeptical doubt about the essential stability and lawfulness of the world, much as Descartes posits skeptical doubt about the very existence of the external world. Neither of them has a basis for this doubt. Whatever else "arbitrary" might or might not mean, this is the core of its valid meaning.

REB

[Chris Grieb]

Roger; In one of your earlier post you mentioned David Harriman's forthcoming book. Is there actually a publisher and date for publication. I remember how long Parallels was forthcoming.

[tjohnson]

It takes very little experience, at least on the adult level, to realize that its particular means of locomotion is an essential characteristic of any animal, while its particular color is not, and that the non-essential characteristics are subject to variation while the essentials are not, and that predictions about non-essentials are so iffy, while predictions about essentials are trustworthy.

REB

Interesting, it seems to me there are a number of species of animals where color must be considered an essential characteristic of it's existence - camouflage plays an important role in nature.

[BaalChatzaf]

It takes very little experience, at least on the adult level, to realize that its particular means of locomotion is an essential characteristic of any animal, while its particular color is not, and that the non-essential characteristics are subject to variation while the essentials are not, and that predictions about non-essentials are so iffy, while predictions about essentials are trustworthy.

REB

Interesting, it seems to me there are a number of species of animals where color must be considered an essential characteristic of it's existence - camouflage plays an important role in nature.

Which raises the obvious question: is there a sure fire way of determine which characteristics of an entity are essential and which are accidental.

Since not all humans are rational (acephelac infants, for example), it is clear that defining human to be the rational animal is incorrect. I think the correct definition of a human should be a characterization of the human genome. Craig Venter is the man to ask "what is man", rather than Aristotle. Our genes are what make us human. Rand never would have bought this definition since she was granite stone ignorant of genetics.

I have a negative half test of being essential: if there is a characteristic not possessed by EVERY member of a set, then that characteristic is NOT essential to the definition of set membership. That is why being rational is NOT an essential characteristic of Man.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited September 16, 2007 by BaalChatzaf

[tjohnson]

Which raises the obvious question: is there a sure fire way of determine which characteristics of an entity are essential and which are accidental.

Since not all humans are rational (acephelac infants, for example), it is clear that defining human to be the rational animal is incorrect. I think the correct definition of a human should be a characterization of the human genome. Craig Venter is the man to ask "what is man", rather than Aristotle. Our genes are what make us human. Rand never would have bought this definition since she was granite stone ignorant of genetics.

I have a negative half test of being essential: if there is a characteristic not possessed by EVERY member of a set, then that characteristic is NOT essential to the definition of set membership. That is what being rational is NOT an essential characteristic of Man.

Bob Kolker

Korzybski addressed this problem by using a functional definition of man. He defined man as a time-binding class of life, which means man has the [potential] ability for one generation to build on the knowledge from previous generations. This definition creates a sharp distinction from animals.

[Dragonfly]

And there is the example of the cormorant. Cormorants can fly, can't they? Then, when locomotion is an essential characteristic, what about the flightless cormorant that cannot fly? Not to mention the wingless fly (puliciphora), almost a contradictio in terminis. I agree with Bob that the only really essential characteristic of a living being is its genome. As far as we now know man is the only animal that is rational, so rationality may be an efficient characteristic for determining whether an animal is a human, but it is not essential, its uniqueness is contingent. Some day some animal may evolve into a rational animal that is not human. In that case the definition of man as the rational animal no longer holds, but the definition by the genome still stands, as this is the essential definition.

[tjohnson]

~ Interesting assertion. Technically, 'true' empirically (probably!) But, your 'experiment' follow-up illustration establishes nothing, really, other than you can't think of anything relevent here other than pickiness.

'Pickiness' ?? LOL Seriously John, it establishes that language is built on undefined terms whether we like it or not. It is these undefined terms that act as "axioms" in the sense that we cannot question them any further - you either know what I mean or you do not.

[BaalChatzaf]

Korzybski addressed this problem by using a functional definition of man. He defined man as a time-binding class of life, which means man has the [potential] ability for one generation to build on the knowledge from previous generations. This definition creates a sharp distinction from animals.

How much time-binding will an acephelac human do? There are a small number of human babies born without a cerebral cortex or pre-frontal lobe. But they are human. They have a human genome.

For a characteristic to be -essential- for membership in a class or set it must be possessed by -every- member of the set. No exceptions.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[BaalChatzaf]

Peikoff does NOT agree with Hume. Hume's rejection of the validity of induction is basically a rejection of the integration of our observations of similarities and differences. Hume says any predictions about the future are only lucky guesses, and that it is reasonable to wonder "what if it's different tomorrow?" Hume posits such skeptical doubt about the essential stability and lawfulness of the world, much as Descartes posits skeptical doubt about the very existence of the external world. Neither of them has a basis for this doubt. Whatever else "arbitrary" might or might not mean, this is the core of its valid meaning.

REB

No basis? How many inductions have turned out to be false? How many, once accepted, scientific theories have turned out to be wrong? I will tell you what is different tomorrow. Tomorrow a new fact may be discovered that shows that our best and most beloved theory is not generally correct. That is what is different tomorrow. Newton did not have a good enough telescope to track the motions of mercury long enough to prove that his inverse square law of gravitation is generally not true. One hundred and fifty years after Newton postulated his law Freunhoffer came up with telescopes good enough to track the motion of Mercury and LeVerrier used a Fruenhoffer instrument to verify that the precession of the perihelion of Mercury does not fit Newton's law of gravitation.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited September 16, 2007 by BaalChatzaf

[tjohnson]

For a characteristic to be -essential- for membership in a class or set it must be possessed by -every- member of the set. No exceptions.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Only in mathematics, it's impossible in natural language since all characteristics cannot be included in definitions.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

It is utterly reliant on the failure of some theorists to think in terms of essentials.

Roger,

I have found this to be strongly present in the discussions.

There is also another problem. Since the whole purpose of induction is to find mental "file-folders" (concepts and principles) that apply universally, there is the problem of exceptions. Every living entity can possibly have deficient offspring, but that does not invalidate the essential characteristic of the species. For instance, it is possible for a swan to be born without wings. That does not mean that swans as a species don't have wings.

Some people argue that because anomalous exceptions exist, you cannot have a universal category or principle. I think this is because the standard of predicting the future has been set in the same place as differentiation and grouping by essentials in some kind of weird sleight-of-hand. Predicting the future is ONE PURPOSE of knowledge, not the ONLY PURPOSE. Wouldn't it be great if we could all become disembodied time travelers? Unfortunately for such theorists, we also have to deal with identification and value-judgments, otherwise we will not be able to predict anything at all because we will be dead.

Then there is the problem of trying to find contextless knowledge. This is where method is said to be superior to experience. Method works under all contexts and time is eliminated from the system as an essential component. I actually think this knowledge is inferior if used stand-alone because it eliminates one crucial aspect of existence—time (for example, 2+2=4 always). It won't get you anything in reality whereas raw experience will at least get you a meal. Thus stand-alone method (so-called analytic knowledge) is incomplete and inferior to experience by its very nature. Method becomes knowledge only when added to experience. Then it allows man a degree of cognitive power and the ability to transform reality unseen on earth until now.

Those who make a false competition between science and philosophy also confuse knowledge based on both methods. This is where the DNA versus rationality problem comes in when defining man. But this is actually no problem at all, since man is both rational and has a specific DNA. I wonder what these people would call humans who are born with anomalous DNA.

Michael

[BaalChatzaf]

For a characteristic to be -essential- for membership in a class or set it must be possessed by -every- member of the set. No exceptions.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Only in mathematics, it's impossible in natural language since all characteristics cannot be included in definitions.

Predicates are what they are. Classifying them as essential of accidental is a word game. Today's essential is tomorrow.s accident.

We now know that the genome is what makes us human. Aristotle not only did not know that, he could not have know that. Why fiddle with Aristotle's obsolete idea? Yesterday's primary and important philosophical concept is today's quaint historical footnote. Essentiality or essentialness has no scientific importance. Why bother with it?

Ba'al Chatzaf

[tjohnson]

Predicates are what they are. Classifying them as essential of accidental is a word game. Today's essential is tomorrow.s accident.

We now know that the genome is what makes us human. Aristotle not only did not know that, he could not have know that. Why fiddle with Aristotle's obsolete idea? Yesterday's primary and important philosophical concept is today's quaint historical footnote. Essentiality or essentialness has no scientific importance. Why bother with it?

Ba'al Chatzaf

No argument here, 'essentials' are meaningless to me, but classification is necessary in any language. We need to classify but we can't delude ourselves into thinking that these classifications are cut and dried, 2-valued affairs, except in mathematics.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

No argument here, 'essentials' are meaningless to me, but classification is necessary in any language.

GS,

By what standards do you classify? The opposite of essential is arbitrary.

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

For a characteristic to be -essential- for membership in a class or set it must be possessed by -every- member of the set. No exceptions.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Only in mathematics, it's impossible in natural language since all characteristics cannot be included in definitions.

Predicates are what they are. Classifying them as essential of accidental is a word game. Today's essential is tomorrow.s accident.

We now know that the genome is what makes us human. Aristotle not only did not know that, he could not have know that. Why fiddle with Aristotle's obsolete idea? Yesterday's primary and important philosophical concept is today's quaint historical footnote. Essentiality or essentialness has no scientific importance. Why bother with it?

Ba'al Chatzaf

Essentially this is true.

--Brant

[tjohnson]

GS,

By what standards do you classify? The opposite of essential is arbitrary.

Michael

We classify however it suits our purpose. In Korzybski's definition (classification) of man as a time-binder he had a reason to do so. He believed that it was crucial to mankind for us to define and think of ourselves as something very different from an animal, even a rational animal, so he came up with a definition to do just that. To understand WHY he thought this I recommend his short initial publication, Manhood of Humanity, available online here;

http://www.esgs.org/uk/art/manhood.htm

We can make whatever classifications (definitions) we want - man could be a 'featherless biped' if we want, this seems obvious to me. No matter what definition we use the important thing to realize is that there will always be cases where is is not clear if an individual fits the definition or not, except in mathematics.

[Dragonfly]

There is also another problem. Since the whole purpose of induction is to find mental "file-folders" (concepts and principles) that apply universally, there is the problem of exceptions. Every living entity can possibly have deficient offspring, but that does not invalidate the essential characteristic of the species. For instance, it is possible for a swan to be born without wings. That does not mean that swans as a species don't have wings.

Such a wingless swan might breed true while it still can interbreed with other swans. In that case the wingless swan is no longer an accident, but a possible form of swan. It might not survive in the wild (although it might in a special environment, just like the wingless flies), but it could do very well as a pet. Just as there are tailless cats and cats without hair, not to mention all kinds of monstrous dogs.

Those who make a false competition between science and philosophy also confuse knowledge based on both methods. This is where the DNA versus rationality problem comes in when defining man. But this is actually no problem at all, since man is both rational and has a specific DNA. I wonder what these people would call humans who are born with anomalous DNA.

You're missing the point of the discussion, which was about Rand's claim that man's rationality gives the essential characteristic of man. A highly specific characteristic isn't the same as an essential characteristic, however. The advantage of the DNA definition is that it gives the complete biological basis of human beings. In that sense it is much more essential than one single characteristic, no matter how specific that may be. Further you should keep in mind that there isn't just one single "correct" DNA sequence for human beings, there are lots of variations, but we can pose limits on those variations. Of course that implies some arbitrariness, but it allows for "anomalous" humans who still are humans according to this definition, and not chimps for example. But the boundaries are necessarily fuzzy, especially when we go back in time to earlier hominids.

[Daniel Barnes]

Roger:

>There is a world of difference between saying: All swans are winged and All swans are white.

But a swan can be born without wings by an accident of birth, say. It's still a swan, unless you simply then fiddle with the terminology to deny it. Further, there is absolutely no reason why a wingless swan might not* be discovered. Do you know the origin of the "white swan" example Roger?It's from early biologists making the same "overgeneralisation" about colour that you're making about wings, prior to the discovery of the black swan in Australia. Finally, there are plenty of birds who do not use flying for locomotion as an "essential characteristic," and have given up the need for wings. This claim itself is a false overgeneralisation. Therefore is no reason why a swan might be discovered which has no wings.

>Peikoff does NOT agree with Hume.

Peikoff does indeed agree with Hume. Specifically, he agrees that induction (in the sense that X number of swans have wings=all swans have wings) is deductively invalid. You agree with that. I agree with that. Hume agrees with that. That is the alpha and omega of the situation. The question is: do you take logical results seriously. I do. Hume, in the end, did not.Somewhat insincerely, he remained an inductivist all the same.

Peikoff further agrees with Hume that we should somehow just overlook this problem (though Peikoff claims to have his own method for ignoring it)

>Hume's rejection of the validity of induction is basically a rejection of the integration of our observations of similarities and differences.

Hume did not reject induction, however. He stuck with it despite the fact it was illogical. Plenty of people have done the same ever since. Peikoff is just another in a long line. The consequences of this are, unfortunately, that once you start to privilege particular illogical beliefs, you have to privilege them all!

>Hume says any predictions about the future are only lucky guesses,

I'm not sure he did. It's what Popper says, but I can't recall Hume saying this. Hume was an inductivist.

>and that it is reasonable to wonder "what if it's different tomorrow?"

There is nothing at all unreasonable about so wondering. Society 10,000 years ago was different to society today.The earth 3 billion years ago was different to the earth today. The universe 13 billion years ago was completely different to today.

>Hume posits such skeptical doubt about the essential stability and lawfulness of the world,

The skeptical doubt applies to our knowledge of the lawfulness of the world, not necessarily the lawfulness of the world itself. That is, what we think the laws are, are not necessarily the laws of the universe. We may have a set of laws that the universe seems to obey to incredible precision for centuries, only to find that they are false, and need to be replaced by a better theory, just like Newton being replaced by Einstein. Now, just because our theories are false, does not necessarily mean they are useless. The Newtonian picture of the world is false, but was still useful for many great developments. Its predictions are still useful as a rule of thumb.

*"not" accidentally omitted at first. Apologies for any confusion.

Edited September 17, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Jonathan]

Please support this claim. Where does Rand state a "personal preference for literature over all other art forms"?

I don't know that she "stated" that she had a personal preference for literature, but I would say that it is strongly implied in her choice of career, in her apparent lack of knowledge of any previous or contemporary theories of painting, dance and photography (or her refusal to address them in her work) and in her apparent lack of interest in gaining any real knowledge about those art forms, as well as in the absence of any technical discussion of architecture in her aesthetics, and even in her choice of subtitle for The Romantic Manifesto ("A Philosophy of Literature").

Btw, if you have evidence that she seriously studied the history and methods of art forms such as dance, painting and photography, I'd love to hear about it. And architecture. I know that she worked in an architect's office in order to gain knowledge for writing The Fountainhead, but I don't know that she familiarized herself with any theories of architecture as an art form.

Referring to her three principal theoretical essays on aesthetics (essays 1-3 in Romantic Manifesto), please explain how her theory is based "mainly/solely" on her literary preferences. That is, please tell me how you explain ~away~ her numerous references to art forms ~other~ than literature.

I haven't tried to "explain them away." I didn't say that she ignored everything other than literature, I said that her theory is biased in favor of her personal preference for it. Besides, making "numerous references" to other art forms doesn't necessarily mean that they've been seriously considered or addressed. For example, saying that architecture is art even though it serves a utilitarian purpose and doesn't re-create reality implies to me that there hasn't been much thought applied to the topic.

Is the application to other art forms of concepts such as subject and style and sense of life and emotional abstraction and metaphysical value-judgment necessarily ~clumsy and inappropriate~?

Yes, it's clumsy and inappropriate if we apply Rand's requirement of identifying the artist's subject and meaning, which is an attempt to apply to all art forms her method of judging the types of literature that she favored.

Some...might? Honestly, I find it impossible to look at ~any~ artworks without seeing this aspect of them. I approach each artwork, in each artform, with the perspective that the artist has given me a "window" on another world. I don't feel that I am ~forcing~ this perspective. I feel that the artworks ~compel~ me to take it. I realize that some people don't (can't? won't?) approach art in this way. I also suspect that many people implicitly approach it this way, without realizing or conceptualizing it.

I'm not interested in debating people who don't (can't? won't?) experience art this way, any more than I am in debating the merits of music with those who are tone deaf.

What about people who experience art in the way that you do, but also in other ways that you don't? What if you are the one who is "tone deaf" in some ways? Do you have any interest in exploring the nature of art based on what mankind can experience, or just on what you are capable of experiencing?

If you don't already grasp that all art has microcosmic qualities and that this is tantamount to art's being a "world in miniature," nothing I say is going to convince you. I'm interested in reaching those who already agree with this viewpoint, but perhaps haven't clearly realized it yet.

I grasp that art has microcosmic qualities. I just don't agree that those qualities are necessarily art's only means.

The fact that she understood best and was most familiar with literature, and so wrote the greatest number of elaborative essays about how her theory applies to literature, does not invalidate or limit the usefulness of the theory.

I think her theory is valuable, but I think that it's usefulness is limited if not supplemented by other theories which address the issues that make the other art forms different from literature.

In fact, I think something ~like~ her approach to literature is needed to help make sense out of the dramatic nature of a great deal of music.

Your ideas may indeed apply to "a great deal" of music. What about the rest of it, though?

"Intelligible" simply means discernable and graspable by the senses or intellect. Even a great deal of modern music and abstract art fits underneath this umbrella.

I can largely agree with that. But we're now talking about our theories of art and our notions of intelligibility, not Rand's.

J

Edited September 17, 2007 by Jonathan

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

To understand WHY he thought this I recommend his short initial publication, Manhood of Humanity, available online here;

http://www.esgs.org/uk/art/manhood.htm

We can make whatever classifications (definitions) we want - man could be a 'featherless biped' if we want, this seems obvious to me.

GS,

Heh. Short publication? You linked me to a full book. In the very first part, I found an interesting observation:

By induction we pass from particulars to the general. However, this method is not reliable enough. We have to build a deductive system and verify empirically whether the general applies to the eventual random particular, which then would become the foundation for predictability. This, after all, is the main aim of all science. So far what we 'knew' about 'man' were statistical averages gathered inductively, and so our human world picture was rather sad, distorted, if not hopeless. The human understanding of time-binding as explained here establishes the deductive grounds for a full-fledged 'science of man', where both inductive and deductive methods are utilized. I believe that this very point of inductive and deductive scientific methods with regard to humans tangibly marks a sharp difference between the childhood and the manhood of humanity. In other words, we try to learn from the study of the individual the main characteristics of the phylum (the human race). Now with the time-binding theory, for the first time to my knowledge, having accumulated data by induction (statistical averages), we can start with what we have learned about the phylum and analyze the individual from the point of view of human potentialities as a phylum. I may be wrong, but perhaps this may become the turning of a page of human history.

In other words, induction is for primitives and deduction is for educated people. Why can't they both be used reliably according to a rational standard? They can. The foundation for this error is the supposition that predictability "is the main aim of all science." I disagree with this, although predictability is one of the aims of science. I have no problem with the time-binding concept. This is merely passing on knowledge from one generation to the next.

As to categorization according to essentials, of course one can categorize according to whim. But that does make it a valid concept, because concepts include all the knowledge of what they refer to, not just the basis of the categorization (the definition). A concept and its definition are two different things. Here is a small amusing example from Peikoff that illustrates this. (Please try not to get turned off by the aggressive and insulting posture. This was not necessary to impart the idea, but there it is. Those who ape Rand think that this attitude is cool. Still the ideas are valid.) Objectivism:The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, p. 100:

The opposite of the principle of fundamentality is exemplified in certain kinds of psychotic thinking. One schizophrenic in New York City's Bellevue Hospital routinely equated sex, cigars, and Jesus Christ. He regarded all these existents, both in his thought and in his feelings about them, as interchangeable members of a single class, on the grounds that all had an attribute in common, "encirclement." In sex, he explained, the woman is encircled by the man; cigars are encircled by tax bands; Jesus is encircled by a halo. This individual, in effect, was trying to form a new concept, "encirclist." Such an attempt is a cognitive disaster, which can lead only to confusion, distortion, and falsehood. Imagine studying cigars and then applying one's conclusions to Jesus!

This mode of thought is calamitous because "being encircled" is not a fundamental; it is not causally significant; it does not lead to any consequences. It is a dead end. Groups erected on such a basis necessarily lead to cognitive stultification.

To define a valid concept in terms of nonfundamentals is to commit a similar error. Such a practice evades the actual basis of the concept, the root similarity uniting its instances, and substitutes instead an insignificant resemblance. This evasion converts a legitimate concept into the epistemological equivalent of "encirclist" and confounds the very purpose of conceptualization.

A definition in terms of fundamentals can be formulated only by reference to one's full knowledge of the units. In order to identify a fundamental distinguishing characteristic (and a fundamental integrating characteristic—the genus), one must take into account all the known facts in the case. One must bear in mind how the units differ from other things, how they resemble other things, and what causal relationships obtain within these two sets of attributes. Only on this basis can one establish that a certain characteristic is fundamental (within that context of knowledge).

There is one caveat. We are talking about definitions and not artistic-like integrations, which are used to illustrate wider principles. For an art work, "encirclement" could be a valid symbol. (This is what makes Peikoff's comment insultingly aggressive. He insinuates that this kind of categorization only has one other cognitive use: "certain kinds of psychotic thinking." Heh. Maybe he was trying to by funny. Rand was an artist who used symbols all the time in her fiction works...)

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Dragonfly to Mike:

>You're missing the point of the discussion, which was about Rand's claim that man's rationality gives the essential characteristic of man.

Yes. To elaborate further, Rand claimed that an "essential" characteristic was the thing on which all other characteristics depend.

But this definition, superficially plausible, turns out to be functionally useless. For we could say, following Ba'al, man's rationality depends upon his DNA (try constructing a brain without it). Or we could also say it depends on breathing; for if a man cannot breathe he does not stay rational for very long....;-) And so forth. So we could say that DNA, or even breathiing, is more essential than rationality, as the latter depends on the former, and still be perfectly consistent with Rand's definition.

[tjohnson]

Heh. Short publication? You linked me to a full book.

Sorry about that, it's short compared to Science &Sanity , which is also available at that site but I don't recommend that unless you plan to spend a year or so reading it. It has to be one of the most exhaustive works ever written, the bibliography contains 619 entries in 6 languages covering every aspect of science in 1933. It was 12 years in the making.

In other words, induction is for primitives and deduction is for educated people. Why can't they both be used reliably according to a rational standard? They can. The foundation for this error is the supposition that predictability "is the main aim of all science." I disagree with this, although predictability is one of the aims of science. I have no problem with the time-binding concept. This is merely passing on knowledge from one generation to the next.

Not sure why you interpret that to mean "In other words, induction is for primitives and deduction is for educated people."?

What do you think the main aim of science is?

Time-binding is not simply passing on knowledge from one generation to the next - it is building on previous knowledge. Many animals pass on knowledge but they can't build on it and essentially grow it exponentially.

As to categorization according to essentials, of course one can categorize according to whim. But that does make it a valid concept, because concepts include all the knowledge of what they refer to, not just the basis of the categorization (the definition). A concept and its definition are two different things. Here is a small amusing example from Peikoff that illustrates this. (Please try not to get turned off by the aggressive and insulting posture. This was not necessary to impart the idea, but there it is. Those who ape Rand think that this attitude is cool. Still the ideas are valid.)

Michael

You know if you replaced valid concept with useful concept I think I could agree with you. But I feel that 'concept' is a rather vague term at any rate. I usually replace 'concept' with 'formulation' in my mind when I read it or hear it. I can understand a visualization (like of a cat) and a definition of a cat are different so maybe you equate 'visualization' with 'concept'?