SCORECARD! Can't tell the players without a scorecard!

[Daniel Barnes]

Ba'al:

I have proposed that Objectist prefix their peculiar locutions with a Dollar Sign. For example: "logic" means what 99 percent of the world means by logic, to wit valid inference. $logic means Rand's definition (non contradictory identification) which only Objectivists use. Ditto for "induction" and "$induction". etc. etc. etc.

Superb idea. Gets my vote

However, I am not sure it will help them at the next level, which I will get into in a bit more detail later. Suffice to say, when Objectivist "induction" (or "$induction") is discussed, deductive terms such as "premises", "conclusions" "validity" and "inferences" are tossed about, further adding to confusion because it is strenously asserted in the same breath that $induction is not only not induction , it is not deduction either. Surely using all the same terminology for a completely different thing, once again will utterly confuse?

Further we all know that deduction has, for example, rules of valid inference , and that these can be easily specified.

Can someone therefore specify what the rules for a valid inference are in "$induction"?

Edited September 19, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

No doubt, therefore, you will have a problem should the same technique be applied to Hume's theories by Peikoff.

Daniel,

I have stated and/or implied this several times. I am always for defining one's terms. It makes matters easier when people know what one another mean. It is Popper who doesn't like to define terms.

Ellen,

My new syllogism was to provide an alternative to the way "irrational" was being sneaked in under the guise of "illogical." They are two different concepts and "irrational" had nothing to do with Daniel's syllogism other than being tacked on at the end. Since he went to the realm of knowledge, I elaborated.

It was a nice try, though.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

... "$induction" ...

Daniel and Bob,

Sorry. That one is klunky too. I don't see it catching on.

Michael

[John Dailey]

ADDENDUM:

~ Anti-inductioners make me wonder just what they even mean re their use of the terms 'valid' or 'validity' when they ask about 'deductive validity.' Mere 'internal [arbitrarily accepted 'rules' of...'logic'?] consistency' and that's it? Internal to what? Mental puzzles which have nothing to do with life-discoveries (such as the place of 'logic' being relevent...externally)? If so, they're irrelevent to discovering (a la DaVinci, Newton, nm Einstein or Hawking) anything worth risking (as they have) reputations in committing themselves to "THIS is the way things are/-not." They're just nuisance gadflys, giving Socrates a bad name.

~ Note my 1st statement above: Can we say 'stolen concept'?

LLAP

J:D

PS: I'd discuss/debate Popper, but he implicitly contradicts himself too much. He's a 'name', but, I find that his content's worth discussing as much as Anselm's.

Edited September 19, 2007 by John Dailey

[Daniel Barnes]

Mike:

It is Popper who doesn't like to define terms.

No, no no! Popper has no problem with defining terms. He has a problem with arguing over definitions, with debates over what is the "true" meaning of a word, because such debates are, contra Rand, and much philosophical habit, logically irresolvable.

Now do you get it?

[John Dailey]

~ Given the latest concerns...

...did you know that $in $ity 2 is getting made?

~ Staying relevent to the original thread (well, 'title', anyways), here's a story (given the writer's rep) not needing a 'scorecard.'

~ Can't wait for this Frank Miller latest.

LLAP

J:D

PS: I 'induce' it will be as worthwhile watching (and arguing over) as his original, and, his 300 (hell, throw in V for Vendetta).

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

No, no no! Popper has no problem with defining terms. He has a problem with arguing over definitions, with debates over what is the "true" meaning of a word, because such debates are, contra Rand, and much philosophical habit, logically irresolvable.

Daniel,

If you say so, but I get a completely different impression when I look at the man's words. Here are a few quotes from Two Kinds of Definitions and more are easy to find:

It may be said that what people have in mind, if they demand definitions, is the elimination of the ambiguities so often connected with words such as 'democracy', 'liberty', 'duty', 'religion', etc.; that it is clearly impossible to define all our terms, but possible to define some of these more dangerous terms and to leave it at that; and that the defining terms have just to be accepted, i.e., that we must stop after a step or two in order to avoid an infinite regression. This defence, however, is untenable. Admittedly, the terms mentioned are much misused. But I deny that the attempt to define them can improve matters. It can only make matters worse. That by 'defining their terms' even once, and leaving the defining terms undefined, the politicians would not be able to make their speeches shorter, is clear; for any essentialist definition, i.e. one that 'defines our terms' (as opposed to the nominalist one which introduces new technical terms), means the substitution of a long story for a short one, as we have seen. Besides, the attempt to define terms would only increase the vagueness and confusion.

. . .

As we have seen, science does not use definitions in order to determine the meaning of its terms, but only in order to introduce handy shorthand labels. And it does not depend on definitions; all definitions can be omitted without loss to the information imparted. It follows from this that in science, all the terms that are really needed must be undefined terms.

. . .

In science, we take care that the statements we make should never depend upon the meaning of our terms. Even where the terms are defined, we never try to derive any information from the definition, or to base any argument upon it. This is why our terms make so little trouble. We do not overburden them. We try to attach to them as little weight as possible. We do not take their 'meaning' too seriously. We are always conscious that our terms are a little vague (since we have learnt to use them only in practical applications) and we reach precision not by reducing their penumbra of vagueness, but rather by keeping well within it, by carefully phrasing our sentences in such a way that the possible shades of meaning of our terms do not matter.

These quotes are not taken out of context. Within context they mean exactly what they mean here.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Mike:

If you say so, but I get a completely different impression when I look at the man's words. Here are a few quotes from Two Kinds of Definitions and more are easy to find:

Your impression is correct, in that Popper does not consider defining terms of very much importance. None of these quotes conflict with what I am saying however. You can define your terms, and then define those definitions, and so forth, as much as you like. Knock yourself out. Popper's point is that doing so will add nothing to the precision of your arguments - quite the reverse. So why bother?

Look, all you have to keep in mind is this: disputes over the meanings of words are not logically resolvable. Rand is mistaken on this point, and as a result her claim that words must not be considered mere conventions also collapses.

It turns out they must be conventions to be of any use (other than, perhaps, in some kind of Gertrude Steinian personal secret language).

Edited September 19, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Look, all you have to keep in mind is this: disputes over the meanings of words are not logically resolvable.

Daniel,

That is not what I am reading. Popper is saying that definitions do not necessarily contain any information, not that they are not logically resolvable (which he might say somewhere else, but not here). What's more, if they do contain information, such information should not be used.

(From the quotes above): "... all definitions can be omitted without loss to the information imparted..." AND "... in science, all the terms that are really needed must be undefined terms..." AND "Even where the terms are defined, we never try to derive any information from the definition..."

These are his words, not mine. They are pretty clear.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Rand is mistaken on this point, and as a result her claim that words must not be considered mere conventions also collapses.

It turns out they must be conventions to be of any use (other than, perhaps, in some kind of Gertrude Steinian personal secret language).

Daniel,

This is one example of misrepresenting Rand's thoughts. She did not claim "that words must not be considered mere conventions." On the contrary, she actually claimed that they were "merely symbols." But the real issue is knowledge.

She claimed that those who postulated that words have no referents in reality and that words are merely "arbitrary social conventions" are wrong. To clarify this further, she did not claim that convention did not play a role in formulating the "visual-auditory symbols." (She said nothing about the role of convention, to be exact.) She claimed that this was not knowledge. Here it is a bit clearer (ITOE, 2nd, p. 40):

A word is merely a visual-auditory symbol used to represent a concept; a word has no meaning other than that of the concept it symbolizes, and the meaning of a concept consists of its units. It is not words, but concepts that man defines—by specifying their referents.

Michael

[Alfonso Jones]

Rand is mistaken on this point, and as a result her claim that words must not be considered mere conventions also collapses.

It turns out they must be conventions to be of any use (other than, perhaps, in some kind of Gertrude Steinian personal secret language).

Daniel,

This is one example of misrepresenting Rand's thoughts. She did not claim "that words must not be considered mere conventions." On the contrary, she actually claimed that they were "merely symbols." But the real issue is knowledge.

She claimed that those who postulated that words have no referents in reality and that words are merely "arbitrary social conventions" are wrong. To clarify this further, she did not claim that convention did not play a role in formulating the "visual-auditory symbols." (She said nothing about the role of convention, to be exact.) She claimed that this was not knowledge. Here it is a bit clearer (ITOE, 2nd, p. 40):

A word is merely a visual-auditory symbol used to represent a concept; a word has no meaning other than that of the concept it symbolizes, and the meaning of a concept consists of its units. It is not words, but concepts that man defines—by specifying their referents.

Michael

Reading this thread thus far leads me to suggest a change in name from:

SCORECARD! Can't tell the players without a scorecard!

to

ALERT! Familiarity with ITOE at some level (perhaps reading it!) will be necessary to understand or comment meaningfully on this thread!

Alfonso

[John Dailey]

Alfonso:

~ You are so....correct.

~ Haven't caught all responses since my last post in this thread, but, let me throw out this point to consider: As soon as you (generally speaking) say/use-the-term 'abstraction'...can you give a logical 'deduction' as to how you 'deduced' it as being usefully, communicationally, meaningful?

~ If so, give an example (trust me on this: 'Think Twice...about your show-and-tell' argument.)

~ If not, what 'label' would you give what you consider its worthwhile, justificatory (er, 'logical'?) source...and why?

~ For an 'abstraction' example, how about...'holes'? (Or, pick whatever.)

LLAP

J:D

PS: My hidden point is: no 'abstraction' can be 'deduced.'

Edited September 19, 2007 by John Dailey

[Daniel Barnes]

Mike:

That is not what I am reading. Popper is saying that definitions do not necessarily contain any information, not that they are not logically resolvable (which he might say somewhere else, but not here).

Oh, really? As a matter of fact, Mike, Popper does too say that they are logically irresolvable. Right here, only a few paras before the parts you quote:

"Since Aristotle, it has become widely known that one cannot prove all statements, and that an attempt to do so would break down because it would lead only to an infinite regression of proofs. But neither he nor, apparently, a great many modern writers, seems to realise that the analogous attempt to define the meaning of all our terms must, in the same way, lead to an infinite regression of definitions." (emphasis DB)

Do you know what an infinite regression is in logic, Mike? It's a situation that' s logically irresolvable.

Worst still, it so happens that three sections you have chosen to clip are in fact merely later parts of an argument initiated by the section you didn't read. This omission, and probably others, leads you to entirely misunderstand what Popper is talking about in the sections you quote; namely you seem to think that by using "undefined terms", he is suggesting using meaningless terms, with no definition at all. I now take the time and trouble to walk you through Popper's actual argument to demonstrate exactly how you've gone wrong.

In this argument, Popper is criticising the second of two essentialist doctrines. (It starts with line "The second doctrine to be criticised is...). This doctrine is, delightfully, held by both Objectivists and Logical Positivists alike, and Popper illustrates it by quoting the most famous LP of all: "...if we do not know precisely the meaning of the words we use, we cannot discuss anything profitably..." (Wittgenstein).

We might call this the doctrine of precise definition. Popper then shows over the next page or so just how this ostensibly plausible doctrine fails in practice, and achieves the exact opposite of precision in argument, merely encouraging waffle and confusion. (this is where you clipped your first quote from, and as we don't need to cover this section in depth you may re-read it for yourself scroll down)

We then reach the part where you have clipped your other two quotes from. Here, Popper poses himself the very question his readers are also asking by now:

"But undoubtedly, the demand that we speak clearly and without ambiguity is very important and must be satisfied. Can the nominalist view satisfy it? And can nominalism escape the infinite regress?

He answers:

"It can. For the nominalist position there is no difficulty which corresponds to the infinite regression. As we have seen, science does not use definitions in order to determine the meaning of its terms, but only in order to introduce handy shorthand labels. And it does not depend on definitions; all definitions can be omitted without loss to the information imparted."

OK, so I will stop the tape here and now point out that what Popper is saying here is that, unlike Logical Positivists and Objectivists, scientists do not think it necessary to provide precise definitions of their terms* before they can have a productive discussion. Said definitions can be "omitted", words can be left with their usual "vague" meanings. Precision is reached "not by reducing their penumbra of vagueness, but rather by keeping well within it, by carefully phrasing our sentences in such a way that the possible shades of meaning of our terms do not matter (emphasis DB). This is how we avoid quarrelling about words."

He then provides a couple of simple examples:"dunes" and "wind."

"The view that the precision of science and of scientific language depends upon the precision of its terms is certainly very plausible, but it is none the less, I believe, a mere prejudice. The precision of a language depends, rather, just upon the fact that it takes care not to burden its terms with the task of being precise. A term like 'sand-dune' or 'wind' is certainly very vague. (How many inches high must a little sand-hill be in order to be called 'sand-dune'? How quickly must the air move in order to be called 'wind'?) However, for many of the geologist's purposes, these terms are quite sufficiently precise; and for other purposes, when a higher degree of differentiation is needed, he can always say 'dunes between 4 and 30 feet high' or 'wind of a velocity of between 20 and 40 miles an hour'. And the position in the more exact sciences is analogous. In physical measurements, for instance, we always take care to consider the range within which there may be an error; and precision does not consist in trying to reduce this range to nothing, or in pretending that there is no such range, but rather in its explicit recognition."

So you got it now? Using "undefined terms" in this essay does not mean terms that have no definition at all, as you seem to erroneously believe, but merely terms that nobody goes out of their way to particularly define before using.

OK. So is that now cleared up for all time? Good. Let's move on.

Incidentally, Popper then briefly criticizes another doctrine held, delightfully, by Ayn Rand and Logical Positivists alike: "..that of Wittgenstein, who holds that while science investigates matters of fact, it is the business of philosophy to clarify the meaning of terms..."

*except, obviously, obscurities and neologisms

Edited September 19, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Daniel Barnes]

I wrote:

Rand is mistaken on this point, and as a result her claim that words must not be considered mere conventions also collapses.

Mike replied:

This is one example of misrepresenting Rand's thoughts. She did not claim "that words must not be considered mere conventions."

But then he wrote:

She claimed that those who postulated that words have no referents in reality and that words are merely "arbitrary social conventions" are wrong.

Huh??? But this last is obviously what I was saying in the first place!

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

As a matter of fact, Mike, Popper does too say that they are logically irresolvable.

Daniel,

You are right. Infinite regression is logically irresolvable. I am corrected in that he did mention it here. But just to be clear, Popper did not say this was the only problem with definitions. He also said definitions contained no information.

btw - I did read the parts of the essay you said I did not read. How do you know that I did not read them? I do wish you would crawl out of my head and stay in yours.

He [Popper] answers:

"It can. For the nominalist position there is no difficulty which corresponds to the infinite regression. As we have seen, science does not use definitions in order to determine the meaning of its terms, but only in order to introduce handy shorthand labels. And it does not depend on definitions; all definitions can be omitted without loss to the information imparted."

OK, so I will stop the tape here and now point out that what Popper is saying here is that, unlike Logical Positivists and Objectivists, scientists do not think it necessary to provide precise definitions of their terms* before they can have a productive discussion.

Sorry, but "all definitions can be omitted without loss to the information imparted" does not mean "precise definitions" are not needed. Not if you are using the English language. It means that definitions do not contain information. And this even takes into account that this section could be "keeping well within" the "penumbra of vagueness." Vague is one thing. Saying something completely different is another.

Is Popper now to be treated like the Bible, where Christians say that it is true, but has to be "interpreted" to mean something different than what it says? That's not good.

So you got it now? Using "undefined terms" in this essay does not mean terms that have no definition at all, as you seem to erroneously believe, but merely terms that nobody goes out of their way to particularly define before using.

OK. So is that now cleared up for all time? Good. Let's move on.

No it isn't cleared up for all time. (Incidentally, why are you now starting to ape the rhetoric of Pross? I personally find this form of rhetoric obnoxious.) Anyway, I didn't say that. You really should read what I write before going into attack mode.

Here is your statement once again to highlight an error:

"Using 'undefined terms' in this essay does not mean terms that have no definition at all, as you seem to erroneously believe..."

There you are in my head again. I don't believe that at all and I have not even given any indication of believing that. Here is my exact phrase from above, and it correctly paraphrases Popper's pronouncements: "Popper is saying that definitions do not necessarily contain any information... What's more, if they do contain information, such information should not be used."

(I clipped out my mistake about where Popper placed his other idea for the sake of clarity.) And if you like, I can repeat Popper's own words that say the exact same thing.

Maybe Popper is vague about what he means by "information"? Maybe "information" in this part of his essay means one thing and in another part, "information" means something else? Like "precise definition" or something? I certainly believe in poetic license, but that's a stretch. I don't believe he did this. I think he meant the same thing every time he used the word "information" throughout his entire essay.

I must say that I thoroughly disagree with his view. I think definitions do contain information and the information they contain has to be used in order to know what you are talking about. Pointing and grunting only goes so far.

I wrote:

Rand is mistaken on this point, and as a result her claim that words must not be considered mere conventions also collapses.

Mike replied:

This is one example of misrepresenting Rand's thoughts. She did not claim "that words must not be considered mere conventions."

But then he wrote:

She claimed that those who postulated that words have no referents in reality and that words are merely "arbitrary social conventions" are wrong.

Huh??? But this last is obviously what I was saying in the first place!

No it isn't what you were saying in the first place and from the sound of it, you still did not understand what I am saying. There are two problems with what you said:

1. You stated "mere conventions" as being Rand's words and she, being much more precise, always uses the phrase "arbitrary social conventions" (in several places). What you are talking about and what she is talking about are two separate things.

2. Rand did not say "mere conventions" are not used. She is saying that ONLY "arbitrary social conventions" are not knowledge. I will try to make it clearer for you.

According to Rand's writing, the Logical Positivists (whom Rand always targeted with this phrase) say words are "arbitrary social conventions." STOP. GO NO FURTHER. That's the end of it. Words do not have any reference to reality other than some kind of convenience along the lines of crossword puzzles.

Rand says "visual-auditory symbols" (which can be made by "mere conventions," as evidenced by different languages although she does not mention this in ITOE) REFER TO CONCEPTS and these concepts REFER TO REAL THINGS.

You are treating it (as in your phrase from the earlier post, "It turns out they must be conventions to be of any use...") as if Rand says NO CONVENTIONS AT ALL are used in making words. That's simply wrong. She never claimed that and I am sure she never would.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

You are right. Infinite regression is logically irresolvable. I am corrected in that he did mention it here.

Thank you.

But just to be clear, Popper did not say this was the only problem with definitions. He also said definitions contained no information.

No. He doesn't. This is not a direct quote. Where does he say this? This is your reformulation. Once again, exactly as I said before, you seem to be trying to make a case that Popper thinks words have no meaning i.e. contain no information.

But he doesn't say this. In fact he says that they do contain meaning, but this is always somewhat vague, and attempts to make them more precise backfire.

Look, you persist with this misunderstanding here:

Sorry, but "all definitions can be omitted without loss to the information imparted" does not mean "precise definitions" are not needed. Not if you are using the English language. It means that definitions do not contain information. And this even takes into account that this section could be "keeping well within" the "penumbra of vagueness." Vague is one thing. Saying something completely different is another.

You are just so confused on this point it is not funny. Once again, Popper is contrasting the scientific method with the Aristotelian philosophic method, by saying that in science we can and do omit the practice of supplying definitions of our terms as a preliminary to discussion. This omission, counterintuitively, adds precision to debate.

Of course, you are welcome to invent your own reformulations of a couple of phrases, and cling to them in the face of the rest of the essay, and indeed in the face of common sense itself, to try to make your case.

Is Popper now to be treated like the Bible, where Christians say that it is true, but has to be "interpreted" to mean something different than what it says?...why are you now starting to ape the rhetoric of Pross? I personally find this form of rhetoric obnoxious

!!!

Anyway, I didn't say that. You really should read what I write before going into attack mode.

Actually you are saying it over and over again:

I must say that I thoroughly disagree with his view. I think definitions do contain information and the information they contain has to be used in order to know what you are talking about. Pointing and grunting only goes so far.

You are basically trying to make a case that Popper thinks words have no meaning. This is a merely faded photocopy of an ancient Objectivist fudge. This is why you keep insisting that Popper says words contain no information, but have only on your own reformulations to achieve it. But he never says anything of the sort. Further, you have to fly in the face of your own principle of charity to keep insisting on this, as he says quite clearly that words have meanings, albeit vague ones, throughout the essay. The principle of charity - not to mention commonsense - says therefore you should simply accept this interpretation ahead of your uncharitable one.

If you are not saying that, then what is your point?

1. You stated "mere conventions" as being Rand's words and she, being much more precise, always uses the phrase "arbitrary social conventions" (in several places). What you are talking about and what she is talking about are two separate things.

LOL!

2. Rand did not say "mere conventions" are not used. She is saying that ONLY "arbitrary social conventions" are not knowledge. I will try to make it clearer for you.

Sorry, but you have not succeeded.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

You are basically trying to make a case that Popper thinks words have no meaning. This is a merely faded photocopy of an ancient Objectivist fudge.

Daniel,

I never said anything about meaning. You are stuck and once again in my head telling me what I am doing. I really wish you would stay in your own head. But if you insist, here is exactly what I am doing with this issue. I am reading Popper's own words.

This is why you keep insisting that Popper says words contain no information, but have only on your own reformulations to achieve it. But he never says anything of the sort.

No, I did not say "Popper says words contain no information." Now you are misquoting me in addition to trying to be in my head. I said that Popper says that definitions of words do not necessarily contain information, and if they did contain information, scientists should not use that information. And he did say that. Practically in those words.

I am not going to play kindergarten and show you over and over the same thing. I have listed the quotes a few times already. Here is the last time:

(From the quotes above): "... all definitions can be omitted without loss to the information imparted..." AND "... in science, all the terms that are really needed must be undefined terms..." AND "Even where the terms are defined, we never try to derive any information from the definition..."

These are his words, not mine. They are pretty clear.

"Omitted without loss to the information imparted" means they do not necessarily contain information, at least not the kind that is imparted (communicated).

Reread the essay if you think I transcribed them incorrectly.

The only other possibility I see here is that according to Popper, a definition contains one kind of information (useless) and some utterance of some sort contains another kind of information (the real deal). If that is what he is saying, I find no reason on earth to accept that just because he says so. I put that in the "moon is made of green cheese" category.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Here's what you said about Popper:

Mike then:

He also said definitions contained no information.

Bull. Popper never said this, only you did. That's why you don't have any direct quotes. Further, the quote you do cite doesn't support your reformulation. You've just misread it. It just means the infomation imparted by science does not depend on formulating your definitions to begin with, as Aristotelian philosophers do! Science just rocks on, leaving its terms formally undefined (and this is what he means by "undefined terms" - not "information free definitions"). Here it is in black and white:

"As we have seen, science does not use definitions in order to determine the meaning of its terms, but only in order to introduce handy shorthand labels. And it (science) does not depend on definitions; all definitions can be omitted without loss to the information imparted."

Information imparted by science, Mike.

You're up a creek, mate.

Fortunately, you seem to sense you've got it somehow wrong because you're now diluting your original interpretation:

Mike now:

I said that Popper says that definitions of words do not necessarily contain information

But Popper never said this weaker version either. Faced with all this, are you now going to accept you've got it wrong, as you properly and graciously did with your earlier misreading?

Edited September 19, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Daniel,

One thing you have yet to understand with me. I don't care about who wins an argument. My interest is in the ideas. Thus, I will never be up a creek or whatever else your little heart dreams up to pretend you are vanquishing your foes. I ain't preaching, I am discussing. I seek no converts.

How can I put this? I am very selfish in the finest sense of the word. If I learn something from an exchange with you (either from you, a source discussed or my own inner thinking and prompted research), I win. If I only irritate myself and learn nothing, I lose. I am the only one playing my game and I really don't care about convincing you of anything. Your thing is Popper. Cool. I don't care.

You, however, apparently take great pleasure in these competitive things like put-downs and so forth, so go for it. We all get our jollies in different manners and I certainly do not want to deny you of your jollies. Jollies are not easy to come by in this cold cruel world. I only request that you keep the noise within a certain limit because it is annoying (in the manner of a child running around taunting and sticking his tongue out while one is trying to concentrate) and interferes with the flow of ideas.

Now, back to the ideas. So you are saying that Popper holds to the mold of two kinds of information about reality? He claims that there is scientific information and normal or other information (or whatever adjective he uses for this kind of information)? Is that fair to say?

I have been under the impression until now that he thought there was information and speculation.

If the 2 informations system is the case, would you please tell me what kind of utterance Popper believes that contains scientific information as opposed to this lesser kind of information? Is this lesser information included in definitions? (You have already explained/admitted that when he was using the term "information" in the context of definitions not imparting information, he was only referring to scientific information.)

If you say "proposition," then what, are propositions made of that endows them with information, especially information about the physical world? If you say non-falsifiability according to deduction, that still does not establish the connection.

What is information to Popper?

Also, I am very curious about the relationship of measurement to information in CR.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Mike:

You, however, apparently take great pleasure in these competitive things like put-downs and so forth, so go for it.

Excuse me, but did I compare you to a Christian, reinterpreting the Bible any way I wanted to? Did I say you were trying to "ape the rhetoric" of the well-known liar and plagiarist Victor Pross?

No. But you had no compunction about saying these things about me. IMHO, far worse than me saying that you're "up a creek" on some issue.

Yet you're now trying to make out that I'm just into "putdowns", and you're the one into "the ideas"?

Personally, based on the your last few time-consuming misreadings, I think its you that need to spend more time focussing on the ideas under discussion, Mike.

What is information to Popper?

Same as it is to everyone else. Haven't we just had this whole discussion??? You know, that thing about just going with standard meanings for words, and not placing much importance on highly specific definitions or shades of meaning...?

Also, I am very curious about the relationship of measurement to information in CR.

I, sadly, am not. I want to get back to the induction issue, and Roger Bissell's interesing comment. If you want to discuss it make another thread sometime. Or go to the Critical Cafe and ask around.

Edited September 19, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

[Me]

Also, I am very curious about the relationship of measurement to information in CR.

I, sadly, am not.

Daniel,

Why does that not surprise me?

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Why does that not surprise me?

Look, if you think that measurement omission or something is going to vastly illuminate Popper's Critical Rationalism, why don't you roll over Beethoven and tell Tchaikovsky the news?:

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Critical_Cafe/

Plenty of eager ears there. Plenty of un-Popperians too. Off you go.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Look, if you think that measurement omission or something...

Daniel,

No I "don't think that..." There you go again. It certainly is getting crowded in my head. I wish you would stay in yours.

Since you do express interest, I am not thinking about "measurement omission." I have been wondering why measurement hasn't been included.

Michael

(I moved the following from the post above since our posts crossed.)

EDIT:

Excuse me, but did I compare you to a Christian, reinterpreting the Bible any way I wanted to? Did I say you were trying to "ape the rhetoric" of the well-known liar and plagiarist Victor Pross?

No. But you had no compunction about saying these things about me. IMHO, far worse than me saying that you're "up a creek" on some issue.

You still didn't get it. I don't care if I convince you and prove my idea beats yours or yours beats mine. I was making honest evaluations. Really. If you were offended, sorry. That's just the way you came off (especially aping Pross's trademark put-down after a snide comment: "Got it? Good. Let's move on." I expected anything from you, but not that.)

[John Dailey]

~ Well, clearly a lot of Popper seems needed to be discussed by many...in this induction-scorecard thread.

~ Question: what logical (of whatever 'type') argument did he give for specifically what worthwhile conclusions? (I'm aware of none.) -- Or, did he just merely raise a lot of perplexing questions to purposefully vex 'logician'-oriented humans, especially re the worthlessness of defining what he's talking about?

LLAP

J:D

Edited September 20, 2007 by John Dailey

[Daniel Barnes]

Roger:

Hume is not even talking about the same thing that Peikoff and I are.

Now, after something of a detour, back to this point Roger has made here, which is perhaps the most important in the whole discussion.

To wit: Hume and everyone else is talking about one thing, whereas Roger and Peikoff (and presumably Objectivism in general, are talking about something else entirely. But both sides are using the same word, "induction".

Folks: Is it any wonder the situation is completely confused? This can be overcome however. To help clarity, I will simply offer to adopt Roger and Leonard's terminology for the rest of the discussion.

We will henceforth call the Objectivist process of observational-integrative generalisation "induction," and the standard version "Hume's problem of enumerative generalisation", or just "Hume's problem."

Let's see if this helps. (I'll return to the issue tomorrow)

This post has been edited by Daniel Barnes: Yesterday, 03:21 AM

Edited September 21, 2007 by Daniel Barnes