Critique of Objectivist ethics theory

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Daniel,

"Parsnips" was cruel... (and buttered ones at that!)

Have mercy!

Michael

[Victor Pross]

I’m starting to wonder if Daniel makes any fundamental and pressing choices in his life that effect it in a real way—ones that are of a graver nature than the innocuous examples he cites as a monumental proof against Rand’s ethics. 'Hmmm, it’s sunny outside….should I stay at my computer and construct some lame arguments or rob a bank today? Damn, the sun is on my screen, what ever will I do!'

Edited March 12, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Victor,

OK, you've dismissed all discussion out of hand (especially concerning the Hume problem) as being obviously wrong. We get it. You have miraculously managed to convince the entire planet and the world is now safe for democracy or whatever.

Now please let the discussion continue without trying to drown it out with more boldly sung arias instead of logic.

Michael

[Victor Pross]

Victor,

OK, you've dismissed all discussion out of hand (especially concerning the Hume problem) as being obviously wrong. We get it. You have miraculously managed to convince the entire planet and the world is now safe for democracy or whatever.

Now please let the discussion continue without trying to drown it out with more boldly sung arias instead of logic.

Michael

Michael,

Try reading my posts more carefully, and with a pinch of due respect. Ethics, according to Rand and other philosophers within the general trend of Aristotelianism, is a normative science. I have established a case that many sciences other than ethics are concerned with ought-judgments. Take medicine for example. Do I need to spell it out? Architecture is another normative science: architecture discovers what OUGHT to be done in the course of constructing a building—and as with medicine, his ought-judgments must be based on facts. Why does this change (or become a problem) in the field of ethics?

Don't you see how weak the arguemts are?

Victor

Edited March 12, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Victor,

What is happening is what I was afraid would happen. Do you think by simply saying you won an argument, dismissing Daniel's entire posts and starting to mock him in a Randroid fashion that you have even addressed what he was talking about? All you did was repeat Rand and, frankly, you demonstrated that you do not have an inkling of where this guy is coming from. I assure you, Daniel has read Rand, including the parts you mentioned. He did not need your citations to be familiar with them.

I intend to discuss these issues on Daniel's terms, but this entails reading much more than a Wikipedia article and some pretty heavy thinking.

I don't agree with many of Daniel's positions, but I respect them. I hope to successfully counter the ones I disagree with. Maybe he and I can even agree once in a while. All this is hard because he is very good at backing up his arguments with some highly clever thinking and solid sources. (But so am I, although I freely admit that I am at a slight disadvantage because of the reading that I still need to do.)

I assure you that you convinced nobody by treating the issues in such a superficial manner. All you did was provide some amusement at your own expense. Your manner is actually making it much more difficult to counter his claims because you are setting yourself up and this detracts from the actual arguments.

Please, no more lectures on the obvious. And please stop the mocking. Horsing around is OK, but no more mocking.

Michael

[Victor Pross]

Victor,

What is happening is what I was afraid would happen. Do you think by simply saying you won an argument, dismissing Daniel's entire posts and starting to mock him in a Randroid fashion that you have even addressed what he was talking about? All you did was repeat Rand and, frankly, you demonstrated that you do not have an inkling of where this guy is coming from. I assure you, Daniel has read Rand, including the parts you mentioned. He did not need your citations to be familiar with them.

I intend to discuss these issues on Daniel's terms, but this entails reading much more than a Wikipedia article and some pretty heavy thinking.

I don't agree with many of Daniel's positions, but I respect them. I hope to successfully counter the ones I disagree with. Maybe he and I can even agree once in a while. All this is hard because he is very good at backing up his arguments with some highly clever thinking and solid sources. (But so am I, although I freely admit that I am at a slight disadvantage because of the reading that I still need to do.)

I assure you that you convinced nobody by treating the issues in such a superficial manner. All you did was provide some amusement at your own expense. Your manner is actually making it much more difficult to counter his claims because you are setting yourself up and this detracts from the actual arguments.

Please, no more lectures on the obvious. And please stop the mocking. Horsing around is OK, but no more mocking.

Michael

Michael,

His remark “Fine words butter no parsnips in logic” shifted a change in how I approached him. But even still, I am not hostile to him. Really, I'm not. I have a smile on my face. But that’s you, again, reading too much into my posts. Come on, it’s not that bad.

Fact is, I do know where he is coming from. To my mind, he has not presented any serious arguments against Rand. Are you really impressed with this Hume deduction argument? Come on, Michael, I expect more from you. You consider Hume's position as a serious philosophical arguement for the IS/OUGHT position. I don't. Yes please catch up on your reading! (Oh yeah, the referencing me as employing Randoid behavior is becoming old real fast, let’s try to be creative and come up with something else).

No, M, I did counter the argument he presented. I established Rand’s central points on a firm grounding—but more: I also argue that the onus of proof is on Daniel to prove his case that there is a gulf between IS and an OUGHT—not the other way around.

Lectures on the obvious? What is the obvious? That there is no gulf? Yes, it IS obvious. So what's the intellectual problem in Rand's ethics? Come on, the IS/OUGHT dichotomy is a fantasy; it is clearly false. But we can now move on to something else. If you wish to downplay what I have covered so far as nothing much...well, what else is new? :whistle:

-Victor

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Daniel,

I am going to take on this Is/Ought challenge. I believe I started to earlier.

The hardest part you and I are going to have is making sure we both understand what the other means. I have a nasty suspicion that Hume was talking about one thing and Rand another, but I will save this for later. I just read the Wikipedia article Is-ought problem where it gave a quote from Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature, said to be the start of the problem:

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.

Is this the correct Hume citation just for starters?

(Incidentally as a trivial aside, I really don't like double negatives.)

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Victor:

>His remark “Fine words butter no parsnips in logic” shifted a change in how I approached him.

Well, I'm sorry, but I didn't consider that a particularly offensive remark. It is true at any rate.

>I also argue that the onus of proof is on Daniel to prove his case that there is a gulf between IS and an OUGHT—not the other way around.

Victor, I am going to have to give the 411 on this. Listen up: just because a decision may involve a fact, or be based around a fact, or suggested by a fact, or influenced by a fact, does not mean it is logically derivable from that fact, nor that it can be logically reduced to that fact. All decisions involve a fact of some kind - yet the same facts can give rise to all kinds of different decisions - even opposite ones. Thus the fact it is sunny outside means I might decide to go out, or stay in. Thus - and follow the bouncing ball here - these decisions cannot be logically valid derivations.

Now, there is no difference in principle here between this trivial decision and important ethical ones. The distinction is the same (and actually becomes very important for the concept of individual responsibility, as it means we cannot entirely fob our decisions off on to some abstract system) It is not a "gulf" - nor is it completely "arbitrary" or random or any of the other things you are repeating somewhat thoughtlessly. The artificial - such as a decision - is not the same as the arbitrary - another distinction regularly missed by Miss Rand. A novel or work of art is artificial, and is not entirely reducible to any fact or set of facts, but no-one would call it arbitrary.

>You (Michael K) consider Hume's position as a serious philosophical arguement for the IS/OUGHT position.

Michael is right. It clearly is.

>I established Rand’s central points on a firm grounding—but more: I also argue that the onus of proof is on Daniel to prove his case that there is a gulf between IS and an OUGHT—not the other way around.

See the above. Look, my friend, you are an artistic and imaginative fellow (I'm a creative type myself). Let me try to persuade you - just for a short while - to imagine the unimaginable - that what Rand said about important philosophic issues, and what you may passionately and sincerely believe, may in fact be completely incorrect. We all have had that experience where our deepest, most dearly held convictions turn out to be wrong. Well, just go with it for a while as the debate plays out. You never know...;-)

[Daniel Barnes]

Michael K

>Is this the correct Hume citation just for starters?

Yes indeedy. I'm back on the road tomorrow however, and may not reply for a few days.

regards

Daniel

[Daniel Barnes]

Michael K

> I have a nasty suspicion that Hume was talking about one thing and Rand another, but I will save this for later.

Actually, shortcut: I think you might be right.

[Daniel Barnes]

Michael K

> I have a nasty suspicion that Hume was talking about one thing and Rand another, but I will save this for later.

Actually, shortcut: I think you might be right. That is to say, she didn't really address the issue Hume raised.

[studiodekadent]

studiodekadent, may I politely ask what's up with the "analytic philosophy" biz? Who is arguing here from an 'analytic' point of view? The term usually refers to conceptual or linguistic analysis-type philosophies, or Logical Positivism some such, and I believe those philosophies to be in serious error too - and even share to some serious errors with Objectivism. I'm not interested in attacking Objectivism for not being "intrinsic" etc. Nothing could be more tiresome IMHO.I'm interested in basic logical and factual errors in Rand's arguments, and the "fudge" words and jargon that concealed them from her readers, and especially, I believe, Rand herself.

By Analytic philosophy Im referring to the philosophical tradition descended from G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell.

[Dragonfly]

Excuse me. I though I was clear. I thought I said "they [the human parasites] would not survive using the parasite system if stranded alone on a desert island" instead of "they are unable to use reason to produce food or shelter." Hmmm... Yes. As a matter of fact, I did say that. Yep. It's right there in my post. I find it strange that you missed it. Was that difficult to understand? Could I have written it clearer?

I might have missed that while that is the usual argument I hear (beginning with Rand herself). I must have underestimated you, so at least you're making progress! But alas, the argument is still invalid. Why should it be a problem for the parasite if he can't use his parasitic lifestyle when he'd be stranded alone on a desert island? First, the situation is extremely unlikely (even more unlikely than the classical lifeboat situation), but even apart from that, what does it matter? He's just flexible and can adapt to the circumstances, from an evolutionary point of view a good strategy. Why should he always act in the same way, regardless of the circumstances? That is a dogma which does not follow from the facts.

(suddenly afflicted)

Talk to me, Dragonfly! Talk to me!

It's ok, it's ok... I know how difficult this must be for you, just bite the bullet and at the end everything will be all right and you'll feel relieved!

[Brant Gaede]

Excuse me. I though I was clear. I thought I said "they [the human parasites] would not survive using the parasite system if stranded alone on a desert island" instead of "they are unable to use reason to produce food or shelter." Hmmm... Yes. As a matter of fact, I did say that. Yep. It's right there in my post. I find it strange that you missed it. Was that difficult to understand? Could I have written it clearer?

I might have missed that while that is the usual argument I hear (beginning with Rand herself). I must have underestimated you, so at least you're making progress! But alas, the argument is still invalid. Why should it be a problem for the parasite if he can't use his parasitic lifestyle when he'd be stranded alone on a desert island? First, the situation is extremely unlikely (even more unlikely than the classical lifeboat situation), but even apart from that, what does it matter? He's just flexible and can adapt to the circumstances, from an evolutionary point of view a good strategy. Why should he always act in the same way, regardless of the circumstances? That is a dogma which does not follow from the facts.

(suddenly afflicted)

Talk to me, Dragonfly! Talk to me!

It's ok, it's ok... I know how difficult this must be for you, just bite the bullet and at the end everything will be all right and you'll feel relieved!

Well, in "Atlas" the parasites either go belly up or insane. Aren't we the living living in the world of "Atlas"?

--Brant

[Brant Gaede]

On Daniel Barnes' blog I found a link to an interesting article by Michael Huemer about Objectivist ethics. It discusses some of the big holes in the theory I've mentioned in earlier posts. Something for our Michael to chew on.

The problem I have with Huemer's essay is not that he starts by giving his overview of Rand's position(s), but that he then analyzes his analysis thus refuting her! Later on he gives exact quotes, piece by piece. I don't have time for this, nor for others' analyses of the analysis and then analyses of the analyses.

What is needed is a better written essay with longer quotes. Best would be a better ethics to displace her claims. All I've seen so far in the little reading on this thread I've done is attempts at displacement from her critics. For the record, she wrote her ethics for her fictional characters and imaginary people. If you want to really critique her start by referring to real people--people as they are, not just what they "might be and should be." Otherwise you won't get there from here, which was Rand's basic problem, frankly. I guess she couldn't face the fact that there is no John Galt there, however, just pretension, her own and other's. Another way to put it is "wishful thinking." Galt has no potential for evil. He grew up never telling a lie or doing something he ought not to have done. He is as innocent as the day he was born. To be like Galt is to be as human as a moral sledgehammer and a complete, phoney, bore. I think Francisco should have beat the shit out of Galt after finding out he was after his woman ("So that's why you wanted me to go on strike!" ).

People first (data) then philosophy. Rand mostly got it backwards. So too, most Objectivists. No Objectivist Ethics can be objective, otherwise. People, you can have these endless discussions going nowhere.

--Brant

Edited March 12, 2007 by Brant Gaede

[Victor Pross]

On Daniel Barnes' blog I found a link to an interesting article by Michael Huemer about Objectivist ethics. It discusses some of the big holes in the theory I've mentioned in earlier posts. Something for our Michael to chew on.

The problem I have with Huemer's essay is not that he starts by giving his overview of Rand's position(s), but that he then analyzes his analysis thus refuting her! Later on he gives exact quotes, piece by piece. I don't have time for this, nor for others' analyses of the analysis and then analyses of the analyses.

What is needed is a better written essay with longer quotes. Best would be a better ethics to displace her claims. All I've seen so far in the little reading on this thread I've done is attempts at displacement from her critics. For the record, she wrote her ethics for her fictional characters and imaginary people. If you want to really critique her start by referring to real people--people as they are, not just what they "might be and should be." Otherwise you won't get there from here, which was Rand's basic problem, frankly. I guess she couldn't face the fact that there is no John Galt there, however, just pretension, her own and other's. Another way to put it is "wishful thinking." Galt has no potential for evil. He grew up never telling a lie or doing something he ought not to have done. He is as innocent as the day he was born. To be like Galt is to be as human as a moral sledgehammer and a complete, phoney, bore. I think Francisco should have beat the shit out of Galt after finding out he was after his woman ("So that's why you wanted me to go on strike!"

People first (data) then philosophy. Rand mostly got it backwards. So too, most Objectivists. No Objectivist Ethics can be objective, otherwise. People, you can have these endless discussions going nowhere.

--Brant

Brant,

To my understanding, Rand wrote a non-fictional treatise on ethics in The Virtue of Selfishness called “The Objectivist ethics.” In any event, she first thought a great deal about the question of ethics and then created characters that embodied those principles.

-Victor

Edited March 13, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Brant Gaede]

On Daniel Barnes' blog I found a link to an interesting article by Michael Huemer about Objectivist ethics. It discusses some of the big holes in the theory I've mentioned in earlier posts. Something for our Michael to chew on.

The problem I have with Huemer's essay is not that he starts by giving his overview of Rand's position(s), but that he then analyzes his analysis thus refuting her! Later on he gives exact quotes, piece by piece. I don't have time for this, nor for others' analyses of the analysis and then analyses of the analyses.

What is needed is a better written essay with longer quotes. Best would be a better ethics to displace her claims. All I've seen so far in the little reading on this thread I've done is attempts at displacement from her critics. For the record, she wrote her ethics for her fictional characters and imaginary people. If you want to really critique her start by referring to real people--people as they are, not just what they "might be and should be." Otherwise you won't get there from here, which was Rand's basic problem, frankly. I guess she couldn't face the fact that there is no John Galt there, however, just pretension, her own and other's. Another way to put it is "wishful thinking." Galt has no potential for evil. He grew up never telling a lie or doing something he ought not to have done. He is as innocent as the day he was born. To be like Galt is to be as human as a moral sledgehammer and a complete, phoney, bore. I think Francisco should have beat the shit out of Galt after finding out he was after his woman ("So that's why you wanted me to go on strike!").

People first (data) then philosophy. Rand mostly got it backwards. So too, most Objectivists. No Objectivist Ethics can be objective, otherwise. People, you can have these endless discussions going nowhere.

--Brant

Brant,

To my understanding, Rand wrote a non-fictional treatise on ethics in The Virtue of Selfishness called “The Objectivist ethics.” In any event, she first thought a great deal about the question of ethics and then created characters that embodied those principles.

-Victor

You are correct. (Could you please edit out that smilely face in your quote of me? I did and my edit crossed your post. Thanks.)

--Brant

Edited March 12, 2007 by Brant Gaede

[Darrell Hougen]

Darrell offered the following as an example of an "obvious error" in Huemer's piece:

"2. Something is valuable to an entity, only if the entity faces alternatives."

Huemer wrote:

"Premise 2 seems to be false. If I knew that I was inevitably going to get a million dollars tomorrow--there's no way I can avoid it--would that mean that the money will have no value? Again, Rand offers no defense of this assertion."

Darrell criticised Huemer as follows:

>If I was going to receive a million dollars tomorrow, that would not convert me into a being that is not faced with alternatives. If I receive a million dollars, I must still decide how to use it.

Hi Darrell,

I'm sorry, but this does not seem to be an error - or at least not an obvious one. If anything, I might politely suggest you have mistaken Huemer's point. First of all, we should note Huemer is rather tenative about this criticism - he talks about what Rand "seems" to be saying and it's certainly not one of the errors he calls "egregious".

Huemer does seem to be somewhat tentative about it, but it is also listed as one of the eight "fatal flaws" in Rand's argument. I find that very puzzling. If I were tentative about a proposition, I wouldn't list it as a "fatal flaw" in someone else's philosophy.

Secondly, the prima facie point is is about whether or not the enforced $1m will have value to you - not whether it will "convert" you "into a being not faced with alternatives". Whether the enforced money will still have value to you is the initial point at issue.

This illustrates the manner in which Huemer misinterprets or misunderstands Rand. Rand never claimed that every occurrence in life requires alternatives, just that the kind of being that requires a moral code is the kind of being that is faced with alternatives and that some alternatives have more value to that being than others. She gives a clear example of an indestructible robot as something that does not need a moral code.

If it doesn't matter whether an indestructible robot eats or sleeps or jumps off of a tall building or lays down on a railroad track, then it don't need a moral code because nothing it does has any influence on its existence. For such a robot, a million dollars would have no value because it doesn't need anything in order to continue to exist. It doesn't need money to buy food because it doesn't need any food. It doesn't need money to buy a house because it doesn't need a house. If it wants to ride the roller coaster at the amusement park, it can do so at any time because no one can stop it or damage it in any way.

But, if a being is faced with at least some alternatives that effect its existence, then it needs a moral code. So, if I receive a million dollars, I still need to decide whether to pay down my house loan or save it for my children's education or blow it all in Vegas. Therefore, the million dollars is still valuable to me, whether I have any choice about receiving it or not. Moreover, I still can't jump off of a tall building or lay down on a railroad track if I want to continue to exist. The million dollars doesn't change those aspects of my existence at all. I am still finite and still have needs and desires for which I have to budget and physical constraints on my behavior. Therefore, I still need a moral code.

That, in the first instance, I am sure most people would say "yes" to. Now, of course we may take the next step and expand to a secondary point as you suggest - but Huemer raises a question mark as to whether this is what Rand actually meant, because it seems Rand herself did not offer this defense. (Huemer may be wrong; however I can think of anywhere she did offhand. Do you know where Rand defends it? If you do then this might show Huemer up as not having done his homework, which is always handy)

Rand explained herself with the illustration of the indestructible robot. To me, the illustration is clear. I don't know if she was ever faced with Huemer's question, per se, so I don't know of any reference in which she answered it. However, I wonder whether your purpose (or Huemer's purpose) is to attack Rand's solution to the is-ought problem or to attack the philosophical notion that there is a solution to the is-ought problem.

To me, the second issue is more interesting than the first and if we are discussing the second issue, I don't necessarily have to find references in Rand to support my arguments. I can just speak plainly using logic and examples. If the question is whether Rand's solution to the is-ought problem is adequate or whether her presentation of the solution is adequate, that may require more scholarship and examples.

I guess that I'm not really interested in debating whether Rand solved the problem until we agree on whether there is a solution to the problem or not. Then, we can go back and debate the adequacy of her scholarship, debate whether she really understood what she was saying or not, or debate the adequacy of the presentation. I would not, however, underestimate Rand's grasp of the facts.

Darrell

[Ellen Stuttle]

This illustrates the manner in which Huemer misinterprets or misunderstands Rand. Rand never claimed that every occurrence in life requires alternatives, just that the kind of being that requires a moral code is the kind of being that is faced with alternatives and that some alternatives have more value to that being than others. She gives a clear example of an indestructible robot as something that does not need a moral code.

[....] I don't know if she was ever faced with Huemer's question, per se, so I don't know of any reference in which she answered it.

I don't know either if she was ever asked that question, but I can imagine her explosion if she was, since the question does widely miss her point.

However, I wonder whether your purpose (or Huemer's purpose) is to attack Rand's solution to the is-ought problem or to attack the philosophical notion that there is a solution to the is-ought problem.

In trying to catch up to what's been happening on this thread since I last checked in, it seems to me that the discussion has lost track of the foundational question of whether or not there can be a solution to the is-ought problem. If there can't be, obviously Rand didn't provide one.

Ellen

___

[Ellen Stuttle]

Why would the individual organism ever risk its own skin in a way that benefits another or others of its kind? That's the question hard to answer from a Darwinian standpoint.

Is it really? Cannot a Darwinian say that species some of whose

members do that have more offspring that survive long enough to

procreate? -- Mike Hardy

In a way, yes, Mike, but not in the way in which you put it. The issue isn't survival of the species. A species isn't an organism, and there's nothing advantageous for the individual organism in keeping the type of which it's a representative continuing to be represented amongst the living. The question is what benefit is conferred on the organism which is taking the risk to its own survival such that such risk-taking behavior would evolve?

But you said "hard to answer from a Darwinian standpoint." From a Darwinian standpoint, I don't see that the question is what benefit is conferred on the individual organism. -- Mike Hardy

Mike, is your problem with my having used "Darwinian" instead of "neo-Darwinian"? If so, you couldnt have just asked, "Wouldn't 'neo-Darwinian' be more accurate?"?

Ellen

___

[Judith]

Ethics, according to Rand and other philosophers within the general trend of Aristotelianism, is a normative science. I have established a case that many sciences other than ethics are concerned with ought-judgments. Take medicine for example. Do I need to spell it out? Architecture is another normative science: architecture discovers what OUGHT to be done in the course of constructing a building—and as with medicine, his ought-judgments must be based on facts. Why does this change (or become a problem) in the field of ethics?

Victor's point is valid and needs to be addressed.

Judith

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Victor's point is valid and needs to be addressed.

Judith,

I know what stopped me:

1. Ethics is the normative branch of philosophy for ALL philosophers, hell, for ALL people regardless of their profession, not just a select few. This is by definition.

2. I do not like the use of the word "science." It seems to be a lame attempt to make philosophy respectable and I already hold that it is respectable on its own merits. Rand used this term at times, but look at the Wikipedia entry on normative science:

A normative science is a form of inquiry, typically involving a community of inquiry and its accumulated body of provisional knowledge, that seeks to discover useful ways of achieving recognized aims, ends, goals, objectives, or purposes.

The three normative sciences, according to traditional conceptions in philosophy, are aesthetics, ethics, and logic.

I seriously doubt Rand would have liked the conclusion that ethics is an "accumulated body of provisional knowledge," although she did stress context as a component of knowledge. But she also stressed absolutes. In short, I maintain a distinction between philosophy and science, and I use science more in the sense of a system of gathering knowledge based on controlled trial-and-error experiments, etc.. I accept the fact that "science" is used as a technical term in philosophy to designate a branch, even if I don't like it, but I rarely see it used with this meaning, epecially as given in the Wikipedia explanation above (which I presume is the standard meaning). More often than not, I see it used as rhetoric to sound more learned.

3. I have no idea of which philosophers fall "within the general trend of Aristotelianism" because I have no real idea what "Aristotelianism" means in this context. Then I have no idea why that qualification would make ethics a "normative science" for those falling within that general trend. And if it did make ethics a "normative science" for them, I have no idea why it would not be a "normative science" for others.

Terrible start. It is one hell of a reason to stop right there.

As to the rest, I did address that point way early in the thread. I will get back to it later when I address some early posts.

Michael

[Dragonfly]

Ethics, according to Rand and other philosophers within the general trend of Aristotelianism, is a normative science. I have established a case that many sciences other than ethics are concerned with ought-judgments. Take medicine for example. Do I need to spell it out? Architecture is another normative science: architecture discovers what OUGHT to be done in the course of constructing a building—and as with medicine, his ought-judgments must be based on facts. Why does this change (or become a problem) in the field of ethics?

Victor's point is valid and needs to be addressed.

The answer is simple. The purpose of architectural science and medicine is clear-cut: respectively making buildings that don't crumble and treating disease and injury. The purpose of ethics is much more vague, is it enabling people to live a good life? That raises immediately the question what a "good life" is. Different people will have different answers to that question, so what that purpose is, is a subjective notion. Now some people may claim that they have the answer for all people, but that is also a subjective position (there are many different groups who all claim to have the only correct answer for all people) which cannot be proved on the basis of facts, no matter how often you stamp your feet and say that only your system is rational. So whatever reasoning you come up with, it will always depend on the subjective choice of your goal. When we look at objective facts like the probability of survival it's clear that on the basis of only those facts there are many different solutions possible.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Judith,

I don't want to leave this dangling. Some "oughts" are derived from "is." Others are not.

There is a fallacy of reasoning I detect in this entire discussion. It is a two-part fallacy. One part is looking at a couple of specific and limited examples (like the ones Victor gave), then saying that the conclusions for them are true for ALL cases, even where other factors are involved. The other part is in saying that because a conclusion does not fit one specific example (or a few specific ones), it does not fit ANY. I see no convincing logic to either side.

That is my position from earlier in the thread.

Michael

[Mike Hardy]

Why would the individual organism ever risk its own skin in a way that benefits another or others of its kind? That's the question hard to answer from a Darwinian standpoint.

Is it really? Cannot a Darwinian say that species some of whose

members do that have more offspring that survive long enough to

procreate? -- Mike Hardy

In a way, yes, Mike, but not in the way in which you put it. The issue isn't survival of the species. A species isn't an organism, and there's nothing advantageous for the individual organism in keeping the type of which it's a representative continuing to be represented amongst the living. The question is what benefit is conferred on the organism which is taking the risk to its own survival such that such risk-taking behavior would evolve?

But you said "hard to answer from a Darwinian standpoint." From a Darwinian standpoint, I don't see that the question is what benefit is conferred on the individual organism. -- Mike Hardy

Mike, is your problem with my having used "Darwinian" instead of "neo-Darwinian"? If so, you couldnt have just asked, "Wouldn't 'neo-Darwinian' be more accurate?"?

Ellen

___

Well, normally I'd quote only a brief excerpt, but since we're trying for the record for multiply nested quotes, I'm leaving it all here.

(Skip the above and start reading at this point.)

Actually, I don't know what "neo-Darwinian" means.

But I think you're position is becoming clear. -- Mike