Critique of Objectivist ethics theory

[Daniel Barnes]

Victor writes to Bob:

>Why are you so convinced beyond a doubt that such is the case?

Hi Victor,

The onus is not really on Bob to prove a point that is true by ordinary standards of logical validity. It's on the people who go against the basic logic of the problem that have to make their case.

[Darrell Hougen]

Hi Darrell

>I guess that I'm not really interested in debating whether Rand solved the problem until we agree on whether there is a solution to the problem or not.

Well, more correctly speaking, the "is/ought" (or the fact/decision) problem has been solved - Hume solved it, negatively. What Rand is supposed to be challenging is this solution. But it is hard to see how her solution even addresses the problem.

I'm sorry you think that, but it simply isn't true.

There are basically two solutions to the problem and I am sure that Rand grasped the first (weak) solution, though I'm not sure that she grasped the second (strong) version.

The weak solution starts with the assumption that man is faced with a fundamental choice between life and death. If he chooses life, then he must make life his standard of value because there is no other choice that improves his odds of staying alive. In this solution, reason is instrumental to keeping him alive and is his primary virtue. Therefore, man ought to live a rational life because he is a volitional being and that is his only rational choice if he chooses to live. If he doesn't choose to live, he can do whatever he wants and it doesn't matter whether he is rational or not.

In the strong solution, it is argued that a rational life is man's only rational choice and is therefore his only proper (that is logical) course of action. That argument follows from the fact that if rationality is not integral to the proper end, then man is, necessarily, irrational. In other words, rational life, is the only possible end in itself for a rational being. That is, man ought to live a rational life because he is a rational being.

BTW, it seems like either nobody read post #93 or no one understood it.

I'm not interested in discussing problems with Rand's epistemology on this thread. Epistemology is arguably the most difficult branch of philosophy and I do believe there are problems with her epistemology. However, it is clear that all of us reading this thread do actually know something, so let's keep the discussion focused on ethics. Later, we can debate how we know what we know.

BTW, you mentioned earlier you might be interested in discussing a point in Huemer that I considered a strong one. I offered his Point 5, about fudge words and Man Qua Man. I am happy to discuss this as well.

I will try to get to point 5 in the near future. Although Huemer is wrong, point 5 is not as trivial as point 2.

Darrell

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

The onus is ... on the people who go against the basic logic of the problem that have to make their case.

Daniel,

You mean like saying that chosen values has nothing to do with reality?

(Sorry. I'm trying, but I just couldn't resist...)

Michael

[Victor Pross]

Victor writes to Bob:

>Why are you so convinced beyond a doubt that such is the case?

Hi Victor,

The onus is not really on Bob to prove a point that is true by ordinary standards of logical validity. It's on the people who go against the basic logic of the problem that have to make their case.

Maybe so, but good Golly Miss Molly, I can't ask?

[galtgulch]

'Michael Stuart Kelly'

I had occasion to discuss the death penalty with an educated woman yesterday. Her take was simply that one has no right to kill and that execution of a killer is just as wrong because it requires that one kill in the process!

I tried to make it clear that it is justifiable to kill someone who is about to kill someone else, in effect averting a murder by coming to the potential victim's defense. It is a version of acting in one's own self defense.

It seems that it is ethical to kill a potential murderer who is in the act of murdering someone up until the point when the victim is dead. Then some people do not see that it is an injustice for the murderer to remain alive when he or she has caused the death of a person.

As Rand put it by execution all one is doing is "Granting to the murderer the destruction of the only person whose destruction he had a right to choose, his own!" That is a paraphrase more than a quote but the idea is there I think.

Just curious how so many people just don't get it. Of course in reality so many innocent people have been executed that the execution of murderers should be reserved for cases where there is virtually no doubt of guilt. I think the technical concept is beyond a shadow of a doubt rather than lesser criteria such as preponderance of the evidence.

It is heartening to know that we have everything all figured out in theory and now all we have to do is inform the billions of humans on the planet who are misguided. I have considered writing a book entitled "The Antidote" but that is another matter. No doubt Rand's books should serve to stimulate thought and help the next generation to crystallize their own ideas which hopefully would be consistent with the Objectivist philosophy.

galt

Edited March 14, 2007 by galtgulch

[Victor Pross]

BTW, it seems like either nobody read post #93 or no one understood it.

Darrell,

I read it and understood it.

-Victor

Edited March 14, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Victor Pross]

BOB MAC:

As far as I can tell, Rand had no choice but to detest, insult, and 'refute' Hume (I use that word lightly). Hume didn't use mysticism or faith to argue against reason and it's limitations. He used reason to argue against itself. This made him a dangerous guy in Rand's eyes, so she made him 'evil'. In reality though, Hume seems correct, at least more so than Rand.

Bob,

“Reason is a slave of the passions.” David Hume.

The notion that Hume used “reason to argue against itself” is an interesting claim, and perhaps this -- and the question of skepticism -- can be talked about after you (and Daniel) are refuted on the is-ought debate. For now, I can say this: Hume’s skepticism (or skepticism as such) is allied with faith—not reason. (But maybe that's a different thread).

-Victor

Edited March 14, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Daniel Barnes]

Victor:

>“Reason is a slave of the passions.” David Hume.

The quote is actually:

"Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions"

>The notion that Hume used “reason to argue against itself” is an interesting claim, and perhaps this -- and the question of skepticism -- can be talk about after you (and Daniel) are refuted on the is-ought debate. For now, I can say this: Hume’s skepticism (or skepticism as such) is allied with faith—not reason. (But maybe that's a different thread).

Victor, do you have any idea why a ruthlessly logical thinker like David Hume came to this conclusion? It's for a very famous reason that I've already discussed.

I'm happy to explain it to you if you don't already know.

[Victor Pross]

Victor:

>“Reason is a slave of the passions.” David Hume.

The quote is actually:

"Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions"

>The notion that Hume used “reason to argue against itself” is an interesting claim, and perhaps this -- and the question of skepticism -- can be talk about after you (and Daniel) are refuted on the is-ought debate. For now, I can say this: Hume’s skepticism (or skepticism as such) is allied with faith—not reason. (But maybe that's a different thread).

Victor, do you have any idea why a ruthlessly logical thinker like David Hume came to this conclusion? It's for a very famous reason that I've already discussed.

I'm happy to explain it to you if you don't already know.

Daniel,

I have studied generally philosophy for about fifteen years, but I suspect—to be perfectly honest—that you know your Hume better than me (not that I am ignorant of his philosophy of course) and I am open to learning from you. Perhaps—maybe—you could learn something from me. We’ll see. But I will take you up on your proposal for two reasons:

A, It could be of interest to the other posters and readers.

B, I would be interested in hearing you out on this matter--and your understanding of it.

Speak freely. :turned:

-Victor

Edit: It’s interesting to note that the discussion can easily branch out beyond its own subject matter—ethics--to epistemology (given that ethics rests on it) and before you know it, the thread has been hijacked by everyone in general, and nobody in particular. But that is the nature of philosophic inquiry.

--

Edited March 14, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Ellen Stuttle]

The quote is actually:

"Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions"

Pause on the wording of that, Daniel. Notice anything...interesting...in the context of the current discussion?

Ellen

___

[Victor Pross]

The quote is actually:

"Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions"

Pause on the wording of that, Daniel. Notice anything...interesting...in the context of the current discussion?

Ellen

___

Ellen,

Yeah, we can speculate that the word you’re hinting at is “ought” as contained in the Great David Hume’s own quote---and I suppose this could be faulted as a flaw, but I hardly think Daniel would be impressed by any argument here. I am fairly certain that Daniel would say that any “oughts” coming from Hume would be, admittedly, PRECRIPTIVE as opposed to DESCRIPTIVE—thereby safeguarding his own thoughts on the matter. Did you intend this as an argument?

-Victor

[Daniel Barnes]

I wrote:

>The quote is actually:

"Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions"

Ellen replied:

>Pause on the wording of that, Daniel. Notice anything...interesting...in the context of the current discussion?

Yes, that was the first thing I noticed...;-) That's why I thought it was amusing that Victor left if out. But of course this is simply an assertion, Hume is not trying to claim it is a successful derivation.

[Victor Pross]

I wrote:

>The quote is actually:

"Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions"

Ellen replied:

>Pause on the wording of that, Daniel. Notice anything...interesting...in the context of the current discussion?

Yes, that was the first thing I noticed...;-) That's why I thought it was amusing that Victor left if out. But of course this is simply an assertion, Hume is not trying to claim it is a successful derivation.

Daniel,

I didn't purposely leave it out, I'm reading a book covering Hume's thoughts, and I found the quote as I offered it. Why would I "leave it out"--I would have found it ironic--not as an argument. Anyway, we digress… :turned:

-Victor

Edited March 14, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Victor Pross]

Daniel,

As I suggested, ethics is a derivative branch resting on a much more fundamental foundation in philosophy. For example, if you try to persuade a religious person of the soundness of Objectivism's ethics, you will be swept into the issues of epistemology and metaphysics. A rational ethics, of course, (or for the sake of argument) cannot be based on an epistemology of revelation and religion propagates “rules.” It does not assess their authority upon any basis other than god's supposed will. So a question I have—and I suppose we’ll find out soon enough—where do you stand on the question of metaphysics and epistemology? Can you at all capsulate an answer while standing on one foot?

:turned:

-Victor

Edited March 14, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Victor Pross]

You cannot conceptually have "ought" without a proceeding "is"; to acknowledge "ought" is to acknowledge "is."

Victor

Victor,

The problem comes NOT when you connect FACTS and VALUES, but when you attempt to DERIVE VALUES from FACTS. Can't be done.

There is always a PRECRIPTIVE premise either explicit or implied as opposed to DESCRIPTIVE. Hence the problem.

Bob

Bob,

Granting your premise for the moment—that there is an important distinction between "precriptive" and "descriptive"--would you nevertheless agree that the relationships I illustrated in other posts are objectively demonstrable—that the value judgment involved can be true? [Let’s take the case of medicine and architecture].

-Victor

Edited March 14, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Daniel Barnes]

Victor:

1)where do you stand on the question of metaphysics and epistemology? Can you at all capsulate an answer while standing on one foot?

I'm a Popperian - a fan of Karl Popper. He goes beyond the usual monist and dualist cosmologies with his own freaky trialist metaphysics...;-)

Metaphysics: 3 "World" theory

"World" 1: Objective physical reality

"World" 2: Subjective non-physical consciousness

"World" 3: Objective non-physical knowledge

Epistemology: Critical rationalism, or: "No amount of white swans will prove that all swans are white; a single black swan will disprove it"

[Daniel Barnes]

Victor:

>I will take you up on your proposal (about why Hume thought reason was "slave to the passions")

I'm travelling right now, and posting between wireless hotspots. So I'll hand the mike over to Karl Popper, and how Hume arrived at "reason is..the slave of the passions" as a derivation from the problem of induction. Popper calls it the psychological problem of induction, as opposed to the logical problem of induction.

http://dieoff.org/page126.htm

Read and absorb, question, ponder, there's no hurry.

[Darrell Hougen]

Quoted from Huemer:

6. Every living thing acts to maintain its life, for its own sake. premise

(7. There is no other thing that they act to gain or keep for its own sake.) implicit premise

...

Objection (v):

Premise 6 is false.

If we read it in a teleological sense, as saying living things have inherent goals or purposes, then it is false because nature is not teleological--Aristotelian physics and biology have long since been refuted. In that sense, living things do not aim at anything (with the exception of conscious beings with intentions).

If we read (6), as Rand suggests (p. 16n), to mean merely that the actions of living things result in the maintenance of their lives, then two problems appear. First, (7) will now be false. There are many things that living things' actions result in. For one thing, their actions result in the reproduction of their genes. For another, animals' actions result in production of body heat.

Second, it would follow, absurdly, that any object whose actions have results, has values. Thus, since when a rock rolls downhill, this results in its having greater kinetic energy, we must conclude that the rock acts to gain and/or keep kinetic energy, and therefore that kinetic energy is a value for the rock.

To begin with, let me note that objection 5 is not central to Rand's argument. She merely uses plants and animals (other than humans) as a point of contrast in order to more clearly explain the morality required for man. Man is volitional, while animals are not and plants are not. Animals make choices, but only at the perceptual level and they have no choice about the values they pursue. Therefore, even if Rand's argument is not precise at this point, it is not important to her conclusion.

Now, Huemer asserts that nature is not teleological and therefore living things cannot have goals or purposes. The alternative that he suggests is that their actions simply, "result in the maintenance of their lives." However, this is a very inadequate description of the actual situation. In reality, animals, for example, act as if their behavior was goal directed, even if the goal is not a conscious goal involving conceptual knowledge.

A good analogy can be obtained by looking at the behavior of a chess program. A chess program acts to maximize an objective function which ascribes a certain value to a move based on the values of the pieces, their positions, and the relationships between the pieces and their positions. It generates a set of possible moves (actions) and evaluates the resulting positions in terms of the values that have been placed on the pieces, etc., by the programmer. It then choose a move --- the one that maximizes its objective function --- and makes the move that it has chosen. The chess program acts as if its goal was to win the game. In fact, its behavior may be fairly characterized in terms of the goal of winning the game. It just doesn't understand its goal in conceptual terms.

The same is true of an animal. A cheetah chasing a gazelle is conscious of its goal in perceptual terms. It sees the gazelle and places a certain value on catching it. That leads it to value reducing the distance between it and the gazelle. At each point in time, it is faced with choices of actions which it considers, such as moving downwind, stalking, and giving chase. It places certain values on each possible choice based on its knowledge of the wind conditions, speed of the gazelle, distance to the gazelle, etc. Although it may not be conscious of its goal in conceptual terms, its behavior may be fairly characterized in terms of the goal of catching the gazelle. Moreover, that goal is instrumental to the goal of preserving its life. If the cheetah is not hungry, it places a lower value on the goal of catching the gazelle than if it is hungry.

Thus, it is a gross mischaracterization to assert that animals, and other living things are not capable of goal directed or purposeful behavior. If Huemer does not believe that such behavior is possible, I wonder how he would characterize the behavior of the cheetah or the computer program, described above. To state that an action merely results in a desirable state is a gross mischaracterization of the situation and naturally leads to absurd conclusions about rocks having values. In order for something to have values, it must have goals and must have alternatives. Animals and plants do have goals, though they are not conceptual goals.

Now, it is debatable whether the goal of an animal is the preservation of its life or not. It is probably more accurate to state that it is the preservation of its genes. The "objective function" that it is born with, tends to cause it to strive to both stay alive and reproduce. However, it is clear that staying alive is a principle goal of all living things. Therefore, Rand is substantially correct, even if she is slightly off. And, her point works as a point of contrast with human nature, and thus bolsters her argument, even though it is not strictly required by her argument.

Darrell

[Darrell Hougen]

BTW, it seems like either nobody read post #93 or no one understood it.

Darrell,

I read it and understood it.

-Victor

Thank you.

BTW, thank you for your contributions to this thread. I think you have made some good points that have not been adequately addressed by your opponents.

Darrell

[Victor Pross]

BTW, it seems like either nobody read post #93 or no one understood it.

Darrell,

I read it and understood it.

-Victor

Thank you.

BTW, thank you for your contributions to this thread. I think you have made some good points that have not been adequately addressed by your opponents.

Darrell

Darrell,

Thank you. And as are you.

Adequately addressed? Yes, you can see that, huh? Ah, believe me, I am an “old pro” at this and I can tell you that I have learned a lot over the years, but nothing has changed when arguing with most philosophical opponents. One can see that central points—the meat of the argument---are glossed over with a lot of chewing around the fat though. (And this is done in order to give the appearance that the meat is being addressed). :turned:

-Victor

[Ellen Stuttle]

Daniel,

Picking up on something you've said several times about Rand's followers believing she solved the problem of induction...

I'll quote the relevant part from the post (#144) in which you quoted the Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology workshops:

For Rand often did not realise she had not solved the problem she thought she had. The "is/ought" example is a typical one. The other one that is amazingly obvious - so much so that people who have a lot of confidence in Rand's claims can scarcely believe it is true - is that Rand did not in fact refute Hume's famous "problem of induction" - the basis of all modern skepticism. Not only did she not refute it, she had not even done any work on it. For this, you do not need to rely on my say-so. She admits this with crystal clarity in her own words in the ITOE. Let's review this remarkable passage in full: (ITOE p304/5)

Professor M asks - admittedly not very clearly - how one can verify scientifcally that Newton's theory of gravitation is correct.

Rand replies:

"After it has been verified by a great many observations, not merely the verification of one prediction, then at a certain time one can accept it as fact. But taking your example as an illustration of what you are asking, if the sole validation for Newton's principle was that it predicted that orbits will be elliptical, that wouldn't be sufficient proof. Epistemologically, it wouldn't be enough. You would have to have other observations, from different aspects of the same issue, which all support this hypothesis. (Historically Newton validated his theory by means of a great many observations of widely differing phenomena)"

Prof M:"The question is: where does one stop? When does one decide that enough confirming evidence exists? (emphasis DB) Is that the province of the issue of induction?"

Now we will pause briefly here, as anyone even faintly familiar with Hume's famous philosophical problem will recognise this question as the induction problem in a nutshell. Of course, Hume's answer to this question is simply: Never! For no matter how many observations you make, you can never positively establish the truth of a universal law. The logical inference is always going to be invalid, as the universal truth of the conclusion will always exceed the truth of the premises (or observations), which will always be limited to some extent. Further, appeals to some kind of "inductive validity" as opposed to purely logical validity also fail, because it is circular. So it is a mother of a problem alright - as Rand then acknowledges.

AR: "Yes. That's the big question of induction. Which I couldn't even begin to discuss - because a) I haven't worked on that subject enough to even begin to formulate it, (emphasis DB) and b ) it would take an accomplished scientist in a given field to illustrate the whole process in that field"

That's right - just read that passage again. The problem of induction, Hume's big Kahuna that informs his other skepticisms, such as causality, and kicked off modern skepticism, not to mention Immanuel Kant - and she hasn't worked on that subject enough to even begin to formulate an answer to it! (Her appeal to some "scientist" to come along and explain it only indicates that she doesn't realise the nature of the problem; for the problem of induction is a logical one, not an empirical one). Knowing this, it becomes extremely difficult to take the oft-made claims that Rand refuted Hume's skepticism seriously. In her own words, she has barely even thought about the subject!

First, a personal note, though it's a sidelight, re Prof M. You wrote:

"Professor M asks - admittedly not very clearly - how one can verify scientifcally that Newton's theory of gravitation is correct."

Prof M admits that he didn't ask very clearly. He's occasionally mildly kicked himself ever since the book with the partial transcript appeared for not having been clearer. Nevertheless, he didn't feel content with AR's answer. (Prof M is otherwise known as Larry Gould, my husband.)

Also, on the issue of the participants being called "Prof": This is an abbreviation for "Professional," not for "Professor." Although the usage is explained in an introductory comment, I find it "fudgy," with an impliction conveyed that AR was talking to a whole group of professors. Only 3 of the participants -- Leonard Peikoff, George Walsh, and Ralph Nelson -- could have properly been considered "professors." Most of the others were graduate students; a couple of them I think might have still been undergraduates.

Now the point I wanted to ask you about. You wrote:

"The other one that is amazingly obvious - so much so that people who have a lot of confidence in Rand's claims can scarcely believe it is true - is that Rand did not in fact refute Hume's famous "problem of induction" - the basis of all modern skepticism. Not only did she not refute it, she had not even done any work on it."

Where do you get the belief that there are Rand followers who think she DID answer the "problem of induction"? I can't recall ever having encountered a Randian who thinks this. Do you know of examples in New Zealand? As far as I'm aware, it's been common knowledge in O'ist circles that Rand didn't solve the problem. In a fairly recent course, Leonard Peikoff claims to have solved it. I've heard the relevant section of whatever the course was. I'm sorry, I don't remember either the name of the course or the details of his argument. (Non-informative, I know.) But as to a claim of Rand's having solved it, I'm unaware of this claim ever having been made.

Ellen

___

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

One can see that central points—the meat of the argument---are glossed over with a lot of chewing around the fat though. (And this is done in order to give the appearance that the meat is being addressed).

Victor,

(sigh)

Your style emphasizes 3 kinds of fat: (1) bombastic rhetoric, (2) speculations on the evasion/dishonesty motives of others (which you always present as fact in the manner of a run-of-the-mill Randroid), and (3) broad generalizations on issues (often tangential issues) where your writing shows that you have very little familiarity with them, or that you have not thought them through or assimilated them well enough to understand them on a basic cognitive level. The meat is the actual ideas being discussed. I admit that once in a while, a sliver or two of meat is buried in the fat in your writing. But when you present too much fat and very little meat, what do you expect folks to chew?

That is my beef.

(Graaaaack! That pun was unintentional...)

Michael

[Victor Pross]

One can see that central points—the meat of the argument---are glossed over with a lot of chewing around the fat though. (And this is done in order to give the appearance that the meat is being addressed).

Victor,

(sigh)

Your style emphasizes 3 kinds of fat: (1) bombastic rhetoric, (2) speculations on the evasion/dishonesty motives of others (which you always present as fact in the manner of a run-of-the-mill Randroid), and (3) broad generalizations on issues (often tangential issues) where your writing shows that you have very little familiarity with them, or that you have not thought them through or assimilated them well enough to understand them on a basic cognitive level. The meat is the actual ideas being discussed. I admit that once in a while, a sliver or two of meat is buried in the fat in your writing. But when you present too much fat and very little meat, what do you expect folks to chew?

That is my beef.

(Graaaaack! That pun was unintentional...)

Michael

Michael,

Ye of little faith! Golly, Judith and Darrel seem to think I’m doing okay, but I’ll try a little harder—if only to please you. :angel:

I’m working on this “prescriptive” and “descriptive” difference in relation to the is-ought discussion. That is a meat issue, you would agree?

-Victor

[Victor Pross]

Bob,

We are coming close to bridging the problem and we have here the opportunity to do some serious communicating. You objected to my posts dealing with the is-ought question as seen thusly:

The problem comes NOT when you connect FACTS and VALUES, but when you attempt to DERIVE VALUES from FACTS. Can't be done.

There is always a PRECRIPTIVE premise either explicit or implied as opposed to DESCRIPTIVE. Hence the problem.

Leaving aside the "it can't be done"---would you agree that any thoughts from me (or anyone else)--as Germaine to the topic--would be a step forward.

Also, I asked you this question, and I think it is relevant to the above. Let's say I "can't do it"---THIS question is still at hand:

Granting your premise for the moment—that there is an important distinction between "prescriptive" and "descriptive"--would you nevertheless agree that the relationships I illustrated in other posts are objectively demonstrable—that the value judgment involved can be true? [Let’s take the case of medicine and architecture].

Would answering this question spring us forward to some interesting philosophical exploration?

-Victor

Edited March 14, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I’m working on this “prescriptive” and “descriptive” difference in relation to the is-ought discussion. That is a meat issue, you would agree?

Victor,

Absolutely.

Descriptive = is = cognitive.

Prescriptive = ought = normative.

Rand claimed that these were two different strains of concepts. She called them interconnected (and I agree). The strange part with her writing is that she wrote about this difference more in The Romantic Manifesto than anywhere else.

However, here is the rub for the present discussion. Rand's argument (only in places in her writings, but most especially in the deductions of others from Rand's argument) is that ALL cognitive concepts include a normative abstraction, thus they are not really different.

Hume's argument (or more specifically, the deductions of others from Hume's argument) is that the two strains are COMPLETELY separate.

I hold that they are like two circles that overlap, like in the diagram below:

We can fight over the size of the gray area, but I see no reason to believe in separate circles within the same brain using the same neurological processes for making categories (concepts). I also see no reason to believe in the two circles being only one circle—all gray area because of some kind of unstated need to boil everything down to a oneness. That would make them the same and different at the same time, which makes no sense to me.

Michael