Critique of Objectivist ethics theory

[Dragonfly]

The basic reason that you can't derive "ought" from "is", is that there is always a conditional statement involved: "if you want this... then you ought to do that. A conditional statement isn't a fact however, it implies that you can choose, that there is at least one alternative. If there is no alternative, the "ought" becomes meaningless (we don't say that the sun "ought" to attract the earth for example). But as soon as there is a choice, we have introduced a subjective factor. Let's take Rand's example of the choice between life and death as the fundamental choice. Now this isn't as straightforward as she seems to suggest. Are we talking about this choice for an individual? If so, is life always to be preferred over death? At all costs? If not, then it can't be the ultimate choice as other factors may override this choice. Suppose someone prefers to die to save someone he loves, a possibility that Rand does acknowledge. In that case the person chooses the life of another person over his own life, but then his own life cannot be the ultimate value. Rand may try to save the situation by saying that life without that other person would no longer be worth living, but then she's again smuggling in her fudge factor "life as man qua man" to replace the simple "life qua existence". You can't escape the fact that as soon as a choice is involved a subjective element is introduced. Statistical arguments won't help either, as these only describe the average behavior of a large number of people, which doesn't necessarily apply to the individual (the argumentum ad populum). They may have value if we want to know why people behave as they do, but we cannot derive an "ought" from them without introducing another "if", i.e. a subjective choice (for example that all people should follow the same ethical principles). Repeatedly using the word "rational" to justify a certain choice ("rational choice", "rational system", etc.) is no proof either, the choice is always subjective, no matter how "rational" you think it is.

We have seen earlier that even if we suppose that survival is a valid criterion, you can't derive Rand's system from that criterion, as for example a parasite can also survive very well, and the only way to circumvent this problem is to introduce new subjective elements, like "life of man qua man" or other extra assumptions like "an ethical system ought(!) to be universally valid for everyone". But the error is even more fundamental, as any criterion is already based on a subjective choice, even that between life and death, which isn't always as simple as it seems to be. Now this all doesn't mean that I'm against an ethical system per se, I'm only against the pretension that you can derive such a system in an objective, scientific way.

[Brant Gaede]

No "ought" from "is" means no (objective) morality. Ought people not have morality? Isn't "ought" being used as a stolen concept in this discussion? Ought not a scientist be truthful about his experimental results?

--Brant

Edited March 15, 2007 by Brant Gaede

[Dragonfly]

No "ought" from "is" means no (objective) morality. Ought people not have morality?

That's a personal opinion... which doesn't mean that we couldn't agree on it. We don't have to prove everything we agree on.

[Daniel Barnes]

I also meant to reply to Victor that there is undoubtedly much I could learn from him, as I do not consider myself an expert in any field, though I do have an interest in some particular problems. My interest in Rand is mostly in her epistemology. The reason for this is simple: she regarded her chief original contribution as being in this field, and she claimed all her other insights logically flowed from this contribution (and that said contribution was vital for the survival of humanity, which would naturally be of some interest to me...;-)) So if we test the strength of her epistemological theories and they are found wanting, we can be reasonably sure the rest of her system is likely to be false - at least on Rand's own terms - and from a practical point of view this will save us a great deal of time and trouble with the rest of her claims. (Of course, other parts of her system may still be true, as it is perfectly possible to derive true conclusions from false premises, or may turn out to be not derivable from her epistemology in the first place. But I hardly think Rand would be happy with either of those two fallback positions). I am also a little interested in her ethics, as these seem to have some claims open to straightforward criticism.

[Daniel Barnes]

Hi Victor

Many thanks for your post #245. I apologise for not being able to respond at greater length but then brevity can be a virtue. As it is in this case, Merrill's 'insight' can be disposed of in a single sentence - one that I assume may even be in his own words, or very close to them:

"They are not normative statements, but they are phrased as if they were..."

regards

Daniel

PS: Darrell, I also apologise for not replying to your posts as yet. Please be assured however that I have read them. I will hopefully find time to properly explain the problems I see with your arguments in the next couple of days.

[Ellen Stuttle]

No "ought" from "is" means no (objective) morality. Ought people not have morality?

People can't avoid having morality. They don't necessarily have some code of behavior which they've made a systematic attempt -- or even an unsystematic attempt -- at explicitly working out; but making choices is unavoidable in living one's life, and everyone has some form of decision-making criteria.

Ellen

___

Edited March 15, 2007 by Ellen Stuttle

[Brant Gaede]

We do get oughts from ises. The critics of this say we ought not to, but we do anyway. It might be fairer to say we think we do this, but then we would just be referring to different ises. Does it depend on what the definition of is is?

--Brant

[Brant Gaede]

I suggest that morality is subjective toward oneself, but objective toward other people--that is, they are free to do anything except violate rights. This relates to the subjective value judgments in economic transactions.

--Brant

[Rodney]

My interest in Rand is mostly in her epistemology. ... she claimed all her other insights logically flowed from this contribution ...

As usual, I don’t have time to participate in these highly interesting debates (especially right now), but off the top of my head I’m sure this is false. All Ayn Rand ever maintained (as far as I know, and I think I’ve read everything she ever formally said on the subject) was that she used her epistemology to arrive at the rest of her conclusions. But since she was to a large extent merely describing man’s manner of awareness (along the way necessarily making some prescriptions), this means that she merely claimed to have reasoned correctly, applying logic to experience in the usual manner of any thinker.

Edited March 15, 2007 by ashleyparkerangel

[Brant Gaede]

No "ought" from "is" means no (objective) morality. Ought people not have morality?

People can't avoid having morality. They don't necessarily have some code of behavior which they've made a systematic attempt -- or even an unsystematic attempt -- at explicitly working out; but making choices is unavoidable in living one's life, and everyone has some form of decision-making criteria.

Ellen

___

Of course. But I was talking about "ought," not "is." I guess I should have put "(objective)" in front of "morality" the second time I used it, not just the first.

--Brant

[Ellen Stuttle]

We do get oughts from ises. The critics of this say we ought not to, but we do anyway. It might be fairer to say we think we do this, but then we would just be referring to different ises. Does it depend on what the definition of is is?

--Brant

Brant,

I don't know which critic you're referring to, none of those I've read here. Daniel, Dragonfly, and I all agree that, sure, you can get an "ought" from an "is," a conditional ought, an ought of the form, IF you want to achieve X, then Y is necessary (or probably necessary, taking account of the uncertainties of knowledge) to achieving X. We're saying that you can't get an absolute, universalizable "ought" -- an imperative, as Kant would say -- that you can't deductively demonstrate from an "is" that everyone ought to do Y. And you know what, Rand actually said that too in her fashion in the article "Causality Versus Duty," the theme of which is (1) that, in the words of an uneducated woman she knew, you "don't gotta do anything but die"; and (b ) that there is no unchosen obligation. You've been on Atlantis for years, Brant, starting with the original Atlantis. Surely you remember how many debates there were over interpreting that article.

Ellen

___

[Ellen Stuttle]

My interest in Rand is mostly in her epistemology. ... she claimed all her other insights logically flowed from this contribution ...

As usual, I don’t have time to participate in these highly interesting debates (especially right now), but off the top of my head I’m sure this is false. All Ayn Rand ever maintained (as far as I know, and I think I’ve read everything she ever formally said on the subject) was that she used her epistemology to arrive at the rest of her conclusions. But since she was to a large extent merely describing man’s manner of awareness (along the way necessarily making some prescriptions), this means that she merely claimed to have reasoned correctly, applying logic to experience in the usual manner of any thinker.

Actually, she did say something about her idea of the "objective" -- as she defined "objective" -- nature of knowledge being the base of her system. I don't remember off-hand where she said that. Maybe in the Intro. to the Intro. to O'ist Epistemology. I'll look and see if it's there.

I recall Nathaniel saying that her epistemology was her greatest achievement, and I think both Barbara and Leonard might have said that too. Rings bells, but muffled ones, hazy in memory.

Ellen

___

[Rodney]

Actually, she did say something about her idea of the "objective" -- as she defined "objective" -- nature of knowledge being the base of her system. I don't remember off-hand where she said that. Maybe in the Intro. to the Intro. to O'ist Epistemology. I'll look and see if it's there.

Don't bother. It does not affect my point that I can see.

I recall Nathaniel saying that her epistemology was her greatest achievement, and I think both Barbara and Leonard might have said that too. Rings bells, but muffled ones, hazy in memory.

Then this confirms something I suspected, that the statement "she regarded her chief original contribution as being in this field" is also wrong, since it was others who said something similar and not her. I don't think she would have said it or thought it. Or if she did, she rather thought it to be her most important contribution.

Edited March 15, 2007 by ashleyparkerangel

[Daniel Barnes]

I wrote:

>"My interest in Rand is mostly in her epistemology. ... she claimed all her other insights logically flowed from this contribution"

Rodney replied:

>As usual, I don’t have time to participate in these highly interesting debates (especially right now), but off the top of my head I’m sure this is false. All Ayn Rand ever maintained (as far as I know, and I think I’ve read everything she ever formally said on the subject) was that she used her epistemology to arrive at the rest of her conclusions. But since she was to a large extent merely describing man’s manner of awareness (along the way necessarily making some prescriptions), this means that she merely claimed to have reasoned correctly, applying logic to experience in the usual manner of any thinker.

Hi Rodney, nice to hear from you...;-)

If I've overstated the situation, I'm happy to revise my statement to "...other insights flowed from this contribution..." or similar. But I confess to being a little confused, because what you're saying actually seems to pretty much agree with what I'm saying i.e that she "used her epistemology to arrive at her conclusions..." and that "....this means that she claimed to have reasoned correctly, applying logic to experience in the manner of any thinker." (I hope I have not misunderstood your meaning here).

To clarify, are you saying Rand would not claim her other insights logically flow from her epistemology?

[Ellen Stuttle]

Actually, she did say something about her idea of the "objective" -- as she defined "objective" -- nature of knowledge being the base of her system. I don't remember off-hand where she said that. Maybe in the Intro. to the Intro. to O'ist Epistemology. I'll look and see if it's there.

Don't bother. It does not affect my point that I can see.

Well, I did bother, but I don't find the comment I remember there. She says in the Introduction:

The issue of concepts (known as "the problem of universals") is philosophy's central issue. [And that] What is at stake here is the cognitive efficacy of man's mind.

Somplace she said that what's in Galt's Speech rests on her theory of the objective nature of knowledge, an issue she didn't go into in the speech. Also, I think that at some point she was directly asked what she considered to be her most important contribution, but I don't remember what she said or when and where the question was posed (The Ford Hall Forum?).

Ellen

___

[Rodney]

To clarify, are you saying Rand would not claim her other insights logically flow from her epistemology?

Not as conclusions follow from premises. More like as good results follow from intelligent methods. Remember, she is not so much prescribing man's methods as describing them. She is saying that any knowledge of any of us flows from this epistemology. For example, Feynman's insights into subatomic interactions. But, of course, a good description and understanding of man's conceptual faculty in action can obviously give man more control and lead to better and faster results--hence the somewhat prescriptive aspects of her monograph.

By the way, recall that she put her entire philosophy in Atlas Shrugged long before turning to the theory of concepts. She probably only had a few ideas on the subject before writing the monograph. So there couldn't have been the type of logical flow I take you to mean.

Daniel, this time I'll take your winking emoticon as non-taunting, and thank you for the greeting. I extend the same to you.

Edited March 15, 2007 by ashleyparkerangel

[Daniel Barnes]

I wrote:

>To clarify, are you saying Rand would not claim her other insights logically flow from her epistemology?

Rodney replied:

>Not as conclusions follow from premises. More like as good results follow from intelligent methods. Remember, she is not so much prescribing man's methods as describing them. She is saying that any knowledge of any of us flows from this epistemology.

OK, gotcha, I think. So do you think that if her epistemological descriptions turn out to be incorrect that this might not actually result in much of a problem for the other branches of her philosophy?

>By the way, recall that she put her entire philosophy in Atlas Shrugged long before turning to the theory of concepts. She probably only had a few ideas on the subject before writing the monograph. So there couldn't have been the type of logical flow I take you to mean.

I sort of see what you mean, but I was under the impression that Rand had come to her fundamental theories - such as her epistemology - very early, and that "Atlas" was the artistic expression of them, and something like the ITOE was the technical manual, if you like. So I would expect a fairly large degree of consistency between them.

[Daniel Barnes]

Ellen wrote:

>Also, I think that at some point she was directly asked what she considered to be her most important contribution...

For what it's worth I can chip in that in the ITOE she describes herself as "an epistemologist."

[Brant Gaede]

We do get oughts from ises. The critics of this say we ought not to, but we do anyway. It might be fairer to say we think we do this, but then we would just be referring to different ises. Does it depend on what the definition of is is?

--Brant

Brant,

I don't know which critic you're referring to, none of those I've read here. Daniel, Dragonfly, and I all agree that, sure, you can get an "ought" from an "is," a conditional ought, an ought of the form, IF you want to achieve X, then Y is necessary (or probably necessary, taking account of the uncertainties of knowledge) to achieving X. We're saying that you can't get an absolute, universalizable "ought" -- an imperative, as Kant would say -- that you can't deductively demonstrate from an "is" that everyone ought to do Y. And you know what, Rand actually said that too in her fashion in the article "Causality Versus Duty," the theme of which is (1) that, in the words of an uneducated woman she knew, you "don't gotta do anything but die"; and (b ) that there is no unchosen obligation. You've been on Atlantis for years, Brant, starting with the original Atlantis. Surely you remember how many debates there were over interpreting that article.

Ellen

___

Well, that's my position too. :purple: --Uh, I think. I mean, everyone ought not violate individual rights.

--Brant

Edited March 16, 2007 by Brant Gaede

[Rodney]

OK, gotcha, I think. So do you think that if her epistemological descriptions turn out to be incorrect that this might not actually result in much of a problem for the other branches of her philosophy?

Yes, that's correct. Since epistemological theorizing involves a great deal of introspection (I know you might disagree, but anyway), if she fails in this component of her investigation she might well be wrong in her theory of concepts and right in her ethics, metaphysics, politics, esthetics, and even the broad outline of her epistemology.

I sort of see what you mean, but I was under the impression that Rand had come to her fundamental theories - such as her epistemology - very early, and that "Atlas" was the artistic expression of them, and something like the ITOE was the technical manual, if you like. So I would expect a fairly large degree of consistency between them.

For the most part Rand tackled problems as she became interested in them. First she wished to present her vision of the ideal man. But for this this she had to define her concept of individualism, which led to The Fountainhead. She became interested in politics, and a conversation on this topic triggered the idea for "the mind on strike," which led to Atlas. That novel's plan expanded more and more as she worked out the plot and implications, until finally Galt's speech became the near-treatise it is (it's not really a treatise because as a spoken passage in fiction it had to have drama, color, clarity, and simplicity). After Atlas she was drawn to nonfiction explanations of her thinking, and often only considered an issue when it was raised by someone.

Her way was to continually refine her ideas, introducing qualifications when she thought them called for (this even happens within the expanded edition of IOE). That is why it is best not to take everything she has said as graven in stone, but to regard her whole corpus as a living expression of a constantly active mind.

[Daniel Barnes]

Rodney:

> That is why it is best not to take everything she has said as graven in stone, but to regard her whole corpus as a living expression of a constantly active mind.

An eminently sane approach.

[Darrell Hougen]

The basic reason that you can't derive "ought" from "is", is that there is always a conditional statement involved: "if you want this... then you ought to do that. A conditional statement isn't a fact however, it implies that you can choose, that there is at least one alternative. If there is no alternative, the "ought" becomes meaningless (we don't say that the sun "ought" to attract the earth for example). But as soon as there is a choice, we have introduced a subjective factor.

You're putting the choice in the wrong part of the sentence. Ethical choices aren't about choosing if clauses, they are about choosing ought clauses. For example, there may be several ways for you to earn a living, e.g., driving a taxi, being a scientist, gaining political office, etc. So, if you want to earn a living, you could drive a taxi, study to become a scientist, run for politcal office and perhaps you ought to be a scientist. So, the choice is not with respect to your basic goal, it is with respect to the manner in which you attempt to satisfy it. Deriving your basic goal from an is doesn't obliterate your need to make choices.

We have seen earlier that even if we suppose that survival is a valid criterion, you can't derive Rand's system from that criterion, as for example a parasite can also survive very well, and the only way to circumvent this problem is to introduce new subjective elements, like "life of man qua man" or other extra assumptions like "an ethical system ought(!) to be universally valid for everyone".

I notice that you didn't respond to my most recent post on this subject. At any rate, I've already illustrated the reasons that non-voluntary parasitism isn't a very successful strategy. Moreover, it can be forcefully argued that people need to live a principled existence if they want to maximize their odds of surviving.

Remember too, that is not merely surviving, but living rationally that is the standard of value. Morality has no meaning for those that are willfully irrational (nor does anything else).

Darrell

[Darrell Hougen]

No "ought" from "is" means no (objective) morality. Ought people not have morality?

That's a personal opinion... which doesn't mean that we couldn't agree on it. We don't have to prove everything we agree on.

What if you can't achieve univeral agreement? You've just stated that there is no means of using logic to convince another person of the correctness or superiority of your position over that of another person. What makes one person's opinion superior to another's? In the absense of cognitive content, your point of view carries no more logical weight than that of a terrorist.

Darrell

[Victor Pross]

Hi Victor

Many thanks for your post #245. I apologise for not being able to respond at greater length but then brevity can be a virtue. As it is in this case, Merrill's 'insight' can be disposed of in a single sentence - one that I assume may even be in his own words, or very close to them:

"They are not normative statements, but they are phrased as if they were..."

regards

Daniel

PS: Darrell, I also apologise for not replying to your posts as yet. Please be assured however that I have read them. I will hopefully find time to properly explain the problems I see with your arguments in the next couple of days.

Daniel,

The Merrill quote on thin ice, huh? Hmm. You know, a tiny particle of a quote (and the brevity of your post) does not bring the edifice that is the totality of my post and Rand’s ethical system to a ruble, so don’t congratulate yourself so soon. The arguments still stand. But be my guest, chew on the fat and ignore the meat. :turned:

Keep trying. You're doing good.

-Victor

Edited March 16, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Daniel Barnes]

Victor:

>The Merrill quote on thin ice, huh? Hmm. You know, a tiny particle of a quote (and the brevity of your post) does not bring the edifice that is the totality of my post and Rand’s ethical system to a ruble, so don’t congratulate yourself so soon.

Well, I do not see how substituting factual statements (eg: the fact that you need to format a disk to save a file to it) for normative ones (eg: love thy neighbour) can be seriously said to solve the "is/ought" difference! As Merrill admits, these are not normative statements, they just appear to be, courtesy of the usual flexibility of the English language. Let me repeat Merrill's words: "They are not normative statements." Truly, what is there left for me to add?

I cannot explain such an obvious howler. Merrill, who I have read before and is obviously highly intelligent, appears to have forgotten himself for a moment. We all do this from time to time. Alternatively, perhaps the source of his confusion lies in another very common ambiguity of language: the decision itself (say, to adopt or not adopt the practice of loving thy neighbour)and the fact that a such a decision was made (for example, a formal legal decision or council decision or other factual records). Indeed, this exact confusion seems to be taking place in Merrill's concluding line:

“So if we can agree on what morality is to accomplish, we can develop moral rules as factual statements. For normative statements are merely factual statements about means and ends.

That you can make factual statements about norms, or decisions, or moral rules (which is what Merrill seems to be saying, and I think that would be the most charitable interpretation of the above sentence), has nonetheless zero bearing on the "is/ought" distinction at all, because of course the problem is not the fact a norm or rule (or means or end) was adopted, but what norm or moral rule (or means or end) to adopt.

>The arguments still stand. But be my guest, chew on the fat and ignore the meat.

I thought I had ignored the fat, and gone straight for the marrow. At any rate, I do not see how Merrill's argument stands, nor yours if the above is what it rests on.