Critique of Objectivist ethics theory

[CNA]

Let me try to persuade you - just for a short while - to imagine the unimaginable - that what Rand said about important philosophic issues, and what you may passionately and sincerely believe, may in fact be completely incorrect.

Wow. With all due respect, I'm a bit floored by this statement that I have to chuckle a bit. Such a sweeping generalization. Considering what I personally went through as a child and throughout my teenage years and the brutality of it, that the convictions I came to due to what I went through in fact may be incorrect. Hmmm....very interesting. Before making such a sweeping generalization, you should talk with individuals that have had upclose and personal experiences with the types of individuals that Rand wrote about and how detrimental they can be to those individuals that are trying to survive by their own hardwork. If anyone applies the philosophy to their life, they'll find that it works extremely well in the real world.

Although I do not have a lot of time, I've been watching this thread. But this is one statement that I had to address and make a comment on.

Angie

[Ellen Stuttle]

Well, normally I'd quote only a brief excerpt, but since we're trying for the record for multiply nested quotes, I'm leaving it all here.

(Skip the above and start reading at this point.)

How many points for the longest sequence of multiply nested quotes?

(Skip that question and start reading here.)

Actually, I don't know what "neo-Darwinian" means.

But I think you're position is becoming clear. -- Mike

Oh, re your not knowing what "neo-Darwinian" means. Shame, shame for the "you're."

Dear Dr. Hardy, mathematician extraordinaire, could it be that you've never read The Selfish Gene? If not, you might want to read it someday. I think it gives a pretty good overall picture of the development of evolutionary theory, even though it originally appeared in 1976. (A revised 2nd edition appeared in 1989; if you ever read the book, best to get the revised edition.)

In a nutshell, the basic theory of evolution ever since Darwin has been this: A range of variations is produced amongst offspring from generation to generation. Most variations are unfavorable; some few are favorable -- meaning that they increase the likelihood of the organism's surviving long enough to produce offspring. Over the course of multiple generations the distribution of characteristics in a group of species members changes in the direction of a higher percentage of the group having the favorable variations.

One of Darwin's big problems in proposing the initial theory was they he didn't know of a mechanism whereby the variations in characteristics were produced and transmitted. Mendel's work on genetics was done during Darwin's lifetime (Darwin lived from 1809-1882, Mendel from 1822-1884), but Darwin didn't know of this work. It was in the early 1930s that what's called the "neo-Darwinian synthesis" was forged, bringing together evolutionary theory with the field of genetics, which field provided the mechanism evolutionary theory needed. There continued to be various debates on where the focus of evolution should be placed: on the species, or the group, or the individual. I believe there are still some today who place a focus on the group, to the consternation of a theorist like Dawkins. However, most biologists at least since the neo-Darwinian synthesis have thought of the locus of evolution as the individual organism. As I said earlier, this causes certain problems for how what's called by evolutionists "altruistic behavior" -- behavior which endangers the individual organism while possibly benefitting fellow group members -- could evolve. Dawkins argued, among other points, in The Selfish Gene that placing the emphasis on the genome resolves this problem. His book caused a certain amount of flap, including outright indignation. He was surprised at this. He explains in the 1989 Preface:

pp. vii-x,

1989 edition The Selfish Gene,

Oxford University Press paperback

The selfish gene theory is Darwin's theory, expressed in a way that Darwin did not choose but whose aptness, I should like to think, he would instantly have recognized and delighted in. It is in fact a logical outgrowth of orthodox neo-Darwinism, but expressed as a novel image. Rather than focus on the individual organism, it takes a gene's-eye view of nature. It is a different way of seeing, not a different theory.

[....]

The gene's-eye view of Darwinism is implicit in the writings of R. A. Fisher and the other great pioneers of neo-Darwinism in the early thirties, but was made explicit by W. D. Hamilton and G. C. Williams in the sixties. For me their insight had a visionary quality. But I found their expressions of it too laconic, not full-throated enough. I was convinced that an amplified and developed version could make everything about life fall into place, in the heart as well as in the brain. I would write a book extolling the gene's-eye view of evolution. It should concentrate its examples on social behavior, to help correct the unconscious group-selectionism that then pervaded popular Darwinism. I began the book in 1972 when power-cuts resulting from industrial strife interrupted my laboratory research. The blackouts unfortunately (from one point of view) ended after a mere two chapters, and I shelved the project until I had a sabbatical leave in 1975. Meanwhile the theory had been extended, notably by John Maynard Smith and Robert Trivers. I now see that it was one of those mysterious periods in which new ideas are hovering in the air. I wrote The Selfish Gene in something resembling a fever of excitement.

[He goes on to say that when he was approached for a second edition, the decision was made to leave the basic material from the first edition "warts, sexist pronouns and all" so as to retain its youthful enthusiasm, and to revise in the light of later developments by adding footnotes and some additional chapters. I think the book is a wonderful read.]

Ellen

___

Edited March 13, 2007 by Ellen Stuttle

[Ellen Stuttle]

In regard to the is-ought problem, I think it's possible to get a conditional "ought" from an "is." But is it possible to get a universalizable "ought," an "ought" true of everyone irrespective of motives?

To take what I hope is a clear-cut example: If one wants to live, one ought to eat nutritious food and not rat poison. But suppose one doesn't want to live? Is there anything to say one ought to want to live?

In the case of the prudent predator example which has been talked about quite a bit: Someone has to provide, even if only through hunting and gathering, whatever food the predator consumes. But is there anything to say that the prudent predator ought to be the one who provides it -- either directly or through exchanged services -- if someone else can be found to do the work? Objectivism holds that the prudent predator is immoral by the standard of man's life qua man; but suppose the prudent predator doesn't give a fig? Suppose he rejects your ethics? Is there any way you can demonstrate that he ought to accept it?

Ellen

___

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Objectivism holds that the prudent predator is immoral by the standard of man's life qua man; but suppose the prudent predator doesn't give a fig? Suppose he rejects your ethics? Is there any way you can demonstrate that he ought to accept it?

Ellen,

Sure.

Bash him over the head when he takes your stuff. (I mean it.)

Michael

[Victor Pross]

To take what I hope is a clear-cut example: If one wants to live, one ought to eat nutritious food and not rat poison. But suppose one doesn't want to live? Is there anything to say one ought to want to live?

Ellen,

No.

-Victor :turned:

[Victor Pross]

Ethics, according to Rand and other philosophers within the general trend of Aristotelianism, is a normative science. I have established a case that many sciences other than ethics are concerned with ought-judgments. Take medicine for example. Do I need to spell it out? Architecture is another normative science: architecture discovers what OUGHT to be done in the course of constructing a building—and as with medicine, his ought-judgments must be based on facts. Why does this change (or become a problem) in the field of ethics?

Victor's point is valid and needs to be addressed.

Judith

Judith,

Thank you for the vote of confidence that I can actually make a point. It can happen every now and then.

The place to look for a refutation of Hume's skepticism is not within the Objectivist ethics, but rather, it is eradicated with the Objectivist conception of causality united with the Objectivist theory of concepts. (Ethics rests on that, and I don’t want to philosophize midstream). Maybe even the Objectivist conception of causality is a good place, too. Hume's weak spot is his nominalism and that will be my focus. The is-ought proposition (Hume’s law) has become a modern article of faith among skeptics, and they are really rather easy to refute. (But I’m still doing more reading and thinking on this subject).

Victor

Edited March 13, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Ellen Stuttle]

Objectivism holds that the prudent predator is immoral by the standard of man's life qua man; but suppose the prudent predator doesn't give a fig? Suppose he rejects your ethics? Is there any way you can demonstrate that he ought to accept it?

Ellen,

Sure.

Bash him over the head when he takes your stuff. (I mean it.)

Michael

This hasn't proven anything to him logically, Michael. And I'd agree, that is your only ultimate recourse with an unregenerate example of the type.

Ellen

___

[Ellen Stuttle]

To take what I hope is a clear-cut example: If one wants to live, one ought to eat nutritious food and not rat poison. But suppose one doesn't want to live? Is there anything to say one ought to want to live?

Ellen,

No.

-Victor :turned:

You've just sundered any non-conditional is-ought link, Victor. As Rand herself did with her article "Causality Versus Duty." My belief, though I don't know this as fact, about that article is that she wrote it as a result of discussions with Allan Blumenthal about the moralistic ways in which her followers were understanding her ethics.

Ellen

___

[Victor Pross]

You've just sundered any non-conditional is-ought link, Victor.

Ellen,

Without plunging into any further “I’ll show you” oratory like the art threads, tell me how so. You made the above claim and I’m interested as to why you think so. There is no argument or substantiating claims following the assertion. This could be very interesting. To my understanding, ethics is the “instruction manual” to living a life—if one decides to undertake the project. It has nothing to say to those who have given up the challenge. ("Please, don't do it! Stay alive!")

Victor

Edited March 13, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Victor Pross]

Michael,

1. Ethics is the normative branch of philosophy for ALL philosophers, hell, for ALL people regardless of their profession, not just a select few. This is by definition.

Why, of course! Man, I hope you don’t think I thought otherwise. It applies to all people (visual artists, too)

2. I do not like the use of the word "science." It seems to be a lame attempt to make philosophy respectable and I already hold that it is respectable on its own merits.

I agree with the spirit of what you are saying. Mind you, there are many crossovers when it comes to science and philosophy. A very basic one comes to mind for now: Causality has been very important to philosophers to deliberate over, but causality is of a fundamental interest to scientists too. This is, I imagine, because it appears to be what binds the whole of the known world together: it is why the cosmos is not just a jumble or a chaos. One event causes, or is caused by, another; and there are persistent regularities in many of these happening, such that the different states of affairs connect up with one another in ways that our intelligible to understanding, thus enabling us to make sense of our environment.

Anyway, just a few musing like thoughts; I was just passing through. :turned:

-Victor

Edited March 13, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Victor Pross]

3. I have no idea of which philosophers fall "within the general trend of Aristotelianism" because I have no real idea what "Aristotelianism" means in this context. Then I have no idea why that qualification would make ethics a "normative science" for those falling within that general trend. And if it did make ethics a "normative science" for them, I have no idea why it would not be a "normative science" for others.

Michael,

I was simply thinking of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics were he addressed the question “What is the Good?” (This being a normative inquiry).

However, I think Judith is simply taking my central point into focus--and not the fat around it that you like to chew on. :turned:

I have established a case that many sciences other than ethics are concerned with ought-judgments. Take medicine for example. Do I need to spell it out? Architecture is another normative science: architecture discovers what OUGHT to be done in the course of constructing a building—and as with medicine, the ought-judgments must be based on facts. Why does this change (or become a problem) in the field of ethics?

The point stands.

Suggestion: Wiki 'Aristotelianism'; this might help.

-Victor

Edited March 13, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

This hasn't proven anything to him logically, Michael. And I'd agree, that is your only ultimate recourse with an unregenerate example of the type.

Ellen,

First you have to see if a person like this is open to reason. The whole purpose of the police force is for people who are not open to reason.

But, for the sake of argument, assuming he is open to reason, I would play the man's nature card, along with the self-esteem card. I would not play the legality card too much to convince him of right and wrong, though. I would only play that card to convince him to keep his mitts off my stuff, regardless of what he thought.

As to the manner of delivery of playing the human nature and self-esteem cards, I doubt such a person would be persuaded to change on the basis of a third-party observation, so I would try to devise manners for him to feel the deep-rooted pleasure of accomplishment and demonstrate how that feeling differs from the one that accompanies making a sting.

As a matter of fact Rand did part of this beautifully. She wrote fiction and plumbed the depths of the feeling of accomplishment. If you can get a person open to reason to read one of her fiction books, half the job is done. However, Rand's depiction of the short-term ego rushes of parasites at the moment of the sting was pretty far off. Hardcore parasites (at least the ones I knew) are really evil bastards who get off on feeling superior to everybody else when they steal from them. Some even have belly laughs as they blame the victims. Rand did not show this side well.

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

You've just sundered any non-conditional is-ought link, Victor.

Ellen,

Without plunging into any further “I’ll show you” oratory like the art threads, tell me how so. You made the above claim and I’m interested as to why you think so. There is no argument or substantiating claims following the assertion. This could be very interesting. To my understanding, ethics is the “instruction manual” to living a life—if one decides to undertake the project. It has nothing to say to those who have given up the challenge. ("Please, don't do it! Stay alive!")

Victor

Victor, I doubt that you comprehend the difference between a conditional is-ought and a universalizable is-ought. I think if you did you wouldn't have asked the question. I think if you'd like to understand, you might start by re-reading the whole thread to date. That's a conditional "ought."

Ellen

___

[Ellen Stuttle]

This hasn't proven anything to him logically, Michael. And I'd agree, that is your only ultimate recourse with an unregenerate example of the type.

Ellen,

First you have to see if a person like this is open to reason. The whole purpose of the police force is for people who are not open to reason.

[...]

Michael, are you claiming that anyone "open to reason" will have to accept your ethics? Why, if so? The basic issue being contended here, as I understand it, is whether or not there is any ethical code which follows as the night the day from the fact of human existence existing. I don't see that what you responded demonstrates that there is such a code. Further, I think that AR herself contradicted the idea that there is later on (from Galt's Speech and "The Objectivist Ethics") in her own writing with her "Causality Versus Duty" article.

Ellen

___

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen,

Dayaamm! We are talking about different things. You asked me how I would convince a parasite about ethics. My head was into that. And since I have lived in the underworld for a stretch, my visual imagery was quite vivid.

If your issue was simply deriving "ought" from "is," I have already made several statements on this and I will make some more in answer to Daniel Barnes's posts.

As regards making someone think, or making it so they "have to accept my ethics," I can't. We have volition so anyone can choose to close their minds (or keep them closed).

There are universal truths that are not "my" truths (which would result in "my ethics"). For example, we cannot choose the nature of our values, just like we cannot choose the nature of ourselves as human beings. Hell, even Rand used the term, "the given." And some of our values innately develop from affects (I mentioned this earlier). As regards that part, human beings are subjected to various influences they did not choose, but profoundly affect their values: society, family life, nutrition (especially if lacking enough to effect mental functioning), and a few others. We consciously choose the rest of our values.

Here is the short version of my own thinking (so far).

If an "ought" involves the nature of a value, this "ought" is derived from "is." If the "ought" has automatically developed from affects (even if only for the most part), this "ought" is derived from "is." Where volition is involved, however, the "ought" is always conditional to the value pursued. And that value is chosen, thus it is ultimately subjective, i.e, dependent on the person's free will. A rational code of ethics ideally takes all this into account. That is why I say some "oughts" derive from "is" and others don't.

Here is an interesting example: the will to live. I don't know of many infants who commit suicide while they are still at the stage of learning to talk. They come with a will to live already built in (along with affects). Even as they learn their first notions of right and wrong, their will to live is automatic. As their volitional capacity develops, they have a possibility of making other choices and eventually giving up that will to live as they mature. All of an infant's "oughts" are derived on a fundamental level from his automatic will to live, i.e., his "is." After the infant matures and grows a fully developed conceptual volitional faculty, the "oughts" based on his will to live become a mixture of context, desire, nature, learning and maybe some other elements. They become conditional to much more than the simple "is" of his infancy.

(As usual, I wrote more than I wanted to...)

Michael

[bmacwilliam]

"If an "ought" involves the nature of a value, this "ought" is derived from "is." If the "ought" has automatically developed from affects (even if only for the most part), this "ought" is derived from "is." Where volition is involved, however, the "ought" is always conditional to the value pursued. And that value is chosen, thus it is ultimately subjective, i.e, dependent on the person's free will. A rational code of ethics ideally takes all this into account. That is why I say some "oughts" derive from "is" and others don't."

The problem I think is that each and every ought, as Ellen has pointed out, is ALWAYS derived from an "IF" and not an "IS".

The only thing universal about is-ought is the universality of an implied "ought" in everything. Humans can live as animals, but isn't it better that we use our rational faculties and live "qua" man. Sure, I'd agree with that. But there's no solid, logical foundation in this. It's implied that we "ought" to do more than survive like an animal. I agree, but it cannot be proven just because we "are" or we "can". Rand's is-ought dismissal is remarkably weak.

Rand's words again:

"In answer to those philosophers who claim that no relation can be established between ultimate ends and values and the facts of reality, let me stress that the fact that living entities exist and function necessitates the existence of values and of an ultimate value for which any given living entity is its own life. Thus the validation of value judgements is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality. The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do. So much for the relationship between "is" and "ought."

- Rand, 'The Objectivist Ethics', VOS, italics in original."

In a nutshell, all she says is that life is the ultimate value and we must do "something" to live. Therefore all actions can be validated against this objective backdrop.

Sure, we must "do" something to live, but the first part of that is wrong. Life is not the ultimate value in an evolutionary sense, gene replication is - objective fact. These are related concepts, but importantly and significantly different. Also, "it's own life" is also wrong. Some species readily sacrifice themselves for the collective (also makes sense genetically). In human terms, we can choose to risk or even sacrifice our lives for another, maybe a spouse or child (in both emergency and non-emergency situations). In evolutionary (genetic) terms, it's consistent. Rand defends this by saying something like this choice is valid because my life is not worth living without person B, instead of admitting she's full of crap. I remember laughing out loud with this justification. Reality refutes this Objectivist position completely.

It fascinates me how seemingly intelligent people refuse to admit these types of obvious errors and go through all kinds of rather amazing intellectual backflips to justify these foolish and erroneous positions.

According to Rand, life is the "ultimate" value, but it can nevertheless be morally justified to risk it or even sacrifice it sometimes. I call bullshit on that one. A=A , but maybe A=B if X or Y is the case...

Bob

Edited March 13, 2007 by Bob_Mac

[bmacwilliam]

Again, it comes down to what I conclude as Rand's primary motivation, and that's politics. Her primary motivator in my opinion was to "prove" that the political system she grew up in was objectively wrong. Admirable perhaps, but her task was nearly impossible I think.

In order to "prove" that altruism in the socialist/communist sense was wrong, she had to "prove" that it was never acceptable to live for, or in fact to do anything for, the sake of another without one's own best (selfish) interests in mind. This is why one's life had to be primary. It simply HAD to be morally wrong so that the political system she so venomously despised also had to be objectively wrong.

She didn't seem to mind discarding all sorts of real philosophical problems and clear contradictions in order to get to the goal. For all her lip service to reason and reality, she didn't let reality get in the way of her ambition.

Bob

[Danneskjold]

Still waiting for that thread of yours.

[Victor Pross]

Bob Mac:

The problem I think is that each and every ought, as Ellen has pointed out, is ALWAYS derived from an "IF" and not an "IS".

The concept "ought" arises from the difference between an automatic form of consciousness and a volitional form of consciousness. "Ought" refers to behavior, but a certain kind of behavior: that which is life-conducive as opposed to that which is life-detractive. The cognitive function of the word "ought" is to designate preferable actions, those which promote the goals of the acting being..

As for human beings, the volitional nature of our consciousness is part of what we ARE. It enables us to select (to a great extent) the significance of our behavior.

What a thing IS, determines what it CAN do, what it WILL do---and if the thing is possessed of volitional choice, what it OUGHT to do.

The concept "ought" presumes the possibility of a certain kind of behavior, a deliberate selection among alternatives. "Ought" has meaning only with reference to a conscious entity that has the capability to make such a selection. "Ought" assumes that there IS such an entity, and that the entity IS faced with an environment that IS containing alternatives. If any of these "IS" conditions are removed from consideration, then the "ought" is deprived of any meaning; it becomes a Stolen Concept. So, therefore, "ought" is based on "is."

You cannot conceptually have "ought" without a proceeding "is"; to acknowledge "ought" is to acknowledge "is." It is the possession of volitional consciousness that gives rise to the whole field of normative propositions. The fact that a human being IS a being of volitional consciousness is the direct source of all normative behavior, and so "moral instruction" is necessary because human beings do not live by instinct as animals do. So much for the is-ought dicohotomy.

Victor

Edited March 13, 2007 by Victor Pross

[bmacwilliam]

You cannot conceptually have "ought" without a proceeding "is"; to acknowledge "ought" is to acknowledge "is."

Victor

Victor,

The problem comes NOT when you connect FACTS and VALUES, but when you attempt to DERIVE VALUES from FACTS. Can't be done.

There is always a PRECRIPTIVE premise either explicit or implied as opposed to DESCRIPTIVE. Hence the problem.

Bob

[Ellen Stuttle]

Again, it comes down to what I conclude as Rand's primary motivation, and that's politics. Her primary motivator in my opinion was to "prove" that the political system she grew up in was objectively wrong. Admirable perhaps, but her task was nearly impossible I think.

In order to "prove" that altruism in the socialist/communist sense was wrong, she had to "prove" that it was never acceptable to live for, or in fact to do anything for, the sake of another without one's own best (selfish) interests in mind. This is why one's life had to be primary. It simply HAD to be morally wrong so that the political system she so venomously despised also had to be objectively wrong.

She didn't seem to mind discarding all sorts of real philosophical problems and clear contradictions in order to get to the goal. For all her lip service to reason and reality, she didn't let reality get in the way of her ambition.

Bob

I think it's more complex than that, Bob. I agree that her abhorence of the Communist state was significant in giving her a vivid idea of what she opposed. But she'd had an individualist bent since she was a child -- and recall her early attraction to Neitzsche. It's always seemed to me that there was a change of emphasis, a change of emotional attitude between We the Living and Atlas Shrugged, with The Fountainhead transitional. An image which I love from We the Living is that of Kira's Viking with his sword and his salute: "To a life which is an end in itself." That spirit was strong in We the Living and I think it doesn't really jibe with her attempt by the time of Atlas at providing a deducible universalizable (supposedly) fully rational code. Something changed -- hardened -- in her in between, I believe; but I don't think as a result of so unitary a focus as "political." I think she'd acquired the ambition to "sew it all up," to present a complete new philosophy, hermetically sealed and logically perfect. In other words, I think her ambition in devising her formal ethics was a more embracing one than you're saying.

Ellen

___

Edited March 13, 2007 by Ellen Stuttle

[Daniel Barnes]

Hi Darrell

>I guess that I'm not really interested in debating whether Rand solved the problem until we agree on whether there is a solution to the problem or not.

Well, more correctly speaking, the "is/ought" (or the fact/decision) problem has been solved - Hume solved it, negatively. What Rand is supposed to be challenging is this solution. But it is hard to see how her solution even addresses the problem.

>I would not, however, underestimate Rand's grasp of the facts.

I think Rand's grasp of the facts is often highly overrated, I am sorry to say. Hence my additional example of Hume's problem of induction, where the situation is crystal clear. I cannot tell you the number of times Objectivists have told me how Rand completely refuted Hume's skepticism. Rand herself certainly believed it. Yet the problem of induction is absolutely central to Hume's skepticism, and the modern variants thereof. [(Betrand Russell, as I recall, in a rather despairing discussion of it in his History of Western Philosophy, called it the timebomb placed under modern philosophy). And yet Rand in her own words plainly admits she has never even done any work on this problem. One can only conclude she indeed had very little grasp of the facts of the matter.

If someone told you that they had completely refuted Rand's epistemology, yet at the same time had not even begun to think about her theory of concept formation, would you think they had a sufficient grasp of the facts?

BTW, you mentioned earlier you might be interested in discussing a point in Huemer that I considered a strong one. I offered his Point 5, about fudge words and Man Qua Man. I am happy to discuss this as well.

Edited March 14, 2007 by Daniel Barnes

[bmacwilliam]

As far as I can tell, Rand had no choice but to detest, insult, and 'refute' Hume (I use that word lightly). Hume didn't use mysticism or faith to argue against reason and it's limitations. He used reason to argue against itself. This made him a dangerous guy in Rand's eyes, so she made him 'evil'. In reality though, Hume seems correct, at least moreso than Rand.

Bob

[Victor Pross]

You cannot conceptually have "ought" without a proceeding "is"; to acknowledge "ought" is to acknowledge "is."

Victor

Victor,

The problem comes NOT when you connect FACTS and VALUES, but when you attempt to DERIVE VALUES from FACTS. Can't be done.

There is always a PRECRIPTIVE premise either explicit or implied as opposed to DESCRIPTIVE. Hence the problem.

Bob

Bob,

I understand. When I have more time (and i'm still devoting time to thinking it over) I will post again--but I am not convinced that it CAN'T be done. Why are you so convinced beyond a doubt that such is the case?

But let me ask this: Granting the premise, for a moment, that it can't be done, would this render ethics subjective, to your mind?

-Victor

Edited March 14, 2007 by Victor Pross

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Actually, in this entire discussion, the word "subjective" needs clarification.

Subjective in Objectivism means personal, but "detached from reality." Subjective is also often used to mean "personal," but not necessarily detached from reality.

So which meaning are people using here? (Or are they using another meaning altogether?) If one says ethics is detached from reality, that is one thing. If he says ethics is a personal matter, that is another (especially because of contexts).

I think "subjective" is a great word to clarify before continuing.

Here is a thought. If ethics is not detached from reality, obviously there is a big honking "IS" in there somewhere.

Michael