imurray

"If you wish to save the last of your dignity, do not call your best actions a “sacrifice”: that term brands you as immoral." If you go back to Rand's definitions this makes sense and I don't see why it's so wrong. It basically says we should do something because we value doing it. In the case of the mom, it's obvious that any woman who would rather buy the hat is a psychopath. Perhaps a definition of the word psychopath would be helpful here because as I read it Rand would say a psychopath was immoral because the values they hold are themselves immoral because they are not rational. It depends on whether or not the value is rational. That's where the debate could possibly start - what makes a value rational? Some are easier to identify as "rational" than others, like feeding a child, but others aren't like charity. I agree with that, but we should be beyond getting stuck on the words. I'd want to know this: can a person rationally value charity? Rand would probably say no which is why I have a problem with some of her more prescriptive language, but I'd like to find out if I have this right and how to get around, or are we at the mercy of Rand's rationality?

If I'm reading things right I think it would be fair to say this about "moral" "obligation": an obligation implies that one must choose to act upon the highest rationally chosen value that is in play in a given situation. That would in turn be a "moral" act. To act upon a lesser value, a value that is not "rational", or out of "duty" (imposed values) would be "immoral". If this is right it seems that the "obligation" in "moral obligation" must take on a different meaning. In order for something to be an "obligation" and not a "duty", as Rand defined it, it must already imply a value and in that sense the word does not simply mean "something one must do" it means one must do the "right" thing. To hold yourself to this type of system would be "moral". So if Rand says "moral obligation" it could be that she means that one has an "obligation" in the common sense of the word to act morally, that is, staying true to one's hierarchy of chosen rational values. Where have I gone wrong George?

I'm out of the evolution word game I agree with the point that I think Dragonfly was making - one could infer what was meant or intended by the use of the word "evolution" in that context.

I didn't say that, I said it implies that mechanism, meaning that it is not just some random changes. Sorry, that's how I read it.

I think you have to be careful here. Evolution is not the mechanism that drives changes. Evolution is the name of the theory of how and why organisms change. The mechanism that drive the changes would be things like mutation, genetic drift, etc.

This is what I wrote over in the Altruism thread, I think it's applicable here: From http://aynrandlexico...icon/duty.html: "The meaning of the term “duty” is: the moral necessity to perform certain actions for no reason other than obedience to some higher authority, without regard to any personal goal, motive, desire or interest." From http://aynrandlexico...obligation.html "Accepting no mystic “duties” or unchosen obligations, he is the man who honors scrupulously the obligations which he chooses. The obligation to keep one’s promises is one of the most important elements in proper human relationships, the element that leads to mutual confidence and makes cooperation possible among men . . . . The acceptance of full responsibility for one’s own choices and actions (and their consequences) is such a demanding moral discipline that many men seek to escape it by surrendering to what they believe is the easy, automatic, unthinking safety of a morality of “duty.”" From http://aynrandlexico.../sacrifice.html "“Sacrifice” is the surrender of a greater value for the sake of a lesser one or of a nonvalue... This applies to all choices, including one’s actions toward other men. It requires that one possess a defined hierarchy of rational values (values chosen and validated by a rational standard). Without such a hierarchy, neither rational conduct nor considered value judgments nor moral choices are possible." Back to the example: "If a mother buys food for her hungry child rather than a hat for herself, it is not a sacrifice: she values the child higher than the hat; but it is a sacrifice to the kind of mother whose higher value is the hat, who would prefer her child to starve and feeds him only from a sense of duty." Restated: If a mother buys food for her hungry child rather than a hat for herself, she has not surrendered the higher value in her hierarchy which she has chosen for herself: she values the child higher than the hat which is at the lower end of her chosen hierarchy; but if the hat is on the higher end of her chosen hierarchy then she surrenders this value if she chooses to feed the child (which is on the lower end of her chosen hierarchy) - in this case she would prefer her child to starve, but feeds him only because she feels she must based not on her own choices, but those prescribed by others. In the first instance she is "obligated" to feed the child because it is in keeping with her own rationally chosen hierarchy of values. In the second she has not chosen to feed her child out of "obligation", but because society tells her she must (duty). You could argue that this is not a very good example because any mother who would choose a hat over feeding her child is obviously a psychopath making it overly simplistic, but as an illustration it works fine. Basically it says that it is okay to feel or be "obligated" (moral even) to do something if it was rationally chosen and fits your hierarchy of values - it is not okay to do something that is of lesser value in your rationally selected hierarchy while sacrificing a higher value (this would be done out of a sense of "duty", not obligation - you are only "obligated" to follow your rationally selected hierarchy of values). The question here could be if the mother did indeed consider the hat of higher value than feeding the child - would Rand consider her actions moral if she bought that hat? But that's the wrong question. The act is not immoral based on the mother's actions (buying the hat instead of feeding the child)it is immoral because the chosen value is incommensurate with being a rational human, that is, it is not a rational value because it would not support the continuation of life (in this case). Rand, as I understand from this site and my limited reading, did not say that people could do whatever they wanted as some think Nietzsche advocated for his Ubermensch(I don't necessarily agree with that reading of Nietzsche, but that's beside the point). Simply put you can't rationally choose to value doing harm to others because if everyone held a value like that man would not survive. Ian

Interesting and problematic as I see it now. In the second example could she have said this because she describes "duty" as an "anti-concept" and therefore it doesn't really exist in and of itself, but is the word given to define an absence of rational thought (which is really no-thing)? The first example seems more problematic, but I think it's reasonable to assume she's speaking of "moral duty" in the common meaning of the term and not in the same abstract way she is using it in the second example. Can George clarify this? Am I way off base? Or was it just an oversight on her part? I agree with your interpretation. It's as if an atheist were to say (1) I don't believe that morality comes from God, and (2) I don't believe in the existence of God. There are two different contexts here. What I find interesting is Rand's statement that she does not consider charity to be a "major virtue." This suggests that she regarded charity as at least a minor virtue, which would be news to me. Where is that line from? It sounds like it might be from a Q&A session, in which case, depending on the inflection of her voice, Rand may have said "major virtue" in a dismissive tone, thereby indicating that she does not regard it as a virtue at all. In other words, "major virtue" might differ from "major virtue." I haven't gotten caught up with all the latest posts in this thread, so some of this may have already been covered. Ghs Okay. I'll start with point one which I have brought over here since the current discussion is about 'virtue': I'm sorry, but I missed the point you were trying to make and I don't mean this sarcastically. Could you restate it as a statement maybe?

I totally agree. Or at least in the sense that if it's not always immoral, in fact it (sacrifice) is sometimes moral and not just neutral (not sure if you agree). But nevertheless, even though I also agree that it's a "minor tweak", it's a minor tweak to the ethical foundations which does not leave most of the downstream implications intact, so in this sense "minor" doesn't seem appropriate. She does state an obligation to oneself, and rationality: "Do you ask what moral obligation I owe to my fellow men? None—except the obligation I owe to myself, to material objects and to all of existence: rationality." Bob An obligation to oneself with the qualification "qua man". That is to say all rational obligations chosen for oneself should also be held in some regard by others as is commensurate with being a rational human being. We cannot rationally choose values which do harm to others because they would not be rational.

Interesting and problematic as I see it now. In the second example could she have said this because she describes "duty" as an "anti-concept" and therefore it doesn't really exist in and of itself, but is the word given to define an absence of rational thought (which is really no-thing)? The first example seems more problematic, but I think it's reasonable to assume she's speaking of "moral duty" in the common meaning of the term and not in the same abstract way she is using it in the second example. Can George clarify this? Am I way off base? Or was it just an oversight on her part?

Do you realize how Rand is using "duty" in the above statement? Do you realize how she contrasts duty with obligation? From http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/duty.html: "The meaning of the term “duty” is: the moral necessity to perform certain actions for no reason other than obedience to some higher authority, without regard to any personal goal, motive, desire or interest." From http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/responsibility-obligation.html "Accepting no mystic “duties” or unchosen obligations, he is the man who honors scrupulously the obligations which he chooses. The obligation to keep one’s promises is one of the most important elements in proper human relationships, the element that leads to mutual confidence and makes cooperation possible among men . . . . The acceptance of full responsibility for one’s own choices and actions (and their consequences) is such a demanding moral discipline that many men seek to escape it by surrendering to what they believe is the easy, automatic, unthinking safety of a morality of “duty.”" From http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/sacrifice.html "“Sacrifice” is the surrender of a greater value for the sake of a lesser one or of a nonvalue... This applies to all choices, including one’s actions toward other men. It requires that one possess a defined hierarchy of rational values (values chosen and validated by a rational standard). Without such a hierarchy, neither rational conduct nor considered value judgments nor moral choices are possible." Back to the example: "If a mother buys food for her hungry child rather than a hat for herself, it is not a sacrifice: she values the child higher than the hat; but it is a sacrifice to the kind of mother whose higher value is the hat, who would prefer her child to starve and feeds him only from a sense of duty." Restated: If a mother buys food for her hungry child rather than a hat for herself, she has not surrendered the higher value in her hierarchy which she has chosen for herself: she values the child higher than the hat which is at the lower end of her chosen hierarchy; but if the hat is on the higher end of her chosen hierarchy then she surrenders this value if she chooses to feed the child (which is on the lower end of her chosen hierarchy) - in this case she would prefer her child to starve, but feeds him only because she feels she must based not on her own choices, but those prescribed by others. In the first instance she is "obligated" to feed the child because it is in keeping with her own rationally chosen hierarchy of values. In the second she has not chosen to feed her child out of "obligation", but because society tells her she must (duty). You could argue that this is not a very good example because any mother who would choose a hat over feeding her child is obviously a psychopath making it overly simplistic, but as an illustration it works fine. Basically it says that it is okay to feel or be "obligated" (moral even) to do something if it was rationally chosen and fits your hierarchy of values - it is not okay to do something that is of lesser value in your rationally selected hierarchy while sacrificing a higher value (this would be done out of a sense of "duty", not obligation - you are only "obligated" to follow your rationally selected hierarchy of values). The question here could be if the mother did indeed consider the hat of higher value than feeding the child - would Rand consider her actions moral if she bought that hat? But that's the wrong question. The act is not immoral based on the mother's actions (buying the hat instead of feeding the child)it is immoral because the chosen value is incommensurate with being a rational human, that is, it is not a rational value because it would not support the continuation of life (in this case). Rand, as I understand from this site and my limited reading, did not say that people could do whatever they wanted as some think Nietzsche advocated for his Ubermensch(I don't necessarily agree with that reading of Nietzsche, but that's beside the point). Simply put you can't rationally choose to value doing harm to others because if everyone held a value like that man would not survive. Ian [Edited for spelling and minor additions.]

I quite liked George's post on Butler as well, and I tend to agree. But I don't agree with this conclusion of yours. The motivation (once we wisely get beyond the first-level "trivial" self-interest that always must exist) is explicitly to help others, true. I go to the grocery store an buy much more food than I need because I feed my kids too. Yes, I CANNOT be happy if my kids are underfed and miserable if I don't choose this altruism. This is a problem? Hardly. One big problem, as I see it, is twisting acts of altruism like this back into self-interest to defend a egoist position. This, I often think, is dishonest. I can see a problem if altruistism becomes the primary focus of one's life, I agree. But it's not an either/or. Bob I think the problem here is using the wrong definition of altruism and not the technical philosophical term Comte first coined. There is no twisting back into self-interest in my example - in fact, I made sure to differentiate between "goals and actions" and "taking an interest" to avoid this problem. I don't disagree that acting altruistically may not always be a problem, but if you were an altruist in Comte's example you would be overly dependent on the happiness of others for your own well-being and self-esteem. For example you wouldn't be happy unless your children were happy with what they ate - so you'd feed them sugary-sweet meals all the time just to make them smile. That doesn't help them, it helps you to be happy. I agree with this, and to be clear, I was not accusing you of the "twist". But look: "I don't disagree that acting altruistically may not always be a problem" vs "This is why there is a problem with acting altruistically " ??? Agreed, poor choice of words on my part. I should have qualified the statement. Although I think I would be correct to say the latter if there was an understanding that I was using Rand's/Comte's definition, but I'd need to think about that more as I realize the contradiction in my own analysis. I don't know enough to say I agree with Rand and I have a gut feeling that I don't, but I'm making an attempt to figure out what she meant before I continue to criticize her theory and incur the wrath of George. I'd rather come prepared - at least then I'll know if I have him beat and he's just not admitting it Regarding the "twist" - I'm impressed by the acrobatics some people employ to get there, but find the core argument to be quite banal.

I quite liked George's post on Butler as well, and I tend to agree. But I don't agree with this conclusion of yours. The motivation (once we wisely get beyond the first-level "trivial" self-interest that always must exist) is explicitly to help others, true. I go to the grocery store an buy much more food than I need because I feed my kids too. Yes, I CANNOT be happy if my kids are underfed and miserable if I don't choose this altruism. This is a problem? Hardly. One big problem, as I see it, is twisting acts of altruism like this back into self-interest to defend a egoist position. This, I often think, is dishonest. I can see a problem if altruistism becomes the primary focus of one's life, I agree. But it's not an either/or. Bob I think the problem here is using the wrong definition of altruism and not the technical philosophical term Comte first coined. There is no twisting back into self-interest in my example - in fact, I made sure to differentiate between "goals and actions" and "taking an interest" to avoid this problem. I don't disagree that acting altruistically may not always be a problem, but if you were an altruist as Comte's conceived it you would be overly dependent on the happiness of others for your own well-being and self-esteem. For example you wouldn't be happy unless your children were happy with what they ate - so you'd feed them sugary-sweet meals all the time just to make them smile. That doesn't help them, it helps you to be happy. An egoist would be happy with the act of giving the children a well-balanced diet. This is a very simple example, I realize. The key is to understand the important role of "technical" language which belongs to special arts or sciences like philosophy. It should be assumed that the readers on this blog are familiar with the the terms and definitions that Rand used, therefore, it is unfair to say that Rand has somehow violated propriety or has committed an act of barbarism when it comes to her use of the term "altruism". It would seem that it is reasonably explained and defined by both her and Comte. It is okay, however, to point out where she may violate the rules of propriety within the context of her writing without making it explicit or to point out where her definition may be lacking. It is merely confusing to keep attributing different meanings to Rand's technical jargon - that is in itself a violation of propriety.

I'm not arguing with George here. I enjoyed this write up as I was unfamiliar with Butler's analysis and can understand why it is so important to this discussion and others. Technically speaking, I think it's safe to say that all interests are self-interests provided we are discussing the act of "taking an interest". Our interests are our own; whether we choose to "take an interest" on our own or are motivated to "take an interest" by something external, we rationalize the interest within our "self". When we are discussing the goal of a particular interest we may say that our action is taken for the benefit of the "self" or the "other". This distinction makes it possible to say that one may act altruistically. It is impossible to avoid the fact that the action of "taking an interest" is an internal, rational, action - that seem obvious and not worth discussing. It is how the interest manifest externally, i.e., the goal associated with acting on an interest, which we are discussing when we speak of an altruistic act. For example: If I choose to become interested in doing charity work, the rationale for becoming interested is my own (or I have at least made it my own). The action(s) I may be said to be in the interest of others, that is, the goal of my action(s) may be to help others. Subsequently the action(s) I take may make me feel good. Simply becoming interested in charity does not make one feel good - one must first act on the interest which in this case makes "feeling good" a byproduct of the action. It is true that in this situation one may imagine that taking action is going to make them feel good and that may be part of the rationale for taking the interest in the first place, but one cannot know for sure or have the feeling until after the external action is taken. It is clear in the example that merely calling and interest a "self-interest" does not benefit this conversation on altruism. What's important is the goal of the action and how one defines a "successful" action. In the above case and in light of this distinction one can make another important distinction between one who is said to be acting egoistically and one who is said to be acting altruistically: For the egoist the happiness (or whatever feeling) may come as a result of performing the action, that is, doing the act would make them feel good (or whatever) about themselves. (If they performed the action poorly they may feel bad). For the altruist the happiness would come as a result of performing the action AND would be dependent on how they perceive the response of others to the action, that is, they will only be happy if the action made "others" happy. This is why there is a problem with acting altruistically - one is dependent on others for their own happiness.

Xray, Dan, are you ready for this? I have to agree with George on this one - this "hardwired" stuff doesn't work for me. I think it's pretty easy to disprove: First: What exactly is biologically hard-wired? I'm assuming you're talking about the same genetic 'predisposition' possessed by unrational animals, which is to insure the continuation of one's genetic code through procreation. This drive to reproduce and perpetuate the species/life is the primary motivator for animal behavior. If this is indeed what you mean then survival and procreation must be at the top of any hierarchy. So in George's example of risking one's life by volunteering to serve in war, even for a good cause, violates or stands in opposition to the primal or hard-wired disposition I spoke about above. When you argue that a person chooses to risk their life in war because they view the cause to be of higher value than their own life you are no longer in the realm of primal unrational biological hard-wiring, you are in the realm of values. If you are arguing that values are biologically hard-wired then it must follow that all people would choose to fight in war over their own life. I don't think there's any question about this - unless you think there is a gene that forces us to choose that which is most beneficial to us and concomitantly allows a person to choose to die - which doesn't make sense. This is because man is a rational animal and can choose to subordinate his biological drives wheras unrational animals cannot. Earlier I said that people can rationally choose to smoke and purposely do harm to themselves as an example of how humans can subordinate their biologically determined 'behavior'. You argued that would be an irrational choice and you are correct, however to act irrationally is to deny rationality. The word I've used above, unrational, is the privative word and implies a complete absence of rationality without denial.

I'm not expert, but I know "dispersed knowledge" is a buzzword among Austrian School economists. Dan may know more as I've seen him reference the Austrian school several times. From my limited understanding the concept basically denies that an agent can make a rational decision because the agent does not and cannot have access to the necessary knowledge without having already depreciated its value. Instead the agent only has information, which is rendered practically useless as a direct result of it becoming known (that is, once information gets out it is no longer as profitable as it was when it was unknown). A confusing scenario, I know.

HAHA! That's different! I take it back, altruism is dead!

Wait, how long have you been here? You gotta be kidding me. I mean, when it was new, the idea was to not have it turn foul but the only way to do that was wait until it turned foul as expected and then MSK fixed it, which required him to get a little Machiavellian. Long time ago, that one. The foulest things I have ever seen are those like bizarre levels of statistical density in numbers of posts, and occasional hyper-anal-retentiveness (Neener-neenering<tm>). But in comparison to all that at its worst this is no more significant than "a flea sitting on the penis of an alien, in outer space," as Adrien Belew once lyriced. George is both funny AND smart, and sometimes that combination gets certain people who write on philosophy boards all assed-out. Oh well. I think it's cute that you've come out to defend George, who is obviously more than capable of defending himself. It's heartwarming to see that altruism still exist, Rich.

I never intended any condescension, I wonder how many others on the forum feel that it is condescending? I believe your comments can be reasonably read as condescending. In other words, I agree with George on this. I'm not sure how this could be construed as condescending - unless giving an overview of the goal of general semantics, as GS understands it, is considered condescending? He basically says that GS is a system that was designed to help people think about words and symbols so they are better prepared to take in the language of philosophy - what's the problem and how is that condescending? You either agree or disagree, but I don't see how you get offended. He specifically stated that not everybody who reads philosophy becomes insane - so presumably those who aren't taken in are already competent (whatever that entails). I don't know enough about GS to say that it holds the answers, but I will say that I believe that people are sometimes tricked by language - take a Christian for example No offense Dan, but you have butted into numerous conversations to defend George without really understanding what is going on.

Xray, I generally agree with your assessment, but I'm not sure it's accurate to say that altruism is impossible because we are biologically hardwired for survival. While passing on one's genes is in every organisms self interest and absolutely necessary for the preservation of the gene pool, man, being a rational being, is in a unique position where he able to subordinate his biological drives for other interests. For example humans choose to smoke or do drugs, engage in sports where there is great risk of bodily harm or even death, couples choose not to continue their genetic line by not procreating, etc. Here's another example: I assume that you would agree that the drive for survival is hardwired in organisms to insure the preservation of genes. What if a couple decides not to procreate because they feel that their society has become a horrible place and decide that it would be unfair to a child to be brought into such a place. Is that not an act of altruism (in your system) - sacrificing the perpetuation of one's genes for a child?

I must have missed your proof. Sorry about that. Bend over and I'll see if I can find it. I have no interest in convincing you of anything. I respond to your posts because this provides me with an entertaining pastime -- something to take my mind off my real work of meeting deadlines. When this diversion becomes boring for me, I'll stop. Yeah, I'm a tough guy all right -- a real bully. Ask anyone who has met me (he said, to the sound of thunderous laughter echoing in cyberspace). Two questions: (1) What have you learned? (2)What have you read by Rand? Ghs I'm not surprised that you wouldn't be a bully in person. Guys like you like to shoot your mouths off in online forums. I've learned that there are a lot if people on here who I can learn from - excluding yourself. I'll give you the last word on this. This is my last reply to you on this site as arguing with you is pointless and not very stimulating. We've already done enough harm to this discussion - one of us has to stop and I volunteer.

Back to altruism...I volunteer to compile a list of the major arguments made here in order to help focus the conversation - it will help me at least and maybe benefit others also.

You're right. I don't care what you think. But I was impressed by your "Liar, liar, pants on fire!" reply. It is impossible adequately to respond to such a finely-honed and clever riposte, so I won't even try. You and some other Rand-bashers on OL use insults as frequently as I do -- your latest post is a case in point -- even if many of your insults are directed at a dead woman. Your problem seems rooted in the fact that I am much better at formulating insults than you are. Eat your heart out, rookie. Ghs Wow. You're a jackass. I didn't simply say you were a liar, I proved it. You'd rather ignore that and keep living in your fantasy world. You don't care what I think, but you continue to engage me and attempt to convince me you're right. Sticks and stones...tough guy. I'm not even anti-Rand, I came here to learn more about her - it's you I took issue with.

Political party stances are relative. *THAT* is a really nice incite. Thank you for sharing it. Great perspective. Never thought of it quite like that, but it rings true to me. Ian

My forthcoming book, Themes in the History of Classical Liberalism, will be published by Cambridge University Press. I realize that Cambridge doesn't meet the high standards of your undergraduate review, but it will have to do, I suppose. If you review my posts, you will find that my insults are directed mainly at people who display little knowledge or understanding of Rand's ideas, but who criticize her nonetheless. I have never had any tolerance for that kind of intellectual sleaziness. If someone wants to criticize Rand, fine -- I have done so many times myself (the first two times in 1971-2, when I published a lengthy two-part critique of her theory of rights and a three-part article on "Objectivism as a Religion") -- but at least make a reasonable effort to understand her first. This is a matter of common decency. People who don't show this minimal respect for Rand will get no respect from me. Ghs Well congratulations! You must "turn it on" when you're writing a book. I have to be honest you've lost all credibility with me by refusing to admit you were appealing to authority when it's about as black and white as it gets no matter how hard you try to spin it. If you're willing to lie and sacrifice your integrity so you won't be "wrong" about something so petty I'd be extremely dubious of the rest of your scholarship. Of course you don't care what I think, but I'm calling you out on it anyway. You're a liar. Do you think everybody here is so stupid that you can just talk your way out of it? On top of that you try to convince us you, Mr. Insult himself (Mr. I'll decide who knows enough about Rand to speak in my presence) are the victim in this.You're a bully, plain and simple.

Let me preface my comment here by saying I'm rather enjoying my exchanges with GHS, and his posts in general. He's at least as snotty as I can be, which is refreshing, and at least 100 times more erudite, so there is no doubt that I will learn quite bit from him over our exchanges. Having him here is a credit to OL. However all these things don't stop him from being wrong now and again, as I'm sure he'd be the first to acknowledge. And I think GHS is clearly wrong here: this does read like an appeal to authority. His final question makes this obvious, which is in effect: are you calling these authorities wrong? Or worse, fools? Actually, I think it's perfectly possible for the above authorities to be quite wrong. This is because Rand's key errors seem to me, following Popper, to be errors that have been around for a long time in philosophy - she's just another in a long line. So it's not a question of them being "all dupes and/or fools" so much as simply not being aware of some very subtle but important problems that underly their whole discipline. And of course let's not forget that Rand basically regarded 99.99% of all philosophers as dupes and fools - at best! - and claimed that all their fundamental assumptions were wrong. So if you're going to argue on Rand's behalf, it pays not to be too sensitive about the same type of criticisms played back at you. My comment above (#644)confirms this and I'm wicked smart - so it must be true. Unless we've been duped because we don't have George's keen insight!