imurray

Hi Panoptic, The obvious rebuttal seems to be that this a petitio error? regards Daniel Daniel, Read the rest. We're looking at two different perspectives here: 1. From the mother's value hierarchy and 2. from a rational value hierarchy. From perspective one buying the hat would appear to moral. From perspective two buying the hat is immoral. It follows that since the mother's value hierarchy isn't rational, buying the hat would be judged immoral and that would be the reality because it was judged rationally from a rational perspective and not the mother's irrational perspective. It is not a petitio error. Only a person not thinking rationally would come to the conclusion that it was moral to buy the hat. You have to look at this as a rational person. This philosophy hinges on the idea of an objective rational mind - if it didn't then values and morals would be relative and not grounded in reality, which they cannot be in Rand's system. Go back and read Aristotle's N.Ethics. You're missing a HUGE part.

The same could be said about the followers of a certain philosophy? (joking) To be sure, I think no particular philosophical movement has a monopoly on true believers, if that's what you're hinting at. Also, typically, reality-deniers following a philosophy don't also have political power. The former tend to be self-limitng -- they are easy for the rest of us to avoid and even provide some mild entertainment; the latter tend to visit the costs of their lies on the whole of society. We need to get those realists visiting the cost of their lies on the whole of society out of office AND get in some of those funny harmless reality-deniers/ moral relativists! I can't even imagine what that would look like!

The same could be said about the followers of a certain philosophy? (joking)

If we could only be so lucky! I wish this could be tied to one particular administration, but as Dan correctly pointed out: this has been going on for a long time and will more than likely continue. Oh, yes to believe that this will be a be a 4-8yr anomaly and then back to rainbows and unicorns - ahh, sweet bliss!

Who knew that Austin Powers had Randian overtones?! Fat Bastard: the epitome of a rational, moral human being.

Over in the thread "Settling the Debate on Altruism" Brant has threatened to eat the baby and burn the hat in Rand's now infamous example of "sacrifice". My questions for you are: Is it moral to eat an imaginary baby and burn an imaginary hat to settle a real debate? Is an imaginary baby more valuable than an imaginary hat? Can one sacrifice buying an imaginary hat for feeding an imaginary baby? What if the mother was from Wisconsin and the hat was made out of cheese and she fed it to the baby after she bought it? What say you?

Hmm, let's see. Eating the baby would be immoral in the sense that it's an irrational value, however, what you want to accomplish is to end this debate - which is more valuable to you than the baby. So if you don't eat the baby you're sacrificing a higher value for a lower value. So I guess the only logical conclusion would be that you have to eat the baby in order to be moral. Oy vey. --Ian poached

Here's the potential 'problem' with a more Utilitarian view: So the mom buys the hat instead of feeding her daughter - another woman notices this and calls the department of social services and the child is taken away and is eventually placed in a loving home where she is very happy. According to the Utilitarian view, buying the hat could have been a moral act because as a consequence of that act the child went to a better home and is happy. In other words: a moral end justifies or trumps the immoral means. Philosopher's like Rand and Aristotle would basically say: "Wait a minute! That doesn't sound quite right. Her intent wasn't moral - the eventual moral consequence of her action was a result of sheer luck and a product of immoral means." Do you see the possible ethical dilemma here? And why Rand might conceive that rational motives are important to integrate into an ethical or moral judgment? And furthermore, why the concept of luck is taboo in her thought? In this case, a rational person doesn't need luck to achieve a moral end nor would they resort to immoral means.

Daniel, I address this in my last post. Yes it's immoral to feed the child instead of buying the hat - yes because it's a sacrifice, but also because the mother does not value her child more than the hat, which would be the rational value to hold. So it is only immoral according to the mother's hierarchy of values - which is inherently wrong anyway! You're refusing to see or understand the non-consequentialist's concept of morality. Read some Aristotle, seriously - it will help you understand where this is coming from and why they don't hold a strict Utilitarian view of morality. Here's a snip from my last post: Judged according to Rand's philosophy (talking of the second mother who'd rather buy the hat): buy hat = immoral because it's not a rational value, i.e., her obligation is to a value that is not rational. feed child = immoral because it's done out of duty, i.e., not done out of obligation to a rational value (which she ought to have). The mother basically has two levels of obligation: one is to act rationally according to her values (micro-level) and the other is to hold rational values (macro-level), that is, to be rational (which to Rand is synonymous to "being human"). She's acting morally if she's true to both obligations. So it's easy to see why she herself would be acting immorally no matter what she did. Do you really think a moral or ethical person would feed a child just because they had to and not because they wanted to? What a pitiful state to be in to not value and enjoy your own child. The mother's point of view is WRONG because she's not thinking rationally so it really doesn't matter. It just looks good to put "moral" next to buying the hat because it makes Rand's philosophy look shocking, but it's a parlor trick because it wouldn't be congruent with Rand's ethics - it's the ethics of a crazy mom made to look like it's representing Rand and therefore it's worthless as an argument. ---- Would someone please at least acknowledge this position when they reply (rebuttal is totally fine and I welcome it - I do not mean that one must agree) - I feel that this takes us in a different direction. I've been hearing the same argument over and over and over again and it is weak. Please give Rand and her "followers" some credit when reading that example - if it was as simple as you all make it out to be someone would have noticed it a long time ago and it would have been worked out. The crux of Rand's argument and philosophy is that a person acting morally WOULD NOT NEED TO SACRIFICE because they would rationally choose the right/moral value hierarchy to begin with.

The upshot is then, that if you have an "immoral" value heirarchy you cannot ever act morally. So, every sacrifice is immoral and every non-sacrifice is immoral. That doesn't make sense. Look at it this way. Judged externally: buy hat = immoral feed child = moral Mother's POV: buy hat = moral feed child = immoral Bob The mother probably wouldn't be thinking in those terms, but okay. However, this is not how the system works. Here's what it looks like: Judged according to Rand's philosophy (talking of the second mother who'd rather buy the hat): buy hat = immoral because it's not a rational value, i.e., her obligation is to a value that is not rational. feed child = immoral because it's done out of duty, i.e., not done out of obligation to a rational value (which she ought to have). The mother basically has two levels of obligation: one is to act rationally according to her values (micro-level) and the other is to hold rational values (macro-level), that is, to be rational (which to Rand is synonymous to "being human"). She's acting morally if she's true to both obligations. So it's easy to see why she herself would be acting immorally no matter what she did. Do you really think a moral or ethical person would feed a child just because they had to and not because they wanted to? What a pitiful state to be in to not value and enjoy your own child. The mother's point of view is WRONG because she's not thinking rationally so it really doesn't matter. It just looks good to put "moral" next to buying the hat because it makes Rand's philosophy look shocking, but it's a parlor trick because it wouldn't be congruent with Rand's ethics - it's the ethics of a crazy mom made to look like it's representing Rand and therefore it's worthless as an argument. The external point of view takes us into Mill's Utilitarianism. Judged according to a Utilitarian consequentialist: buy hat = immoral because the child starves, i.e., the consequences of her actions are immoral feed child = moral because the child is fed, i.e., the consequences of her actions are moral. Consequentialist do not care about intent, therefore, even if somebody intended to do harm and ended up doing good their action would be "moral" based on the consequences alone. Rand, Aristotle and others felt like the intent was also important because they believe that a rational being must act with proper intent in order to be "happy". It's not merely a thought-crime because they perceive that it is important to the "happiness" or "self-esteem" or whatever you want to call of the person performing the act - it is in keeping with being a rational human or using ones "wisdom" as Aristotle might have said. Put simply, the woman who would buy the hat is not really going to be happy buying the hat because her happiness is not real - it's based on her irrational decision, i.e., she's one sick puppy. In other words, they want people to know what the right thing is and to do it because it merits being done. The byproduct of such a system is personal happiness or self-esteem and a better world. I'd criticize this based on my opinion that it's ridiculously idealistic! To me there's just as much chance of there being a truly Utopian Socialist or Communist State. As for value hierarchies - people have different hierarchies for different situations. A person may act immorally in one situation and morally in another based on that particular hierarchy. Making one irrational or immoral decision does not mean that one is either always moral or always immoral. You have to use her system, you're missing something in your analysis. This is not the weak link that we should be focusing our criticism on. I personally like my philosophy to be grounded in the idea of pluralism. I was wrong about Aristotle there, and I posted that earlier - I forgot that his teleology wasn't consequentialist. My mistake.

But what does it mean that you "choose" her Cardinal values? The only meaningful interpretation is that you decide to *act* on them, but you cannot force yourself to desire them. As Schopenhauer already remarked: "Der Mensch kann wohl tun, was er will, aber er kann nicht wollen, was er will". I think what she's thinking is that a rational person would not have to choose her values - they are a product of rational thought. Always keep in mind that Rand is assuming that her philosophy is for a "rational" human being. That's important when looking at her example, e.g., the mother and the hat. It's crazy, in my opinion, to assume that she would think it's moral to buy the hat - it seems clear that this would not be an act a rational human being would take. A rational human being would value the child more - and the same goes for all rational choices. Basically if you are acting rationally according to your rational values then the action will be moral. There is room for discussing how one would know if a value is rational in a more nuanced and complex example than the mother and the hat, but I urge you to give that example what a rhetorician would call a "generous" reading and assume that Rand was smart enough not to make a fatal flaw in her own example and be considerate of the intelligence of those here. In other words, nobody is saying (Rand included) that the woman should buy the god-forsaken hat!!! Also, I was mistaken when I spoke about Aristotle - I reread some of his ethical theory and what I said was incorrect I forget that his teleology wasn't consequentialist. His ethics are very close to Rand's.

Can't have it both ways though. The mother that values the hat more cannot be acting immorally in both cases (buying the hat, feeding the child). Either the act of buying the hat is immoral (substituting our 'rational' values) or feeding the child is immoral (her values). They can't both be immoral. If feeding the child is the moral choice, then sacrfice is not always immoral. If feeding the child is immoral, then that's even worse. I think Rand painted herself nicely into a corner here. Bob There is no corner, and no thought crime, either. Let's leave out the term "sacrifice". The immorality lies in the mother pretending or being coerced to prefer the child over the hat if she really values the hat more than the child. It's an obnoxious decision if she truly valued the hat more than the child, but it would be more obnoxious if she faked reality by acting as if she did not value the hat more than the child. Jeffrey S. This interpretation weakens Rand's philosophy imo. You're essentially saying that it would be less obnoxious if she just bought the hat - it wouldn't be because the value is not rational and acting irrationally violates the Cardinal virtue in Rand's philosophy. If you interpretation is correct then it simpy becomes a semantic argument and Xray, Dragonfly, Bob, and Daniel are generally correct. It is more complex than this. It's reasonably easy to understand if you read my previous posts that quote Rand.

In other words, she is a proponent of the idea of a thought crime. A person would in her view be immoral, no matter what he does, if he has the "wrong" ideas. I find that a despicable idea. It's the same as those fundamentalist christians who insist that merely desiring your neighbor's wife is a sin, even if you don't act on your desires. What a horrible philosophy! That's your opinion, which is fine. I'm not an Ayndroid or Randroid or whatever. However, you have to realize why rational motive is important in her philosophy - it goes beyond the rather simple conclusions you've drawn here. Acting rationally is moral; obligation to act according to a hierarchy of rational values is moral - that's what it comes down to. Your comparison to Christianity is interesting, however, she advocates rational choice and individualism which are incommensurate with Christianity. Her philosophy has no tolerance for anything but rational thought. No doubt this is a weakness because we do not live in a world of hyper-rational humans who consistently subordinate emotion, wants, and whims to rationality. It's more than a simple "thought crime" it's a wrench in the system.

Really? The conclusion appears to be correct, based on what Rand wrote. If it isn't, demonstrate this, don't just assert randomly. The "Ergo: ..." quote is not from me, but from DB. Please reread my # 848 post. As for DB stating that the conclusion is correct, it certainly is, based on Rand's premise that: “Sacrifice” is the surrender of a greater value for the sake of a lesser one or of a nonvalue. " She adds: "Thus, altruism gauges a man’s virtue by the degree to which he surrenders, renounces or betrays his values (since help to a stranger or an enemy is regarded as more virtuous, less “selfish,” than help to those one loves). The rational principle of conduct is the exact opposite: always act in accordance with the hierarchy of your values, and never sacrifice a greater value to a lesser one. This applies to all choices, including one’s actions toward other men. It requires that one possess a defined hierarchy of rational values (values chosen and validated by a rational standard). Without such a hierarchy, neither rational conduct nor considered value judgments nor moral choices are possible." (Rand) But the elaborations she added about a defined hierarchy of values become null and void by the mere fact of her claiming that the mother who reluctantly feeds her child (while valuing the hat more) does perform a sacrifice. Now apply Rand's criteria in this case: "sacrifice" = surrender of a greater value (hat) for the sake of a lesser value.(child) It was RAND who called "sacrifice" what this mother does, right? Since per her own words , sacrifice implies the surrender of a greater for a lesser value, that's what you get. All what D. Barnes did was to take Rand by her own words and draw a logical inference from her premise. Values are always subjective. As are "standards" of value. Their subjectivity does not mean that they do not pertain to reality. Standards of value are subject to permanent change, evidenced for example in the dramatic change of moral values in the course of history. In Rand's example the mother who values the hat more is making a sacrifice by buying the food, yes. I don't disagree with that. What you're not taking into account is the morality of the value itself. If a mother values a hat more than her child it is an immoral value because it is not a value any rational human would choose, therefore if she bought the hat it would be an immoral act based on the value - not on the act itself. Please read my responses (especially 852). But considering Rand firm stance on "friendhsip, family and friends not being primary in a man's life", a mother valuing a hat over her child woud not make an immoral choice at all. "If [people] place such things as friendship and family ties above their own productive work, yes, then they are immoral. Friendship, family life and human relationships are not primary in a man’s life. A man who places others first, above his own creative work, is an emotional parasite." (Rand ) If we expand a little on the hat and imagine the mother being a fashion designer who buys a hat because she wants to study it as a model for her own "productive work", disregarding her child's needs would be be perfectly in sync with the values approved by Rand in the above quote. Panoptic, do you see how little empathy and understanding Rand has for those values most humans hold highly? Who is Rand to arbitrarily decide that "Friendship, family life and human relationships are not primary in a man’s life". ? It would still be an immoral value even if she was a fashion designer. Look at what I posted above.

Can't have it both ways though. The mother that values the hat more cannot be acting immorally in both cases (buying the hat, feeding the child). Either the act of buying the hat is immoral (substituting our 'rational' values) or feeding the child is immoral (her values). They can't both be immoral. If feeding the child is the moral choice, then sacrfice is not always immoral. If feeding the child is immoral, then that's even worse. I think Rand painted herself nicely into a corner here. Bob Nope, separate issues. It's complicated, maybe too complicated, but it can indeed be both ways. The second mother is acting immorally if she buys the hat or feeds the baby because in the first case she'd follow an immoral value and in the second she's be sacrificing and acting out of duty. This distinction separates her from Aristotle who only really cared about the end or result of an act - Rand also cares about why people act.

Really? The conclusion appears to be correct, based on what Rand wrote. If it isn't, demonstrate this, don't just assert randomly. The "Ergo: ..." quote is not from me, but from DB. Please reread my # 848 post. As for DB stating that the conclusion is correct, it certainly is, based on Rand's premise that: “Sacrifice” is the surrender of a greater value for the sake of a lesser one or of a nonvalue. " She adds: "Thus, altruism gauges a man’s virtue by the degree to which he surrenders, renounces or betrays his values (since help to a stranger or an enemy is regarded as more virtuous, less “selfish,” than help to those one loves). The rational principle of conduct is the exact opposite: always act in accordance with the hierarchy of your values, and never sacrifice a greater value to a lesser one. This applies to all choices, including one’s actions toward other men. It requires that one possess a defined hierarchy of rational values (values chosen and validated by a rational standard). Without such a hierarchy, neither rational conduct nor considered value judgments nor moral choices are possible." (Rand) But the elaborations she added about a defined hierarchy of values become null and void by the mere fact of her claiming that the mother who reluctantly feeds her child (while valuing the hat more) does perform a sacrifice. Now apply Rand's criteria in this case: "sacrifice" = surrender of a greater value (hat) for the sake of a lesser value.(child) It was RAND who called "sacrifice" what this mother does, right? Since per her own words , sacrifice implies the surrender of a greater for a lesser value, that's what you get. All what D. Barnes did was to take Rand by her own words and draw a logical inference from her premise. Values are always subjective. As are "standards" of value. Their subjectivity does not mean that they do not pertain to reality. Standards of value are subject to permanent change, evidenced for example in the dramatic change of moral values in the course of history. In Rand's example the mother who values the hat more is making a sacrifice by buying the food, yes. I don't disagree with that. What you're not taking into account is the morality of the value itself. If a mother values a hat more than her child it is an immoral value because it is not a value any rational human would choose, therefore if she bought the hat it would be an immoral act based on the value - not on the act itself. Please read my responses (especially 852). You're getting hung up on the word "sacrifice" here. A sacrifice is always immoral. The act is a sacrifice and therefore immoral because the mother is acting out of "duty" and not "obligation" to her child if she feeds the child instead of buying the hat. That's half of it - the other half, which you're ignoring, is that if she did buy the hat instead of feeding the child it would no longer be immoral because it was a "sacrifice", it would be immoral because the value was immoral, i.e., subhuman, a whim, not rational, etc. So no, it in no way follows that the woman would be acting morally if she bought the hat. What it does mean, however, is that the mother who feeds her child when she'd rather buy the hat is acting "immorally" because she holds an immoral value. It would seem that, in Rand's view, if you perform an act it is important to do it for the right or rational reasons because the opposite would be to do it out of "duty" or irrationality. So just because the baby gets fed by this mother it does not mean she acted morally despite the final result being the baby is fed. She is still immoral because she doesn't value the child more than the hat (that is, her values are not rational) regardless of whether or not she feeds the baby. Also, yes, morals change. I agree, but that doesn't mean that they cannot still be rational and grounded in reality. Ian

Haha. That makes more sense, but no matter how much breathing and relaxing I do I can't make out that run-on sentence. You need some punctuation. As it reads you're saying that you need a real disconnect to bridge a gap - that's one article I'd love to read! Here, kid, let me lend you a cane. --Brant or try whiskey I prefer Bourbon

Really? The conclusion appears to be correct, based on what Rand wrote. If it isn't, demonstrate this, don't just assert randomly. See my response above Leonid's. As an aside: I have spent very little time with Rand, but have found that if your conclusion insinuates that her philosophy dictates that one should act irrationally then it's good to go back and check your conclusions. It would be utterly ridiculous for a philosopher to argue that a woman should buy a hat over feeding a child and that would be a "moral" act. Give the philosophy and those who follow it at least modest amount of credit - if that's what she was advocating or if her flaws were that easy to point out then her philosophy would already be dead. I don't say this because I don't believe in criticizing Rand, I believe in doing so carefully as not to water down the debate with easily refuted accusations that make the critics look like fools and diminish their credibility. From the Ayn Rand Lexicon: http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/selfishness.html "There is a fundamental moral difference between a man who sees his self-interest in production and a man who sees it in robbery. The evil of a robber does not lie in the fact that he pursues his own interests, but in what he regards as to his own interest; not in the fact that he pursues his values, but in what he chose to value; not in the fact that he wants to live, but in the fact that he wants to live on a subhuman level (see “The Objectivist Ethics”)." and "The Objectivist ethics holds that the actor must always be the beneficiary of his action and that man must act for his own rational self-interest. But his right to do so is derived from his nature as man and from the function of moral values in human life—and, therefore, is applicable only in the context of a rational, objectively demonstrated and validated code of moral principles which define and determine his actual self-interest. It is not a license “to do as he pleases” and it is not applicable to the altruists’ image of a “selfish” brute nor to any man motivated by irrational emotions, feelings, urges, wishes or whims. This is said as a warning against the kind of “Nietzschean egoists” who, in fact, are a product of the altruist morality and represent the other side of the altruist coin: the men who believe that any action, regardless of its nature, is good if it is intended for one’s own benefit. Just as the satisfaction of the irrational desires of others is not a criterion of moral value, neither is the satisfaction of one’s own irrational desires. Morality is not a contest of whims . . . . A similar type of error is committed by the man who declares that since man must be guided by his own independent judgment, any action he chooses to take is moral if he chooses it. One’s own independent judgment is the means by which one must choose one’s actions, but it is not a moral criterion nor a moral validation: only reference to a demonstrable principle can validate one’s choices." From George H. Smith's post in the thread ""Obligation" in the Writings of Rand" (which he pulled from his Objectivism Research CD-ROM): "The only "obligation" involved in individual rights is an obligation imposed, not by the state, but by the nature of reality (i.e., by the law of identity): consistency, which, in this case, means the obligation to respect the rights of others, if one wishes one's own rights to be recognized and protected." [i think this means something very similar to the "Golden Rule"]

Xray, I posted this earlier. The man who offered to sell you the baby would have been acting immorally because his value was not rational, that is, it doesn't follow the "golden rule" which Rand states differently but is basically the same concept imo. From http://aynrandlexico...icon/duty.html: "The meaning of the term “duty” is: the moral necessity to perform certain actions for no reason other than obedience to some higher authority, without regard to any personal goal, motive, desire or interest." From http://aynrandlexico...obligation.html "Accepting no mystic “duties” or unchosen obligations, he is the man who honors scrupulously the obligations which he chooses. The obligation to keep one’s promises is one of the most important elements in proper human relationships, the element that leads to mutual confidence and makes cooperation possible among men . . . . The acceptance of full responsibility for one’s own choices and actions (and their consequences) is such a demanding moral discipline that many men seek to escape it by surrendering to what they believe is the easy, automatic, unthinking safety of a morality of “duty.”" From http://aynrandlexico.../sacrifice.html "“Sacrifice” is the surrender of a greater value for the sake of a lesser one or of a nonvalue... This applies to all choices, including one’s actions toward other men. It requires that one possess a defined hierarchy of rational values (values chosen and validated by a rational standard). Without such a hierarchy, neither rational conduct nor considered value judgments nor moral choices are possible." Back to the example: "If a mother buys food for her hungry child rather than a hat for herself, it is not a sacrifice: she values the child higher than the hat; but it is a sacrifice to the kind of mother whose higher value is the hat, who would prefer her child to starve and feeds him only from a sense of duty." Restated: If a mother buys food for her hungry child rather than a hat for herself, she has not surrendered the higher value in her hierarchy which she has chosen for herself: she values the child higher than the hat which is at the lower end of her chosen hierarchy; but if the hat is on the higher end of her chosen hierarchy then she surrenders this value if she chooses to feed the child (which is on the lower end of her chosen hierarchy) - in this case she would prefer her child to starve, but feeds him only because she feels she must based not on her own choices, but those prescribed by others. In the first instance she is "obligated" to feed the child because it is in keeping with her own rationally chosen hierarchy of values. In the second she has not chosen to feed her child out of "obligation", but because society tells her she must (duty). You could argue that this is not a very good example because any mother who would choose a hat over feeding her child is obviously a psychopath making it overly simplistic, but as an illustration it works fine. Basically it says that it is okay to feel or be "obligated" (moral even) to do something if it was rationally chosen and fits your hierarchy of values - it is not okay to do something that is of lesser value in your rationally selected hierarchy while sacrificing a higher value (this would be done out of a sense of "duty", not obligation - you are only "obligated" to follow your rationally selected hierarchy of values). The question here could be if the mother did indeed consider the hat of higher value than feeding the child - would Rand consider her actions moral if she bought that hat? But that's the wrong question. The act is not immoral based on the mother's actions (buying the hat instead of feeding the child)it is immoral because the chosen value is incommensurate with being a rational human, that is, it is not a rational value because it would not support the continuation of life (in this case). Rand, as I understand from this site and my limited reading, did not say that people could do whatever they wanted as some think Nietzsche advocated for his Ubermensch(I don't necessarily agree with that reading of Nietzsche, but that's beside the point). Simply put you can't rationally choose to value doing harm to others because if everyone held a value like that man would not survive. Ian

Xray, First I'll start with a disclaimer: I have a BS in Biology, but not evolutionary biology so what I am about to write is based on my understanding of evolution. I would have to do some additional research to substantiate my claims, but I'm relatively confident that what I write will be at least in the right ballpark. I could be wrong so if you have knowledge of data that refutes this I will be happy to reconsider. I think you're confusing what biologists mean by "goal-seeking" and what sociologists mean by the term. Sociology has a tendancy to borrow from Evolutionary Theory without being true to the propriety of the technical/scientific usage of terms. When biologists speak of "goal-seeking" they are not talking about our rational ability to make choices, but the mechanisms which drive the Evolutionary process, that is, teleomatic vs. teleonomic processes (conditions vs. systems). These are terms given to processes that appear to be goal directed. What you are talking about is different - you are basically saying that our genes force us to persue those goals which we value most and that is not, as far as I know, a scientifically substantiated claim. I realize that other branches of science have studied motivation and purpose driven behavior, but to my knowledge there is no agree upon theory because they tend to get stuck when trying to explain how humans define a data set of desirable goals and objectives from which to choose from.

Haha. That makes more sense, but no matter how much breathing and relaxing I do I can't make out that run-on sentence. You need some punctuation. As it reads you're saying that you need a real disconnect to bridge a gap - that's one article I'd love to read!

Hi all experts, If you have a moment could you please comment on my posts #6 and #12, I would just like to know if you think I'm on track here. Even a simple "that sounds right" or "you might want to read x" would be appreciated. As with all the philosophies I have studied or am studying I like dive in and play in the mud in order to get a personal reading before consulting secondary sources or asking for help and then I appreciate a little guidance to make sure that my reading is at least internally coherent and I didn't botch something simple. I say this because I've taught graduate rhetoric and hated when student didn't take some initiative before asking me to explain things for them and I didn't want to come accross that way. On another note I have to admit I forgot who my audience was when I first came here. I'm so used to seminars where everybody is feeling their ways through and there's a free flow of more right and more wrong interpretations and opinions before we all become more familiar and start to really focus in. I think that's why George and others felt like I was here to Rand bash and I want to make it clear now that my intent is to first and foremost make an honest effort to understand her philosophy. My approach to any philosophy is always to come in skeptical. I generally don't read philosophy looking for a guide to live my life - I read philosophy with an eye towards discovering new ways to think about the world and am fascinated by how much my world can change when looked at through a different lens. So I will be more careful to remember that I am here with people who are new and people who are experienced in Rand's philosophy and adjust the tone of my comments accordingly - like a good little rhetorician

Can you clarify that for me Brant? I lost you. "I'm beginning to think there is a real disconnect between the morality in Objectivism needed to bridge the gap..." Huh? What?

I'm fully agreed. Biological determinism as source of morality is contradiction in terms since morality as code of values accepted by choice presupposes existence of free will. Besides, evolutionary determinism isn't only explanation of emergent properties of the living organisms. Most probably spontaneous self-organization plays very important role in this process. As J. B. Edelmann and M.J.Denton observed: "Biological self-organization witnessed classically in the folding of a protein or in the formation of the cell membrane—is a fundamentally different means of generating complexity. We agree that self-organizing systems may be fine-tuned by selection and that self-organization may be therefore considered a complementary mechanism to natural selection as a causal agency in the evolution of life. But we argue that if self-organization proves to be a common mechanism for the generation of adaptive order from the molecular to the organismic level, then this will greatly undermine the Darwinian claim that natural selection is the major creative agency in evolution." ("The uniqueness of biological self-organization: challenging the Darwinian paradigm", Published online: 13 December 2006 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006) Determinism is incompatible with life as it's incompatible with mind. I'm going to get in the middle of this "evolution debate" for a second and then back away from it because I don't think I can add much more than I'm going to say now. I don't think anyone was talking about biological determinism when they spoke about evolution. They were talking about the survival of the species and how our morals may change as a consequence of novel biological pressures, not that evolution determines our morals. Or put another way, our morals evolve as we do. This doesn't take rational choice out of the equation - it just means that the choice that is rational may change. I don't see that as deterministic.

I don't understand how an obligation can be imposed "by the nature of reality", and also, how does the law of identity fit in? As indicated by the rest of the sentence (after the colon), Rand is talking about consistency, which, in her view, is a practical implication of the Law of Identity. My take on this approach, to put it briefly, is that Rand viewed "obligation" as a type of rational constraint. In other words, if you claim rights for yourself, you are rationally constrained, as a matter of consistency, to recognize the rights of others. Of course, Rand doesn't argue the point in this passage, but the the nature of rights as reciprocal claims is an important part of her theory, and she was far from alone in holding this view. It's a standard view of rights theory, one that was defended by John Locke and by many other political philosophers. Ghs So in this case would the Law of Identity read something like "human is human" (or even "other is me" speaking on the level of the species) and therefore is similar to the "golden rule"?