imurray

If you keep watching Beck, your brain will atrophy. He said it himself: “I say on the air all the time, 'if you take what I say as gospel, you’re an idiot.’“ Mr. Beck is, after all, "a rodeo clown." I get the point he's making here though. I feel the same way about health care reform. I personally was for reform, but I wouldn't help push it unless congress agreed to be the first to change its plan. I guess I took this comment to be Obama's attempt at empty populist rhetoric, which I don't like in and of itself, but nothing more menacing than that. When I watch Beck I wait for the rubber coated feeding spoon to pop out of my television screen. "Goo goo gaa gaa, mmmmm." Ian

I have to correct the summary for the sake of accuracy: $125k/yr is for married individuals filing a separate return. It's $200k/yr for single individuals and $250k/yr for couples filing a joint return. It's minor to some, but a $75k/yr or $125k/yr difference is a lot to me! Aside from that, the people with the greatest potential for suffering are those individuals and families with household incomes just over 400% of the federal poverty level. We tend to focus on the "wealthy" and the very poor when the truth is the wealthy can probably afford the increase (even if it means changing the way they live) and the very poor will get full compensation, but the person or family in the middle has less room to maneuver financially and won't receive any federal support.

In that essay I made the point that most of the problems relating to Objectivist religiosity have to do with Rand's style rather than with the substance of her philosophy. I still stand by the following passage: Ghs George, I took the time to read the whole article and I enjoyed it very much. I can see why you are admired for you clear and concise style. I must say that I am on my way to agreeing with you, but I've hit a few snags. One of them came today when Peter posted: Now, this explanation he posted may be wrong and, if you're so inclined, please tell me it is (a simple yes or no will do for me and I'll be on my way to do more research). If it is correct, which I currently have no reason to doubt based on Peter's use of what seem to be 'encyclopedic' references and my own understand of Rand, how can one objectively "judge" a person "according to the moral character they have actualized" and "grant" them "personal, individual value and appreciation, in proportion to their virtues?" It would seem that in order for her basic philosophy about the individual in society to be true, it would be necessary to work from a universal code of values. Doesn't her theory rest on the idea that rational people will treat each other morally? Which leads me to question: if indeed people are free and in another sense obligated to judge others according to their own perception of reality, what if a group of rational people reached different judgments about the same people or issues - how would that be resolved by her philosophy? If that situation is allowed for her system, how does it differ from more subjective philosophies? And finally, if rational people can reach different conclusions about reality, that is also to say rational people can hold different values (and by extension different conclusions about who and what is valuable or not valuable in society), how can she be so sure something like laissez faire government or free market capitalism would work as she conceives it? Ian

Peter, Thanks for posting, however, it would be nice if you could distill these long copy and paste pieces down a bit for us. That would actually really help you make your points better as I doubt many people have time to read through all of this and on top of that dig through it to find and make all the relevant connections. Of course, this would take some time on your part that, understandably, you may not have. I wasn't being facetious when I asked for some clarification of your last post (as I'm not being facetious now). I wasn't sure what you wanted us to see and was giving you a chance to clarify yourself before agreeing or attempting a rebuttal. Ian

Peter, I'm not sure this addresses Xray's assertion that friendship, family life, and human relationships are not primary to a rational (and by extension moral) person and the implications of conceptualizing morality in that way. Like Xray, I struggle with this, but I think I am more generous in my assessment of Rand's intentions. Perhaps you can parse this quotation out for us and show us where you think it addresses Xray's comment? I for one would appreciate if you took the time to do that. Ian

Xray and Daniel, Let me help you both out. This is an excerpt from a famous essay by Stanley Fish: "Why No One's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser" (in Doing What Comes Naturally, 1989). It's an elegant essay and, I think, you'll immediately see why your arguments reminded me of it. I think you can see how this, after swapping out a few terms, would work rather nicely with your arguments against Rand. I think it's ironic that the same argument Fish launched against Iser, whose theory revolves around subjectivity and pluralism, has been made against Rand. Switching gears. I'd agree, this definition does imply all kinds of moral codes and values, but I don't think it's correct to conclude that Rand intended it to mean that any code of values is moral and ethical. Seeing as this was on page 13, I think it's more accurate to say that she was simply defining what constitutes morality or ethics - not what makes a moral code of values moral or ethical. Agreed, but this isn't an analogous example. The correct term, of course would be soccer ball, in the context of soccer. However, I could write a book and decide that I'm going to call a soccer ball a "fork" and choose to define it as such. In that case, you'd be wrong to imagine a fork (the kind with tines that you eat with) when you come across the word in my book. It would be confusing, of course, but not wrong. I don't think Rand called for universal, absolute, definitions for words. I could be wrong, but I don't think her theory necessitates that concept. More later, have to go judge a debate!

Very good advice! I do this with Rands use of 'morality' which I take to mean 'rationality' because she uses it in a non-standard way; I take this to mean that if you don't use your head (rationality) you will die when left to you own devices but she calls this 'morality'. I noticed that too. The more I read by Rand, the more I'm convinced that rationality and morality (as she conceives of them) are interchangeable as acting rationality is acting morally as acting morally is acting rationally.

Xray, I disagree. Philosophers do this all the time out of necessity - they just can't go around inventing new words all the time. Here are just a few examples: Kierkegaard's use of "anxiety", "despair", "faith", "absurd", etc.; Heidegger's use of "authentic" and "inauthentic", "equipment", "being", "temporality", etc.; Nietzsche's use of "morality", "genealogy", "power", etc.; Wittgenstein's use of "grammar"; Foucault's use of "archaeology", "archive", "culture", "technology", etc. Not to mention all the other terms commonly used in philosophy: "truth", "reality", "identity", etc. And not to mention all the various translations of these words - as you well know, not all of these words translate easily from one language to another. I understand Rand wrote in English, but perhaps there was a Russian word better suited, but "sacrifice" was the closest word in English? I don't know, but I do know that happens - one example is that most of Foucault's translators retain "lange" and "parole" because there are no suitable English equivalents. Sure there are words like "a priori" that are part of the universal jargon of philosophy, but that's not a good analogy. Really, what separates one philosophy from another are nuanced definition of common terms! If everyone agreed on an absolute definition for each word then we wouldn't have anything to argue about (disputes over what is truth, reality, self, identity, knowledge, time, etc. would all be settled if we all agreed to a universal definition for these words). Words are like tools - you reach for the best one for the job, but sometimes it isn't exactly what you need, so you improvise a little. Within the context of a philosophy the meaning given by the author is the "real" definition, your problem is that you insist on arguing that the author is somehow confused or deliberately trying to confuse others. That's more than likely not the case - most take great pains in defining their terms. You need to use their definitions if you want to understand their philosophy; if not it is YOU who is using the "wrong" definition not them. Also they're called "technical" definitions, not "connotative" definitions since the definitions are usually very specific and constitute the PRIMARY definitions within the context of a particular philosophical treatise. You wouldn't argue that biologists are using "sympathetic" wrong in "sympathetic system" and insist that it must mean something else - would you? My advice is either to use her definition or if you just can't get past it, use a word instead of "sacrifice" when you come across it in her writing - call it "arcoplastiopterice" instead. It doesn't really matter which word you use - it's the meaning that counts and she has defined it as well as one could expect (although the overarching concept itself is not unambiguous - that I'd agree with). In other words, who cares if "sacrifice" is the wrong word? All that matters is the meaning she's clearly assigned to it. Sacrifice, as DEFINED BY RAND, IS trading a higher value for a lower value. That is the correct, technical, definition within the context of her work. You can make an argument that she should have used a different word with a standard definition that fits closer to her meaning, but that's not an argument against her philosophy - only against her choice of words. Practically any guide to writing a technical work (like a thesis) will give you this advice (this is from http://www.cs.purdue.edu/homes/dec/essay.dissertation.html): 1. Each technical term used in a dissertation must be defined either by a reference to a previously published definition (for standard terms with their usual meaning) or by a precise, unambiguous definition that appears before the term is used (for a new term or a standard term used in an unusual way). 2. Each term should be used in one and only one way throughout the dissertation. 3. The easiest way to avoid a long series of definitions is to include a statement: ``the terminology used throughout this document follows that given in [CITATION].'' Then, only define exceptions. Ok, this is frustrating me lol. Sorry for the sharp tone of the email, grammar, and spelling, but I'm firing this off quick. Ian

Indeed it has. Classic case of a false premise is Rand's so-called "definition" of "sacrifice" (= trading a higher for a lower value). This is no definition, but a value judgement. She presents as an "objective" definition what are merely her personal feelings and associations with a term. That is, she confuses connotation and denotation. I doubt she was even aware of the mistake she made here. Xray: I sound like a broken record, but I'd like to once again point out that philosophers often use different meanings for common words - these are not connotative of denotative definitions, but technical. The only real problem occurs when the propriety of a term is violated within the context of the system itself without an acknowledgement.

Thanks. I don't deny their continued relevance, though I believe that, in so far as I understand them, they're mistaken on the central issue of government itself. And, going to back to something George said in another topic, I do think that once the "consent door" is opened, the end is no government -- at least, no government of the traditional territorial monopolist of legitimate force variety. Since Dan is a member of Atlantis II, he has probably seen this before, but others may find it of interest. I submitted it to A2 on 12/04/09: Speaking of first-hand experiences of anarchy, one of the most interesting examples of this is found in Part II of Thomas Paine's "Rights of Man." In Chapter 1, Paine writes: "Government is no farther necessary than to supply the few cases to which society and civilization are not conveniently competent, and instances are not wanting to show, that everything which government can usefully add thereto, has been performed by the common consent of society without government." To buttress his contention that government is a convenience, not a necessity, Paine points out that many American communities during the Revolution functioned quite well without any government: "For upwards of two years from the commencement of the American war, and to a longer period in several of the American States, there were no established forms of government. The old governments had been abolished, and the country was too much occupied in defence, to employ its attention in establishing new governments; yet during this interval, order and harmony were preserved as inviolate as in any country in Europe." The view that government is a convenience, not an absolute necessity, was also expressed by Thomas Jefferson, especially in his numerous references to anarchistic Indian communities. For example: "I am convinced that those societies (as the Indians) which live without government, enjoy in their general mass an infinitely greater degree of happiness than those who live under the European governments." (Letter to Colonel Edward Carrington, January 16, 1787). Jefferson once remarked that anarchy is the ideal social condition, but that it is impractical for larger societies for which a republican form of government serves as second-best, in effect. The position that government is a convenience rather than a necessity was rooted in Locke's observation that a government is needed to remedy certain "inconveniences" that will arise in a state of nature. These radical Lockeans were not anarchists, of course, but their position differs radically from that of Ayn Rand, who is much more of a Hobbesian than a Lockean in her argument for the necessity of government. Ghs Yes, I think I do remember you posting this. Also, I recall something recorded of you a long time ago giving a presentation on that period where you discussed what sounded to me like a no government situation: the colonial legislatures were at a stalemate with the royally appointed governors and nothing or very little got done -- got done in terms of the government doing it. Also, the recent book Indian Givers: How the Indians of the Americas Transformed the by Jack Weatherford goes over, in some detail, the influence of Native American examples of European and American political philosophy. I believe Weatherford might be overstating his case, though I don't doubt having these examples close at hand did provoke some thought and probably served to reinforce some liberal or proto-liberal political ideas in European and in British North American thought. Excellent summary of Locke and Paine, George. That's the kind of thinking that, in my opinion, would have been a nice addition to Dan's article. It actually works to buttress some of his key points. To make myself clear - Dan's article and argument is no less elegant without it. Ian

And this means what? Mere mortals can't aspire to such knowledge and shouldn't bother discussing these things? Nope, just that one might want to start there first rather than sitting around speculating out of their derriere. Mortals have already done a lot of the work - why not try to understand what they've done first and then try to move the discussion forward...?

There are journals that talk about this stuff. On top of that, they're often peer reviewed and written by people who know what the hell they're talking about. Just saying...

Interesting, but I was surprised there was no mention of Paine's "Common Sense" or Locke's "Two Treatises of Government" - two works that help to inform the "why" and to a lesser degree the "how" of American government and that are still relevant to the philosophical discussion.

Your point? The guy gave a speech not unlike many other speeches in American history pointing out what he thinks are flawed ideals, which are themselves historically commonplace...this has been played out over and over again in American history so why should I be shocked? I'd say if this type of rhetoric and debate ceased then that would be something to talk about. Do you ever have your own ideas, Peter? Or do you just quote and summarize?

"In one scene she describes in careful detail the characteristics of passengers, doomed to perish in a violent railroad crash, making it clear that their deaths are warranted, by their ideological errors. (566-568)." She obiously didn't read or understand Crime and Punishment. Ayn Rand is a lot like dear Rodya except she didn't attempt to really live her philosophy. She insulated herself within a close knit inner-circle and never left herself open to feel the cruelty and alienation that a strict adherence to her ideals may have caused, but we'll never know for sure since the way she lived excluded her from being a testament to her own philosophy. Perhaps she would have gone crazy like our friend Friedrich - imagine how crazy he would have been if he had to hock his books or defend his philosophy on the Phil Donahue show!

Self-interested and unsentimental - is that why Don Draper is a cheater and about to lose his wife and family on the show? Viva Objectivism! ;)

I don't think the position is too absurd. If someone doesn't understand (at least intuitively) the way logic works, then they will be unable to recognize when a syllogism is true, or why. In other words, for them, if P then Q would be as "valid" a syllogism as if P then not Q. Of course, this assumes that this is what the ARIans intended in making that claim. Jeffrey S. Jeffrey, I agree with you, but think you've make a subtle distinction in your analysis that is not made in the original. There's a difference between somebody who is unable to recognize a syllogism as valid because they don't understand the rules of deductive logic and a syllogism being "invalid" for somebody who doesn't understand the rules of deductive logic. The former seems rather obvious because the error in or lack of logic rests in the person, the latter seems to imply that the syllogism itself somehow loses its inherent validity to a person who does not understand logic. This is the duty/obligation in relation to moral/immoral argument all over again and I'm beginning to see that Ayn's detractors are rightly confused. Ian

Somebody has a special admirer.

I agree that words should be used carefully and that every attempt should be made to follow the basic rules of precision and propriety; however, many if not most philosophers take some liberty in using words in ways that aren't aligned with their denotative meanings. It doesn't make it wrong per se, but it brings us into the realm of technical jargon where one needs to familiarize oneself with the "special" meanings. I thing George and others have pointed out the more serious problem - Rand seems to occasionally slip between denotative and technical meanings and violates propriety within the context of her own work.

If anyone needs facts for their arguments outside of the forum about Obama being a socialist, I believe this is a good resource. Michael Sorry, can't listen to Beck. Easy rebuttal to 99% of his claims (not just about Obama) Occam's Razor. He's a conspiracy theorist. He studied Freud and Nietzsche and practiced critical theory and those are part of an argument that he's a Socialist? Maybe Rand is too - she read Nietzsche. My whole grad research seminar is... Just don't care for the associative style of arguing.

But she doesn't say anything about dinner. I can't help wondering about her preference for beef Stroganoff, what was it made of? People! Beef Stoganoff is peeeoople!

To which I reply: go and read your: Then consider this: Isn't 2. what Rand is seeking to establish with her various ethical assertions, including the one under discussion? Hence you can't introduce another "rational value hierarchy" ad hoc as a assumption in order to save Rand from absurd consequences of those assertions. That seems to be the upshot of your "two perspectives" argument AFAICS. The situation is basically incoherent, which is unfortunately where you often get to with Rand when you drill down. (I think, for example, of her truly amazing garbling of Antisthenes' famous "horseness" remark in the ITOE, a passage that deserves a mini-essay in itself). I think a more detailed layout of the convolutions of this child-hat passage would be helpful, as there is plenty that people could get wrong, me included, and I will do that when I get a clear moment. Unless anyone else feels like doing it! There is only one rational hierarchy in the example (the mother's is obviously not rational) so I'm not introducing anything or fixing anything. In this example there is only one rational choice, but don't confuse that with Rand being prescriptive. In most other situations there will be more than on rational choice. That's what makes this a good example - imagine if she used an example with numerous rational choices that weren't all as obvious as this one. OK I'm done - choose not to understand this and go back to spinning in circles.

I read and agreed with your post #884. Are you happier now? Haha - you're not the one I'm trying to convince! But thanks for acknowledging it.

Why couldn't he desire to do so without regarding it as a duty? In my opinion Rand's definition is less problematic than yours. Suppose I were to buy a luxury car for $60,000. The $60,000 is a significant value and the car the higher value. That is not a sacrifice in my book. Is anyone even reading my posts? You just keep going around and around in circles. If I'm wrong - show me how. Any reason nobody is taking my argument on?

Hi Merlin You tell me about these supposedly important omissions, of which I am perfectly aware, but it would be helpful if you explained how these impact on the problem. I am of the view that they do not, but you can always put me straight. In fact I get the sense that you agree with me that this example is basically flawed. However where we no doubt differ is that you will probably view this as simply an infelicitous example. Whereas I think it is symptomatic of a fundamental befuddlement. This example is good because there is only ONE OBVIOUS rational/moral choice. I can imagine other examples that would be less extreme, but in all probability there will be more than one rational choice which would make for a confusing example.