Rand's notions of Kant and Hume

[BaalChatzaf]

What is an ought derived from that is not an is?

--Brant

An apriori moral principle not instantiated in the real world.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Xray]

Murphy presented the standard Humean argument that one cannot derive a normative conclusion from two purely descriptive premises in a deductive syllogism.

Example: From the descriptive ("is") premise that each day thousands of animals die in slaughterhouses, one can't derive the normative conclusion that this "ought to" stop.

Sorry about my sloppiness in listing only one descriptive premise.

Correction: From the descriptive ("is") premises that many people eat meat and that each day many animals die in slaughterhouses, one can't derive the normative conclusion that slaughtering animals "ought to" continue (or "ought to" stop).

On various occasions I have attempted to explore some of the legitimate objections mentioned by Xray, but these discussions went nowhere. She seems to think that any reasonable objection to Rand's theory of value somehow proves that values are subjective -- which of course is nonsense -- so every such discussion has hit a philosophical dead end.

George,

The problem in the discussion (leading to possible misunderstadings) could lie in the term "subjective" which per Rand is "the arbitrary, the irrational, the blindly emotional". In case you agree to her "definition" of subjective (which reflects merely her personal associations and is in fact a (dis)value judgement), it would explain you reading into my use of "subjective" something which I don't intend to convey at all.

In case your idea of subjective is the same as Rand's namely, that ""the subjective is the "the arbitrary, the irrational, the blindly emotional", it would explain your negative reaction to propositions stating that values are subjective. For in case the argumentation is based on the major premise that

1) The subjective is the the arbitrary, the irrational, the blindly emotional

ad then the second premise is added:

2) Values are subjective.

one would get the "logical" conclusion

Values are arbitrary irrational, blindly, emotional.

In that case, each time I make the statement: "Values are subjective", you (if you share Rand's view of subjective) would reply: "No, you are wrong, because this would mean values are arbitrary, irational, blindly emotional, (in short whims), and values are not whims."

And I did often have the impression that this was where you were coming from. That you accepted Rand's premise about the subjective as a given.

So to continue the discussion, checking Rand's premise, her idea of subjective, is essential.

Speaking of thinking in essentials, is an interesting post by Neil Parille.

A point and a question:

1. "Thinking in essentials" certainly saves a lot of time reading books.

2. Has anyone ever had a pleasant exchange with an orthodox Objectivist on any issue touching on philosophy? You are constantly accused of "context dropping," "rationalization," etc. James Valliant is worse than the typical Objectivist, but his name calling is characteristic of many orthodox.

Neil,

1.) Thinking in essentials makes it easier to grasp the nucleus of an issue, whether it is in a book or in a discussion. Examining the premise on which an argument is based is an example of thinking in essentials. And only a radical approach will get you at the root. This is the experience I myself have made when my premises were once radically checked by a debate opponent in a discussion on atheism. At that time, I was still a believer, though not a fervent one, for religion never interested me that much. I was actually more an agnostic fence-sitter leaning somewhat toward the 'belief' side.

2.) Discussing with orthodox followers of a philosophy or ideology is discussing with believers, and believers will of course try defend their faith against everything which has the potential of calling the faith into question.

Therefore any pleasant exchange on philosophy will only last as long as the believer feels his own belief is not threatened.

In accusing others of "context dropping" (or having an- "anti-conceptual mentality") the follower mistakenly believes that parroting terms coined by the founder equals proof of anything. It is a classic case of circular reasoning.

As for name calling, it is almost always an indicator that the person at the receiving end has touched on an issue where the name caller does not want to go because it would get him/her in a corner where refuting the other's arguments becomes difficult or even impossible.

But checking premises involves also checking the premises of Objectivism.

A while ago, I wrote on another thread:

I'm well aware that the critics' position is the easier one since they can point out mistakes and erros without having the task to defend a system as a whole.

The one who sits in the trap is the believer in the system. Not the one who e. g. says "I agree with this part of Rand's philosophy but not with others" since this person is not ruled by the doctrine.

But the problem with Objectivism's founder is that she did not allow this. Here's the rub.

NB wrote:

Quote

"Encouraging dogmatism

Ayn always insisted that her philosophy was an integrated whole, that it was entirely self-consistent, and that one could not reasonably pick elements of her philosophy and discard others. In effect, she declared, "It's all or nothing." Now this is a rather curious view, if you think about it. What she was saying, translated into simple English, is: Everything I have to say in the field of philosophy is true, absolutely true, and therefore any departure necessarily leads you into error. Don't try to mix your irrational fantasies with my immutable truths. This insistence turned Ayn Rand's philosophy, for all practical purposes, into dogmatic religion, and many of her followers chose that path."

(NB, complete article posted in # 984 on the "Settling The Debate on Altruism" thread).

Rand condemned "package deals", but isn't her own position here an example of a package deal? "You have to take the whole package, not just parts".

So every person considering Objectivism as a viable philosophy will arrive at some point where there is the forking of the ways for them: if they follow Rand's "all or nothing doctrine", it will turn them into believers, and their believer's position will be that of the defensor fidei. The task of the defensor fidei in a discussion is arduous since he/she can't allow themselves to openly admit weaknesses of the system. One could call it "the believer's trap".

What is an ought derived from that is not an is?

--Brant

An apriori moral principle not instantiated in the real world.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Exactly.

Edited May 30, 2010 by Xray

[Brant Gaede]

What is an ought derived from that is not an is?

--Brant

An apriori moral principle not instantiated in the real world.

Ba'al Chatzaf

While an answer it's not necessarily the only answer. This reads like a tautology. You are simply implying an argument by definition which is a variation of Xray continually repeating herself as if she were simply pointing out the obvious.

--Brant

Edited May 30, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I wonder... according to the "tautology" school of thinking about morality, can the premises that make up the concept and definition of morality--to them--ever be anything but a priori at root, or a tautology on being elaborated?

Inquisitive minds seek... and all that...

Michael

[George H. Smith]

> I have long had disagreements with Rand over the applicability of "value" to [plants]... a plant doesn't act at all in any meaningful sense, and it certainly doesn't act to achieve a goal....we can say that water is of value to a plant in an objective sense, because water is essential to sustaining the life of a plant. But this judgment of a relationship is a specifically human judgment. [GHS]

PC: If she had used the word "end" instead of "value", would you have had a problem? And if so, what word would you use for that to which a plant strives or is built and that to which a consciousness strives or is built?

I'm not sure how I would answer these questions, but I tend to be skeptical of philosophers who offer teleological explanations for non-human biological entities. This is so not because I reject such teleological explanations in principle but because I think this issue falls largely within the province of science, and philosophers should tread carefully when they trespass into that domain.

In any case, I don't think any of this stuff about plants supposedly acting to achieve a goal is even relevant to a biocentric conception of values. It merely confuses the matter and should be eliminated from the basic defense of biocentric values.

Let me illustrate my point with this passage from "The Objectivist Ethics""

"Value" is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. The concept "value" is not a primary; it presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what? It presupposes an entity capable of acting to achieve a goal in the face of an alternative. Where no alternative exists, no goals and no values are possible.

As I have noted before, "that which one acts to gain and/or keep" pertains to subjective values -- subjective not in the sense of unjustified or arbitrary, but subjective in the sense of values that are in fact pursued by a valuing subject. This conception clearly does not apply to plants, but because Rand uses it as a generic definition of "value," rather than as a definition of one type of value -- she is forced into the awkward situation of talking about the acts and goal-directed behavior of plants.

But, as I said, none of this is necessary to defend Rand's biocentric approach to values; indeed, it is counter-productive. In an objective sense, values pertain to things that are good or bad for a living entity, i.e., things that are beneficial or detrimental to the life of an organism. It matters not at all whether or not the organism in question is "capable of acting to achieve a goal in the face of an alternative."

Although this factor is relevant when considering the moral values of human beings, it has nothing to do with the reason why we can speak of "good" and "bad" in relation to plants. Water is good for a plant -- i.e., it is of value to a plant -- because it furthers the life of a plant, even though a plant cannot act to gain and/or keep water. Likewise, extreme cold is bad for a plant, even though a plant can do nothing about the temperature.

Rand is quite correct to assert that "the concept of 'value' is genetically dependent upon and derived from the antecedent concept of "life." This is an important point, but life of some kind is all that is needed to generate the concept of (objective) values, i.e., things that further the life of a living entity. A particular form of life need not exhibit goal-directed behavior in order for the concept of "value" to be applicable to it. All that is required is that it be alive, but when Rand throws in some superfluous requirements about goal-directed behavior, all she really does is to divert attention from what is truly essential to a biocentric conception of values.

The passage quoted above asserts, "Where no alternative exists, no goals and no values are possible." This passage should read, Where no alternative exists, no values are possible" -- with "no goals" deleted. This superfluous and complicating addition, as noted above, is necessitated by Rand's misleading definition of "value." In an objective sense -- which is the only sense in which values apply to plants -- a "value" is simply that which furthers the life of an organism, regardless of whether the organism is capable of acting in a goal directed manner.

As the philosopher Richard Taylor, who also defends a biocentric approach to values, puts it, "The things that nourish and give warmth and enhance life are deemed good, and those that frustrate and threaten life are deemed bad" (Good and Evil, Macmillan, 1970, p. 126). None of this requires goal-directed behavior.

Ghs

[Philip Coates]

> Water is good for a plant -- i.e., it is of value to a plant -- because it furthers the life of a plant, even though a plant cannot act to gain and/or keep water. Likewise, extreme cold is bad for a plant, even though a plant can do nothing about the temperature. [GHS]

But plants can act/display teleology/goal-directed behavior in regards to both water and temperature (also in regard to light, as the suffix -tropism indicates..."heliotropism" in that case). All plants stretch their roots out in the direction of water, often longer or thicker in the direction of damper soil. (I see that every day along a marsh bank where I jog.) Plus many plants drop their leaves in the first frost, can have rolled up leaves in cold climates (pine needles), develop thicker water-bearing bodies that don't dry out in very hot climates (cactus), etc. And the long evolution of plants is teleology in operation. Not within a single lifetime but across millennia.

I don't want to get too picky about exactly how T.O.E. should be worded or belabor too fine a point, but goal-directed action is crucial to her ethics. And thus I think any g.d.a. of simpler organisms is relevant as a base and as an analogy on the principle of study the simple to gain insight into how the compound or complex operates, or emerged from simplicity.

Edited May 30, 2010 by Philip Coates

[George H. Smith]

> Water is good for a plant -- i.e., it is of value to a plant -- because it furthers the life of a plant, even though a plant cannot act to gain and/or keep water. Likewise, extreme cold is bad for a plant, even though a plant can do nothing about the temperature. [GHS]

But plants can act/display teleology/goal-directed behavior in regards to both water and temperature (also in regard to light, as the suffix -tropism indicates..."heliotropism" in that case). All plants stretch their roots out in the direction of water, often longer or thicker in the direction of damper soil. (I see that every day along a marsh bank where I jog.) Plus many plants drop their leaves in the first frost, can have rolled up leaves in cold climates (pine needles), develop thicker water-bearing bodies that don't dry out in very hot climates (cactus), etc. And the long evolution of plants is teleology in operation. Not within a single lifetime but across millennia.

I don't want to get too picky about exactly how T.O.E. should be worded or belabor too fine a point, but goal-directed action is crucial to her ethics. And thus I think any g.d.a. of simpler organisms is relevant as a base and as an analogy on the principle of study the simple to gain insight into how the compound or complex operates, or emerged from simplicity.

Whether the phenomena you mention -- which Rand describes as the "automatic physical functions" of a plant -- are properly characterized as "goal-directed behavior" is open to serious doubt. But, however we resolve this matter, what difference does it make to Rand's central claim that the concept "value" is genetically dependent upon the concept "life?" None at all. Her key argument that "value" pertains only to living entities would remain valid in either case.

Moreover, as I said before, by eliminating this superfluous baggage, we are able to focus on the essential issue without getting bogged down in philosophical biology. It is always a risky matter for a philosopher to link her philosophical views to a particular interpretation of a scientific issue -- for if that interpretation eventually proves untenable it can take the philosophical theory down with it, unless the two types of claims are clearly distinguished.

This was the fate that befell Herbert Spencer, whose later writings on ethics and sociology were interspersed with all kinds of biological details -- especially in regard to his Lamarckian approach to evolution -- that turned out to be wrong in many cases. Spencer understood the difference between philosophy and empirical science, so he insisted that his biological examples were only offered as analogical illustrations; but once the science he used became discredited, many readers no longer took his philosophical theories seriously.

I agree that goal-directed behavior is crucial to Rand's ethics -- a discipline that applies only to rational agents -- but it is not crucial to her metaethics, specifically, her theory of value. As for possible insights about complex living entities that can be gained by the study of simpler organisms, this is not a philosophical matter. It is properly a topic for biology and has no relevance to a biocentric theory of value. Even if we could learn absolutely nothing via this kind of investigation, the essentials of Rand's theory of value would still hold up. What we should avoid is mixing those philosophical essentials with nonessential biological interpretations of life.

Ghs

[rhartford]

I agree that goal-directed behavior is crucial to Rand's ethics -- a discipline that applies only to rational agents -- but it is not crucial to her metaethics, specifically, her theory of value.

In thinking about the facts giving rise to the concept "value," I separate in my mind those conditions that are good for an organism, with no action required by the organism, from those beneficial conditions that the organism's action creates. The former I take to be "a good" for the organism and the latter I take to be "a value" for the organism.

Rand emphasizes that a valuing process involves an organism's action to benefit its life. That which is good for the organism simply provides the necessary context for the organism's successful valuing action. For instance, the presence of water for a plant, "a good"; the development of a robust root system, "a value."

Is it the case that you do not see a need to distinguish between "a good" and "a value?" Or, that my attempt to distinguish them is an error? I find distinguishing between the referents of those two to be valuable.

Edited May 30, 2010 by Robert Hartford

[Xray]

Whether the phenomena you mention -- which Rand describes as the "automatic physical functions" of a plant -- are properly characterized as "goal-directed behavior" is open to serious doubt.

Re the plants, from Ba'al's post elsewhere:

1. Do plant roots seek water? Yes or no?

2. Do heliotropic plants seek sunlight? Yes or no?

to 1. plants do not have purposes. They move their roots (or the roots move) toward water from purely electrochemical causes.

to 2. plants do not seek light in the sense of purposeful movement. Again it is electrochemical causes at work.

Plants do not seek anything anymore than a dropped stone seeks the ground.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Ghs: But, however we resolve this matter, what difference does it make to Rand's central claim that the concept "value" is genetically dependent upon the concept "life?" None at all. Her key argument that "value" pertains only to living entities would remain valid in either case.

But isn't that central claim a bit banal? That "life" is the precondition of all this?

This would be the same as making the "central claim" that without life, no philosophy, and that only living entities can philosophize.

Ghs: Moreover, as I said before, by eliminating this superfluous baggage, we are able to focus on the essential issue without getting bogged down in philosophical biology. It is always a risky matter for a philosopher to link her philosophical views to a particular interpretation of a scientific issue -- for if that interpretation eventually proves untenable it can take the philosophical theory down with it, unless the two types of claims are clearly distinguished.

Good point. Especially in ethics, bolstering one's moral code with arguments from biology can be a very slippery slope.

Edited June 1, 2010 by Xray

[merjet]

Re the plants, from Ba'al's post elsewhere:

1. Do plant roots seek water? Yes or no?

2. Do heliotropic plants seek sunlight? Yes or no?

to 1. plants do not have purposes. They move their roots (or the roots move) toward water from purely electrochemical causes.

to 2. plants do not seek light in the sense of purposeful movement. Again it is electrochemical causes at work.

Plants do not seek anything anymore than a dropped stone seeks the ground.

Ba'al Chatzaf

As much as Xray and Ba'al want to cram words in my mouth, I did not use "seek" to mean it in the manner of a human or even an animal. I will answer like I did then.

Plants do not seek anything anymore than a dropped stone seeks the ground.

seek v.

3. to bend one's efforts toward; aim at; pursue

(source)

Stones don't make efforts; plants do.

Do plant roots act by electrochemical means to obtain water? Yes or no?

Do heliotropic plants act by electrochemical means to obtain sunlight? Yes or no?

Does a stone make an effort to fall to the ground? Yes or no?

Edited June 1, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[Ellen Stuttle]

[....]

As much as Xray and Ba'al want to cram words in my mouth, I did not use "seek" to mean it in the manner of a human or even an animal. I will answer like I did then.

Plants do not seek anything anymore than a dropped stone seeks the ground.

seek v.

3. to bend one's efforts toward; aim at; pursue

(source)

Stones don't make efforts; plants do.

Do plant roots act by electrochemical means to obtain water? Yes or no?

Do heliotropic plants act by electrochemical means to obtain sunlight? Yes or no?

Does a stone make an effort to fall to the ground? Yes or no?

Merlin,

What's your idea of "effort" that you're describing electrochemical processes as "efforts"?

And within your usage, how would you distinguish the electrochemical means by which plants obtain water and sunlight from the electrochemical processes of, for instance, batteries and solar cells, or of solutes in general?

Ellen

[merjet]

What's your idea of "effort" that you're describing electrochemical processes as "efforts"?

And within your usage, how would you distinguish the electrochemical means by which plants obtain water and sunlight from the electrochemical processes of, for instance, batteries and solar cells, or of solutes in general?

1. Metabolism.

2. Plants metabolize; batteries and solar cells do not.

[rhartford]

. . . how would you distinguish the electrochemical means by which plants obtain water and sunlight from the electrochemical processes of, for instance, batteries and solar cells, or of solutes in general?

I know the question was addressed to Merlin, but maybe the following is useful:

Based on my recollections from "The Biological Basis of Teleological Concepts" by Harry Binswanger, plants actions result from the processes of mutation and natural selection. If a given plant's action benefited its life, those actions would be passed to its offspring. The action "by which plants obtain water and sunlight" only exists because of its survival benefit. In that sense the action can be considered "goal-directed." This is not the case for non-living natural electrochemical processes.

(My apology to Binswanger if I am misremembering his work.)

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Merlin,

It's an existent called life, no?

Don't you ever wonder about how people miss this?

I'm serious--not trying to play any put-down games with anyone.

I think the mistake of deducing reality from principles and ignoring what doesn't fit applies equally to top down and bottom up perspectives.

From top-down, we already have many examples in how the history of Objectivism has unfolded (I often call this oversimplification). But from bottom-up, I often see odd attempts, like trying to define life as nothing but chemical and molecular processes--or at least strongly insinuating this.

The idea that life has its own nature--in addition to the nature of the components of organisms--seems to be completely foreign to this kind of thinking. (The popular saying that expresses this is "the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.") Yet anyone can observe growth, death, reproduction, self-generated action, etc. It gets weird when these things get jargonized to fit the theories. Death becomes "system breakdown" and things like that.

I (and I believe you) hold that principles must be arrived at through observation, not reality derived from principles. And I mean on a practice-level, not just saying-it level. Everyone I know of agrees with that statement. Not everyone uses it in the observations they communicate.

I also believe identifying this outlook and practice is critical to arriving at the premises underlying ethics--whether Objectivist ethics or any other.

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

What's your idea of "effort" that you're describing electrochemical processes as "efforts"?

And within your usage, how would you distinguish the electrochemical means by which plants obtain water and sunlight from the electrochemical processes of, for instance, batteries and solar cells, or of solutes in general?

1. Metabolism.

2. Plants metabolize; batteries and solar cells do not.

Repeating the first question substituting "metabolic processes," then:

What's your idea of "effort" that you're describing metabolic processes as "efforts"?

If you're merely using "effort" in the physics sense of:

merriam-webster

"4 : effective force as distinguished from the possible resistance called into action by such a force"

or:

freedictionary

"5. Physics Force applied against inertia."

then you'll end up equivocating if you want to speak of "effort" as pertaining to volitional processes. Or vice versa, you seem to be attributing intention to plants. I'm not seeing the terminology as helpful in making needed distinctions between volitional and non-volitional activity.

Ellen

[Xray]

Plants do not seek anything anymore than a dropped stone seeks the ground.

seek v.

3. to bend one's efforts toward; aim at; pursue

(source)

Stones don't make efforts; plants do.

A plant makes no more efforts than a stone. Neither is capable of effort since they are not volitional entities.

Every living organism requires sustaining nutrients in order to survive during the life cycle. I know of no one who argues against this fact.

But life is no more a "goal" than death. The plant has no say in the matter. Biologically speaking, it's all about energy changing form per nature.

"Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of action." (Rand)

As for the Objectivist position that "life is en end in itself" - life is no more an end in itself than e.g. a galaxy is an end in itself. All what one can observe is a constant transformation of matter, whether it is of living entities, or of non-living systems which are continually being transformed as well.

I think we can all agree that the biological 'functioning' of a non-volitional plant has nothing to to do with the ethical choices of a volitional human being.

Edited June 3, 2010 by Xray

[Dragonfly]

What kind of actions do we find? We can distinguish actions by non-living things from actions by living things. Binswanger is correct in stating that we can assign a purpose to actions of living things [i don't know if he does use that particular term, but I gather from Robert's post that that is what he means]. Those living things are machines that evolved. Such machines are not meaningless contraptions that just blink some lights or move some parts, they're machines with a purpose, namely to preserve the genes that form the basis for those machines (that's why those machines evolved in the first place). Part of that program is to ensure survival long enough to produce new machines that can take over the task, so therefore an important part of those machines is to ensure its own survival long enough, and the action that result can be called purposeful actions. In that regard metabolism isn't the essential part that determines whether we can speak of a purpose, a goal (although it may be of course necessary to help surviving those machines), the essential part is the procreation of the genes, that is what creates purpose (in contrast to a stone or a snow flake, that don't have a purpose). Even a Binswanger finds an acorn now and then.

Now the machines that we call plants contain a relatively simple and fixed program, as do the simplest animals. But in general the program in animals becomes more extensive thanks to the possibility of locomotion, using sensors for acquiring more information about their environment. Whereas plants are severely limited in their options - they're rooted in place and with a few exceptions can only move by growing in certain directions -, animals can change their environment and thereby choosing a more favorable environment, which creates many more possibilities. Higher (i.e. more complex) animals do have brains that can store memories, which enables learning from past experiences, and human beings go still a step further by being able to make models of reality, so that different possible actions can be compared in advance without testing them in practice.

So to be able to speak of a purpose or a goal, the essential differentiation is between non-living things and living things, but whether you define value to include automatic actions such as those of plants, or only for systems that depend on a more or less intelligent system that can choose between many different options by making an abstract projection of the results, is just a matter of convention.

[Philip Coates]

Well-stated, DF.

Edited June 3, 2010 by Philip Coates

[rhartford]

Binswanger is correct in stating that we can assign a purpose to actions of living things [i don't know if he does use that particular term, but I gather from Robert's post that that is what he means].

Binswanger shows that plants exhibit automatic goal-directed action and the higher animals exhibit purposeful goal-directed action. "Purpose" is not an attribute of all living things. This description of his book should clarify his view somewhat:

[The book] presents a theory to explain the meaning of goal-directed action—i.e., of teleology. As Dr. Binswanger puts it; "I will argue that . . . this new definition (of goal-directed action) justifies the classification of all levels of living action—whether purposeful or automatic—as goal-directed . . . In short, I will show that men, animals and plants act for the sake of obtaining certain ends, but rocks, rivers and machines do not."

A more complete description and table of contents is available here

[BaalChatzaf]

Binswanger is correct in stating that we can assign a purpose to actions of living things [i don't know if he does use that particular term, but I gather from Robert's post that that is what he means].

Binswanger shows that plants exhibit automatic goal-directed action and the higher animals exhibit purposeful goal-directed action. "Purpose" is not an attribute of all living things. This description of his book should clarify his view somewhat:

[The book] presents a theory to explain the meaning of goal-directed action—i.e., of teleology. As Dr. Binswanger puts it; "I will argue that . . . this new definition (of goal-directed action) justifies the classification of all levels of living action—whether purposeful or automatic—as goal-directed . . . In short, I will show that men, animals and plants act for the sake of obtaining certain ends, but rocks, rivers and machines do not."

A more complete description and table of contents is available here

Consider a steam engine centrifugal governor. While it does not act consciously, it act in order that the speed of the engine is limited so it does not shake itself apart. Negative feed back control is what it is whether once calls it conscious control or not. The hallmark of purpose or goal directness is closed loop homeostasis.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Ellen Stuttle]

Now the machines that we call plants contain a relatively simple and fixed program, as do the simplest animals. But in general the program in animals becomes more extensive thanks to the possibility of locomotion, using sensors for acquiring more information about their environment. Whereas plants are severely limited in their options - they're rooted in place and with a few exceptions can only move by growing in certain directions -, animals can change their environment and thereby choosing a more favorable environment, which creates many more possibilities. Higher (i.e. more complex) animals do have brains that can store memories, which enables learning from past experiences, and human beings go still a step further by being able to make models of reality, so that different possible actions can be compared in advance without testing them in practice.

Except you believe, right, that choices are illusions, since at any given time there's only one physically possible future, for humans as much as for thermostats? Which in turn are as determined in their "choice" as a rock's course rolling down hill?

Thus your use of "purpose" as applied to animate entities only ends up robbing the term of its connotative meaning whereby humans think of themselves as having purposes. Exactly the end result which I'm not seeing Merlin as avoiding with his use of "effort."

If the laws of mechanics are the same for all entities, animate or inanimate, and among animate entities for all such entities from the earliest cells to humans, then I don't see the legitimate use of terms implying intention anywhere in the panorama. (Nor do I see any legitimate scope for epistemology -- i.e., how does one find out what the nature of reality is? You dismiss this quandary as false, but I have yet to see you explain how you can arrive at knowledge without a non-necessitated ability to test your beliefs.)

Ellen

[merjet]

duplicate deleted

Edited June 4, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[merjet]

What's your idea of "effort" that you're describing metabolic processes as "efforts"?

effort - the using of energy to get something done (from my Webster's dictionary and here)

Roots seeking water and plants seeking light are hardly controversial. See here for example.

I'm not seeing the terminology as helpful in making needed distinctions between volitional and non-volitional activity.

Please tell me why I need to when I have said nothing about "volitional plants."

A plant makes no more efforts than a stone. Neither is capable of effort since they are not volitional entities.

Another arbitrary assertion by the Word Nazi. Please tell us. In an ant capable of effort? Is an ant volitional?

Every living organism requires sustaining nutrients in order to survive during the life cycle. I know of no one who argues against this fact.

What's your point, if you even have one? I did not argue against it.

Edited June 4, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[George H. Smith]

I agree that goal-directed behavior is crucial to Rand's ethics -- a discipline that applies only to rational agents -- but it is not crucial to her metaethics, specifically, her theory of value.

In thinking about the facts giving rise to the concept "value," I separate in my mind those conditions that are good for an organism, with no action required by the organism, from those beneficial conditions that the organism's action creates. The former I take to be "a good" for the organism and the latter I take to be "a value" for the organism.

Rand emphasizes that a valuing process involves an organism's action to benefit its life. That which is good for the organism simply provides the necessary context for the organism's successful valuing action. For instance, the presence of water for a plant, "a good"; the development of a robust root system, "a value."

Is it the case that you do not see a need to distinguish between "a good" and "a value?" Or, that my attempt to distinguish them is an error? I find distinguishing between the referents of those two to be valuable.

I'm afraid I don't see any difference between calling something "good" for a plant and calling something "a value" for a plant. "Good" and "bad" are simply basic value terms.

Since I posted #355 , there has been considerable disagreement over whether plants exhibit goal-directed behavior. As I said before, I'm undecided on this matter, but the controversy illustrates my original point, namely, that this issue is not essential to Rand's biocentric approach to values. Unless I missed something, no one has yet explained why the concept of "value," as applied to a plant, depends in the least on whether or not a plant can "act" to gain and/or keep anything. Rand's "basic alternative" of life or death still applies to a plant in either case. Things can be "good" or "bad" for a plant in either case, and this is all that is really needed to ground values in life.

Ghs

[Guyau]

Ellen and Merlin,

I would suggest that structuring causes are added to efficient (including triggering) causes to get all the way from the gravitational falling of amyloplasts onto the endoplasmic reticulum within the columella cells in the tip of the root, all the way to the response of the root of the gravitropic plant upon being uprooted.

—As in the section Organic Determinism of “Volitional Synapses” in Obj V2N4 and, subsequently, on the web (e.g.).

Ellen, I want to apologize for being short and unfair to you in an exchange on another site about a year ago. I was irritated at getting distracted from something very difficult I was working on at that time. I always enjoy your intelligence and information. Sorry. –Stephen

Edited June 4, 2010 by Stephen Boydstun