Rand's notions of Kant and Hume


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Chiming in here with my reading of Rand's solution to the is/ought problem.

That fish in water analogy can become, well, a bit of a red herring - to say nothing of forever debating the value of sustenance to a person.

Rand was doubtless speaking of higher things. In her identification of Man, she saw the "capability" of rationality as paramount.

Add to this the capability (potentiality is the only other word I can come up with) of independence, of integrity, honesty, justice, productiveness, and of pride.

Given that capability as the 'IS', she simply derived the 'OUGHT', (or 'should', or 'must') as one's self-obligation to strive for these virtues.

Sort of, if you've got it, flaunt it; or, perhaps, use it, or lose it.

She dismisses the so-called dichotomy as though it never existed - and I think she's right.

Tony

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Meanwhile, since you deny that values can be objective, try drinking acid instead of water (or conventional beverages) for the next day and see how that works out for you.

You couldn't have chosen a more illustrative example to demonstrate the subjectivity of values.

Suppose a person intends to commit suicide or a murder, swallowing (or administering) acid would be of value to them. For it has the objective effect desired to achieve a (subjectively chosen) goal. Bottom line: acid has no "objective" value as such, since something only becomes "a value" in respect to a desired goal.

The last sentence is also Rand's position: "The concept value...presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what?" (VOS, 15)

How anyone could participate on an O'ist list for as long as you have and not know this defies understanding.

I have addressed this issue many times here at OL. See also my post # 361 on the Moral Certainty thread where I replied to your wrong assumption that I don't know what Rand said about values. My personal favorite is the 'value-seeking plant'. ;)

Xray: You are confusing objective characteristics with objective value.

GHS: You are confusing your own peculiar and often erratic linguistic preferences with a philosophical argument.

Whether the argument is 'philosopical' is secondary. I think we can agree that every argument in a discussion is to be checked for the validity and soundness of its premises.

GHS: For Rand, the term "objective" expresses the factual relationship between a goal and a particular means that will achieve that goal. In the case of food, its objective characteristics are precisely what make it an objective value for the goal of survival. Food is an objective value because it will, in fact, further the goal of survival. This is not a matter of subjective preference or whim. If you want to survive, then you must -- or ought to, or should -- eat food.

You must eat food if you want to live. "Ought/should" are not sufficient to indicate the biological necessity. If you don't eat food to sustain your organism, you will die. There is no choice involved in that you can choose to survive without ingesting nutrients.

GHS: This reasoning exemplifies the Aristotelian "practical syllogism," to wit:

Fact: I want to survive.

Fact: Food is essential to my survival.

Normative conclusion: Therefore, I ought to eat food.

See above. "Ought to" is not enough. For you have no choice but to eat food if you want to survive. The if-then connection of biological necessity is as clear as it can get.

GHS: I posited the acid example on the assumption that you want to live. The very fact that you haven't killed yourself exhibits what economists call a "demonstrated preference" for this option.

Which means that no thing has value in itself unless and until some volitional entity attributes value to it. Do you agree?

Edited by Xray
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Rand's entire ethics is predicated on the basic choice to live.

Precisely so! And, that is why her ethics is incomplete.

For a valid ethics, the following question must be answered in the affirmative. Is there a cognitive principle from which one can derive the foundational principle of the ethical system? I answer in the affirmative in “Objectivity and the Proof of Egoism,” The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, Spring 2007, pp. 291-303. To present that proof, I reformulate the novelist’s formulation of the foundational principle, “the choice to live,” into the philosopher’s formulation, “holding one’s own life as the motive and goal of one’s action.”

I argue that logical consistency with the nature of the evolved human mind requires “Holding one’s own life as the motive and goal of one’s action” (p. 293) Not to do so leads one to hold mutually contradictory premises, a logical contradiction. I would like to see that argument countered or strengthened.

Only that killing oneself is an "egoistic" act as well. In that case, the person's self-interest is to free self from the burden of living.

In response to recent posts on “objective value,” consider the following fact:

A person chooses to pursue something he or she thinks will benefit his or her life.

The above statement does not say if the pursued goal is, in fact, beneficial or harmful to the person.

Objectivity refers to chosen cognitive processes that best lead to true conclusions.

If the person used objective cognitive processes, it is likely the goal chosen will, in fact, benefit his or her life. As shorthand, the chosen goal can then labeled as an “objective value” because it was chosen based on objective cognitive processes and was chosen for the goal of benefit to the person’s life.

If the person was, in fact, correct – then the chosen goal was in fact a “value.”

If the person made an error, even though objective processes were used – then the chosen goal was, in fact, a “disvalue.”

If a person chooses a goal, without using objective cognitive processes or with a purpose other than benefit to life (“benefit” here includes the possibility of ending life if it has become unbearable), the chosen goal can be labeled a “subjective value.”

If you find error in anything above, please use your own words and arguments, not Rand’s. The above is not intended to be consistent with Rand, it is intended to be consistent with truth.

You wrote:

"If the person used objective cognitive processes, it is likely the goal chosen will, in fact, benefit his or her life. As shorthand, the chosen goal can then labeled as an “objective value” because it was chosen based on objective cognitive processes and was chosen for the goal of benefit to the person’s life.

If the person was, in fact, correct – then the chosen goal was in fact a “value.”

If the person made an error, even though objective processes were used – then the chosen goal was, in fact, a “disvalue.”" (Robert Hartford).

Suppose a person wants to cook spaghetti.

The person makes an error by putting the spaghetti in cold insted of boiling water.

But this does not make the chosen goal (spaghetti properly cooked) a disvalue.

Edited by Xray
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Suppose a person wants to cook spaghetti.

The person makes an error by putting the spaghetti in cold insted of boiling water.

But this does not make the chosen goal (spaghetti properly cooked) a disvalue.

Real Objectivists don't eat spaghetti.

--Brant

they only eat breakfast in Galt's Gultch once a year.

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GHS: For Rand, the term "objective" expresses the factual relationship between a goal and a particular means that will achieve that goal. In the case of food, its objective characteristics are precisely what make it an objective value for the goal of survival. Food is an objective value because it will, in fact, further the goal of survival. This is not a matter of subjective preference or whim. If you want to survive, then you must -- or ought to, or should -- eat food.

Xray: You must eat food if you want to live. "Ought/should" are not sufficient to indicate the biological necessity. If you don't eat food to sustain your organism, you will die. There is no choice involved in that you can choose to survive without ingesting nutrients.

I was making a point about objective values. You of course ignored the point, as you often do, and repeated your nonsense about "must" versus "ought." Then, to top things off, you made an incoherent remark about having no choice but to take an action if that action is necessary to achieve a chosen goal. Hence, if I want to get a lot of money within the next day, and if the only way I can get the money is by robbing a bank, then of course I have no choice except to rob a bank. Yeah, right. Makes perfect sense to me.

I don't give a damn whether you prefer "must" over "ought" in some circumstances and the reverse in other circumstances. For all I care, you can fart once when you mean "ought" and twice when you mean "must," and then explain that two farts don't mean the same thing as one fart. In your world, they probably don't. If someone put a laboratory rat in the middle of your brain, it wouldn't be able to find its way out.

What a gigantic waste of time it is to discuss ideas with you.

Ghs

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What a gigantic waste of time it is to discuss ideas with you.

George,

Having fun?

:)

Michael

I ought to stop responding to Xray's posts. Either that or I must stop responding to them. I need to give this matter some thought and decide which I ought to do. Or must do. <_<

Ghs

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What a gigantic waste of time it is to discuss ideas with you.

George,

Having fun?

smile.gif

Michael

I ought to stop responding to Xray's posts. Either that or I must stop responding to them. I need to give this matter some thought and decide which I ought to do. Or must do. dry.gif

Ghs

Don't forget you should. Maybe a 12-step plan? Remember "the sanction of the victim"!

--Brant

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In response to recent posts on “objective value,” consider the following fact:

A person chooses to pursue something he or she thinks will benefit his or her life.

The above statement does not say if the pursued goal is, in fact, beneficial or harmful to the person.

Objectivity refers to chosen cognitive processes that best lead to true conclusions.

If the person used objective cognitive processes, it is likely the goal chosen will, in fact, benefit his or her life. As shorthand, the chosen goal can then labeled as an “objective value” because it was chosen based on objective cognitive processes and was chosen for the goal of benefit to the person’s life.

If the person was, in fact, correct – then the chosen goal was in fact a “value.”

If the person made an error, even though objective processes were used – then the chosen goal was, in fact, a “disvalue.”

If a person chooses a goal, without using objective cognitive processes or with a purpose other than benefit to life (“benefit” here includes the possibility of ending life if it has become unbearable), the chosen goal can be labeled a “subjective value.”

If you find error in anything above, please use your own words and arguments, not Rand’s. The above is not intended to be consistent with Rand, it is intended to be consistent with truth.

Although I think the meaning is clear in the context of the post, the sentence above maybe should have been written:

If the person made an error in choice of goal (such that it was harmful to the person's life), even though objective processes were used – then the chosen goal was, in fact, a “disvalue.”

(Xray (in her post #328) read that sentence as "If the person made an error in means to achieve the chosen of goal, . . . ")

Edited by Robert Hartford
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I ought to stop responding to Xray's posts. Either that or I must stop responding to them. I need to give this matter some thought and decide which I ought to do. Or must do. dry.gif

Ghs

Don't forget you should. Maybe a 12-step plan? Remember "the sanction of the victim"!

--Brant

As my father used to say whenever I repeatedly did something stupid, "Even a dog knows enough to get out of the rain."

On occasion Xray stumbles on a legitimate point (the cliché about a broken clock comes to mind here); most recently, her skepticism about applying the the concept "value" to plants raises a number of interesting questions. I have long had disagreements with Rand over the applicability of "value" to such cases, but I use such disagreements to advance my own thinking about this subject, not to dance on Rand's grave while chanting, "You were wrong! You were wrong!" As I have noted many times before, we can frequently learn more from the errors of a genius than we can from the truths of a lesser mind.

On various occasions I have attempted to explore some of the legitimate objections mentioned by Xray, but these discussions went nowhere. She seems to think that any reasonable objection to Rand's theory of value somehow proves that values are subjective -- which of course is nonsense -- so every such discussion has hit a philosophical dead end.

Ghs

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I have long had disagreements with Rand over the applicability of "value" to [plants] . . .

For over thirty years I have thought that Rand's use of the term "value" was frequently equivocal. Sometimes she seems to indicate "a value" is that beneficial end toward which an organism's goal directed action is aimed. At other times she uses the term "value" to mean a human conclusion as to the benefit of pursuing some end, i.e. a value principle or a value judgment. The first meaning is applicable to plants, the second not.

Please know that many of us enjoy and benefit from your posts. Some of us, more than others, are open to ideas that differ from our own preconceived notions.

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> For over thirty years I have thought that Rand's use of the term "value" was frequently equivocal. Sometimes she seems to indicate "a value" is that beneficial end toward which an organism's goal directed action is aimed. At other times she uses the term "value" to mean a human conclusion as to the benefit of pursuing some end [Robert H]

Robert (and possibly George?), I wouldn't consider that either an equivocation - or any other mistake in writing or thinking:

1.When Rand writes about a value as that which a living creature seeks to gain or keep, she simply means an end. 2. When she writes of that which is of known value to a man, she is speaking of an end which is consciously held.

All the second is is a form or application of the wider meaning: It is not a different or opposed meaning. Or a hidden switch.

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GHS: For Rand, the term "objective" expresses the factual relationship between a goal and a particular means that will achieve that goal. In the case of food, its objective characteristics are precisely what make it an objective value for the goal of survival. Food is an objective value because it will, in fact, further the goal of survival. This is not a matter of subjective preference or whim. If you want to survive, then you must -- or ought to, or should -- eat food.

Xray: You must eat food if you want to live. "Ought/should" are not sufficient to indicate the biological necessity. If you don't eat food to sustain your organism, you will die. There is no choice involved in that you can choose to survive without ingesting nutrients.

I was making a point about objective values. You of course ignored the point, as you often do, and repeated your nonsense about "must" versus "ought." Then, to top things off, you made an incoherent remark about having no choice but to take an action if that action is necessary to achieve a chosen goal. Hence, if I want to get a lot of money within the next day, and if the only way I can get the money is by robbing a bank, then of course I have no choice except to rob a bank. Yeah, right. Makes perfect sense to me.

I did not ignore the point at all, since we both have already discussed this elsewhere. What you call "objective value" is "instrumental" value. It was basically the same as with your "good knife" example on the "Moral Certainty" thread.

But these "instrumental values" are actually the objective means valued by an individual who uses those means to achieve a personal goal.

For example, boiling hot water is valued as a suitable means by an individual who wants to cook with it, but not valued for taking a shower.

In correctly rejecting the intrinsic theory that the good is inherent in certain things or actions as such, Rand pushed the door wide open for questions like:

"Do you agree that no thing has value in itself unless and until some volitional entity attributes value to it?" I asked you this question (phrased a bit differently) in # 327 but have got no answer yet.

It is an either-or situation: Either no thing has value unless and until some volitional entity attributes value to it; or value is inherent in the thing itself.

If value is not inherent in the thing itself, then the thing itself can't be of objective value either; it only becomes a value after a volitional entity attributes value to it in step with a personal goal.

Suppose X is of the opinion that capitalism is based on "objective values" - but to Y, whose goal is a society not based on capitalism, the values on which capitalism rests can't be objective since they don't meet the criteria "suitable means to achieve a particular goal".

(I'm merely applying your idea of "objective (instrumental) value" to a concrete example).

GHS: For Rand, the term "objective" expresses the factual relationship between a goal and a particular means that will achieve that goal. In the case of food, its objective characteristics are precisely what make it an objective value for the goal of survival. Food is an objective value because it will, in fact, further the goal of survival.

In that case, if one calls "objective value" that which furthers a chosen goal, i.e. that which is suited to purpose to achieve a chosen end, then e. g. a killer's well-functioning gun or a dictator's well-functioning censorship are also "objective values".

GHS: ... and repeated your nonsense about "must" versus "ought."

George, you seem to be quite short-tempered. Please hold your horses a bit - I'm afraid they're going to bolt. ;)

I'm not the only person with whom you have had exchanges over the is-ought topic. It would interest me very much what arguments your debate opponent professor Jeffrie Murphy had in his critique of Rand's approach to the is-ought problem.

In # 931 on the 'Altruism' thread, you wrote:

GHS: He [Murphy] then launched into a critique of Rand's approach to the Is-Ought problem and her approach to definitions, claiming that "man" could be defined as a being who uses urinals.

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=6799&st=920&p=95923entry95923

What were Murphy's main points of critique regarding Rand approach to the Is-Ought problem? What were your main counter points?

I think this would be of interest to all of us who have followed the discussion.

GHS: Then, to top things off, you made an incoherent remark about having no choice but to take an action if that action is necessary to achieve a chosen goal. Hence, if I want to get a lot of money within the next day, and if the only way I can get the money is by robbing a bank, then of course I have no choice except to rob a bank. Yeah, right. Makes perfect sense to me.

The issue was biological necessity, where an "ought to" just doesn't apply.

The biological program sustaining life exists independently of a volitional entiy attributing value to it. A newborn for example does not have the "chosen goal" to live and yet it breathes.

Strictly speaking, since Rand said that where no alternative exists, no values are possible, the air a newborn breathes could not be called a value. Since the newborn can't "choose" to live, it has no alternative.

Rand then tried to escape the contradiction by coining the term "automatic value", but this collapses her own premise of alternative being the precondition of value. ("Where no alternative exists, no values are possible").

GHS: I don't give a damn whether you prefer "must" over "ought" in some circumstances and the reverse in other circumstances. For all I care, you can fart once when you mean "ought" and twice when you mean "must," and then explain that two farts don't mean the same thing as one fart. In your world, they probably don't.

You call that refuting an argument? :D

I hope you did not blow that four-lettter word in Prof Murphy's face as well when you were having the Is-Ought debate. :o

GHS: If someone put a laboratory rat in the middle of your brain, it wouldn't be able to find its way out.

I have more the impression that you currently don't find out of the maze created by the many contradictions in Rand's writings.

What makes ethics discussions so difficult: since they always touch the core of what we believe in most, of what we value most, we tend to react in the way you have described so impressively in your book Why Atheism, p. 62:

"The value-laden nature of personal beliefs helps to explain why we tend to be more jealous of our personal bliefs than our abstract knowledge claims, often defending them with more vigor and passion. When someone criticizes my personal beliefs, (i.e., my "beliefs in"), she is doing far more than challenging my abstract claim to know, for this knowledge claim constitues the foundation of my most important value commitments.

And because my sense of who I am is inextricably linked to my fundamental values, I will defend the knowledge on which these values depend with great passion, as if I were fighting for my very existence - as indeed, in a psychological sense, I am." (George H. Smith)

I'll ask you a direct question, George: do you believe in any such thing as "objective morality"?

View PostXray, on 28 May 2010 - 12:57 PM, said:

Suppose a person wants to cook spaghetti.

The person makes an error by putting the spaghetti in cold insted of boiling water.

But this does not make the chosen goal (spaghetti properly cooked) a disvalue.

Brant Gaede:

Real Objectivists don't eat spaghetti.

--Brant

they only eat breakfast in Galt's Gultch once a year.

LOL - good one!

The Brave New World depicted in Galt's Gulch is a bit sterile, isn't it? Frankly, is there anyone here who would want to live that type of "Pleasantville"? In case GHS should answer in the affirmative, I'll eat my paperback copy of Atlas Shrugged! :)

P. S.: I just read GHS's latest post:

On various occasions I have attempted to explore some of the legitimate objections mentioned by Xray, but these discussions went nowhere. She seems to think that any reasonable objection to Rand's theory of value somehow proves that values are subjective -- which of course is nonsense -- so every such discussion has hit a philosophical dead end.

George,

The problem in the discussion (leading to possible misunderstadings) could lie in the term "subjective" which per Rand is "the arbitrary, the irrational, the blindly emotional". In case you agree to her "definition" of subjective (which reflects merely her personal associations and is in fact a (dis)value judgement), it would explain you reading into my use of "subjective" something which I don't intend to convey at all.

Edited by Xray
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The Brave New World depicted in Galt's Gulch is a bit sterile, isn't it? Frankly, is there anyone here who would want to live that type of "Pleasantville"? In case GHS answers in the affirmative, I'll eat my paperback copy of Atlas Shrugged! :)

Be sure someone films it.

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Well, Xray, you asked George if he believed in "objective morality." I do! I do!

The problem is it always gets subjectively corrupted to some extent. This is because objective morality is passive. Throw in a real dynamic human being and things tend to go off the rails.

Such morality is passive because it appertains to man the idea and is a human invention like man's rights. The objectification of morality goes hand in hand with the objectification of rights for they are intertwined in objective law and the philosophy of Objectivism generally.

If you want to claim that your subjective philosophy is the true and right philosophy you are merely claiming a different objective truth. If you are running to truth as the right thing to do you are running to objective truth, never mind the redundancy. Same, same for morality.

--Brant

xraying Xray

Edited by Brant Gaede
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> For over thirty years I have thought that Rand's use of the term "value" was frequently equivocal. Sometimes she seems to indicate "a value" is that beneficial end toward which an organism's goal directed action is aimed. At other times she uses the term "value" to mean a human conclusion as to the benefit of pursuing some end [Robert H]

Robert (and possibly George?), I wouldn't consider that either an equivocation - or any other mistake in writing or thinking:

1.When Rand writes about a value as that which a living creature seeks to gain or keep, she simply means an end. 2. When she writes of that which is of known value to a man, she is speaking of an end which is consciously held.

All the second is is a form or application of the wider meaning: It is not a different or opposed meaning. Or a hidden switch.

I know that Rand distinguishes between "goal directed" and "purposive" behavior (see her footnote on p. 16 in VOS), but that still doesn't clear up the problem. Consider her definition of "value" as "that which one acts to gain and/or keep," and her statement that the concept value "presupposes an entity capable of acting to achieve a goal in the face of an alternative" (VOS, 15).

The problem here is that a plant doesn't act at all in any meaningful sense, and it certainly doesn't act to achieve a goal. This terminology applies only to purposeful behavior.

Of course, we can say that water is of value to a plant in an objective sense, because water is essential to sustaining the life of a plant. But this judgment of a relationship is a specifically human judgment. A plant does not value water (in a subjective sense), nor does it "act" to achieve the water that we deem a value (in an objective sense).

I am not firmly settled on this issue one way or another, but neither I am satisfied with Rand's basic approach. A fuller and more satisfactory defense of her biocentric theory of value can be found in Liberty and Nature: An Aristotelian Defense of Liberal Order (Open Court, 1991), by the Neo-Objectivist philosophers Doug Rasmussen and Doug Den Uyl, who rely on Allan Gotthelf's treatment of "final causality." In their lengthy section on "The Is-Ought Problem," the two Dougs write:

If the foregoing account of teleology is correct, then the world of fact is not totally devoid of values. There is a biocentric basis for values. Values exist in the sense that there is an end or function that a living thing has in virtue of its nature, and this end or function is the source of all other ends or functions (values) the living thing might have. Now a living thing's acts of valuations are said to be good if they satisfy the needs of a living being, namely, if they allow it to actualize its potentialities, but when these acts are chosen, when there is an agent who chooses these acts, then they are morally good. Moral goods, however, will be discussed later. For now, we see that if there are natural ends, and if their attainment is understood as a process of actualizing potentialities, goodness can be defined in terms of this process of a living thing actualiziing its potentialities. We will discuss this 'definition' of goodness shortly, but we must first consider another version of the is-ought problem. This problem concerns what it is, if anything, that makes the natural end of a human being obligatory.

Unfortunately, this passage exhibits some of the same problems that we find in Rand's treatment. What does it mean, for example, to speak of a plant's "acts of valuations," in contrast to the conscious acts of valuation by a rational agent?

Ghs

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A point and a question:

1. "Thinking in essentials" certainly saves a lot of time reading books.

2. Has anyone ever had a pleasant exchange with an orthodox Objectivist on any issue touching on philosophy? You are constantly accused of "context dropping," "rationalization," etc. James Valliant is worse than the typical Objectivist, but his name calling is characteristic of many orthodox.

-Neil Parille

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> I have long had disagreements with Rand over the applicability of "value" to [plants]... a plant doesn't act at all in any meaningful sense, and it certainly doesn't act to achieve a goal....we can say that water is of value to a plant in an objective sense, because water is essential to sustaining the life of a plant. But this judgment of a relationship is a specifically human judgment. [GHS]

If she had used the word "end" instead of "value", would you have had a problem? And if so, what word would you use for that to which a plant strives or is built and that to which a consciousness strives or is built?

To express her viewpoint, she needed a word, the closest? word in English for that to which something or someone is moving or striving, whether consciously or not. She needed to identify a common denominator which links [the teleology of] all living things and contrasts it with inanimate objects. A common denominator broader than the issue of consciously purposive, but which includes it.

Edited by Philip Coates
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>1. "Thinking in essentials" certainly saves a lot of time reading books. 2. Has anyone ever had a pleasant exchange with an orthodox Objectivist on any issue touching on philosophy? You are constantly accused of "context dropping," "rationalization," etc. James Valliant is worse than the typical Objectivist, but his name calling is characteristic of many orthodox.

Neil, I'm not quite sure what your point is on #1. Are you saying it is invalid to think in essentials?

On #2, I wouldn't call it name-calling if someone says an argument is dropping context, anymore than I would say Aristotle was name-calling when he first identified a whole host of logical fallacies.

Over the years I've seen and personally experienced just as much name-calling, psychologizing, moral condemnation from TAS types as well as ARI types, especially on the web and discussion lists.

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In # 931 on the 'Altruism' thread, you wrote:

GHS: He [Murphy] then launched into a critique of Rand's approach to the Is-Ought problem and her approach to definitions, claiming that "man" could be defined as a being who uses urinals.

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=6799&st=920&p=95923entry95923

What were Murphy's main points of critique regarding Rand approach to the Is-Ought problem? What were your main counter points?

I think this would be of interest to all of us who have followed the discussion.

Murphy presented the standard Humean argument that one cannot derive a normative conclusion from two purely descriptive premises in a deductive syllogism

I responded that, given the nature of a deductive syllogism, Hume's argument is correct but basically irrelevant to ethics. I pointed out that there are ways of "deriving" reasonable conclusions other than via a deductive syllogism. I then launched into a fairly detailed analysis of Aristotle's "practical syllogism," relying heavily on the treatment by Georg Henrik von Wright in The Varieties of Goodness and, to a lesser extent, that by Nicholas Rescher in Introduction to Value Theory.

Ghs

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In # 931 on the 'Altruism' thread, you wrote:

GHS: He [Murphy] then launched into a critique of Rand's approach to the Is-Ought problem and her approach to definitions, claiming that "man" could be defined as a being who uses urinals.

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=6799&st=920&p=95923entry95923

What were Murphy's main points of critique regarding Rand approach to the Is-Ought problem? What were your main counter points?

I think this would be of interest to all of us who have followed the discussion.

Murphy presented the standard Humean argument that one cannot derive a normative conclusion from two purely descriptive premises in a deductive syllogism

I responded that, given the nature of a deductive syllogism, Hume's argument is correct but basically irrelevant to ethics. I pointed out that there are ways of "deriving" reasonable conclusions other than via a deductive syllogism. I then launched into a fairly detailed analysis of Aristotle's "practical syllogism," relying heavily on the treatment by Georg Henrik von Wright in The Varieties of Goodness and, to a lesser extent, that by Nicholas Rescher in Introduction to Value Theory.

Ghs

Of relevance to the above points are the following remarks from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. (I think I quoted this passage during the debate, but I'm not certain.)

Our account of [ethics] will be adequate if it achieves such clarity as the subject-matter allows; for the same degree of precision is not to be expected in all discussions....[W]e must be satisfied with a broad outline of the truth; that is, in arguing about what is for the most part so from premises which are for the most true we must be content to draw conclusions that are similarly qualified....t is a mark of the trained mind never to expect more precision in the treatment of any subject than the nature of that subject permits....

Ghs

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On occasion Xray stumbles on a legitimate point (the cliché about a broken clock comes to mind here); most recently, her skepticism about applying the the concept "value" to plants raises a number of interesting questions. I have long had disagreements with Rand over the applicability of "value" to such cases, but I use such disagreements to advance my own thinking about this subject, not to dance on Rand's grave while chanting, "You were wrong! You were wrong!" As I have noted many times before, we can frequently learn more from the errors of a genius than we can from the truths of a lesser mind.

On various occasions I have attempted to explore some of the legitimate objections mentioned by Xray, but these discussions went nowhere. She seems to think that any reasonable objection to Rand's theory of value somehow proves that values are subjective -- which of course is nonsense -- so every such discussion has hit a philosophical dead end.

George,

This is proof that you are smarter than I am.

It took me 3 times the number of posts you made to come to the identical conclusion.

(I still believe Xray has a peanut gallery that makes merry at all this, though.)

Michael

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George,

This is proof that you are smarter than I am.

It took me 3 times the number of posts you made to come to the identical conclusion.

Michael

I have a much better proof than that.

Major premise: I am smarter than everyone else.

Minor premise: You fall within the class of "everyone else."

Therefore, I am smarter than you.

My logic, as usual, is unassailable. :rolleyes:

Ghs

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Murphy presented the standard Humean argument that one cannot derive a normative conclusion from two purely descriptive premises in a deductive syllogism.

Example: From the descriptive ("is") premise that each day thousands of animals die in slaughterhouses, one can't derive the normative conclusion that this "ought to" stop.

What about you? Do you believe that an "ought" can be derived from "is" at all? If yes, how? Can you illustrate with an example?

GHS: I responded that, given the nature of a deductive syllogism, Hume's argument is correct but basically irrelevant to ethics. I pointed out that there are ways of "deriving" reasonable conclusions other than via a deductive syllogism.

But isn't there a big difference between a reasonable conclusion and an "ought to"?

Why is Hume's argument irrelevant to ethics? Can you give an example of a "reasonable" 'ought to' conclusion which is not based on at least one premise which is already normative?

GHS: I have a much better proof than that.

Major premise: I am smarter than everyone else.

Minor premise: You fall within the class of "everyone else."

Therefore, I am smarter than you.

My logic, as usual, is unassailable. :rolleyes:

LOL - good one! We know about the "fallacious" certainty those syllogisms can lead to, don't we.

The key issue is checking the premises.

I think this is at least one point where you, MSK and I can agree on. And Rand would have agreed too. ;)

Edited by Xray
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