Rand's notions of Kant and Hume

[dan2100]

Where Kant differs from Aristotelians is in his insistence that actions taken to achieve one's own happiness are a matter of prudence rather than morality. Although Aristotelians also distinguished between moral and prudential actions, they drew a different line between the two categories, and (like Rand) they maintained that happiness is the ultimate purpose of ethics.

George,

Did Aristotelians really distinguish between moral and prudential actions? For Arisotle, phronêsis (aka prudence) was a virtue.

Yeah, I thought so too. Also, wasn't prudence considered the chief cardinal virtue by later thinkers heavily influenced by Aristotle, such as Aquinas?

[Robert Campbell]

I'm not dismissing it sight unseen, but I think if you are going to sort of vaguely say 'her ethics is incomplete' you're going to need to bring at lot more persuasion into a post before a reader might want to follow up and investigate more. Robert H, readers here don't have general access to pieces in JARS. It's subscription-based and most libraries don't carry it.

Phil C and Robert H,

There's an easy solution to this problem.

The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies copyright agreement includes explicit permission to authors to post their articles online. They just have to wait 6 months after publication in the journal.

That's why I've linked (in my "Corner") to PDFs of several of my old articles.

Robert C

[George H. Smith]

Where Kant differs from Aristotelians is in his insistence that actions taken to achieve one's own happiness are a matter of prudence rather than morality. Although Aristotelians also distinguished between moral and prudential actions, they drew a different line between the two categories, and (like Rand) they maintained that happiness is the ultimate purpose of ethics.

George,

Did Aristotelians really distinguish between moral and prudential actions? For Arisotle, phronêsis (aka prudence) was a virtue.

This is a complicated issue, one that hinges on the possibility of morally indifferent actions.

Prudence, which was traditionally regarded as one of the four cardinal virtues, is the acquired habit of practical wisdom. It is the ability to apply general rules of conduct to particular situations.

Now, if all purposeful human actions have moral significance, then all prudential actions will have moral significance, so the "prudential" and the "moral" will simply refer to two different aspects of the same action. The term "moral" will mean that the action conforms to an abstract norm, while the term "prudential" will mean that the actor has successfully applied this norm to a particular concrete situation, with all its contingent variables.

Although Thomas Aquinas conceded that some actions can be morally indifferent when considered in the abstract, he also maintained that every human act actually performed by a definite individual -- i.e., (in his words) "every human act that proceeds from deliberate reason" -- is either morally good or morally bad. In this view, as I noted above, the class of prudential actions will be the same as the class of morally good actions.

Aquinas's younger contemporary Duns Scotus disagreed with this position, maintaining that some deliberate actions are morally indifferent. The Wiki article on "Indifferent Act" summarizes this difference as follows:

Both the Thomists and Scotists will declare that, to be morally good, an act must be in conformity with the exigencies and dignity of our rational nature. But the question is, what is to be reckoned as conformable to the exigencies and dignity of our rational nature? According to the Scotists, the deliberate act of a rational being, to be morally good, must be referred to a positively good end. Hence those acts in which the agent adverts to no end, and which have for their object nothing that is either conformable to our rational nature, nor yet contrary to it, such as eating, drinking, taking recreation, and the like, cannot be accounted morally good. Since, however, these discover no deviation from the moral norm, they cannot be characterized as evil, and so therefore, it is said, must be considered as indifferent.

According to the opinion of Thomas Aquinas, a common one among theologians, it is not necessary, in order to be morally good, that an act should be referred to a positively good end. It is enough that the end is seen to be not evil, and that in the performance of the act the bounds set by right reason be not transgressed. Thus the acts of eating, drinking, taking recreation, and the like, while, in the abstract, they are neither conformable nor contrary to our rational nature, in the concrete, by reason of the circumstance of their being done in the manner and the measure prescribed by reason, become fully in accord with our rational nature, and hence morally good. It will be observed from the foregoing that the Thomists hold as morally good the acts which the Scotists maintain to be only morally indifferent.

The Scotist position -- one originally defended by the Stoics -- leaves open the possibility that some prudential acts are not morally significant. The theory of morally indifferent actions, known as adiaphora , would later play a major role in arguments over religious toleration.

Ghs

[Robert Campbell]

The Scotist position -- one originally defended by the Stoics -- leaves open the possibility that some prudential acts are not morally significant. The theory of morally indifferent actions, known as adiaphora, would later play a major role in arguments over religious toleration.

George,

Did the Scotists go the whole way with the Stoics on this?

The Stoics believed that, in the sphere of value, only Virtue was morally good (and Vice was morally evil). Everything else was on a distinct and lower plane, of "preferred" and "dispreferred" "indifferents." But a truly wise or virtuous person wouldn't merely recognize Virtue as the only genuinely good thing; he or she would also exercise highly refined and accurate phronêsis with regard to the "indifferents."

Robert Campbell

[George H. Smith]

The Scotist position -- one originally defended by the Stoics -- leaves open the possibility that some prudential acts are not morally significant. The theory of morally indifferent actions, known as adiaphora, would later play a major role in arguments over religious toleration.

George,

Did the Scotists go the whole way with the Stoics on this?

I don't know enough about the history of Scotism to answer this.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

Where Kant differs from Aristotelians is in his insistence that actions taken to achieve one's own happiness are a matter of prudence rather than morality. Although Aristotelians also distinguished between moral and prudential actions, they drew a different line between the two categories, and (like Rand) they maintained that happiness is the ultimate purpose of ethics.

George,

Did Aristotelians really distinguish between moral and prudential actions? For Arisotle, phronêsis (aka prudence) was a virtue.

Yeah, I thought so too. Also, wasn't prudence considered the chief cardinal virtue by later thinkers heavily influenced by Aristotle, such as Aquinas?

I reread Aristotle's discussion of prudence in the Nicomachean Ethics, much of which appears in Book Six. It is clear that my original statement was mistaken, at least in regard to Aristotle himself. He does not distinguish between moral actions and prudential actions, even if many later Aristotelians did. The virtue of prudence is what makes moral actions possible in particular situations. The following is a summary of Aristotle’s views. (Quotations are from the Penguin Classics edition, trans. J.A.K. Thompson, rev. Hugh Tredennick.)

Prudence, for Aristotle, is one of the five intellectual virtues (i.e., modes of thought by which truth is acquired). It is a good habit of the practical intellect that makes it a more efficient instrument of knowledge. Aristotle contrasts intellectual virtues with moral virtues, or character habits. Intellectual virtues can be taught, whereas moral virtues can be acquired only through repeated practice. Prudence gives us a type of knowledge that is "reasoned, and capable of action with regard to things that are good or bad for man."

Unlike the other intellectual virtues, prudence is directly relevant to the pursuit of happiness, because it "is concerned with acts that are just and admirable and good for man." Moral virtue "ensures the correctness of the end at which we aim, and prudence that of the means towards it." “Thus it is evident that one cannot be prudent without being good.”

Aristotle contrasts the prudent man with a man who is merely clever. To be clever is to be able to carry out the "actions conducive to our proposed aim, and of achieving that aim," regardless of what that aim may be. Although the prudent man will also be clever, it is possible for cleverness to be used for bad purposes.

Prudence teaches us how to apply the principles of right reason to concrete situations. This virtue is essential to leading a good life because moral agents “are compelled at every step to think out for themselves what the circumstances demand.”

Ethics, considered as an abstract discipline, can tell us what the good is in general terms; it can tell us which goals are desirable, but it cannot tell us how those goals can be furthered in every particular case. Concrete choices have many contingent variables, and prudence, by employing the “golden mean,” helps us to avoid making rash and self-destructive choices.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

I can relate to philosophy when it deals with ethical and political questions. I really don't get detailed examinations of metaphysics and epistemology. If reality and reason with a little explication are good enough for scientists I don't need more of that for myself. A is A plus man (reason). The real details are in just what logic and reason and the scientific method are, but the nature of concepts? The problem of universals? If it was valuable for Rand to say ideas are in your head and concrete reality is out there why is it valuable to search out the details of details as if they were sub-atomic particles? Someone please tell me about that; I'm really curious.

--Brant

[Philip Coates]

> Although Thomas Aquinas conceded that some actions can be morally indifferent when considered in the abstract, he also maintained that every human act actually performed by a definite individual -- i.e., (in his words) "every human act that proceeds from deliberate reason" -- is either morally good or morally bad...The Scotist position -- one originally defended by the Stoics -- leaves open the possibility that some prudential acts are not morally significant. The theory of morally indifferent actions, known as adiaphora , would later play a major role in arguments over religious toleration. [GHS, #303]

You can make a connection between the Aquinas intrinsicist mistake and the mistake made here by Leonard Peikoff in "Fact and Value"==> "Since every fact bears on the choice to live, every truth necessarily entails a value-judgment...every fact of reality which we discover has, directly or indirectly, an implication for man’s self-preservation and thus for his proper course of action. In relation to the goal of staying alive, the fact demands specific kinds of actions and prohibits others."

(F&V is the worst thing Leonard ever wrote - directly contradicting a lot of what he said in Understanding Objectivism.)

You can refute both Aquinas and Peikoff here with a simple counter-example that I think immediately occurred to me when I first read those sentences in F&V ==>

What about deciding whether to eat soft-boiled eggs or hard-boiled this morning? Or even more trivially, to choose a blue towel or a green towel to go to the beach? Or still more trivially, I step one inch to the right and trample blade of grass number 12 instead of blade of grass number 11 an inch to the other side?

Is the first set of alternatives more moral [Aquinas]? Or does the second set have an implication for my self-preservation [Peikoff]? I better be more careful about my choice of colors or about blades of grass like a Hindu, lest I suffer damnation. Mephistopheles is lurking. Scramble the egg, scramble the soul.

Edited May 25, 2010 by Philip Coates

[Philip Coates]

> I really don't get detailed examinations of metaphysics and epistemology. If reality and reason with a little explication are good enough for scientists I don't need more of that...the nature of concepts? The problem of universals? [brant]

You probably don't personally: People today with a commonsense businessman's or scientist's implicit metaphysics and epistemology and who think clearly don't need to study it to live happy lives and to reason properly. It's the domain of those who have a special interest. Maybe they want to counter bad ideas in those areas or correct mistakes because, across a culture bad fundamental ideas can damage it, can undercut or misdirect other intellectual trends.

But on the other hand, in some ways studying those branches can sometimes indirectly sharpen your thinking. My knowing the difference between intrinsicism, subjectivism, and objectivism makes it more likely I'd see the big picture relationship between a religious worldview, that of Aquinas and a mistake of Peikoff's [see post #308] which has grotesquely damaged the appeal and consistency of Objectivism and misled, damaged, and confused a generation of students.

Edited May 25, 2010 by Philip Coates

[Philip Coates]

> The theory of morally indifferent actions, known as adiaphora , would later play a major role in arguments over religious toleration [GHS]

And, of course, Peikoff's view that no action is morally (or for survival, which tends to amount to the same thing) indifferent, has played a major role in the debate with the "tolerationist" wing of Objectivism.

[Brant Gaede]

> The theory of morally indifferent actions, known as adiaphora , would later play a major role in arguments over religious toleration [GHS]

And, of course, Peikoff's view that no action is morally (or for survival, which tends to amount to the same thing) indifferent, has played a major role in the debate with the "tolerationist" wing of Objectivism.

This may be true but it doesn't mean that your personal choices are necessarily anyone else's business. They may or may not be. Consider Peikoff's admonition circa +40 years ago that anyone even thinking about purchasing Branden's BPO should take a hike. Daddy talking down to children was all it was. Rand's "Witch Doctor" only he wasn't advising her only acting as her hatchet man.

--Brant

Edited May 25, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[George H. Smith]

> Although Thomas Aquinas conceded that some actions can be morally indifferent when considered in the abstract, he also maintained that every human act actually performed by a definite individual -- i.e., (in his words) "every human act that proceeds from deliberate reason" -- is either morally good or morally bad...The Scotist position -- one originally defended by the Stoics -- leaves open the possibility that some prudential acts are not morally significant. The theory of morally indifferent actions, known as adiaphora , would later play a major role in arguments over religious toleration. [GHS, #303]

You can refute both Aquinas and Peikoff here with a simple counter-example that I think immediately occurred to me when I first read those sentences in F&V ==>

What about deciding whether to eat soft-boiled eggs or hard-boiled this morning? Or even more trivially, to choose a blue towel or a green towel to go to the beach? Or still more trivially, I step one inch to the right and trample blade of grass number 12 instead of blade of grass number 11 an inch to the other side?

Is the first set of alternatives more moral [Aquinas]? Or does the second set have an implication for my self-preservation [Peikoff]? I better be more careful about my choice of colors or about blades of grass like a Hindu, lest I suffer damnation. Mephistopheles is lurking. Scramble the egg, scramble the soul.

If I were a strict Aristotelian or a Thomist, I would reply as follows:

We first need to distinguish between two meanings of "moral." (1) Moral" can be contrasted with "nonmoral," or (2) "moral" can be contrasted with "immoral."

In saying that every purposeful human action is "moral," we are referring to meaning #1. We mean that all distinctively human acts, because they result from deliberation and choice, are the responsibility of the acting agent and so may be judged "good" or "bad," depending on a number of factors (the end of the action, the motive for taking it, particular circumstances, etc.).

To say this, however, does not mean that one of (say) two alternatives is "moral" in sense #2, while the other is relatively "immoral." In Right and Reason, a standard text on Thomistic ethics by Fr. Austin Fagothey, we read:

The opposite of moral is properly unmoral or nonmoral, terms which indicate that the act has no moral significance at all, that it is simply unrelated to morals....Since the word immoral means morally bad, it indicates an act that has a definite moral quality (a bad one). When clearly opposed to immoral, the term moral means morally good. Thus moral and unmoral are contradictories, for everything either has or has not some reference to morals; moral and immoral are contraries, as marking the extremes of good and bad within the field of morals while excluding the morally neutral and irrelevant.

In calling the judgments moral and immoral "contraries," Fagothey means that both judgments cannot be true of the same action (at the same time and in the same respect), but both judgments might be false or inapplicable, as is the case with alternatives that are "morally neutral and irrelevant."

Let us now apply this reasoning to the choice between soft-boiled and hard-boiled eggs. This is a moral (as opposed to nonmoral) choice because we are responsible for it, but in this case neither choice is bad, so either choice is morally permissible. The alternatives per se are morally indifferent -- i.e., neither is more or less "moral" or "immoral" than the other -- but the very act of choosing places the act within the category of moral behavior, in contrast to nonmoral behavior. In so categorizing the choice, we mean that it is subject to the judgments "good" and "bad," and we render precisely this kind of judgment when we say that that both alternatives are equally good. This is so because both alternatives will achieve a good end, i.e., the satisfaction of hunger.

In short, as indicated by Fagothey, to render a moral (versus nonmoral) judgment does not necessarily mean that we will judge one alternative (relatively) moral and the other (relatively) immoral. Instead, a moral (versus nonmoral) judgment may declare that the alternatives are indifferent in the latter respect.

Such would be my argument if I were a strict Aristotelian or a Thomist. I suspect Peikoff would give a similar argument.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

As I have mentioned before, for decades (going back to the early 1970s), I have collected and read Thomistic works on philosophy, especially in epistemology and ethics. One book that I especially recommend is by the Thomistic philosopher Vernon J. Bourke, Ethics: A Textbook In Moral Philosophy (Macmillan, 1951}.

The following passage from the opening of Chapter 1 ("The Nature of Ethics") will indicate why I find this book, and the Aristotelian/Thomistic approach generally, so appealing:

All human beings desire to be happy. This basic and natural urge for happiness is deep-rooted in the being of every man. Without it, man would have no good reason for doing anything. It is the original stimulus for all human action....

Each man's moral problems, throughout life on this earth [bourke is a Catholic, remember], is to select and do the kind of actions which are conducive to true happiness. This is a problem for every individual person who reaches any degree of maturity. Every man must face, and answer for himself, the question: "What should I be doing with my life?" He may be assisted in doing the right things by various external agencies: by advantages of origin, environment, and training, by the impact of societal laws and popular opinion, by the advice and example of relatives and associates. Ethical and religious instruction are other extrinsic sources of such help. In the final analysis, however, the living of a good life depends on personal thinking, choosing and acting.

It is essential to grasp this point right at the beginning of this study: successful human living cannot be predetermined for the individual person by any kind of science or philosophy. Certainly, it is not the work of ethics to establish a rigid and fixed pattern of individual actions which man must perform mechanically and necessarily, in order to achieve personal happiness. Every human being is a distinct person, living under contingent circumstances peculiar to himself. In ethics, we consider man in relation to his moral problems but always with a view to reaching rational conclusions of some universality. Moral rules must be general and universal; moral actions are individual, concrete events.

Ethics may be defined as the systematic study of human actions from the point of view of their rightness or wrongness as a means for the achievement of ultimate happiness. Moral philosophy is merely another name for ethics. The material object (what is considered) of ethics is human action. The formal object (how, or from what point of view the consideration is made) is the quality of rightness or wrongness....For the present, we will take right action to be that which should be done, and wrong action to mean that which should be avoided, to achieve happiness (pp. 3-4).

Of course, every Thomistic text will have theological elements, but it is a great virtue of such texts that they clearly distinguish the natural, purely Aristotelian aspects of ethics from supernatural components that were added by Thomas Aquinas. The detailed analyses of moral deliberation that one will find in these texts is nothing short of remarkable.

Ghs

[Philip Coates]

Subject: Facts, Values, Ises and Oughts

> the choice between soft-boiled and hard-boiled eggs...neither choice is bad, so either choice is morally permissible...is subject to the judgments "good" and "bad," and we render precisely this kind of judgment when we say that that both alternatives are equally good...I suspect Peikoff would give a similar argument. [GHS, #312]

George, I don't want to beat this to death but the above would make be valid and that may be what Aquinas (but I doubt Peikoff - see below) meant, but it's not what the meaning of the following phrases indicates:

i) [Aquinas as per GHS]--> " 'every human act that proceeds from deliberate reason' -- is either morally good or morally bad". Unless that last phrase was your paraphrase and you mis-spoke?

ii) [Peikoff]--> "every fact of reality which we discover has, directly or indirectly, an implication for man’s self-preservation and thus for his proper course of action. In relation to the goal of staying alive, the fact demands specific kinds of actions and prohibits others."

Peikoff states it in another way: "Every 'is' implies an 'ought'." That's simply wrong: A lot of facts don't imply -any- oughts. A lot of alternatives don't even require a moment's thought and can be handled on automatic. The facts that there are alternative in walking one inch to one side on the grass as I described or of towel color have -no- implication for man's self-preservation, there are no "ought" statements that follow in any normal, non-geeky meaning of the term "ought" statement.

But he extends the above statements further, making it more and more clear what he means [all quotes below from "Fact and Value"] ==>

1. "Justice—being an aspect of the principle that every cognition demands an evaluation—requires moral judgment of men and their works across-the-board, with no areas of life excepted or exempted."

2. And then: "Just as every “is” implies an “ought,” so every identification of an idea’s truth or falsehood implies a moral evaluation of the idea and of its advocates."

3. Then he talks about: "inherently dishonest ideas—e.g., Nazism, Communism, non-objective art, non-Aristotelian logic, egalitarianism, nihilism, the pragmatist cult of compromise, the Shirley MacLaine types".

4. And then a step further: "The originators, leaders and intellectual spokesmen of all such movements are necessarily evaders on a major scale."

5. And later with Kant as an example: "To anyone capable of understanding Kant’s ideas, the first thing to say about them is: “false.” But implicit in the all-embracing war on reality they represent is a second verdict: “wicked.” The cause of such ideas has to be methodical, lifelong intellectual dishonesty; the effect, when they are injected into the cultural mainstream, has to be mass death. There can be no greater evasion than the open, total rejection of reality undertaken as a lifetime crusade."

Why all this? This all springs from what Peikoff means by the way Peikoff means his -false- view that "Every 'is' implies an 'ought'." Peikoff brought all this up because he wants to try to deduce that David Kelley has sundered 'is' from 'ought' and thus abandoned ethics at its root. Peikoff wants to say every idea can be evaluated morally, as well as its holders for holding a 'bad' (or 'good') idea. And he wants to condemn as bad Objectivists and weak-kneed "tolerationists" those who (he claims) fail to do so, think it's okay to speak at a libertarian function, etc.

,,,,,

> it doesn't mean that your personal choices are necessarily anyone else's business. They may or may not be. Consider Peikoff's admonition circa +40 years ago that anyone even thinking about purchasing Branden's BPO should take a hike. Daddy talking down to children [brant, #311]

Brant, you may have misunderstood my post. I was not agreeing with Peikoff's attack on 'tolerationists'. My view is the *exact opposite* of the second sentence here by Peikoff: "Honest errors of knowledge are possible. But such errors are not nearly so common as some people wish to think, especially in the field of philosophy."

In fact, honest errors are far more common than most people think. Especially in a field as complex, abstract, and historically confused as philosophy. [Philip Coates, 5/25/10]

Edited May 25, 2010 by Philip Coates

[dan2100]

Brant, you may have misunderstood my post. I was not agreeing with Peikoff's attack on 'tolerationists'. My view is the *exact opposite* of the second sentence here by Peikoff: "Honest errors of knowledge are possible. But such errors are not nearly so common as some people wish to think, especially in the field of philosophy."

In fact, honest errors are far more common than most people think. Especially in a field as complex, abstract, and historically confused as philosophy. [Philip Coates, 5/25/10]

How do you know here? Not being sarcastic. I'm just curious on how one would find out what's more prevalent.

[Philip Coates]

There's no theoretical way. It's living your life and observing what people struggle with. (Being a teacher helps a bit, too.)

Most of one's knowledge about people comes from a lifetime of observing them.

[Xray]

It astonishes me that you are unable to understand what Rand means here. None of this applies to a fish, unless you think a fish can make the choice to live and needs "principles of action" to implement its choice.

Don't lose focus of what the discussion was about. Rand stated that a fish "ought to" live in water, and you yourself admitted in post # 193 verbatim that her example of fish was "pretty dumb". ITA with this assessment of yours; we are on the same page here, so why not take it from there and proceed?

Xray: But I'm afraid all the meanings of "ought to" can't be applied to a fish without sounding absurd.

GHS:

Wrong again. One of the definitions of "ought" is: "Used to indicate probability or likelihood: She ought to finish by next week. (American Heritage)."

In this context, it makes perfect sense to say "The salmon ought to be swimming upstream to spawn this time of year." We say things like this all the time, e.g., "It ought to rain today."

In case you missed it, I already adressed this use of "ought" in post # 183:

Xray:

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/ought

1. Used to indicate obligation or duty: You ought to work harder than that.

2. Used to indicate advisability or prudence: You ought to wear a raincoat.

3. Used to indicate desirability: You ought to have been there; it was great fun.

4. Used to indicate probability or likelihood: She ought to finish by next week.

(The variants 3 and 4 can be neglected here since the issue is about 1 and 2)

So the variants 3 and 4 had already been eliminated because they were irrelevant to the discusssion.

But for the sake of clarity and precisness, I'll rephrase my post:

"But I'm afraid the meanings of "ought to" listed in 1, 2, 3, can't be applied to a fish without sounding absurd.

As for # 4: indicating probability/likelihood. Since Rand did not have probability/likelihood in mind when she spoke that a fish "ought to" live in water (for she was certain), this variant can be neglected in the discussion."

This "ought to" ;) to clear up any misunderstanding.

Imo the key issue is to examine whether the claim by moralists who derive an "ought" to from an "is" (using nature as example) has a leg to stand on.

From my # 183 post:

"Imo Rand's attempt to derive an "ought" from an "is" using nature as example is not convincing.

For example, she says a fish "ought to" live in water if it is to survive. But this is no case of "ought to" - for the fish must live in water if it is to survive. Saying a fish "ought to" live in water makes as little sense as saying humans "ought to" breathe for survival. Again, it is: they must breathe if they are to survive. There exists no "ought to" from "is" where survival in nature is concerned.

Imo Rand's trying to use biology to justify her moral code has failed here since it rests on the wrong premise of an "ought to" built into every form of life. " (Xray)

Can you give me one single convincing example where an "is" in nature will lead to an "ought"?

GHS: As for the tax authorities, I would have no doubt what was meant regardless of which terms they used. I don't think anyone would have this problem, except you.

Only that no tax authority would tell people that they "ought to" pay their taxes. The authorities would have problems if they did. For moral obligation does not imply legal obligation.

Xray: The adj. "moral" is from L. moralis "proper behavior of a person in society". http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?l=m&p=31

Can you name any so-called "moral/immoral" action which is not linked to norms of a society or group?

GHS:

The etymology of a word often has little or no relevance to its current meaning. "Bonfire" originally referred to a fire made of bones, so I suppose you would insist that a bonfire that uses wood is not really a "bonfire."

Purely etymological interpretations can of course be misleading, but this does not imply that one is to disregard etymology completely, especially in cases of a term like "moral", where the etymology (unlike in the bonfire example) does not contradict its current meaning at all.

GHS: Again, simply consult one of your beloved dictionaries. A standard definition of "moral" is: "Of or concerned with the judgment of the goodness or badness of human action and character" (American Heritage.) This says nothing about a social context.

There is no need to expliticitly state in a dictionary article what is obvious anyway: that we are always in a social context "qua man" as social animal.

GHS: On a desert island, a Randian ethical code would say that one should plan long-range for one's survival and not delude oneself into thinking that a rescue ship will happen along any day when there is no evidence to support this belief.

Frankly, who would sit there on the desert isand, thirsty, with an empty stomach (not to mention the fear of wild animals!) and do nothing because he/she thinks the rescue ship will happen along? A person that out of touch with reality is mentally impaired, but not "unethical".

GHS: On a desert island as in society, actions that promote one's long-range interests would be good actions, and actions that hinder or harm one's long-range interests would be bad actions. And because such choices would be directly relevant to one's fundamental value on a desert island -- namely, survival -- they are properly termed moral choices.

Suppose a person chooses as fundamental value non-existence over existence, and decides to promote his/her long-range interests by ending his/her life, then per your argumententation, this choice could also be called "moral".

GHS: There are no essential differences here between a solitary context and a social context. Moral choices -- i.e., choices that significantly affect our fundamental values -- will occur in both situations. Some actions will further our survival and happiness, and some will not, and we need a "code of values" to act as a guide when making such choices. Such is the nature of an egoistic ethics of the kind that Rand defended.

Since our fundamental values are different, person X's moral code of values may not apply to person Y if Y does not happen to share it.

I have exchanged views with some Big O's who think choosing between two flavors of ice-cream is a moral question. I simply cannot agree with this view of things.

Name one moral philosopher, O'ist or otherwise, who ever claimed that choosing between two flavors of ice-cream is a moral question.

Maybe Ba'al was having this discussion with a "Peikovian" who believes no action is morally indifferent? ;)

P. Coates: And, of course, Peikoff's view that no action is morally (or for survival, which tends to amount to the same thing) indifferent, has played a major role in the debate with the "tolerationist" wing of Objectivism.

On a desert island one can take actions that are more or less conducive to one's happiness, so such actions are clearly relevant to any moral theory that regards happiness as the purpose of ethics. As Francis Hutcheson (whom I mentioned earlier) put it, "moral philosophy" teaches us "the art of living well" -- and "the importance of the matter requires habit and continual exercise." One can practice the art of living well, relatively speaking, on a desert island as well as in society.

How does a moral theory regarding happiness as the purpose of ethics deal with the fact that people's ideas of what makes them happy can vehemently clash with the ideas of others and lead to conflict? If an individual's happiness is the criterion, what consequences does this have for a claim that there exists any such thing as "objective moral values"?

Imagine a bullfighter and an animal rights activist discussing their moral values. Whose moral values are "objective"?

Peikoff states it in another way: "Every 'is' implies an 'ought'." That's simply wrong:

Imo it is not simply wrong, but totally absurd.

PC: A lot of facts don't imply -any- oughts. A lot of alternatives don't even require a moment's thought and can be handled on automatic. The facts that there are alternative in walking one inch to one side on the grass as I described or of towel color have -no- implication for man's self-preservation, there are no "ought" statements that follow in any normal, non-geeky meaning of the term "ought" statement.

Also, where nature is concerned, one can't derive an "ought" from an "is" at all.

Those who think one can, feel free to provide examples to back up your claim with evidence.

Edited May 27, 2010 by Xray

[BaalChatzaf]

Maybe Ba'al was having this discussion with a "Peikovian" who believes no action is morally indifferent? ;)

P. Coates: And, of course, Peikoff's view that no action is morally (or for survival, which tends to amount to the same thing) indifferent, has played a major role in the debate with the "tolerationist" wing of Objectivism.

Exactly.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[George H. Smith]

It astonishes me that you are unable to understand what Rand means here. None of this applies to a fish, unless you think a fish can make the choice to live and needs "principles of action" to implement its choice.

Don't lose focus of what the discussion was about. Rand stated that a fish "ought to" live in water, and you yourself admitted in post # 193 verbatim that her example of fish was "pretty dumb". ITA with this assessment of yours; we are on the same page here, so why not take it from there and proceed?

Rand made a careless error during a Q&A session, one that she did not repeat in her published writings on ethics. As I said in the comment that you mentioned:

"I agree that Rand's example of fish is pretty dumb. But you won't find this kind of blunder in "The Objectivist Ethics.""

If you want to crucify Rand for misspeaking on a single occasion, be my guest, but I have no interest in joining your revelry. I have made careless errors in verbal Q&A sessions as well -- many of them. I'm sure you never make such errors, but I lack your infallibility, so I'm not disposed to make a federal case out of a single incident.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

GHS: As for the tax authorities, I would have no doubt what was meant regardless of which terms they used. I don't think anyone would have this problem, except you.

Xray: Only that no tax authority would tell people that they "ought to" pay their taxes. The authorities would have problems if they did. For moral obligation does not imply legal obligation.

Oh, so you actually have a theory of moral obligation? And legal obligation? That's quite a trick for someone whose mantra is that no values are objective.

Now that you have committed yourself to a position, I will demand the same of you that you demand of everyone else: Explain what you mean by "moral obligation" and then justify your position.

After you do this, we will see how well your ethical theory holds up in comparison to Rand's.

Meanwhile, since you deny that values can be objective, try drinking acid instead of water (or conventional beverages) for the next day and see how that works out for you.

Frankly, who would sit there on the desert isand, thirsty, with an empty stomach (not to mention the fear of wild animals!) and do nothing because he/she thinks the rescue ship will happen along? A person that out of touch with reality is mentally impaired, but not "unethical".

How do you know that such a person would be "mentally impaired?"

I never said anything about how, if at all, terms like "unethical" would apply to a solitary individual. If a eudaemonist did apply such judgments to a solitary individual, they would merely be shorthand indicators for actions that are contrary to that person's self-interest. The judgments "good" and "bad" are better suited to this purpose.

Throughout your posts, you have exhibited a very rigid, rule-bound conception of ethics, as if obeying a fixed set of rules is the essence of "moral" behavior. This view is antithetical to the Aristotelian conception of ethics, according to which moral principles serve as guides in our quest for a good life and happiness.

This is also how Rand saw the matter, and if you insist on treating her ethical precepts as, in effect, the secular equivalent of the Ten Commandments, then you will never understand her approach.

But, then, it's quite clear that you have little or no interest in understanding Rand's ethical theory. Your primary interest seems to be showing how much more clever you are than Rand.

Ghs

[Rich Engle]

Meanwhile, since you deny that values can be objective, try drinking acid instead of water (or conventional beverages) for the next day and see how that works out for you.

Boy, was I waiting for that one, George. A=A 101. And you even did better with the acid-drinking thing. Here I thought you'd go easy and do the "walk towards the wall, boink your head, and while you are icing it down, continue to say it does not exist" type of dealio.

I like yours much better. More efficient, concise, and overall a very savage example.

But wait for it...wait...Vegas Odds 99/1 you're about to get maybe the straw man thing. That, or something else even more nausea-provoking.

rde

I Don't Think Pepto-Biz is Gonna Cut It, This Time

Edited May 27, 2010 by Rich Engle

[Xray]

It astonishes me that you are unable to understand what Rand means here. None of this applies to a fish, unless you think a fish can make the choice to live and needs "principles of action" to implement its choice.

Don't lose focus of what the discussion was about. Rand stated that a fish "ought to" live in water, and you yourself admitted in post # 193 verbatim that her example of fish was "pretty dumb". ITA with this assessment of yours; we are on the same page here, so why not take it from there and proceed?

Rand made a careless error during a Q&A session, one that she did not repeat in her published writings on ethics. As I said in the comment that you mentioned:

"I agree that Rand's example of fish is pretty dumb. But you won't find this kind of blunder in "The Objectivist Ethics."

Wrong. The error is not a result of carelessness in oral dialogue. Read TOE, p. 18, where Rand states verbatim:

"The fact a living entity is, determines what it ought to do. So much for the issue of the relation between an ought and an is." (Rand)

If you want to crucify Rand for misspeaking on a single occasion, be my guest, but I have no interest in joining your revelry. I have made careless errors in verbal Q&A sessions as well -- many of them. I'm sure you never make such errors, but I lack your infallibility, so I'm not disposed to make a federal case out of a single incident.

See above. Rand's "is-ought" blunder was not a result of carelessness.

The word combination "determines + ought to" is a contradiction in itself. Would you agree? If not, can you name a single example where an "is" determines an "ought to"?

It is about examining a philosophy having "non-contradiction" as a mantra.

As for your musings about infallibility - examining claims as to whether they stand up to testing does not imply that the examiner thinks he/she is infallible. So in case you find mistakes in your discussion partners' reasoning, nothing stops you from pointing them out here and explaining in detail.

The infallibility question would have been been a good one ask Rand and her followers though: "Is Objectivism infallible?"

Have you ever asked her followers this question? If yes, what replies did you get?

GHS: Meanwhile, since you deny that values can be objective, try drinking acid instead of water (or conventional beverages) for the next day and see how that works out for you.

You couldn't have chosen a more illustrative example to demonstrate the subjectivity of values.

Suppose a person intends to commit suicide or a murder, swallowing (or administering) acid would be of value to them. For it has the objective effect desired to achieve a (subjectively chosen) goal.

Bottom line: acid has no "objective" value as such, since something only becomes "a value" in respect to a desired goal.

You are confusing objective characteristics with objective value.

Rich Engle: Boy, was I waiting for that one, George. A=A 101. And you even did better with the acid-drinking thing.

See my above reply to GHS.

It is a thinking error to conclude from "A=A" that "A" is an "objective value".

Acid is Acid, yes. But the value attributed to it is depends on what one wants to use it for.

Edited May 27, 2010 by Xray

[Rich Engle]

Concluding from A=A applying to "A" being an "objective value" is a non-sequitur and therefore a thinking error.

Acid is Acid, sure. But the value attributed to it is depends on what you want to use it for.

Citric acid for example is excellent objective means to achieve the goal "clean toilet", but not recommendable for many other purposes.

You are so cute when you try to make a funny. Suggestion: next time, build your own boxcar.

rde

I Know Canadians That Are Funnier Than That.

[rhartford]

In response to recent posts on “objective value,” consider the following fact:

A person chooses to pursue something he or she thinks will benefit his or her life.

The above statement does not say if the pursued goal is, in fact, beneficial or harmful to the person.

Objectivity refers to chosen cognitive processes that best lead to true conclusions.

If the person used objective cognitive processes, it is likely the goal chosen will, in fact, benefit his or her life. As shorthand, the chosen goal can then labeled as an “objective value” because it was chosen based on objective cognitive processes and was chosen for the goal of benefit to the person’s life.

If the person was, in fact, correct – then the chosen goal was in fact a “value.”

If the person made an error, even though objective processes were used – then the chosen goal was, in fact, a “disvalue.”

If a person chooses a goal, without using objective cognitive processes or with a purpose other than benefit to life (“benefit” here includes the possibility of ending life if it has become unbearable), the chosen goal can be labeled a “subjective value.”

If you find error in anything above, please use your own words and arguments, not Rand’s. The above is not intended to be consistent with Rand, it is intended to be consistent with truth.

[George H. Smith]

Meanwhile, since you deny that values can be objective, try drinking acid instead of water (or conventional beverages) for the next day and see how that works out for you.

You couldn't have chosen a more illustrative example to demonstrate the subjectivity of values.

Suppose a person intends to commit suicide or a murder, swallowing (or administering) acid would be of value to them. For it has the objective effect desired to achieve a (subjectively chosen) goal. Bottom line: acid has no "objective" value as such, since something only becomes "a value" in respect to a desired goal.

The last sentence is also Rand's position: "The concept value...presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what?" (VOS, 15)

How anyone could participate on an O'ist list for as long as you have and not know this defies understanding.

You are confusing objective characteristics with objective value.

You are confusing your own peculiar and often erratic linguistic preferences with a philosophical argument.

For Rand, the term "objective" expresses the factual relationship between a goal and a particular means that will achieve that goal. In the case of food, its objective characteristics are precisely what make it an objective value for the goal of survival. Food is an objective value because it will, in fact, further the goal of survival. This is not a matter of subjective preference or whim. If you want to survive, then you must -- or ought to, or should -- eat food.

This reasoning exemplifies the Aristotelian "practical syllogism," to wit:

Fact: I want to survive.

Fact: Food is essential to my survival.

Normative conclusion: Therefore, I ought to eat food.

I posited the acid example on the assumption that you want to live. The very fact that you haven't killed yourself exhibits what economists call a "demonstrated preference" for this option. If you don't want to live, then why are you still here?

Ghs