Rand's notions of Kant and Hume


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Subject: Laughable Policy - Continued

I guess when Phil decides not to engage with George's posts it's a laughable "second-hand" "Randian" policy, but when George decides not to engage with Phil's posts, it's okay. Except that George's policy would be a step more laugh-inducing to himself,

Because not only won't he -argue-, he "claims" he won't even -read- what Phil has to say.

,,,,,,,,,,

Oops!! But then he later said - #245: "There are some important issues here, so I'm going to renege on my previous resolution." Hard to do if he hadn't been -reading- my posts, isn't it? Maybe he had someone else report back to him and summarize my posts from yesterday afternoon? Maybe he has telepathic abilities?

Okay for George to change his mind, but not for Phil? I bet any time I 'renege' or answer him, when he gets through lobbing insults I'll have him rolling on the floor in fake laughter again.

Don't hurt yourself.

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Subject: Laughable Policy - Continued

I guess when Phil decides not to engage with George's posts it's a laughable "second-hand" "Randian" policy, but when George decides not to engage with Phil's posts, it's okay. Except that George's policy would be a step more laugh-inducing to himself,

Because not only won't he -argue-, he "claims" he won't even -read- what Phil has to say.

,,,,,,,,,,

Oops!! But then he later said - #245: "There are some important issues here, so I'm going to renege on my previous resolution." Hard to do if he hadn't been -reading- my posts, isn't it? Maybe he had someone else report back to him and summarize my posts from yesterday afternoon? Maybe he has telepathic abilities?

Okay for George to change his mind, but not for Phil? I bet any time I 'renege' or answer him, when he gets through lobbing insults I'll have him rolling on the floor in fake laughter again.

Polemics has never been one of your strong points, so maybe you should start working on your grand theory of historical causation. I'm sure I speak for many others when I say that I cannot wait to read it.

I have over a dozen good books on the philosophy of history -- all of which discuss historical causation -- that I could recommend to you, but I wouldn't want to commit another argument from authority, and you wouldn't want to clutter your mind with anything other than Peikoff's ideas.

I'm so glad that your policy doesn't forbid you to respond to my posts. I appears only to prohibit answering my questions. That's a very interesting policy, Phil, but it's a little confusing -- some might even say inconsistent.

For example, if I called you a tin-plated intellectual phony, would your policy then dictate that you break off all contact with me? If not, then what would I need to call you? How about a puffed-up blowhard? Would that work?

These are just examples, of course. I would never actually call you these things. I am just attempting to figure out the fine print of your policy. :lol:

Ghs

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Phil,

Consider this an olive branch....

If at some point you would like to post your thoughts about Peikoff's approach to history, or if you would like to develop your own views, I won't come after you in an inappropriate way. If I have comments to make, I will keep them perfectly civil -- provided, that is, that you focus on my substantive points and don't accuse me of committing all manner of logical fallacies.

The philosophy of history has long been of interest to me (I wrote a couple chapters on it for my abortive project, The Disciplines of Liberty), and I certainly wouldn't want to discourage someone from discussing the subject on OL, as I might have done with my recent mockery.

Ghs

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GHS: If at some point you would like to post your thoughts about Peikoff's approach to history, or if you would like to develop your own views, I won't come after you in an inappropriate way. If I have comments to make, I will keep them perfectly civil -- provided, that is, that you focus on my substantive points and don't accuse me of committing all manner of logical fallacies.

It sounds good in theory, but I do tend to be very critical...and if I think I see a logical fallacy, if someone is being "rationalistic", "too subjective", completely misreading X or whatever, I am likely to say so. (And hopefully give a reason, if I don't think it should be pretty clear.) I'm going to state my opinion on issues of method as well as content, because I think method is where we so often go wrong. Epistemology and Method are probably my main areas of interest in the realm of philosophy. But it seems as soon as I am critical in that area the civility would probably vanish in a heartbeat. (I don't view saying someone has made an intellectual mistake as an insult but merely a factual matter one can learn from or disagree about, even if I were wrong in accusing someone of a wide variety of them. Goodness knows, I will make mistakes from time to time.)

Another problem might be if we disagree on what is a "substantive point". No offense, but I am sometimes limited in time or patience and I don't have time to comment. I will often simply ignore a point on this board if I think it is obvious or not worth a long post or I disagree but don't want to get into it. An example of that might be Peikoff's views on Kant. I don't have the book handy, am not willing to trust paraphrases or short snips...and I simply am not very interested in that outside of the context of the wider issue of historical causation. In other words, I may want to address it later, but I don't want to at a particular moment and repeated demands of answer me won't make me do something out of the order in which I want to proceed. I have a sense that if I address it now, I won't be as good at it compared to when I want to tackle it and have all my ducks in a row.

(What I try to do is comment when I think someone says something that is a totally new insight for me, or that is quite helpful, even when it's not perfect. The reason is that I know how important it is for me to get acknowledgment in that way. Just in the last 24 hours, I thanked Michael Marotta for something he posted in a science thread and Brant Gaede for something in a finance and investments thread. But sometimes even that slips between the cracks.)

GHS: The philosophy of history has long been of interest to me (I wrote a couple chapters on it for my abortive project, The Disciplines of Liberty), and I certainly wouldn't want to discourage someone from discussing the subject on OL, as I might have done with my recent mockery.

Okay. Let me see if I can give it a try in coming weeks.

(I'm in the middle of preparing some fall courses, though.)

As for book recommendations, I'm always open to them. As long as someone is not offended that I don't get to all of them. Or not for a month, a year or whenever. One problem on this site is recommendations need to be explained a bit more than posters often do, since one seldom is willing to take another person's recommendations on things which require a sizable time investment if they have a lot of stuff backed up on their plate.. People here sometimes just give a laundry list, as with movie recommendations. There are only a couple people I can think of I would take esthetic recommendations from wholesale, since my tastes might be very different...I do realize that book recommendations on an intellectual topic are different.

I had polite disagreements with you (and on other topics ongoing with Jeff R and Tim S) had (and in your case, two debates with me) when I lived in California which were marked by very strong differences, coming at the world quite differently. So I know it's possible to be civil when airing views. I always left those discussions with a good feeling, even though both sides went at each other relentlessly - and critically, giving no quarter intellectually.

I think there is a huge difference between disrespecting the viewpoint and disrespecting the person.

Edited by Philip Coates
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GHS: If at some point you would like to post your thoughts about Peikoff's approach to history, or if you would like to develop your own views, I won't come after you in an inappropriate way. If I have comments to make, I will keep them perfectly civil -- provided, that is, that you focus on my substantive points and don't accuse me of committing all manner of logical fallacies.

PC: It sounds good in theory, but I do tend to be very critical...and if I think I see a logical fallacy, if someone is being "rationalistic", "too subjective", completely misreading X or whatever. I'm going to state my opinion on issues of method as well as content, because I think method is where we so often go wrong. But it seems as soon as I do so the civility would probably vanish in a heartbeat. (I don't view saying someone has made an intellectual mistake as an insult but merely a factual matter one can learn from or disagree about, even if I were wrong in accusing someone of a wide variety of them. Goodness knows, I will make mistakes from time to time.)

I strongly suggest that you stick to substantive points, in whatever context and regardless of whom you are responding to. What you frequently call "fallacies" are not fallacies at all, and your observations about "method" are typically nothing more than an expression of your dislike of how a person presents his ideas.

I don't need, nor do I want, your opinions about the above matters in regard to my posts. (Misreadings are another matter. ) It's condescending, for one thing, and it has nothing to do with factual matters, for another.

So, yes, I will indeed go after you if you falsely accuse me of committing elementary fallacies again, especially when you don't understand what those fallacies really mean.

As I said, if you post something on the philosophy of history, I will respond civilly, so long as you stay on point and don't offer unsolicited advice about how I should write posts. I will respond in kind, of course.

It's up to you....

Ghs

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For those who may be interested in such things, my favorite book overall on the philosophy of history is Gordon Leff, History and Social Theory (University of Alabama Press, 1969).

Also excellent is Leff's book, The Tyranny of Concepts: A Critique of Marxism (2nd ed., University of Alabama Press, 1969). This is a thorough examination and critique of "Dialectical Materialism," "Historical Materialism," etc.

Leff is an accomplished historian who has written many books on medieval thought and history; indeed, he wrote a book that I quoted previously on this thread, Heresy in the Later Middle Ages.

For the titles of some other books by Leff, see:

http://www.librarything.com/author/leffgordon

In my experience, books written on the philosophy of history by practicing historians tend to be better than similar books written by philosophers. There are exceptions, of course.

Ghs

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Since Davis focuses on "The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World," his discussion of Islamic slavery is relatively brief (around five pages). His discussion begins (p.60):

"While a few sub-Saharan black slaves mixed with other slaves in the ancient world, the Arabs and their Muslim converts were the first people to make use of literally millions of blacks from sub-Saharan Africa, and to begin associating black Africans with the lowliest forms of bondage."

Davis (p. 62) makes only one mention of Aristotle's possible influence:

"The connection between dehumanizing labor and people with a highly distinctive physical appearance led Muslims in increasing numbers to describe blacks in terms that fit Aristotle's image of natural slaves (whether they had heard of Aristotle or not)."

George,

Thanks. Davis isn't glossing over slavery in the Arab world, and that's important.

To assess the uses of Aristotle's doctrine of "natural slavery" in the Islamic world, one would presumably have to be able to read falsafa in Arabic. A job for a different scholar...

Robert Campbell

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1. Were most [German] philosophy professors Kantians in 1933?

2. Isn't it likely that the current philosophical scene in Germany is worse than in 1933 if viewed in terms of Kantians vs. post-modernists? Yet things aren't as bad as in '33. The strikes me as a problem for Peikoff's theory.

Although this doesn't disprove Peikoff's theory, is it just a coincidence that he is a philosopher and also thinks philosophers are the most influential group of people. Wasn't it a poet who said that poets were the "unknown regulators of mankind" or something like that? Von Mises thought that the embrace of socialism was largely for economic reasons. Etc.

Neil,

I don't know what the breakdown looked like in 1933. There were advocates of Kantianism and neo-Kantianism, but also Hegelians, Marxists, Logical Positivists, Phenomenologists, and exponents of several other schools of thought.

There are postmodernists on the German scene now. If you consider Martin Heidegger a pomo (I wouldn't go that far), he was already on the scene in 1933, but the numbers weren't there yet.

Still, according to Leonard Peikoff's general theme of progressive philosophical degeneration during the 19th and 20th centuries, Germany should be farther gone now than it was in 1933, as just about any other country in the world should also be.

It was Shelley who declared that poets are "the unacknowledged legislators of the world." I wonder how many poets have ever concurred with that judgment...

Robert Campbell

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All of your musings about the Is-Ought problem have no application to Rand unless you take into account her clear statement in "Causality Versus Duty." There she states that all of her "oughts" (she uses the term "must" instead, but it means the same thing in this context) are conditional in nature.

But that is exactly the point. There is a substantial difference between an "ought" and a "must", and Rands ignores this difference by using the terms interchangeably.

"Reality confronts man with a great many "musts," but all of them are conditional; the formula of realistic necessity is: "You must, if—" and the "if" stands for man's choice: "- if you want to achieve a certain goal." You must eat, if you want to survive." (Rand)

The clear "if-then" relation also applies to the fish without a chosen goal.

The fish must live in water if is to survive. Rand's own examples illustrate this.

To state, like she did elsewhere, that a fish "ought to" live in water makes no sense, almost has a comical touch. There exists no "ought to" from "is" in nature.

So why not drop the confusing "ought to" altogether? Is it because prescriptive moralists often don't want to tell people directly "You 'must' do this or that", and use the milder "ought to" instead because it sounds less imposing?

Edited by Xray
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All of your musings about the Is-Ought problem have no application to Rand unless you take into account her clear statement in "Causality Versus Duty." There she states that all of her "oughts" (she uses the term "must" instead, but it means the same thing in this context) are conditional in nature.

But that is exactly the point. There is a substantial difference between an "ought" and a "must", and Rands ignores this difference by using the terms interchangeably.

"Ought to" and "must" are often used interchangeably in moral philosophy. Either can refer to a moral duty, and either can refer to a hypothetical imperative.

"Reality confronts man with a great many "musts," but all of them are conditional; the formula of realistic necessity is: "You must, if—" and the "if" stands for man's choice: "- if you want to achieve a certain goal." You must eat, if you want to survive." (Rand)

The clear "if-then" relation also applies to the fish without a chosen goal.

The fish must live in water if is to survive. Rand's own examples illustrate this.

To state, like she did elsewhere, that a fish "ought to" live in water makes no sense, almost has a comical touch. There exists no "ought to" from "is" in nature.

So why not drop the confusing "ought to" altogether? Is it because prescriptive moralists often don't want to tell people directly "You 'must' do this or that", and use the milder "ought to" instead because it sounds less imposing?

You apparently didn't read the passage from Rand carefully. She says, "and the "if" stands for man's choice." Rand didn't believe that fish have free will, so her reasoning wouldn't apply to them.

Ghs

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"Ought to" is much better than "must." I prefer "I think you ought to" which implies whom I am addressing might think about the matter too and come to his own conclusion and act accordingly. Common usage of these terms and words seems quite adequate and I don't see why any philosopher needs to solve any "is-ought" problem unless the problem is how to make people agree with you sans their own independent judgments. In other words, there is no such problem; it is an artificiality that provides employment to the priesthood which always deals with unscientific social-intellectual absolutes. "Man ought to be rational" begs the question of any particular man's context, for instance. Consider the possibility of the rationally irrational. If you have no idea what I am talking about, no sweat; you ought to be simply rational; it will serve you well, I think.

The "is-ought problem" is the problem of "How can I be an absolutist with revealed answers for the ages and get away with it--that is, avoid the primary equality implicit in ratiocination?"

--Brant

what I just wrote is absolutely true!--argue with that!

Edited by Brant Gaede
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"Ought to" is much better than "must." I prefer "I think you ought to" which implies whom I am addressing might think about the matter too and come to his own conclusion and act accordingly. Common usage of these terms and words seems quite adequate and I don't see why any philosopher needs to solve any "is-ought" problem unless the problem is how to make people agree with you sans their own independent judgments. In other words, there is no such problem; it is an artificiality that provides employment to the priesthood which always deals with unscientific social-intellectual absolutes. "Man ought to be rational" begs the question of any particular man's context, for instance. Consider the possibility of the rationally irrational. If you have no idea what I am talking about, no sweat; you ought to be simply rational; it will serve you well, I think.

The "is-ought problem" is the problem of "How can I be an absolutist with revealed answers for the ages and get away with it--that is, avoid the primary equality implicit in ratiocination?"

--Brant

what I just wrote is absolutely true!--argue with that!

When dealing with what Kant called objective imperatives of reason, both "ought" and "must" are types of "should" statements. Whether they convey different connotations depends on the context in which they are used. In some cases, "must" conveys more urgency than "ought." For example, I would probably say "You must stand back from the fire" (if you don't want to get burned -- this condition is often assumed rather than stated), not "You ought to stand back from the fire."

Ghs

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"Ought to" is much better than "must." I prefer "I think you ought to" which implies whom I am addressing might think about the matter too and come to his own conclusion and act accordingly. Common usage of these terms and words seems quite adequate and I don't see why any philosopher needs to solve any "is-ought" problem unless the problem is how to make people agree with you sans their own independent judgments. In other words, there is no such problem; it is an artificiality that provides employment to the priesthood which always deals with unscientific social-intellectual absolutes. "Man ought to be rational" begs the question of any particular man's context, for instance. Consider the possibility of the rationally irrational. If you have no idea what I am talking about, no sweat; you ought to be simply rational; it will serve you well, I think.

The "is-ought problem" is the problem of "How can I be an absolutist with revealed answers for the ages and get away with it--that is, avoid the primary equality implicit in ratiocination?"

--Brant

what I just wrote is absolutely true!--argue with that!

When dealing with what Kant called objective imperatives of reason, both "ought" and "must" are types of "should" statements. Whether they convey different connotations depends on the context in which they are used. In some cases, "must" conveys more urgency than "ought." For example, I would probably say "You must stand back from the fire" (if you don't want to get burned -- this condition is often assumed rather than stated), not "You ought to stand back from the fire."

Ghs

Yeah, but all this is commonly understood by people with physiologically normal brains and a modicum of education.

--Brant

Edited by Brant Gaede
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When dealing with what Kant called objective imperatives of reason, both "ought" and "must" are types of "should" statements. Whether they convey different connotations depends on the context in which they are used. In some cases, "must" conveys more urgency than "ought." For example, I would probably say "You must stand back from the fire" (if you don't want to get burned -- this condition is often assumed rather than stated), not "You ought to stand back from the fire."

Ghs

Yeah, but all this is commonly understood by people with physiologically normal brains and a modicum of education.

--Brant

Yes, of course, which brings up another consideration.

People who mention Kant's notion of a hypothetical imperative often neglect to point out that he discusses two types of this "ought" judgment. In the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, he calls one "a problematic practical principle," and he calls the other "an assertoric practical principle." Both of these conditional judgments stand in contrast to a categorical imperative, which Kant calls "an apodictic practical principle."

A problematic imperative is what we normally associate with a hypothetical imperative; it takes the form, "If you want X, then you should do Y."

An assertoric hypothetical imperative is quite different; here the end in question is not a matter of choice, so the judgment takes the form, "You do in fact want X; therefore, you should do Y." Here is how Kant put it:

There is, however, one end that can be presupposed as actual in all rational beings...and thus there is one purpose which they not only can have, but which we can assume with certainty that they all do have by a natural necessity -- the purpose, namely, of happiness. A hypothetical imperative which affirms the practical necessity of an action as a means to the furtherance of happiness is assertoric . We may represent it, not simply as necessary to an uncertain, merely possible purpose, but as necessary to a purpose which we can presuppose a priori and with certainty to be present in every man because it belongs to his very being. (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H.J. Paton, in The Moral Law, p. 79.)

Kant follows the Aristotelian tradition here in treating happiness as man's natural end, i.e., as something he desires in virtue of his nature as a human being. According to this view, it would be absurd to treat the desire for happiness as a matter of choice.

Where Kant differs from Aristotelians is in his insistence that actions taken to achieve one's own happiness are a matter of prudence rather than morality. Although Aristotelians also distinguished between moral and prudential actions, they drew a different line between the two categories, and (like Rand) they maintained that happiness is the ultimate purpose of ethics.

This touches on a number of issues that have been discussed before on OL -- for example, whether moral principles would apply to a solitary person who is, say, stranded on a desert island. Aristotelians believed they would; they often wrote about "duties to oneself."

This viewpoint was common even among moral philosophers who were not strict Aristotelians. For example, in the 17th century, the immensely influential philosopher Samuel Pufendorf wrote a book that includes a chapter titled "Of the Duty of Man towards himself" (which is followed by "Of the Duty of one Man towards another"). And in the 18th century, the influential philosopher Francis Hutcheson (a teacher of Adam Smith) wrote a standard text on ethics with the chapter "Duties toward ourselves."

This approach was standard fare for many, many centuries -- at least 2000 years. The notion that moral principles apply only to our relationships with other people was a later development. Yet it is not uncommon, even on OL, for critics of Rand to argue that her notion of purely self-regarding moral principles is somehow an aberration. These critics typically know next to nothing about the history of moral philosophy.

Ghs

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This approach was standard fare for many, many centuries -- at least 2000 years. The notion that moral principles apply only to our relationships with other people was a later development. Yet it is not uncommon, even on OL, for critics of Rand to argue that her notion of purely self-regarding moral principles is somehow an aberration. These critics typically know next to nothing about the history of moral philosophy.

Ghs

A lot of what was "standard fare for 2000 years" was also nonsense. For example, most of Aristotle's notions of physics and motion of bodies. They were dead wrong. Being around for 2000 years is not necessarily a figure of merit. Interpreting ethics and morals in a social context, makes the activity useful. Harms and wrongs done to others can be observed, witnessed and objectively classified and sometimes even measured. As to Kant, the categorical imperative is nonsense. One can hold a rule or principle without making it universal.

The notion of ethics applying to situations devoid of second parties is absurd. On a desert island there are no moral issue. There are only facts and actions taken by the first (and only) party on the island. Since we are the owners of our bodies and our time anything we do to ourselves (alone) is within our rights and therefore cannot be unethical or immoral. One can make errors and even injure or kill himself but one cannot wrong himself unethically. Errors in judgment that lead to (self) harm are like arithmetical mistakes (if committed inadvertently). They have no moral or ethical import at all. Did you hit your thumb with a hammer? Painful, but not immoral. Did you commit suicide? Fatal, but not immoral. Did you mislead yourself? Silly, but not immoral.

I believe this is the question that separates me from the Objectivists. In a world with only one person, there are meaningful non-hypothetical moral questions. Many Objectivists I have had interaction with seem to find ethical and moral questions in the absence of second parties. I have exchanged views with some Big O's who think choosing between two flavors of ice-cream is a moral question. I simply cannot agree with this view of things.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited by BaalChatzaf
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All this Kantian parsing seems to have no value unless it's ultimately in defense of one's right to happiness as opposed to the nasty people who want to take it away. This means it is bottom line a defense of individualism--or should be--against collectivism and a criticism of any philosophy perpetrated or championed by the "witch doctor." So, we can dissolve the guilt of wanting happiness conflicted with what one is told to the contrary, right and proper. That I suspect has always been the best payoff from reading Rand for most people. Too bad Rand didn't know Kant better.

--Brant

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This approach was standard fare for many, many centuries -- at least 2000 years. The notion that moral principles apply only to our relationships with other people was a later development. Yet it is not uncommon, even on OL, for critics of Rand to argue that her notion of purely self-regarding moral principles is somehow an aberration. These critics typically know next to nothing about the history of moral philosophy.

Ghs

Even so, the notion of ethics applying to situations devoid of second parties is absurd. On a desert island there are no moral issue. There are only facts and actions taken by the first (and only) party on the island. Since we are the owners of our bodies and our time anything we do to ourselves (alone) is within our rights and therefore cannot be unethical or immoral. One can make errors and even injure or kill himself but one cannot wrong himself unethically. Errors in judgment that lead to (self) harm are like arithmetical mistakes (if committed inadvertently). They have no moral or ethical import at all. Did you hit your thumb with a hammer? Painful, but not immoral. Did you commit suicide? Fatal, but not immoral. Did you mislead yourself? Silly, but not immoral.

I believe this is the question that separates me from the Objectivists. In a world with only one person, there are meaningful non-hypothetical moral questions. Many Objectivists I have had interaction with seem to find ethical and moral questions in the absence of second parties. I simply cannot agree with this view of things.

Ba'al Chatzaf

There are moral issues for you on this island if you want to buck up and survive as opposed to giving into despair and not taking care of yourself as best you can. For if you don't you will negatively impact your self-esteem and when your gal Friday arrives she won't want to have anything to do with you because if you can't do a good job of taking care of you what would you bring to the relationship that would help her take care of her? It's not just social existence but the still present possibility of a social existence and, deeper, existence itself which is at stake.

--Brant

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This approach was standard fare for many, many centuries -- at least 2000 years. The notion that moral principles apply only to our relationships with other people was a later development. Yet it is not uncommon, even on OL, for critics of Rand to argue that her notion of purely self-regarding moral principles is somehow an aberration. These critics typically know next to nothing about the history of moral philosophy.

Ghs

A lot of what was "standard fare for 2000 years" was also nonsense. For example, most of Aristotle's notions of physics and motion of bodies. They were dead wrong. Being around for 2000 years is not necessarily a figure of merit.

I never claimed this. I merely pointed out that Rand's position is not "an aberration." As for whether the moral ideas of Aristotelians were "dead wrong," how would you know? Have you read their writings?

Interpreting ethics and morals in a social context, makes the activity useful. Harms and wrongs done to others can be observed, witnessed and objectively classified and sometimes even measured. As to Kant, the categorical imperative is nonsense. One can hold a rule or principle without making it universal.

Kant didn't say that all rules and principles need be universal, but he argued that this is a formal condition of moral principles. If you claim that it is morally right for you do X in certain conditions, then it must also be morally right for others to do X in conditions that are similar in relevant respects. This isn't just a Kantian perspective; moral theory would be impossible without it.

As for "interpreting ethics and morals in a social context," your comments are so vague as to be useless.

The notion of ethics applying to situations devoid of second parties is absurd. On a desert island there are no moral issue. There are only facts and actions taken by the first (and only) party on the island. Since we are the owners of our bodies and our time anything we do to ourselves (alone) is within our rights and therefore cannot be unethical or immoral. One can make errors and even injure or kill himself but one cannot wrong himself unethically. Errors in judgment that lead to (self) harm are like arithmetical mistakes (if committed inadvertently). They have no moral or ethical import at all. Did you hit your thumb with a hammer? Painful, but not immoral. Did you commit suicide? Fatal, but not immoral. Did you mislead yourself? Silly, but not immoral.

On a desert island one can take actions that are more or less conducive to one's happiness, so such actions are clearly relevant to any moral theory that regards happiness as the purpose of ethics. As Francis Hutcheson (whom I mentioned earlier) put it, "moral philosophy" teaches us "the art of living well" -- and "the importance of the matter requires habit and continual exercise." One can practice the art of living well, relatively speaking, on a desert island as well as in society.

If anything is absurd, it is the claim that ethics has nothing to teach us beyond respecting the rights of others.

I believe this is the question that separates me from the Objectivists. In a world with only one person, there are meaningful non-hypothetical moral questions. Many Objectivists I have had interaction with seem to find ethical and moral questions in the absence of second parties. I have exchanged views with some Big O's who think choosing between two flavors of ice-cream is a moral question. I simply cannot agree with this view of things.

Name one moral philosopher, O'ist or otherwise, who ever claimed that choosing between two flavors of ice-cream is a moral question. You seem unable or unwilling to deal with moral philosophy in a serious way. That's a shame, because most philosophers are more careful in their use of words than two mathematicians I can think of.

Ghs

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George H. Smith: You apparently didn't read the passage from Rand carefully. She says, "and the "if" stands for man's choice." Rand didn't believe that fish have free will, so her reasoning wouldn't apply to them.

I did read it carefully, which is why I pointed out that "if" in reality does not only stand for man's choice, but applies also to situations where choice is not involved. If the fish is to survive, it must live in water.

Rand's "man's choice" passage is also interesting because it so clearly acknowledges that in those 'if-then' situations involving choice, something becomes "a value" only in respect to a goal.

"Reality confronts man with a great many "musts," but all of them are conditional; the formula of realistic necessity is: "You must, if—" and the "if" stands for man's choice: "- if you want to achieve a certain goal." You must eat, if you want to survive." (Rand)

Food is a biological necessity if one is to survive, it is an objective means necessary to sustain a living organism. If an individual chooses not to survive, then food is of no value to this individual.

But that is exactly the point. There is a substantial difference between an "ought" and a "must", and Rands ignores this difference by using the terms interchangeably.

"Ought to" and "must" are often used interchangeably in moral philosophy. Either can refer to a moral duty, and either can refer to a hypothetical imperative.

In that case, the moral philosophers' practice of using the terms interchangeably is not conducive to achieving clarity on this crucial issue.

Next time I get a letter from the tax authorities telling me that I "must" hand in my tax declaration, and I fail to do so, I'm afraid I won't convince them if I say "I thought you had merely meant I "ought to" hand it in", and then quote a moral philospher who too had said "must" but only meant "ought to". :)

Ba'al Chatzaf: The notion of ethics applying to situations devoid of second parties is absurd. On a desert island there are no moral issue. There are only facts and actions taken by the first (and only) party on the island. Since we are the owners of our bodies and our time anything we do to ourselves (alone) is within our rights and therefore cannot be unethical or immoral. One can make errors and even injure or kill himself but one cannot wrong himself unethically. Errors in judgment that lead to (self) harm are like arithmetical mistakes (if committed inadvertently). They have no moral or ethical import at all. Did you hit your thumb with a hammer? Painful, but not immoral. Did you commit suicide? Fatal, but not immoral. Did you mislead yourself? Silly, but not immoral.
GHS: On a desert island one can take actions that are more or less conducive to one's happiness, so such actions are clearly relevant to any moral theory that regards happiness as the purpose of ethics.

Naming "happiness" as the purpose of ethics is problematic since different things make people happy, and what makes them happy is often so diametrically opposed that one will run into major problems if trying to apply such theory to reality.

Let's illustrate it with an example using the desert island:

Suppose a hunter/trapper/fisher and an ethical vegetarian are on a desert island. The hunter/trapper/fisher is happy to hunt/trap/fish there. If it is moral what makes person happy, then the hunter is behaving morally.

Whereas hunting/trapping/fishing would not make the ethical vegetarian happy at all. Is he now 'immoral' because he is unhappy at seeing the hunter happy with what he is doing?

How is one going to serve a theory of ethics based on happiness to both the vegetarian and the hunter which they both will swallow without protest? ;)

GHS: As Francis Hutcheson (whom I mentioned earlier) put it, "moral philosophy" teaches us "the art of living well" -- and "the importance of the matter requires habit and continual exercise." One can practice the art of living well, relatively speaking, on a desert island as well as in society.

See above. Individual A's idea of "living well" may be totally opposed to individual B's idea of living well.

GHS: If anything is absurd, it is the claim that ethics has nothing to teach us beyond respecting the rights of others.

If anything is absurd, it is to believe that thinking about the rights of others is not an (if not the) essential part of ethics. That's what makes Rand's claim so ridiculous that a man living alone on a desert island needs morality "most".

(I don't think Rand had ethical vegetarians in mind who might get in conflict with their standard of value if they had to hunt for survival there).

An individual who, like she said, thinks "sand is clothing" may be ignorant of facts, but he/she is not behaving "immorally".

Any idea of morality, any idea of a set of rules to guide man's actions is based on the fact that we are beings living in groups. Moral rules are mostly an attempt to organize this living in groups in order to prevent chaos.

George H. Smith, on 22 May 2010 - 04:58 PM, said:

This approach was standard fare for many, many centuries -- at least 2000 years. The notion that moral principles apply only to our relationships with other people was a later development. Yet it is not uncommon, even on OL, for critics of Rand to argue that her notion of purely self-regarding moral principles is somehow an aberration. These critics typically know next to nothing about the history of moral philosophy.

Ba'al Chatzaf, on 22 May 2010 - 05:18 PM, said:

A lot of what was "standard fare for 2000 years" was also nonsense. For example, most of Aristotle's notions of physics and motion of bodies. They were dead wrong. Being around for 2000 years is not necessarily a figure of merit.

GHS: I never claimed this. I merely pointed out that Rand's position is not "an aberration." As for whether the moral ideas of Aristotelians were "dead wrong," how would you know? Have you read their writings?

Ba'al spoke of Aristotle's notion of physics.

Human history can also be seen as a history of corrected errors.

While one can't hold it against e. g. Rousseau that he, in his time, thought man's mind was tabula rasa, any person calling themselves a Rousseau-ian today, bringing up the tabula rasa argument, would not be taken seriously since science has revealed this premise as false.

Now when you think of Rand, even Objectivists will have to admit that her knowledge in many areas was limited. That in itself was not the problem, the problem was that she e. g. brushed aside things like the Second Law of Thermodynamics and its effects on the universe as a mere "story"; which shows a tendency to deny what did not seem fit the Objectivist ideas.

Is it true that she also had doubts about Evolution?

GHS to Ba'al: You seem unable or unwilling to deal with moral philosophy in a serious way. That's a shame, because most philosophers are more careful in their use of words than two mathematicians I can think of.

If philosophers were as willing as mathematicians and natural scientists to expose their theories to radical testing, it would be a big improvement.

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George H. Smith: You apparently didn't read the passage from Rand carefully. She says, "and the "if" stands for man's choice." Rand didn't believe that fish have free will, so her reasoning wouldn't apply to them.

I did read it carefully, which is why I pointed out that "if" in reality does not only stand for man's choice, but applies also to situations where choice is not involved. If the fish is to survive, it must live in water.

You apparently think it makes sense to tell a fish that it "must" live in water. Otherwise, your kvetching over this issue is nothing more than a futile exercise in semantics. Typical.

You're a stickler about dictionary definitions when they suit your purpose, so look up "must." You will find that one of the definitions is: "To be obliged or required by morality, law, or custom" (American Heritage). So do you think a fish can be obliged or required to do something by morality, law, or custom?

I'm sorry that you become so perplexed when you discover that one word can have several meanings, but such is the nature of language. Get used to it.

Rand's "man's choice" passage is also interesting because it so clearly acknowledges that in those 'if-then' situations, something becomes "a value" only in respect to a chosen goal.

"Reality confronts man with a great many "musts," but all of them are conditional; the formula of realistic necessity is: "You must, if—" and the "if" stands for man's choice: "- if you want to achieve a certain goal." You must eat, if you want to survive." (Rand)

Food is a biological necessity if one is to survive, it is an objective means necessary to sustain a living organism. If an individual chooses not to survive, then food is of no value to this individual.

Yes, of course. Rand's entire ethics is predicated on the basic choice to live. Ethics has nothing to say to a dead person.

But that is exactly the point. There is a substantial difference between an "ought" and a "must", and Rands ignores this difference by using the terms interchangeably.

Again, you need to consult your beloved dictionaries. From Merriam-Webster under "must": "be urged to : ought by all means to *you must read that book*"; and: : "be required by law, custom, or moral conscience to *we must obey the rules*"

Ghs: "Ought to" and "must" are often used interchangeably in moral philosophy. Either can refer to a moral duty, and either can refer to a hypothetical imperative.

Xray: In that case, the moral philosophers' practice of using the terms interchangeably is not conducive to achieving clarity on this crucial issue.

No one has a serious problem with this except you.

Ghs: If anything is absurd, it is the claim that ethics has nothing to teach us beyond respecting the rights of others.

Xray: If anything is absurd, it is the claim that reflecting on the rights of others is not an integral part of ethics.

Whoever said that rights are not an integral part of ethics? Rand argued that rights are the application of morality to a social context. Rights are a fundamental aspect of her social ethics.

Any idea of morality, any idea of a set of rules to guide man's actions is based on the fact that we are beings living in groups. Moral rules are mostly an attempt to organize this living in groups in order to prevent chaos.

Do you have an argument for this, or are we supposed to take your word for it?

Ghs

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Rand's entire ethics is predicated on the basic choice to live.

Precisely so! And, that is why her ethics is incomplete.

For a valid ethics, the following question must be answered in the affirmative. Is there a cognitive principle from which one can derive the foundational principle of the ethical system? I answer in the affirmative in “Objectivity and the Proof of Egoism,” The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, Spring 2007, pp. 291-303. To present that proof, I reformulate the novelist’s formulation of the foundational principle, “the choice to live,” into the philosopher’s formulation, “holding one’s own life as the motive and goal of one’s action.”

I argue that logical consistency with the nature of the evolved human mind requires “Holding one’s own life as the motive and goal of one’s action” (p. 293) Not to do so leads one to hold mutually contradictory premises, a logical contradiction. I would like to see that argument countered or strengthened.

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> I reformulate the novelist’s formulation of the foundational principle, “the choice to live,” into the philosopher’s formulation, “holding one’s own life as the motive and goal of one’s action.” [Robert H]

So, is it your view that the second [both of them are Rand's statements] is a more thorough-going principle implying a degree of commitment to standing by and integrating and applying the choice to live across the board? That's how I would take it. Choice to live is merely a shorthand and Rand's readers can expect that.

I'm not dismissing it sight unseen, but I think if you are going to sort of vaguely say 'her ethics is incomplete' you're going to need to bring at lot more persuasion into a post before a reader might want to follow up and investigate more. Robert H, readers here don't have general access to pieces in JARS. It's subscription-based and most libraries don't carry it.

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You apparently think it makes sense to tell a fish that it "must" live in water. Otherwise, your kvetching over this issue is nothing more than a futile exercise in semantics. Typical.

You're a stickler about dictionary definitions when they suit your purpose, so look up "must." You will find that one of the definitions is: "To be obliged or required by morality, law, or custom" (American Heritage). So do you think a fish can be obliged or required to do something by morality, law, or custom?

One of the definitions, George.

You have left out:

2 : be compelled by physical necessity to <one must eat to live>, and that is what it was about. Let's stay focused.

GHS: I'm sorry that you become so perplexed when you discover that one word can have several meanings, but such is the nature of language. Get used to it.

I have studied linguistics, which is why I'm not perplexed at all. But I'm afraid all the meanings of "ought to" can't be applied to a fish without sounding absurd. You yourself wrote in # 193: "I agree that Rand's example of fish is pretty dumb." (GHS)

Xray Rand's "man's choice" passage is also interesting because it so clearly acknowledges that in those 'if-then' situations, something becomes "a value" only in respect to a chosen goal.

"Reality confronts man with a great many "musts," but all of them are conditional; the formula of realistic necessity is: "You must, if—" and the "if" stands for man's choice: "- if you want to achieve a certain goal." You must eat, if you want to survive." (Rand)

Food is a biological necessity if one is to survive, it is an objective means necessary to sustain a living organism. If an individual chooses not to survive, then food is of no value to this individual.

GHS: Yes, of course. Rand's entire ethics is predicated on the basic choice to live. Ethics has nothing to say to a dead person.

Indeed it doesn't. As for the "choice to live", it does not say anything about how one wants to live one's life.

But that is exactly the point. There is a substantial difference between an "ought" and a "must", and Rands ignores this difference by using the terms interchangeably.

GHS:

Again, you need to consult your beloved dictionaries. From Merriam-Webster under "must": "be urged to : ought by all means to *you must read that book*"; and: : "be required by law, custom, or moral conscience to *we must obey the rules*"

They are not my "beloved dictionaries", but since you use them here as well: do you think the meaning of "must" as in "You must read that book" is what moral philosophers have in mind?

As for being "required by law, custom, or moral conscience", the example "we must obey the rules" indicates: "or else ...". Is that what moral philosophy is about?

GHS: "Ought to" and "must" are often used interchangeably in moral philosophy. Either can refer to a moral duty, and either can refer to a hypothetical imperative.
Xray: In that case, the moral philosophers' practice of using the terms interchangeably is not conducive to achieving clarity on this crucial issue.
GHS: No one has a serious problem with this except you.

A simple question: suppose you got a letter from the tax authorites telling you that you "ought to" pay your taxes, would you pay? :)

"Ought to" and "must" are not the same, aren't they, George.

GHS: If anything is absurd, it is the claim that ethics has nothing to teach us beyond respecting the rights of others.
Xray: If anything is absurd, it is the claim that reflecting on the rights of others is not an integral part of ethics.
GHS: Whoever said that rights are not an integral part of ethics? Rand argued that rights are the application of morality to a social context.

Morality only makes sense in a social context.

Xray: Any idea of morality, any idea of a set of rules to guide man's actions is based on the fact that we are beings living in groups. Moral rules are mostly an attempt to organize this living in groups in order to prevent chaos.

GHS: Do you have an argument for this, or are we supposed to take your word for it?

Even without consulting a dictionary, plain old common sense is all it takes to come to the conclusion that "morality" is linked to our living in groups.

The adj. "moral" is from L. moralis "proper behavior of a person in society". http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?l=m&p=31

Can you name any so-called "moral/immoral" action which is not linked to norms of a society or group?

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You apparently think it makes sense to tell a fish that it "must" live in water. Otherwise, your kvetching over this issue is nothing more than a futile exercise in semantics. Typical.

You're a stickler about dictionary definitions when they suit your purpose, so look up "must." You will find that one of the definitions is: "To be obliged or required by morality, law, or custom" (American Heritage). So do you think a fish can be obliged or required to do something by morality, law, or custom?

One of the definitions, George.

You have left out:

2 : be compelled by physical necessity to <one must eat to live>, and that is what it was about. Let's stay focused.

The only thing you are focused on is an irrelevancy. Immediately before the passage in question (from "Causality Versus Duty"), Rand writes:

"Life or death is man's only fundamental alternative. To live is his basic act of choice. If he chooses to live, a rational ethics will tell him what principles of action are required to implement his choice. If he does not choose to live, nature will take its course."

She continues:

"Reality confronts man with a great many "musts," but all of them are conditional; the formula of realistic necessity is: "You must, if—" and the "if" stands for man's choice: "- if you want to achieve a certain goal." You must eat, if you want to survive. You must work, if you want to eat. You must think, if you want to work. You must look at reality, if you want to think- if you want to know what to do- if you want to know what goals to choose—if you want to know how to achieve them."

It astonishes me that you are unable to understand what Rand means here. None of this applies to a fish, unless you think a fish can make the choice to live and needs "principles of action" to implement its choice.

When you publish a book on philosophy, I will gladly comb through it and point out those instances where I would have worded things differently, while ignoring the context that gives meaning to what you said. I'm sure you will find my linguistic advice very useful.

GHS: I'm sorry that you become so perplexed when you discover that one word can have several meanings, but such is the nature of language. Get used to it.

I have studied linguistics, which is why I'm not perplexed at all. But I'm afraid all the meanings of "ought to" can't be applied to a fish without sounding absurd.

Wrong again. One of the definitions of "ought" is: "Used to indicate probability or likelihood: She ought to finish by next week. (American Heritage)."

In this context, it makes perfect sense to say "The salmon ought to be swimming upstream to spawn this time of year." We say things like this all the time, e.g., "It ought to rain today."

Since both "must" and "ought" have meanings that can apply to fish, I guess you will need to coin a new word to express what you previously meant by "ought." For whenever you use that word, I will simply point out that "ought" can also apply to fish. And whenever I do this, you will no doubt thank me for my dedication to clarity.

As for the "choice to live", it does not say anything about how one wants to live one's life.

So?

A simple question: suppose you got a letter from the tax authorites telling you that you "ought to" pay your taxes, would you pay? :) "Ought to" and "must" are not the same, aren't they, George.

I previously noted that "must" and "ought" can convey different connotations, depending on the context. "Must" can be stronger than "ought," which is why I think Rand's choice of "must" was better than "ought." Rand was using the "principle of causality" to contrast her approach with Kant's, and "must" captures this sense quite well.

As for the tax authorities, I would have no doubt what was meant regardless of which terms they used. I don't think anyone would have this problem, except you.

The adj. "moral" is from L. moralis "proper behavior of a person in society". http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?l=m&p=31

Can you name any so-called "moral/immoral" action which is not linked to norms of a society or group?

The etymology of a word often has little or no relevance to its current meaning. "Bonfire" originally referred to a fire made of bones, so I suppose you would insist that a bonfire that uses wood is not really a "bonfire."

Again, simply consult one of your beloved dictionaries. A standard definition of "moral" is: "Of or concerned with the judgment of the goodness or badness of human action and character" (American Heritage.) This says nothing about a social context.

On a desert island, a Randian ethical code would say that one should plan long-range for one's survival and not delude oneself into thinking that a rescue ship will happen along any day when there is no evidence to support this belief.

On a desert island as in society, actions that promote one's long-range interests would be good actions, and actions that hinder or harm one's long-range interests would be bad actions. And because such choices would be directly relevant to one's fundamental value on a desert island -- namely, survival -- they are properly termed moral choices.

There are no essential differences here between a solitary context and a social context. Moral choices -- i.e., choices that significantly affect our fundamental values -- will occur in both situations. Some actions will further our survival and happiness, and some will not, and we need a "code of values" to act as a guide when making such choices. Such is the nature of an egoistic ethics of the kind that Rand defended.

Ghs

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Where Kant differs from Aristotelians is in his insistence that actions taken to achieve one's own happiness are a matter of prudence rather than morality. Although Aristotelians also distinguished between moral and prudential actions, they drew a different line between the two categories, and (like Rand) they maintained that happiness is the ultimate purpose of ethics.

George,

Did Aristotelians really distinguish between moral and prudential actions? For Arisotle, phronêsis (aka prudence) was a virtue.

This touches on a number of issues that have been discussed before on OL -- for example, whether moral principles would apply to a solitary person who is, say, stranded on a desert island. Aristotelians believed they would; they often wrote about "duties to oneself."

This viewpoint was common even among moral philosophers who were not strict Aristotelians. For example, in the 17th century, the immensely influential philosopher Samuel Pufendorf wrote a book that includes a chapter titled "Of the Duty of Man towards himself" (which is followed by "Of the Duty of one Man towards another"). And in the 18th century, the influential philosopher Francis Hutcheson (a teacher of Adam Smith) wrote a standard text on ethics with the chapter "Duties toward ourselves."

Kant still subscribed to the notion of "duties to self" (for instance, he believed we all have a duty to develop our talents). I think it's fair to say that these were vestiges of an older way of thinking—most latter-day Kantians treat them as such—but he didn't try to do away with them.

Robert Campbell

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