Altruism

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

It seems you are trying to confine "force" to "malicious physical force" or similar, whereas I meant simply "physical force". Saving the child's life is initiating physical force.

Merlin,

I once read John Hospers in a piece where he made some very interesting comments about force. For instance boxing is based on the initiation of force. Can you imagine a boxing match based on retaliatory force only? You would have two dudes just looking at each other. How exciting would that be?

It might be consensual, but boxing is definitiely IOF. I doesn't violate any rights, though.

Michael

[cjsmall]

Ellen:

Matters are improving. At least you are now saying you don't understand what I mean before telling me what I think.

Michael:

Adding a smiley doesn't transform this statement into a joke; it is clear in conveying its true meaning. It is really impossible to have a productive discussion with you because there is always an undercurrent, clearly addressed above, that those of us who disagree with you are not honestly addressing the cognitive content of the debate, but are either willfully, or with belligerent ignorance, misrepresenting you for ulterior purposes. Don't you think it curious that so many people don't seem "to get" your point? Ellen has been pretty flexible in addressing you on this thread and I think she deserves better than this.

Regards,

--

Jeff

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Jeff,

Let's see if I get you message correctly. It is OK for you guys to tell me what I think and misrepresent my meaning all over the place, but it is not OK for me to mention it.

Right. Got it.

I meant the quip in good spirits and did not even insinuate the issue of honesty. I am flabbergasted you see that, but must have your reasons.

You are free to take it any way you wish. I certainly can't tell you what to think.

I don't know how to correct the errors in misrepresenting my words without mentioning them. It's kind of a Catch 22.

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

I regret I haven't had time to closely read many of the posts on this thread and am in awe of people who have had time to write them too boot. But ...

The clasical rights' formulation might be described as the "pure" formulation. Whatever else one comes up with is off that base unless man isn't the "rational animal." There is nothing "pure" about the real world and to insist on its creation is Utopian and potentially totalitarian bloody as philosophy is turned into religious dogma by zealots.

Investigation into human nature as a foundation for rights theory begins and stops with "Man is the rational animal." For rights' theory in the real world emprically reveals man is not "pure" nor can he be nor can his society be. The rational thing to do is to advocate more economic and personal freedom--that society move toward that--carefully--and that people be more rational. The ideal is "a city on a hill," but not that we can or will live there or really want to. The best we can do is try with the greatest possible rationality and integrity to personally represent that ideal but not with posturing--with being that way inside out. Posturing is showing off that one has been "saved."

Government will always violate rights to some extent. Voluntary taxation is an oxymoron.

--Brant

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Investigation into human nature as a foundation for rights theory begins and stops with "Man is the rational animal."

Brant,

This cuts right to the heart of the conceptual base of rights.

I agree with this, but I do not agree with ignoring the animal part, as is normal. (I am not saying you do this.)

Man's volition is attached to a living organism. Even without volition, that living organism has a specific nature. Human values not only serve man's volition, but also serve that living organism. Otherwise, there is no volition.

Basing any ethical theory on volition alone, severed from the living organism, is a mind-body dichotomy (to use the jargon).

Michael

[merjet]

Basing any ethical theory on volition alone, severed from the living organism, is a mind-body dichotomy (to use the jargon).

Who in Objectivist circles has done this? Please provide enough citations to be convincing.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Who in Objectivist circles has done this? Please provide enough citations to be convincing.

Merlin,

Positive and negative rights applied to children as a primary.

Too many people to cite.

Michael

[Laure]

Who in Objectivist circles has done this? Please provide enough citations to be convincing.

Merlin,

Positive and negative rights applied to children as a primary.

Too many people to cite.

Michael

OK, does anybody understand that? I don't.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Laure,

Individual rights do not derive from the human nature of children.

Michael

[Laure]

Laure,

Individual rights do not derive from the human nature of children.

Michael

Right. They derive from the human nature of normal adults. So?

[Ellen Stuttle]

Ellen,

[....]

I don't think you are being dishonest by ignoring the issue of the nature of children as compared to adults, or human nature in general, and I do not want to insinuate that, but you always leave it out. So I can only conclude that it is a huge blind spot when you discuss my musings.

I get the distinct impression that you don't think human nature has any bearing on rights, not from what you say, but from what you refuse to acknowledge.

Michael

Michael,

I think it's only in your imagination that anyone is "ignoring the issue of the nature of children as compared to adults, or human nature in general." I'm unaware of any rights theorist who ignores this. And I haven't ignored it; indeed, I succinctly summarized the progression of child maturation in my post #221.

As to your repeated charge of people taking rights as primary, or alternately "[p]ositive and negative rights applied to children as a primary," Laure asked in a post three above if anyone understands what you mean by the second phrasing. I don't. And near as I can attempt to "intuit" what you mean by the more general taking rights as primary, I haven't seen anyone here who does that. There are folks in the world at large -- quite a number of them -- who take "rights," their meaning thereof, as intrinsic, claiming for example that animals have intrinsic rights and that there's something intrinsic about the "good" of the natural world uninterfered with by man. But none of those folks is on this list.

Ellen

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Edited April 1, 2008 by Ellen Stuttle

[merjet]

Positive and negative rights applied to children as a primary.

Too many people to cite.

Michael, my question and request was not about "positive and negative rights applied to children." It was this claim of yours:

Basing any ethical theory on volition alone, severed from the living organism, is a mind-body dichotomy (to use the jargon).

No need to cop out with "too many". One or two, the bigger the better, will suffice.

To anticipate a possible reply, I believe Rand would say a newborn has a right to life (not to be murdered, at least). Yet the volitional capacity of a newborn is little or none. Hence, Rand's position could not be based on volition alone.

Edited April 1, 2008 by Merlin Jetton

[Brant Gaede]

Investigation into human nature as a foundation for rights theory begins and stops with "Man is the rational animal."

Brant,

This cuts right to the heart of the conceptual base of rights.

I agree with this, but I do not agree with ignoring the animal part, as is normal. (I am not saying you do this.)

Man's volition is attached to a living organism. Even without volition, that living organism has a specific nature. Human values not only serve man's volition, but also serve that living organism. Otherwise, there is no volition.

Basing any ethical theory on volition alone, severed from the living organism, is a mind-body dichotomy (to use the jargon).

Michael,

I'm glad you agree with me, but why did you otherwise write as if you didn't? I can see how you can drive people nutso. Man's volition is not served, it is used, unless you mean eating food and drinking water keeps a man and thus his volition alive. Sure you can base an ethical theory--all ethical theories--on volition alone--the other stuff is implicit--in fact you have to do this or it won't make any sense. Dogs don't have or need ethical theories. But based on is not the last word. A house is more than its foundation.

--Brant

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Laure,

Individual rights do not derive from the human nature of children.

Michael

Right. They derive from the human nature of normal adults. So?

Laure,

So the following must follow by logic:

1. Individual rights as defined by Objectivism do not apply to children, only adults, or

2. Children are not human beings;

or worse,

3. Individual rights derive from human nature and do not derive from human nature (A is A and not A).

There is the logical fallacy.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Merlin,

Anyone who claims positive and negative rights apply to children (I believe the terms "from birth" and "inalienable" are normally used when things crank up a notch) as the only proper form of ensuring their right to life is guilty of a mind-body dichotomy at the definition level.

So let's start with you, if you want a specific name to fight about. I already called you on mixing up contexts on this exact point.

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

P.S. I believe there are legitimate positive rights, which are quite limited in scope. The U.S. Constitution includes a positive right to a fair trial, which has been extended to legal representation. An infant has a positive right to being cared for by its parents or other caretakers who have taken on the obligation. The scope is not as broad as rights owed by anyone or society.

I think you're incorrect in viewing either as a case of "positive" rights. The fair trial requirement seems to me an obvious case of attempting to safeguard negative rights. In regard to "parents or other caretakers who have taken on the obligation," I think that this is correctly viewed as (implicitly) delegated negative rights. Parents as guardians are rights-surrogates on whom is vested the decision-making and subsistence-acquiring powers which the child can't exercise, gradually relinquishing these powers as the child grows progressively capable of assuming them.

My casting these as "positive rights" may be unconventional, but here is why I did. A "negative right" is a rule about not doing something. For example, respecting X's right to life means Y must refrain from murdering X. On the other hand, if X is the accused, some Y's have to do something in order to afford X a fair trial. It is not simply refraining from doing something. Similar for the infant. The parents or other caretakers must do something to care for the infant, not simply refrain. In A Life of One's Own David Kelley said positive rights "impose on others positive obligations to which they did not consent and which cannot be traced to any voluntary act." The case of parents and child can be traced to a voluntary act, so my use of "positive rights" differed from Kelley's. It's not so clear how Kelley's "voluntary act" stipulation applies in affording a fair trial.

Merlin,

I really don't want to get into the intracacies of rights theory and the various problems which can result probably no matter how carefully definitions are worded. I understand your reasoning, but I think it's a dangerous way of defining, better to stick to "positive"/"negative" as divided by "unchosen obligation"/(at least implicit) "consent." In regard to a fair trail, as I said I think what applies there is safeguarding the negative right of not being punished without established due cause. It's a precaution to attempt to ensure due cause.

The context of NIOF is primarily the interaction of normal humans past some minimal age, and often between adults. Preventing a child from running onto a busy highway is the right to life trumping NIOF.

Again, I think that that way of stating the issue is incorrect -- both because of the usage "right to life" and because of your implied meaning of "force." "Force" in non-initiation of "force" doesn't mean "force" as in straightforward physical interference. If it did, for example, then wouldn't it be "IOF" when one person takes measures to prevent someone in the throes of an epileptic seizure from inadvertent injury (the epileptic's control of voluntary muscles being inoperative during the seizure)? Stopping a child who isn't old enough to well understand the danger of running in front of a car, etc., is legitimate protection of the child, not IOF -- just as holding out a restraining arm instead of taking the possibly fatality-producing time of relying on a verbal warning to an adult stepping into the street without noticing an approaching car wouldn't be IOF.

In retrospect "right to life" wasn't a good choice of words. "Saving the child's life" is better. You say saving the child's life is not IOF. Why not? It seems you are trying to confine "force" to "malicious physical force" or similar, whereas I meant simply "physical force". Saving the child's life is initiating physical force.

No, my point is that "force" in IOF doesn't mean straightforward physical force, whether malicious or otherwise. It means interfering with exercise of judgment. In the sort of examples such as an epileptic seizure -- or here's another, moving an accident victim who's unconscious; you could lengthily add to these sorts of examples -- or stopping someone from an ill-considered act which poses immediate threat to life, I think the physically force-using action doesn't qualify as interfering with exercise of judgment, although in the latter examples one is overriding someone's momentary bad judgment. It can rapidly become tricky: What of preventing someone from jumping off a bridge? Is that IOF or not? And many, many other complexities and questions. You were there, yes, when this kind of issue was debated nearly ad infinitum on Old Atlantis, and then again periodically on A_II? There are murky areas no matter how one defines "force" in IOF. But my opinion is that it's the interference with exercise of judgment which is the key point, not the physical action qua action.

Ellen

___

[merjet]

So the following must follow by logic:

1. Individual rights as defined by Objectivism do not apply to children, only adults, or

2. Children are not human beings;

. . .

There is the logical fallacy.

Michael

No fallacy. A newborn has a right to life. If you hold that is not Rand's position, then cite where she says "a newborn has no rights" or the like.

[Ellen Stuttle]

[...] ensuring [children's] right to life [...].

There, in a single phrase, is what I think is at the root of Michael's problems with O'ist/libertarian/classical liberal rights theory: a desire to ensure what isn't ensurable. (Plus of course there's the problem of what he means by "right to life.")

Ellen

PS: Merlin, please see #240 in case you missed it while cross-posting.

___

Edited April 1, 2008 by Ellen Stuttle

[Wolf DeVoon]

A newborn has a right to life.

Because why?

W.

[tjohnson]

A newborn has a right to life.

Because why?

W.

I agree. It only has a right if it is granted that right by those with the power to do so in the circumstances under which the baby is born. There was a story on the radio today about all these newborns in Kenya or somewhere that are a result of incest and the mothers leave them in ditches etc. because it is considered to bring bad karma to your life by keeping them around. So what difference does it make when some philosopher or legislator on the other side of the world says babies have a right to life? Of course it's a nice sentiment, something to aim for, that's about it.

[merjet]

A newborn has a right to life.

Because why?

W.

Ask Rand.

[Brant Gaede]

A newborn has a right to life.

Because why?

W.

Ask Rand.

No! Don't!

--Brant

[Brant Gaede]

Laure,

Individual rights do not derive from the human nature of children.

Michael

Right. They derive from the human nature of normal adults. So?

Laure,

So the following must follow by logic:

1. Individual rights as defined by Objectivism do not apply to children, only adults, or

2. Children are not human beings;

or worse,

3. Individual rights derive from human nature and do not derive from human nature (A is A and not A).

There is the logical fallacy.

Michael,

I don't see how these necessarily follow. Laurie just indicated a starting or best reference point. But if any individual human being has a social context, that's all that's necessary for him to have rights to the extent he can exercise them. A baby for instance has a right to cry for his mother. Dad doesn't have a right to hit him to shut him up--or shot him. (Please, let's not start discussing abortion.) Humanity covers birth to death respecting rights. A right not exercised is not a right denied.

--Brant

[Wolf DeVoon]

A newborn has a right to life.

Because why?

W.

Ask Rand.

Ask a dead person?

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

See how it goes?

You would never get this level of confusion down at Sunday School. Religious people have a complete definition of human nature, not one for adults only. Their morality reflects it, too.

I'm not saying I agree, but I have to notice that their premise is more complete. They don't leave out stages of life. This is what holds individualism back. This is why the majority is rarely convinced by the logic of individualism.

Only a certain kind of person seems to be attracted to individualism. It appears to be more of an emotional draw dressed up as an intellectual one than an attraction actually based on logic.

I don't like noticing that fact. In fact, it bothers me. But I can't ignore it, either.

Michael