Altruism

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Now, maybe you didn't mean what you wrote. But you did write it -- three times in the last week.

Ellen,

I meant what I wrote. The way you sound, it seems like I was not clear or trying to make it sound different. No. I meant it.

What's more, care for a child has to come from somewhere else in Objectivism by definition. A child is defined specifically as incapable of taking care of itself.

Where I take issue is that, also, by definition in Objectivism, a child has a right to life. If its means of survivial is not the same as that of an adult, by definition, what does such a right mean? The right to die unaided?

So I stand by what I wrote in the terms I wrote it.

Ironically, I don't believe that an adult stranded on a desert island who encounters an infant would have any obligation because (a.) rights mean nothing to a person outside of a social context, (b.) there are no authorities to take the child to, and (c.) without a government to protect rights, it is basically every man for himself with no one having any rights to speak of. I still think such a person who did not provide aid to an infant would be a bad guy and a monster, but who would be around to obligate him or provide him (or the baby) with any benefits or protection? He would call himself a citizen of what group (country)? Without citizenship and society, he receives no protection for his rights nor bears any obligations.

I am gratified that you acknowledge that I am not suggesting a stranger need do anything more than get a child out of an emergency (if he does not endanger himself) and handed over to the authorities, legal guardians or parents. Obviously we are talking about very short term and very little effort and very little cost. I have no problem at all with such an obligation being a condition of citizenship or even a condition of being a guest of the country. I also have no problem at all with government orphanages when private ones are not available. All this with the following qualification (once again). This is a personal value. I am still working on the philosophy part.

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

All this [your post #175, including your standing by the passages I quoted from you in post #173] with the following qualification (once again). This is a personal value. I am still working on the philosophy part.

While you're working on the philosophy part: You are aware, yes, that you're disagreeing with Rand about "the only proper functions of a government"?

The only proper functions of a government are: the police, to protect you from criminals; the army, to protect you from foreign invaders; and the courts, to protect your property and contracts from breach or fraud by others, to settle disputes by rational rules, according to objective law.

[GS, FNI, 231; pb 183.]

You're proposing -- according to what you've said above -- that the (legitimate) function of government be extended to taking care of children whose parents can't or don't care for them and for whom voluntary alternate care isn't found. Which means that you have no problem with people being taxed to take care of other people's children. (Do you also support compulsory education? You did include teachers as among legal guardians in your "daisy chain of responsibility" -- see the first quote in post #173.)

Ellen

___

[Wolf DeVoon]

without a government to protect rights, it is basically every man for himself with no one having any rights to speak of.

Government produces rights?

Edited March 29, 2008 by Wolf DeVoon

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen,

It is not a matter of agreeing or disagreeing with Rand and this is where the issue gets constantly misunderstood with me. It is a matter of pointing to a contradiction in Rand's model (and the one adopted by Objectivists and libertarians). Either a child is a human being or not. He cannot be one and not be one at the same time. As the saying goes, A is A.

If I disagree with anything, I disagree that a contradiction must be ignored or glossed over with rhetoric to avoid slippery slopes.

As to taxation, I am for a voluntary payment for services taxation model if a viable one can be achieved.

I have no more than a superficial opinion on how or why or if the government should set educational standards for children because I have not considered this in depth. In general terms, I would consider a parent who insists that his child remain illiterate until adulthood to be violating some kind of right of that child. I come from hillbillies and this is more common than you might think. In really backward places, they say a woman's place is to take care of home and famlee so she don't need no buk-larnin'. All that does is put high-falutin' idears in her noggin'. A real man gits his hands dirdy, not laike those sissified edjicated yahoos. (God! Am I ever glad I got out of that culture!)

As an aside, my mother was the first female in her family to receive a high-school diploma. If I can point to any one thing in my parents that fills my heart with pride, that is it. She had an overpowering desire to finish school and she faced enormous opposition. Her mother (my grandmother) was so against this that she locked my mother in a room for a long time and opened it only to feed her. After my mother escaped (with the help of an uncle, who found out about it and became outraged enough to show up and stick his foot in the door), there was a custody case and my grandmother lost custody of my mother, who was awarded to her aunt (my grandfather was no longer in the equation). The judge understood my mother's rights had been violated by her mother. I do too, although I have not fleshed this concept out in philosophical terms.

As to my remark concerning teachers, I was not discussing education, but adult liability. The moment children are in a teacher's classroom or even nearby in the school, he is responsible for those children's welfare during that time. I have never seen the soundness of this policy contested before. I would be flabbergasted if anyone found that to be improper and preferred to let the children fend for themselves, and, for instance, experiment with volatile explosive chemicals or other dangerous materials unsupervised, defend themselves against any adult predators who showed up, take care of their own medical needs when they get sick or injured, etc.

Wolf,

I will set aside your idea of rights not deriving from ethics for the moment (as I still have a lot of thinking to do on it) and answer your question according to my previous premises and best thinking up to now.

A government does not produce rights. In my understanding, a government is part of the concept of rights and falls under it. On the contrary, rights produce government. From what I have observed out in the world and in human history, a government model—all models—always uses a predefined concept of what freedoms and entitlements its citizens are vested with—by virtue of being citizens or guests of the country—and goes about defending and providing them. It calls the whole shebang "rights" in the country's legal documents.

The predefinition of rights is made either by citizens in a convention or something like that and enshrined in a document like a Constitution, or it is handed down by decree from a ruler or ruling council.

Objectivist and libertarian intellectuals have tried to divide the rights issue into freedom of action (negative rights) and entitlements (positive rights), then totally discredit positive rights in order to influence what kind of government will be left over. (One more case of rights producing government.) If positive rights (and I really don't like that term because of how it is emotionally loaded and misused by both defenders and critics to gloss over fundamentals) are found by definition of human nature to be improper to human groups, I have no problem with dismissing them. I think Objectivist and libertarian intellectuals have done a poor job up to now in defining human nature and this is one of the reasons their concept of a negative-rights-only government never gets off the ground with the general public. It certainly has not convinced me and I am highly willing to be convinced and embrace it (but not to the point of swallowing a contradiction wholesale). Emotionally, I want something like that to be true.

One thing is for certain. There is another essential component of rights almost nobody likes to talk about, but it is as true as the sun rises in the East and sets in the West. I cannot look and see it and pretend it doesn't exist, so once again, I go into the hot-seat.

An individual right that is not defended by force against infringement is a word and nothing more. Without force backing it up, it doesn't matter who or what produces it because it means nothing concrete and is ignored by the first person who comes along and wants to infringe it (if "infringe" can be said to have any meaning at all in this context).

Michael

[cjsmall]

An individual right that is not defended by force against infringement is a word and nothing more. Without force backing it up, it doesn't matter who or what produces it because it means nothing concrete and is ignored by the first person who comes along and wants to infringe it (if "infringe" can be said to have any meaning at all in this context).

Since the government is supposed to be the sole instrument of retaliatory force, then by the above logic, is it even possible for the government to violate your rights? If so, where then is the source of force that will defend you from the government's actions? If there is such a source of force, does it then not stand without the necessity of postulating a government of laws and retaliatory force? If so, then rights must come from some other source than a sanctioning government. Possibly the concept of human rights is independent of the presence or absence of retaliatory force. Maybe the idea that it is just to use retaliatory force against others who initiate force in order to violate one's rights flows as a practical necessity from the concept of rights and not the other way around. And if the concept of rights exists independent of the need or justification to take action to defend them, then maybe the fact that at various stages of our development and life as human beings we find ourselves unable to properly act in service of all of our needs for survival is simply an inconvenient truth that we must accept.

Regards,

--

Jeff

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

A government does not produce rights. In my understanding, a government is part of the concept of rights and falls under it. On the contrary, rights produce government.

... then by the above logic, is it even possible for the government to violate your rights? If so, where then is the source of force that will defend you from the government's actions? If there is such a source of force, does it then not stand without the necessity of postulating a government of laws and retaliatory force? If so, then rights must come from some other source than a sanctioning government.

(My emphasis.)

sigh...

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

Michael,

I'm not desirous of continuing to argue with you -- or with anyone else for that matter -- on the issue of children's rights. I have many other pursuits on which I want to be spending my limited computer-reading time. So I'll conclude with a few general comments:

(1) I can agree that as a total system, Objectivism is deficient (in some respects outright mistaken) in its depiction of "human nature."

(2) However, where you get the idea that there's "a contradiction in Rand's model" between claiming that a child is and is not "a human being" continues to elude me. Murray Rothbard, I think, argued that children are "property" -- I'm not sure if I'm correct in attributing such an argument to him. But Rand didn't say anything like that.

(3) Ironically, Rand's theory of rights is the feature of her total system in which I think she produced the fewest and the least serious verbal and/or conceptual mishaps; thus I'm in the position of coming much closer than you to agreeing with Rand in that area, whereas in other areas where you support her (most notably her epistemology and her derivation of ethics) I think her mishaps are extensive. (We're probably about equally critical, though not necessarily for the same reasons, in regard to her aesthetics.)

(4) In regard to "negative" and "positive" rights, I agree with Rand that any claim to "positive" rights contradicts "negative" rights; or to put that another way, any claim of an "entitlement" owed to one person imposes an "unchosen obligation" on someone(s) else.

(5) I agree that "a government is part of the concept of rights and falls under it. [And that] rights produce government."

(6) In regard to financial support of care facilities for children whose parents can't or don't provide for them, you write: "As to taxation, I am for a voluntary payment for services taxation model if a viable one can be achieved." Supposing one could be achieved, then why, in your view, would government facilities be needed as middle-institutions? If adequate voluntary contributions were forthcoming (as I think they would be), why not go direct to non-government-established care facilities?

(7) In regard to compulsory education, I don't see how you could avoid that end result on your approach.

Unless you respond with something which I feel obliged to answer, I'll break off there and leave you to your cogitations. I'll just add, lest anyone has been misunderstanding me on this point: I am by no means unconcerned about the well-being of children. However, I agree with the Objectivist viewpoint that maximum freedom consistent with social living would produce the best results for children as well as for adults.

Ellen

___

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen,

I don't mind you leaving the debate. I merely don't like you misrepresenting what I have written. Your post above has a few clunkers, but since they are repititions of before (or outright absurd affirmations about my views), I will limit this post to only one:

(6) In regard to financial support of care facilities for children whose parents can't or don't provide for them, you write: "As to taxation, I am for a voluntary payment for services taxation model if a viable one can be achieved." Supposing one could be achieved, then why, in your view, would government facilities be needed as middle-institutions? If adequate voluntary contributions were forthcoming (as I think they would be), why not go direct to non-government-established care facilities?

Why, in my view, would "government facilities be needed as middle-institutions"? (The words in quotation marks are your words.) Didn't you read the part where I said I have no problem with government orphanages when private ones are not available? If private ones are not available, as I wrote, see here:

I also have no problem at all with government orphanages when private ones are not available.

... then how can a child "go direct to non-government-established care facilities?" In the hypothesis, they are not available.

As I wrote.

Clearly.

And if I made that qualification, why are you asking me a question starting with "in your view" as if I wrote something else entirely? What is to be gained by such tactics? Do you really need to misrepresent what I have written in order to promote your views? I remember you being better at discussion than that.

Your post gets worse, but I am weary of saying that a cow is a four-legged animal and reading questions as to why on earth I think it is a six-legged one.

Michael

[tjohnson]

You have to differentiate between an expression or statement of a right and the application of it in reality. As Micheal said we can have a statement of a right on the books but it may not be guaranteed in practice without some public institution forcing it's application.

[Wolf DeVoon]

10 pages, 180 replies, thoughtful stuff in the main. I need to noodle a bit more before I respond again. In the meantime, please consider that "Every morning, the state mangles reason and justice to perform simple tasks that private actors (a) would not undertake because the project is stupid; or (b ) could do faster, cheaper, and better than government; or (c ) are implicitly required to do anyway, since the state has no competence except that which is supplied by private contractors. All the U.S. politicians and bureaucrats combined could not repair a flush toilet." Defacto Anarchy

Edited March 30, 2008 by Wolf DeVoon

[Ellen Stuttle]

Ellen,

I don't mind you leaving the debate. I merely don't like you misrepresenting what I have written. Your post above has a few clunkers, but since they are repititions of before (or outright absurd affirmations about my views), I will limit this post to only one:

(6) In regard to financial support of care facilities for children whose parents can't or don't provide for them, you write: "As to taxation, I am for a voluntary payment for services taxation model if a viable one can be achieved." Supposing one could be achieved, then why, in your view, would government facilities be needed as middle-institutions? If adequate voluntary contributions were forthcoming (as I think they would be), why not go direct to non-government-established care facilities?

Why, in my view, would "government facilities be needed as middle-institutions"? (The words in quotation marks are your words.) Didn't you read the part where I said I have no problem with government orphanages when private ones are not available? If private ones are not available, as I wrote, see here:

I also have no problem at all with government orphanages when private ones are not available.

... then how can a child "go direct to non-government-established care facilities?" In the hypothesis, they are not available.

Michael, in the post to which I was replying you said that you favored "a voluntary payment for services taxation model if a viable one can be achieved." That is the hypothesis to which I am referring. If the voluntary contributions were forthcoming on this hypothesis, THEN why would any government care institutions be needed instead of sending voluntary funds direct to voluntary institutions? Why would there need to be "payment for services" through voluntary taxation instead of direct? I assumed in your earlier comment you were talking about present circumstances, not your ideal goal.

I have no idea what else you think I misrepresented, especially since I took pains attempting to state correctly what you've said. Ah, well....

Ellen

___

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen,

I presume you have read some proposals for voluntary taxation. If you have, then you know that they are not usually proposed in the same manner as buying a loaf of bread: you pay for a loaf of bread, you get that product and only that. The ones I have read function more in the form of a club membership where you, as a paying member, are entitled to use certain services like the courts to sue for breach of contract, but other government functions that cannot work like that (like the military) are paid for with the excess amounts left over from such taxes.

I see no reason to exclude orphanages in such a structure and I do not understand your question as to why they would be needed. But to answer, government orphanages would be needed if they are needed (meaning if no private orphanages are avaliable, like I wrote). If not needed (meaning that the private orphanages were sufficient to guarantee the right to life of the abandoned children), then not. Thus there would be no reason to spend the money. It's a back-up to ensure the right to life of abandoned or abused children who fall within the jurisdiction of that country. The government would be protecting the rights of its citizens, as is its function.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Wolf,

I agree more than you can imagine about the incompetence of governments. I lived in a society (Brazil) with the largest number of government owned and mixed economy companies the world has ever seen and watched up close—by living there and feeling the effects on my daily affairs—what happened when much of that was privatized.

Changing gears, I have another issue that has been floating around in my noggin and it just won't leave me alone.

When Ellen used the phrase "compulsory education" I received a shock of dissonance in my mind. This is a standard phrase, so it should not have prompted that effect, but the phrase sounded so incomplete to me that it has kept on echoing in my mind in the darnedest moments.

Together with that phrase is another that started haunting me: "kept in ignorance." We say that a person has been "kept in ignorance" when he should have been given (or permitted) exposure to something he was prohibited from contact so he would be aware of it.

This makes me dig once again into the Objectivist view of human nature, especially the part about learning and volition. In general, there is much I disagree with in Greg Nyquist's book, Ayn Rand Contra Human Nature, but there is one part of Rand's view he contested that I agree with: his criticism of the tabula rasa concept in terms of knowledge. He listed a whole lot of examples, from being right or left handed, to learning to see, to learning to speak and so forth that are not chosen, but develop non-volitionally.

Rand's contention is that learning to see is volitional, even though a baby has no control over it. I don't know what that is supposed to mean, but there it is. How is something you can't choose supposed to be volitional? That part even bothered me when I was a Randroid. Nyquist contends (if I remember correctly) that a baby cannot choose to be blind. I agree. How could I not agree? A baby has no choice but to learn to see. Developing sight is part of its nature—part of the natural growth cycle.

But I see the truth in the middle, i.e., there is a part of learning that is automatic, developmental, inherent, instinctual, etc., and, together with this, a volitional capacity also develops and controls how and to what degree to focus that skill or behavior. I believe this to be correct in terms of concept formation, also. Not all concept formation is choice and in the beginning it is almost no choice. But a faculty of choice develops and grows over time. Fully developed, a person can choose to engage his rational faculty to the fullest capacity at any given moment as well as turn it off as much as the automatic functions of his mind will allow.

In this respect, learning a language is not something a baby chooses either. A normal healthy baby cannot choose not to speak. Something inside it inherently compels it to grow a language of some sort, just as it grows its body to larger and larger.

We would call a person who kept a baby in a pot to make it deformed over time (as given in "The Comprachicos" by Rand) a violator of that baby's rights by mutilating it over time. What do we call a person who insists that his baby, then child, grows up illiterate? Is developing a language a part of normal human nature or is permanent illiteracy man's natural state?

For the concept of "compulsory education" to be valid as an imposition of force (on the literacy level), we would have to start with the premise that, without volition, total ignorance (tabula rasa) is man's natural state, and he learns everything by choice only. In this case, it makes sense to think in terms of positive and negative rights. Let the infant act and choose to be illiterate if he wants to be. But what if he had no choice about that part of his development? What if his natural state is to develop a language and he cannot control whether he wants to or not? What if he wants to because he has to by his nature? Wouldn't prohibiting him to learn the language used in the society he was born in a violation of his nature and his rights in that society? Isn't he being prohibited to live among his peers according to his nature and theirs?

As I stated above, Rand took the volition idea so far as to claim that learning to see was volitional, in which case, blindness would have be man's nature unless he added volition. I cannot, for the life of me, agree with this. I am no scientist, but just looking at the development of any baby will give you enough evidence to see that this is not true. Even the severely mentally impaired learn to see. Animals that supposedly have no volition learn to see. (Apropos, I have only seen the argument that animals cannot choose in Objectivism. I have not seen that clunker anywhere else. But I digress.) It is weird to suppose that man is an animal, but differs from all other seeing animals in this respect. That contradicts Objectivist concept formation.

So I am thinking that the concept of "compulsory education" in society should be balanced by the concept of "compulsory ignorance." I fully agree that an imposed 12 grade school curriculum is "compulsory education" in the meaning of the term that should be resisted—one that actually violates rights. By what standard do these people choose the knowledge they force on children? But "compulsory ignorance" is also a violation of a child's rights if he is not allowed to develop a minimum of the language skills his own nature impels him to develop.

Deciding on where volition legitimately kicks in is the real continental divide between positive and negative rights, not the use of force. The use of force only applies where volition is valid. Where volition is not valid, the standard does not apply as a fundament, although it might apply in some circumstances. A good example would be restraining a young child from running out into a busy highway. The child's volition and learning are not sufficiently developed for him to be responsible enough to choose correctly without seriously endangering himself. Thus, he would not be able to claim that his right to freedom of action, so long as he did not violate another's right to freedom of action, had been violated by such restraint.

I think education and rights are a bit more complicated than an on and off switch. So is human nature.

Just mulling for now.

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

For the concept of "compulsory education" to be valid as an imposition of force (on the literacy level), we would have to start with the premise that, without volition, total ignorance (tabula rasa) is man's natural state, and he learns everything by choice only. In this case, it makes sense to think in terms of positive and negative rights. Let the infant act and choose to be illiterate if he wants to be. But what if he had no choice about that part of his development? What if his natural state is to develop a language and he cannot control whether he wants to or not? What if he wants to because he has to by his nature? Wouldn't prohibiting him to learn the language used in the society he was born in a violation of his nature and his rights in that society? Isn't he being prohibited to live among his peers according to his nature and theirs?

Two definitional points:

(1) I don't know what meaning you're using for "positive and negative rights" there. I don't see the connection to the standard meaning I was using.

(2) Being "illiterate" doesn't mean not learning a language. It means not knowing how to read and write. (Or it's sometimes used broadly for being uneducated, either generally or in a particular field, or for lacking refinement in linguistic use; but the basic meaning pertains to reading and writing.) Except in cases of severe handicap -- such as serious brain damage, or being born both deaf and blind and not having an "Annie Sullivan"-type teacher available -- any child who is raised in social circumstances will learn language. Street children will even develop their own patois.

Ellen

Addendum:

Deciding on where volition legitimately kicks in is the real continental divide between positive and negative rights, not the use of force.

Michael, really, you're using the terms with different meanings than those used, as best I recall, by everyone else in the discussion. The difference between "positive" and "negative" rights is the difference between "entitlements" and "off-limits." A "positive" right is something others are considered morally obligated to do FOR you; a "negative" right is what they aren't allowed to do TO you. If I were to claim a "right to healthcare," that's a "positive" right claim. If I say, no, you're not morally allowed to drag me to a doctor's office, that's a "negative" right claim. Force is involved in both cases, in the first case force or its threat against those required to pay the bill, in the second case directly against my person.

Ellen

___

Edited March 31, 2008 by Ellen Stuttle

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen,

I am mulling, not preaching.

My definition of positive and negative rights is not at odds with what you said. If you read carefully, you will see that I stated them correctly. I am looking at things from a different angle, though, so I am not using them as a premise of human nature. I even thought I was clear earlier. I stated explicitly that I rejected them as a premise of human nature in my present examination of premises. You seem to have difficulty grasping that. So let me try again.

I understand that positive rights are entitlements and negative rights are freedom of action without interference from others.

There.

See? I understand.

Now the next part.

I reject positive and negative rights as a premise of human nature.

Woah! How is that possible? It doesn't matter. I do. I am stating that I do. Right here. Right now. I have stated this before, but I am doing it again. I reject them as a premise of human nature,

If rights are supposed to derive from human nature, I have decided to examine human nature. I have found that positive and negative rights do not explain human nature at all, nor survival means, when matters like the child state of human life are examined.

Thus, once again, I reject positive and negative rights as a premise of human nature.

I don't know how to say that any clearer. So I will have to leave it at that.

Nah... one more time and maybe you will get it. I reject positive and negative rights as a premise of human nature. Not that I use a differnt meaning of them. I reject them as a premise in my present examination.

But this is the kind of thing I complain about with you misrepresenting what I write. You say I am using a different meaning, proceed to give an elementary lesson on what the standard meaning is (for the upteenth time), and forget to mention where I presented the meaning differently, as you allege. The fact is I have never presented the meaning of positive and negative rights differently. I have given the standard meaning of them several times and even called you on this very misrepresentation before. Yet you persist in the error.

I have no idea what you gain by this.

btw - I like how you always leave out the part pertaining to the kids, human nature and the other ideas I am mulling over. But you sure can talk elementary talk about positive and negative rights and repeat up a storm...

Michael

[Wolf DeVoon]

Michael,

Just a second, I'll be right back.

Ellen,

You're quite right about the standard language of 'positive' and 'negative' rights in libertarian and Objectivist literature. I respect your contribution and always read what you say with eagerness, time zones notwithstanding.

Michael is plumbing new territory, and I broadly support and applaud his effort, although I've made things more difficult thus far. Perhaps we can agree that private voluntary social welfare is better than coercive government. What means better? More effective? Less wrong? None of the above, truthfully. Barbara kicked off this fascinating, wide-ranging discussion by quoting Auden's churlish condundrum: We're put on earth to help others, but it's unclear what others are here for? Let's take that as a basic line of inquiry.

There is broad global consensus that everyone should be fed, sheltered, educated, healed, employed, enlightened, enfranchised -- you name it. Currently, I believe it is the case that more people are alive today (6.5 billion) than all the people who ever lived before. Is that a good thing? Is mass survival, mass nutrition an end in itself? Sounds like a McDonald's/Monsanto mission statement.

Michael,

Thank you for mentioning The Comprachicos, the making of monsters. That particular essay saved my life. However, I'm not persuaded that Ayn Rand approved of my life being saved. I think she would have preferred it be someone else who was helped by her skills, abilities and best efforts to save all God's chillen except Eddie Willers, Cheryl Taggart, and Wolf DeVoon. Not trying to be comical. The core question is who to feed. clothe, and shelter?

a. Everybody

b. Babies and small children everywhere on the planet

c. Your own kids and neighbor kids

d. Foundlings

e. HIV-positive babies

f. none of the above

????

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

The core question is who to feed. clothe, and shelter?

a. Everybody

b. Babies and small children everywhere on the planet

c. Your own kids and neighbor kids

d. Foundlings

e. HIV-positive babies

f. none of the above

????

Wolf,

Why not make it a legal question, just as rights are (using my premise: rights produce government)? As it stands right now, I think citizens in the infant stage who are within the jurisdictioin of the country should be assured the right to develop into adulthood without being gravely injured or killed by common negligence (starvation, lack of simple medical attnetion, etc.). I don't mean rare or devastating diseases or fancy foods or anything like that. Just simple basic care so normal healthy infants can grow into normal adults, whereby their rational volition actually does become their instrument of survival. And all this in the order of guardianship and liability as I stated before.

With respect to children outside the country, for as tragic as it might be, they fall under other jurisdictions, so they do not have the same protection for rights as USA citizens do. If matters get too bad, with genocide, mass starvation, etc.,. I have no problem with stepping in and establishing a new structure based on our country's idea of rights. Barring that, they are not the proper concern of our government. Our citizens are.

As to illiteracy, if we were still in the Wild West era, I would not find this so serious. But we are living right in the middle of the Information Revolution. I think it is a crime—and a serious one—to purposely keep a child illiterate in that context. I do not approve of an adult having the right to do that to a child. (I don't know the philosophy for this yet, but I am thinking it over.)

Michael

[Wolf DeVoon]

Lemme think a bit about that one, whether rights produce government. Very important question.

W.

[merjet]

I reject positive and negative rights as a premise of human nature.

...

If rights are supposed to derive from human nature, I have decided to examine human nature. I have found that positive and negative rights do not explain human nature at all, nor survival means, when matters like the child state of human life are examined.

Thus, once again, I reject positive and negative rights as a premise of human nature.

Who do you know that holds rights as a premise of human nature? Rights are not meant to explain human nature. It's common to hold that rights are derived from human nature. To say that rights are both a premise of human nature and derived from human nature is some sort of double-talk. One derives C from or based on premise(s) P.

P.S. I believe there are legitimate positive rights, which are quite limited in scope. The U.S. Constitution includes a positive right to a fair trial, which has been extended to legal representation. An infant has a positive right to being cared for by its parents or other caretakers who have taken on the obligation. The scope is not as broad as rights owed by anyone or society.

Edited March 31, 2008 by Merlin Jetton

[Laure]

Michael, you can say "I reject positive and negative rights as a premise of human nature" again and again, but it never makes any more sense than it did the first time. Merlin is right.

Positive and negative rights are basically ways of classifying the definitions that people have of the concept of rights. In Rand's definition, only negative rights are truly rights. Negative rights are logically self-consistent, in that one person's right never necessitates the violation of another person's right.

Positive "rights" are the result of the corruption of the concept of rights, by those who want "rights" to mean, "any stuff that it's nice for people to have", thus implying that society has the obligation to provide all of this stuff. You can't mix positive and negative rights; it doesn't work logically.

If you think about it, positive rights are logically self-consistent, too, but the world we get by saying that there are no negative rights, only positive ones, isn't pretty. In the world of positive rights, everyone has the right to food, clothing, health care, on and on, but nobody has the right to be left alone, because it's everyone's duty to provide these positive rights for everyone else.

Michael, you seem to be very concerned that in a society that implements the negative rights model, there would be children and helpless people who would not fare well. If you look at it pragmatically for a minute, though, do the children and helpless people of the world really fare better in societies that are based on the positive rights model? Or does the negative rights model facilitate human progress to such an extent that we have plenty of "leftovers", plenty of charity, to take care of these people for whom negative rights are irrelevant?

(* Disclaimer - this is just me talking, not meaning to represent the Objectivist Position *)

The question of where rights "come from" is an interesting one. The two extremes are "endowed by our Creator" and "arbitrary social convention"! I met a guy once who was of the "arbitrary social convention" school of thought, which I had never really been exposed to before. He did kind of have a point. If the majority of people in a society are of the mind that there is no such thing as rights... is there such a thing as rights in that society? You could say there are, but it wouldn't make any difference - as someone is clubbing you over the head and taking your property, you could complain to him about your rights being violated, but in such a case, if you do "have rights", they don't do you any good. There is no difference between having rights that are consistently violated and not having rights at all. Or rather, the only difference is whether you, the victim, feel indignation or not!

I think rights are a human invention that enables us to live in a society with other people in a peaceful manner. We have the concept of rights because most people want to live peacefully in a society with others. If most people didn't want this, nobody would have thought up the concept, and we'd all still be clubbing each other over the head and taking each other's stuff.

Procedural rights such as the right to a fair trial and the right to vote are really different animals. It'd be better if we used a different word than "rights" in this case, but I don't think there is one.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

It's common to hold that rights are derived from human nature. To say that rights are both a premise of human nature and derived from human nature is some sort of double-talk.

Merlin,

This is exactly my point. The standard argument is that rights are derived from human nature. I agree with this. But then the positive/negative rights thing gets into it somehow and this is treated as an all-inclusive absolute reserved for premises.

Which is more important to the concept of rights for you: human nature or the categorization into positive and negative?

In Rand's definition, only negative rights are truly rights.

Laure,

Why? Because this is derived from human nature? Or is another reason? What do you think?

I think rights are a human invention that enables us to live in a society with other people in a peaceful manner. We have the concept of rights because most people want to live peacefully in a society with others.

This is one of the most reasonable statements I have read in this debate. There is profound truth in it.

Michael

[merjet]

This is exactly my point. The standard argument is that rights are derived from human nature. I agree with this. But then the positive/negative rights thing gets into it somehow and this is treated as an all-inclusive absolute reserved for premises.

How and by whom? You didn't answer my first question in post 193. As I see it, the positive/negative distinction is a premise to further specify what particular rights should exist, not to explain human nature.

Which is more important to the concept of rights for you: human nature or the categorization into positive and negative?

Both are important. And non-initiation of force is an important component of rights. If an alleged right requires the initiation of force, it's prima facie suspect.

I think rights are a human invention that enables us to live in a society with other people in a peaceful manner. We have the concept of rights because most people want to live peacefully in a society with others.

This is one of the most reasonable statements I have read in this debate. There is profound truth in it.

Yes, and living peacefully in a society with others requires the non-initiation of force.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

This is exactly my point. The standard argument is that rights are derived from human nature. I agree with this. But then the positive/negative rights thing gets into it somehow and this is treated as an all-inclusive absolute reserved for premises.

How and by whom? You didn't answer my first question in post 193.

Merlin,

Are we reading the same boards? To answer your question ("Who do you know that holds rights as a premise of human nature?"), you, for instance, are one. See below.

Which is more important to the concept of rights for you: human nature or the categorization into positive and negative?

Both are important. And non-initiation of force is an important component of rights. If an alleged right requires the initiation of force, it's prima facie suspect.

Then, in your view, is it safe to say that you do not think rights derive from human nature, but also from NIOF? If so, you are giving NIOF the same fundamental weight as human nature to the formation of the concept. (btw - As I understand it, the categorization into positive and negative is based on NIOF.)

What do you do with your concept when both fundaments collide and prompt a contradiction? From what do you derive NIOF if not from human nature, anyway? If you give NIOF the same weight as human nature in rights for humans, are you not essentially basing human nature on it as some kind of metaphysical law?

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

Ellen,

I am mulling, not preaching.

My definition of positive and negative rights is not at odds with what you said. If you read carefully, you will see that I stated them correctly. I am looking at things from a different angle, though, so I am not using them as a premise of human nature. I even thought I was clear earlier. I stated explicitly that I rejected them as a premise of human nature in my present examination of premises. You seem to have difficulty grasping that. So let me try again.

I understand that positive rights are entitlements and negative rights are freedom of action without interference from others.

There.

See? I understand.

Now the next part.

I reject positive and negative rights as a premise of human nature.

Woah! How is that possible? It doesn't matter. I do. I am stating that I do. Right here. Right now. I have stated this before, but I am doing it again. I reject them as a premise of human nature,

If rights are supposed to derive from human nature, I have decided to examine human nature. I have found that positive and negative rights do not explain human nature at all, nor survival means, when matters like the child state of human life are examined.

Thus, once again, I reject positive and negative rights as a premise of human nature.

I don't know how to say that any clearer. So I will have to leave it at that.

Nah... one more time and maybe you will get it. I reject positive and negative rights as a premise of human nature. Not that I use a differnt meaning of them. I reject them as a premise in my present examination.

Michael,

You claim to "understand that positive rights are entitlements and negative rights are freedom of action without interference from others," but none of the rest of what you said above demonstrates any understanding of this differentiation. Instead you make statements in which I see no meaning, to which I can only say, "Huh?" You "reject positive and negative rights as a premise of human nature," you state. But who's saying anything about "positive and negative rights [being] a premise of human nature"? What does your rejected "premise" have to do with the definition of "negative" and "postive" rights you say you understand?

But this is the kind of thing I complain about with you misrepresenting what I write. You say I am using a different meaning, proceed to give an elementary lesson on what the standard meaning is (for the upteenth time), and forget to mention where I presented the meaning differently, as you allege. The fact is I have never presented the meaning of positive and negative rights differently. I have given the standard meaning of them several times and even called you on this very misrepresentation before. Yet you persist in the error.

See my earlier post.

I quoted two places in your post where clearly you weren't talking about what the rest of us are. Following the second quote from you (in the "Addendum") I explained. You there differentiated "positive" and "negative" on the basis of force, but this isn't a differenda as the rest of us are using the terms. Legitimate recourse to force is considered to pertain by those supporting either type.

I have no idea what you gain by this.

Maybe you might try the hypothesis that I am attempting to explain to you one of the factors which result in communication between you and me (and several others) failing on the topic.

btw - I like how you always leave out the part pertaining to the kids, human nature and the other ideas I am mulling over. But you sure can talk elementary talk about positive and negative rights and repeat up a storm...

Michael, in regard to your various -- I suppose you might think of them as "foundational" -- mullings, I have yet to see any kind of logical thread. Occasional statements you make I agree with. But the "picture" you're presenting remains in my view foggily out of focus. I can't speak to whatever it is, since I have no image of a "something there" to speak to.

Ellen

___

[Laure]

OK, I don't know what your last post means at all, Michael. I think you're using the word "premise" in a funny way, but I'm not sure it would be productive to try to figure it out.

How about this? Long ago, humans decided that they liked living in groups based on voluntary cooperation, and they decided that they would punish those individuals who wanted to prey on other humans. The concept of rights was thought up by these people. After all, is it too much to ask to tell people that they must leave other people alone? It's nice and logically consistent, too. If Person A violates the rights of Person B, he's in effect saying that he doesn't recognize the validity of the concept of "rights", so let's let Person A suffer the consequences of that view and throw him in the can!

Some humans find the concept of "getting something for nothing" appealing. These humans glommed on to the concept of "rights" and decided to use the same word for their concept of "something for nothing." Now, they participate in protests and hold up little signs demanding their right to food, clothing, shelter, education, health care, etc., etc.

Both of these are aspects of "human nature." But, let's bring the discussion back to the wider nature of reality. Again, is it too much to ask to tell people that they must leave other people alone? That seems reasonable enough, not too hard to abide by, and doesn't lead to any logical contradictions.

On the other hand, is it too much to ask that everyone be provided food, clothing, shelter, education, health care? If we have these rights, and I'm unproductive, and you're productive, doesn't it follow that I have a right to your stuff? Where does that lead, logically?

With negative rights, if I want something, I go out and earn it or trade for it. With positive rights, I wait for someone else to earn it and give it to me, while sitting around and whining that my rights are being violated by the nature of reality.

Michael, you keep saying that there's a contradiction involved, in that negative rights don't reflect all of human nature, or something to that effect. But the contradiction is not in the concept of negative rights, it's only that humans have varied natures. It is human nature to want to live together peacefully, but it's also human nature to want something for nothing. Bring it back to the wider nature of reality. Negative rights work because if everyone decides to live together peacefully, it works. Positive rights don't work because if everyone decides to sit around and wait to have their rights bestowed upon them, it doesn't happen.

Another aspect of human nature is that some humans, such as children, are helpless. Negative rights are not enough to ensure their survival. This seems to be what's bothering you, but I don't understand why. Negative rights don't ensure children's survival. So what? It doesn't mean there is any contradiction inherent in the concept. Can't we just say that the child's parents are obligated to take care of him, and that our own sense of "species solidarity" will naturally prompt strangers to aid children in distress?