Altruism

[Brant Gaede]

Brant,

I was talking about the component of concepts made up of abstractions on a metaphysical level.

"A metaphysical level" implies a plural--"levels."

--Brant

[Brant Gaede]

Brant,

Talk to Rand about it. She's the one who said one branch of philosophy rests on the other and that axiomatic concepts are the broadest of all abstractions. I can find plenty of quotes if you like. Measurement is a fundamental part of Rand's theory of concept formation. (It is the main tool she proposes to effect the differentiation and integration of referrents in the abstraction process.)

Michael,

All concepts are purely epistemological. Their referents are either directly or ultimately metaphysical. I find some of your locutions muddying the water. I can't talk to Rand until Arizona grants me my seance license. If you could give me one or two Rand quotes that would be helpful and interesting; I can't get my hands on my copy of ITOE right now.

--Brant

Edited April 5, 2008 by Brant Gaede

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Speaking of metaphysics and history, here is a little piece of history about metaphysics.

http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/ArticleDi...339_7.shtml#158

At the time MSK was buddy-buddy with Lindsay Perigo, his favorite words were "horseshit" and "horseshitter", and he supported a "primacy of consciousness" view of logic. He has improved somewhat since then.

Merlin,

I don't know if horseshit was my favorite word, but I certainly did a number with it in that post. I am known to make serious mistakes in life, but my virtue is that I correct them. For instance, I used to be addicted to alcohol and then crack cocaine. But I gave them up.

I hear the Siren's call and don't seem to resist, so off I plunge onto the shoals.

In the case of using bombastic and vulgar rhetoric as a normal writing style, it is heady and fun, but it gets old and is not conducive to examining ideas, which is my real passion. It is also gratuitously rude. So I formally eshewed this in a public statement and went around apologizing to the main people I had offended with it. Nathan Hawking, Tom Rowland and Daniel Barnes come to mind, but there were many. Some accepted the apology and others didn't. Of all the ones I apologized to, only Daniel Barnes (if I recall correctly) had the grace to apologize back to me for his own excesses. But I did not and do not consider accepting or apologizing back as conditions for my own apologies.

Let me take the opportunity to say that if I offended you with that kind of rhetoric back then, I deeply apologize. This is unconditional. I regret it. As you noted in my posts since, I have not continued that style.

As to my friendship with that contemptible little man, I think I have made my evaluation clear in other places. I screwed up royally with my initial evaluation of him. The only part I do not regret in all that is that I found my public voice on his forum and I met Kat and many wonderful people, including Barbara. So if I defended him as payment for those values, I stand by it. But that debt has long been settled.

Now on to the post you linked to. In addition to the part you didn't like, I also stated the following:

But all you really need to know to start to apply Objectivism to your own life is that reality does exist, human beings are part of it, we have a mind capable of understanding much of it, and because of this mind, we can alter it by using reason to enhance our lives.

My thinking on the metaphysics in that statement has not changed one bit since then.

You are totally incorrect that I supported the "primacy of consciousness view of logic." I have never done that. I have no idea where you got that notion. If you have a quote, I will be more than happy to clarify it for you, or identify if I was unclear.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

If you could give me one or two Rand quotes that would be helpful and interesting; I can't get my hands on my copy of ITOE right now.

Brant,

That's easy. For a simple example, let's do walk-through of a small part of "The Objectivist Ethics," the first essay by Rand in The Virtue of Selfishness and see how she constructed the concept of ethics. Remember all that business I talk about with cognitive and normative abstractions? Rand does this right at the beginning (after some introductory remarks).

To challenge the basic premise of any discipline, one must begin at the beginning. In ethics, one must begin by asking: What are values? Why does man need them?

This is abstracting referents on the metaphysical level. What exists? What is the causality involved?

She goes on to tie values to living organisms (more metaphysics).

I quote from Galt's speech: "There is only one fundamental alternative in the universe: existence or nonexistence—and it pertains to a single class of entities: to living organisms. The existence of inanimate matter is unconditional, the existence of life is not: it depends on a specific course of action. Matter is indestructible, it changes its forms, but it cannot cease to exist. It is only a living organism that faces a constant alternative: the issue of life or death. Life is a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action. If an organism fails in that action, it dies; its chemical elements remain, but its life goes out of existence. It is only the concept of 'Life' that makes the concept of 'Value' possible. It is only to a living entity that things can be good or evil."

Then she presented the only description of God she ever made that I know of, except she didn't call Him God. She called Him a robot.

To make this point fully clear, try to imagine an immortal, indestructible robot, an entity which moves and acts, but which cannot be affected by anything, which cannot be changed in any respect, which cannot be damaged, injured or destroyed. Such an entity would not be able to have any values; it would have nothing to gain or to lose; it could not regard anything as for or against it, as serving or threatening its welfare, as fulfilling or frustrating its interests. It could have no interests and no goals.

You don't get any more metaphysical than that. She then went on to talk about finding and processing fuel as the fundamental function of living organisms to ensure continued existence, thus identifying fuel as a primary value. Notice she is still talking on a metaphysical level (What is it? What is the causality?). She especially highlights the temporary nature of living organisms—unlike inanimate matter, they come into and go out of existence (a metaphysical issue)—and the need for them to act in finding and processing fuel:

Many variations, many forms of adaptation to its background are possible to an organism, including the possibility of existing for a while in a crippled, disabled or diseased condition, but the fundamental alternative of its existence remains the same: if an organism fails in the basic functions required by its nature—if an amoeba's protoplasm stops assimilating food, or if a man's heart stops beating—the organism dies.

A living organism's nature is defined first and foremost by Rand in terms of using fuel to continue existing.

Now she comes to a part where I call the flow between categories. She discusses the standard used for considering something good or evil. She has one foot in metaphysics (What is it? What is the causality?) and one in ethics (What is of value to a living organism? What is damaging to it?)

An ultimate value is that final goal or end to which all lesser goals are the means—and it sets the standard by which all lesser goals are evaluated. An organism's life is its standard of value: that which furthers its life is the good, that which threatens it is the evil.

She jumps ahead to ethics at this point because the purpose of this essay is to present her concept of ethics. But notice that she keeps the observation essentially to a metaphysical question: "ultimate value." Her purpose is to establish a metaphysical basis for evaluating all the rest (i.e., formulating normative concepts).

Now that she has established her metaphysical base of the concept "ethics," it is time for the question, "How do I know it?" In other words, epistemology.

Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of action. Epistemologically, the concept of "value" is genetically dependent upon and derived from the antecedent concept of "life."

Notice that in terms of concept formation, Rand is going along a hierarchy. She uses the phrase "derived from" a lot to indicate this. In the above quote, she even makes explicit reference to a previous abstraction on the metaphysical level: "the antecedent concept of 'life.'"

I need to mention a tangential issue here. Rand sometimes calls a broader concept a simpler one and I have seen this cause great confusion in some discussions and essays. The simpler a concept is, the more inclusive it is, but the less distinctive. This goes all the way down to her idea of ostensive definition for existence (waving her arm all around her and saying "I mean this.") That is the simplest concept possible, but it is the most inclusive. It is the broadest. As an abstraction, it covers everything, including the abstracter. That level of abstraction is basically what I mean when I say the metaphysical level. Rand's rule of concept formation is that complex concepts are made out of simpler ones. And simpler ones are broader in terms of referents. More complex concepts have a more limited scope of referents being focused on, although the broader ones are the background, so to speak, and cannot be eliminated. That is the hierarchy.

Something else should be made clear at this point. There is the process of concept formation and there is the content of the concept. When I say metaphysical level, I am referring to the content being abstracted, not to the process itself. Arguably, the very existence of the faculty to perform concept formation (a mind) is a metaphysical issue, but this does not mean that the act is some kind of metaphysical mystery as an end in itself, i.e., that a concept jumps from reality into a brain as a given. As Rand is showing in the above essay, the principle underlying acts of living organisms is not "concept" but "survival," and even this is based on a wider state, "existence." This principle will also be the underpinning and purpose of a human being's act of concept formation, but that is later down the road in Rand's construction.

Now on to the meat of epistemology (How do I know it?):

Now in what manner does a human being discover the concept of "value"? By what means does he first become aware of the issue of "good or evil" in its simplest form?

Since Rand is not discussing concept formation in itself, but ethics, she focuses mostly on normative abstractions (but does not exclude cognitive abstractions). She starts with pleasure and pain as the basis of normative knowledge.

By means of the physical sensations of pleasure or pain. Just as sensations are the first step of the development of a human consciousness in the realm of cognition, so they are its first step in the realm of evaluation.

Notice the division between cognition and evaluation. And notice that both stem from sensations. This is pure epistemology. So far, Rand has stated that the existence of life is conditional, that the condition is processing fuel, and the basic primal means of knowing if such processing is being done properly is pleasure and pain. Thus, on a very basic level, the cognitive standard for identifying values is fuel and the normative standard is pleasure and pain.

I want to back up a bit in Rand's essay and show where she absolutely insists that the metaphysical level be in order before admitting the legitimacy of a higher level.

To speak of "value" as apart from "life" is worse than a contradiction in terms. "It is only the concept of 'Life' that makes the concept of 'Value' possible."

What does she mean by "worse than a contradiction"? She obviously means that the premise has been severed from the concept. Not that the premise collides with a later integration. And premises come from lower (broader) levels of abstraction. "Value" apart from "life" would be what she calls a floating concept.

I could go on and trace her integration of epistemology to include perception, then automatic code of values, then volition and concept formation, and then the act of forming concepts as a volitional act. (Incidentally, here is where I think she overextends herself. Some concepts are formed automatically, but others can be formed volitionally. Both happen and that's just the way we are. She claims only one happens.) All this gets integrated under consciousness, which, in itself, is a concept that includes metaphysics. So there is a flow back and forth between categories again like I mentioned in a previous post.

I am starting to run out of time. I think I pointed the way to how this is done, which is how I do it. If you crack open the essay and follow Rand's construction of the concept "ethics," you will see her go through this entire hierarchical manner of building it.

Now maybe it is clearer what Rand means when she says rights are derived from human nature (and, so far, I agree with that conclusion). But, also, why I object to some later conclusions she and others made that exclude the state of a child from the premise of human nature used to construct them.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

A thought just occurred to me that I want to get on record.

There are two other fundamental aspects of living organisms that are not included in Rand's premise:

1. Species. A living organism is born within a group of similar organisms and reproduces within that group. This is automatic and is independent of processing fuel.

A seeming exception is evolution: small characteristics common to the group can mutate in individuals over a long time and the changes can eventually become the norm. But this does not negate the fact that a living organism is born into the group. It is inconceivable for an amoeba to be born as an elephant, for example. But it is conceivable for an amoeba with a few differences from other amoebas to be born.

2. Life cycle. All living organisms are born, they grow, they age and they die. This happens with all living organisms, irrespective of any improvements in the fuel they process (although improvements can extend the cycle).

The only exceptions are if they are born defective, if they are killed by an outside agent, or if they are denied fuel altogether. Otherwise, all living beings go through this cycle.

I am not yet clear as to what the relationship these fundamental aspects have with respect to the derivation of values, but something is screaming in my mind saying that they should not be excluded. They are true for, and pertain to, all life.

I have to think more about this.

Michael

[william.scherk]

Mind Control? Ellen is trying to control your mind? Jeepers.

I guess I was trying a bit too hard to be precise, to make a little too clever of a quip (note the smiley), and did not take into account the insinuations or emotional load of that phrase.

[ . . . ]

In this case, my point (which is examining the logic behind definitions) is constantly missed by my intimidator.

[ . . . ]

To be more to the point in this exercise in simplifying the rhetoric, I don't like bossy attitudes in discussions.

[ . . . ]

Is that a little better, or at least clearer?

To me, no. I would like to understand where the discussions with Ellen have lapsed into intimidation.

I wonder which definitions are at issue and how they pertain to altruism/duty to rescue laws . . .

Ellen wrote this: the only flattering explanation I can find for why you keep producing supposed difficulties where none exist is out of worry over those children who might "fall by the wayside" on the Randian approach, plus the mistaken belief that there would be more such cases on that approach than on some alternate.

You wrote back: I find it more polite to ask a person what he thinks than give him predigested alternatives on pain of being insulted.

Is Ellen wrong to suggest you have a worry about those children who 'fall by the wayside'?

Rand's statement about child entitlements is fairly clear:

The government must protect the child, as it would any other citizen . . . Once a child is born, he is entitled to support until he is self-supporting.

As I understand Ellen, she believes that this support is the responsibility only of parents and guardians. If such guardians fail, she believes that there is and there should be no legal obligation on anyone but the guardians. She finds any duty to rescue law leads to a slippery slope . . .

What do you think, Michael? Your personal take seems clear -- a child in dire need may be taken care of by government, in the absence of any other option:

I am not suggesting a stranger need do anything more than get a child out of an emergency (if he does not endanger himself) and handed over to the authorities, legal guardians or parents. Obviously we are talking about very short term and very little effort and very little cost. I have no problem at all with such an obligation being a condition of citizenship or even a condition of being a guest of the country. I also have no problem at all with government orphanages when private ones are not available.

Now, maybe I misunderstand you, Merlin, Ellen, Laure and everyone here with regard to the obligation. It seems to me that there is practical reality and there is Objectivist ethics. In reality, such a child becomes a state ward if parents and guardians are incapable or absent. In Randland, the invisible hand of consistent classic-Enlightenment (CCE) rights theory would presumably ensure a greater successful crop of new humans . . . and there would be no wards.

Ellen ascribes this opinion to you, derived from your earlier statements above -- the (legitimate) function of government [may] be extended to taking care of children whose parents can't or don't care for them and for whom voluntary alternate care isn't found. Is this a fair statement of your beliefs?

If it is a fair statement, then where does the disagreement lie?

Laure puts up an interesting question: If you look at it pragmatically for a minute, though, do the children and helpless people of the world really fare better in societies that are based on the positive rights model?

-- this question can probably be answered more or less objectively by comparing jurisdictions that impose a duty to rescue against those that do not (chiefly European countries versus common-law countries). Do the standard indices of child health, mortality, etc favour the European or the US?

Of course, one can contrast all of these states with those who have little or no governmental aid to infants, where there is a minimum of state-support for families, children, public prenatal care, vaccination regimes, etcetera . . . in this case, where is the 'leftover' that finds its way to the child in need?

It seems to me that nations in of the western model provide a bigger, healthier crop of youngsters. Is this due to a de facto right to life for children, underwritten by the state?

I will look for some statistics for child mortality and health that might answer some of these questions.

Edited April 5, 2008 by william.scherk

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I would like to understand where the discussions with Ellen have lapsed into intimidation.

William,

The moment she ignores what I am writing, says it is a mess but that she understands—I must be motivated by this or that to create such a mess. Sad but understandable. And if I don't fess up to that (what she says I think), she will have a poor opinion of me.

Heh.

Point 1. I did not make a mess.

Point 2. She did not discuss what I did.

Point 3. She is entitled to her opinion of me or anyone else. That will not influence what I think about an issue.

And yes, I call that kind of rhetoric intimidation. (I don't think Ellen does that often, but in this case she is doing it.)

I wonder which definitions are at issue and how they pertain to altruism/duty to rescue laws . . .

I wonder why people keep missing this. I am reexamining the entire concept of rights from the ground up. Thus, the definitions I am talking about are human nature, for instance. Then values, ethics, and so on. I have mentioned them amply. Even animal.

Did you miss the part where I stated that I do not understand the Objectivist definition of animal, despite this being the genus of the Objectivist definition of man? Or the way it is dismissed in later integrations?

Do you have some other kinds of definitions in mind? Since the posts are full of reference to defining these terms, maybe there is something in your question or behind it that I do not discern. Please clarify.

Is Ellen wrong to suggest you have a worry about those children who 'fall by the wayside'?

No.

That is not my primary philosophical concern, however. And to treat it as such is an error. To pile intimidation on top only compounds the error.

As to the rest of your post, you presume I have a philosophical position already. I do not. I have a personal one, but I try to set it aside when I look at definitions. In fact, I am discussing definitions, observations and so forth to see where the logic leads, not start with a predigested opinion and try to prove it. I will revise my personal view or not, depending on the outcome. That is the methodology I use.

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

As I said, all concepts are epistemological. Abstracted referents are epistemological. Unabstracted referents are metaphysical. In the head, epistemological. Outside the head, metaphysical. Ideas and things.

--Brant

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

As I said, all concepts are epistemological. Abstracted referents are epistemological. Unabstracted referents are metaphysical. In the head, epistemological. Outside the head, metaphysical. Ideas and things.

Brant,

The problem is clear and I mentioned it above. (We use a category of abstractions—metaphysics—to indicate a state of existence without awareness, but in reality, we have to be aware, i.e., there has to be an agent, to do it.)

But, hell, let's play. Since you brought it up, what do you mean by "Outside the head, metaphysical"? Isn't that abstraction inside your head? If so, by your standard, wouldn't it be epistemological?

I would be interested in how you obtain knowledge outside the head.

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

As I said, all concepts are epistemological. Abstracted referents are epistemological. Unabstracted referents are metaphysical. In the head, epistemological. Outside the head, metaphysical. Ideas and things.

Brant,

The problem is clear and I mentioned it above. (We use a category of abstractions—metaphysics—to indicate a state of existence without awareness, but in reality, we have to be aware, i.e., there has to be an agent, to do it.)

But, hell, let's play. Since you brought it up, what do you mean by "Outside the head, metaphysical"? Isn't that abstraction inside your head? If so, by your standard, wouldn't it be epistemological?

I would be interested in how you obtain knowledge outside the head.

Michael

You can't. It's observation and analysis and integration. You are emphasizing the process. I am only focusing on the foundation--a clarity of terms. You can take that and do everything you just did in your long post above as far as I know, but a lesson in conceptualization was not what I was looking for, just basic lucidity. Metaphysical parts of a concept are epistemological because a concept is epistemological. The tree you are looking at is a referent for the concept of a tree. The tree is in front of you; the concept is inside of you.

I just read an article in "Arizona Highways" about Tucson's forgotten and abandoned cemeteries. When Tucson was in its eary stages of growth the powers-that-were kept moving headstones and graves to new locations, but frequently they'd just move the headstones leaving the bodies--thousands of bodies--behind and building homes and new streets on top. One grave just recently uncovered was that of a young girl with a tree root growing through her skull.

Is that what you mean?

--Brant

Edited April 6, 2008 by Brant Gaede

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Brant,

Is that the tree of knowledge?

But all I did to you in my previous post is what you did to me.

If forming a concept means abstracting referents from sensations, obviously the particles and waves are "out there" coming "in here" through sensory channels. Just because a person can categorize the scope of concepts into broad, less broad, even less broad, etc., doesn't mean "out there" stopped existing.

When I talk about the metaphysical level in concept formation, I am refering to the scope of the abstraction.

For some reason you are using another meaning and pretending this is what I am saying. Just like I did in my poke in the ribs above.

Fact is metaphysical. Truth is epistemological. There is no truth without fact. And for the notion of fact to exist in our minds, it exists as an abstraction. That is a metaphysical level concept. Fact is both the existent and our notion of the existent, but projecting a state without us perceiving it.

Here is a similar usage by Rand from ITOE (2nd., Chapter 5 - "Definitions," p. 45):

Metaphysically, a fundamental characteristic is that distinctive characteristic which makes the greatest number of others possible; epistemologically, it is the one that explains the greatest number of others.

I only mentioned this one quote from lack of time because I have it underlined in my copy of ITOE. There are oodles of quotes from her. How does she know anything "metaphysically" at all in order to make that statement? Obviously, she identified it on a metaphysical level.

Are we clear on this and now talking the same language, or is there still any doubt? We need to agree on meanings in order to proceed with true understanding and communication of idea. My meaning is the one I gave above. If you object to the word "metaphysical" with that meaning, we can choose another like "ontological," or even another if you have a suggestion.

Incidentally, there is a problem with scope here once again. (Scope is my main gripe with Rand.) She does not state, but insinuates, that all existents have only one fundamental characteristic. But often there are several.

As I showed with adults and children, the concept of human being has more than just "rational" as a fundamental characteristic, since "rational" is not a characteristic of infants. But, if one wants to limit the discussion only to "rational," then the definitoin of man needs to be amplified from "rational animal" to something like "animal that develops a rational faculty," with animal being the genus and "develops a rational faculty" being the differentia. This now covers all adults, infants and even senile old people, and it sets the standard for including defective human beings like retarded ones. It wreaks havok on the idea of reason being man's only means of survival, though.

Michael

[Wolf DeVoon]

"We distinguish human rights as a set of natural liberties belonging in justice to mankind, and only to mankind, because the human understanding is a function of individual effort and a long series of self-determined choices in the conduct of one's life.

"These rights belong in strictly equal measure to every man, woman and child (in proportion to maturity) because the capacity and responsiblity of free choice exists equally for the intelligent and the stupid, rich and poor, native-born and alien immigrant. An intelligent man faces more complex questions, perhaps, than a slower sibling, but with no more or less responsibility to exercise his powers or let them fall into disuse and sloth. A rich man has more responsiblites, if he is to retain and cultivate his wealth, and a poor man has fewer choices to pursue, if he is to make the most of his situation -- but neither is more or less equipped to adopt an honorable moral standard and live according to its mandate. A native son may love his country or spit on its cherished ideals. A newcomer must choose his destination with care -- because no one in this life is guaranteed a pre-ordained satisfaction. Life in a free society is not a Garden of Eden.

"In this sense, then, all men are created equal; they are endowed by nature with certain inalienable responsibilities, to shape their lives and make what they can of it, with nothing but one head to guide them, two hands to labor according to the dictates of their conscience, and a mouth to feed, depending on the rationality of their efforts."

Human Rights

Note the use of 'liberties' and 'responsibilities' in defining rights.

I wrote this 20 years before I had an opportunity to study an infant. close-up, pretty much 24/7. Babies are self-directed. They grow into explorers and daredevils. My kid taught herself to eat solid food, which fascinated me. It required experiment and determination to understand and achieve this new thing. Enough anecdotal stuff. Sorry. The main point I'm trying to make is a unity of human experience. Young or old, it's a journey into the Unknown.

W.

[merjet]

You are totally incorrect that I supported the "primacy of consciousness view of logic." I have never done that. I have no idea where you got that notion. If you have a quote, I will be more than happy to clarify it for you, or identify if I was unclear.

The following is my evidence. All are quotes from your posts in the thread on RoR I linked above and link below.

#135: Dude, reality exists. Period. End of story. Not logically. We can perceive and conceive of it logically. But it does not exist logically.

#135: I repeat, there is no logic without a consciousnesses, not even your own.

#137: You seem somehow to be postulating that "logical order" or whatever exists independently of perception, thus it can fall under rational awareness. That is not the case.

#137: The universe is not logical.

#137: There was and is no logic before a mind.

#153: I would confine logic simply to being an activity of the mind.

Do these sound like (1) a mind imposes logic on reality (like a Kantian category) or (2) a mind can discover logic in reality? In other words, do they reflect (1) a "primacy of consciousness" view of logic or (2) a "primacy of existence" view of logic? I say the former. An example of the latter is here. There is no way to clarify them and turn them into their antithesis.

Edited April 6, 2008 by Merlin Jetton

[tjohnson]

Unabstracted referents are metaphysical.

--Brant

This is self-contradictory I think. To refer to something it needs to be abstracted. Our words refer to our perceptions and conceptions which are abstractions of 'reality'.

[Brant Gaede]

Unabstracted referents are metaphysical.

--Brant

This is self-contradictory I think. To refer to something it needs to be abstracted. Our words refer to our perceptions and conceptions which are abstractions of 'reality'.

I can only say that the truth of my general statement is inferred and the contradiction would appear anytime I tried to get particular to demonstrate its truthfulness. This seems to be the nature of axiomatic knowledge. I can't get outside the objective reality we occupy, which, by the way, we experience somewhat differently because each perspective is unique. The objectivity of reality is also inferred. Objective knowledge is so hard to achieve it's like the Holy Grail. If it seems easy it's either a short cut or been done before and passed down through frequently distorting culture or very basic (don't put your hand in the fire, ouch). The scientific way is the hard way to tentative results.

--Brant

Edited April 6, 2008 by Brant Gaede

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Merlin,

Frankly your view sounds to me like primacy of consciousness. It sounds a lot like you are saying "the universe is a higher form of mental order or intelligence and we have to raise our minds to it to understand it." That is the way I interpreted your words back in 2005 (from where you quoted me). As mentioned earlier, I was in an aggressive mood back then and this is not conducive to proper understanding. But frankly, from reading your posts, you appeared to have been in the same mood (but using your manner of expression).

I think this confusion is be due to us using the word logic to mean different things and I really wish we had taken the time to define our terms. So let's do it now. Better late than never. Rather than stubbornly maintain the misunderstanding, let's probe it.

I think you are using logic to mean order. So with that meaning, yes, order does exist in the universe. Entities exist, they have identity, a specific nature, they cause things to happen, etc. (I have stated this often in other places.)

I was using logic to mean the mental operation of identification. My point is that mental operations only occur within a mind. Logic, in the way I was using it, is the mind's abstract manner of reflecting the order in the universe. It does not impose order on it. I use Rand's definition of "non-contradictory identification" for logic. Thus something cannot be the process of identifying and be the thing being identified at the same time. Even if we use logic to mean rules of inference, it is still a mental operation. You can't take the mental out of the mind.

There is a school of thought that holds that logic is a mental operation disconnected from the rest of reality and operates only according to its own rules. This is not my view and I have stated this too often to need defending. But for the record, I hold that an abstracting faculty with its own nature exists (the mind) and that it is fed waves and particles through sensory channels, which it abstracts into mental symbols. Abstraction is basically transforming the waves and particles into mental units and then grouping them into new units through differentiation and integration. In my meaning, manipulation of these mental units in a certain manner is called logic.

The dictum about defining your terms at the start of a discussion would probably have saved us a lot of misunderstanding. I am operating here under the Principle of Charity when I gave your meaning, so please correct me if I am wrong. I would appreciate the same courtesy.

Michael

[merjet]

Merlin,

Frankly your view sounds to me like primacy of consciousness. It sounds a lot like you are saying "the universe is a higher form of mental order or intelligence and we have to raise our minds to it to understand it." That is the way I interpreted your words back in 2005 (from where you quoted me).

[snip]

The dictum about defining your terms at the start of a discussion would probably have saved us a lot of misunderstanding. I am operating here under the Principle of Charity when I gave your meaning, so please correct me if I am wrong. I would appreciate the same courtesy.

Michael

What do you mean by "when I gave your meaning"? Is it what you attribute to me in the first part above? Trying to portray me as an idealist like Berkeley or Kant or Hegel? You call that practicing a principle of charity? I gave my evidence. Where is your evidence?

Edited April 6, 2008 by Merlin Jetton

[tjohnson]

But for the record, I hold that an abstracting faculty with its own nature exists (the mind) and that it is fed waves and particles through sensory channels, which it abstracts into mental symbols. Abstraction is basically transforming the waves and particles into mental units and then grouping them into new units through differentiation and integration. In my meaning, manipulation of these mental units in a certain manner is called logic.

Micheal, have you been reading some General Semantics by any chance?

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

What do you mean by "when I gave your meaning"? Is it what you attribute to me in the first part above? Trying to portray me as an idealist like Berkeley or Kant or Hegel? You call that practicing a principle of charity? I gave my evidence. Where is your evidence?

Merlin,

sigh...

I said that is what I interpreted your words to mean back then. And they still sound a bit that way today if one uses my meaning of logic (meaning mental method, which, incidentally, is the more standard meaning). So in order to try to figure out where the problem was, I simply presented both meanings side-by-side.

I wrote: "I think you are using logic to mean order. So with that meaning, yes, order does exist in the universe. Entities exist, they have identity, a specific nature, they cause things to happen, etc."

Then I wrote: "I am operating here under the Principle of Charity when I gave your meaning, so please correct me if I am wrong."

Instead of correcting or corroborating, you prefer to insist on some kind of conflict and say I am accusing you of this or that. (I think the whole conflict is semantics, anyway.)

I don't see much future in continuing this line of discussion.

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

I would like to understand where the discussions with Ellen have lapsed into intimidation.

William,

The moment she ignores what I am writing, says it is a mess but that she understands—I must be motivated by this or that to create such a mess. Sad but understandable. And if I don't fess up to that (what she says I think), she will have a poor opinion of me.

Heh.

Point 1. I did not make a mess.

Point 2. She did not discuss what I did.

Point 3. She is entitled to her opinion of me or anyone else. That will not influence what I think about an issue.

And yes, I call that kind of rhetoric intimidation. (I don't think Ellen does that often, but in this case she is doing it.)

Your description of what I was saying is recognizably close, except for the 3rd sentence (starting "And if [...]").

I have a long-standing poor opinion of your skills at intellectual analysis, so my assessment in that respect wasn't being weighed in the balance. On this particular issue, however, you've all along (from the time the arguments started on SOLOHQ) seemed to me extra belligerent, driven by some other factor(s) besides trying to win a debate. (I know you say that you don't think in terms of winning debates, but your behavior has historically seemed to me to belie the claim.)

Among the other factor(s) I can think of which might be driving you here, the one with which I could sympathize was that of a deep-seated concern for children and a worry that children wouldn't fare well could a "CCE" (consistent classical Enlightenment) rights theory be implemented. You say, though, that none of the hypothesis I proposed is correct, which means that you agree with my belief that children would be best off in such a system. (Of course, maybe you didn't notice that part of the hypothesis. Impossible to tell from the speed with which you brushed the hypothesis in toto aside which details you noticed/didn't notice.)

As to whether my approach was "intimidation," I grant that it could qualify as such depending on whom I was addressing. Since I was addressing you, based on prior experience I wouldn't have expected that you'd place sufficient weight on anything I said to feel intimidated by it.

-

In regard to my promise, or threat as the case may be, to compile a partial dossier of the frequency with which you attribute motives, I wasn't thinking in terms of the realities of time constraints.

I'll just give a couple illustrative details from recent replies. You wrote:

Ellen,

I will be interested. I normally discuss behavior, not motives. I normally notice people do stuff. Why is another issue. (All right, I called Bob K lonely, also.)

Michael

My evaluation is that you chronically remark on WHY "people do stuff," that even your descriptions of what people are doing are often motivationally loaded.

For instance, your post to Merlin just a few before:

Merlin,

Correct me if I am wrong, but I am starting to discern in your comments that you do not believe metaphysics to be the broadest conceptual integration for concept formation.

[....]

Is that correct? Or are you just in a snarky mood these days?

Michael

You provide -- as an exhaustive and mutually exclusive either/or -- only two possibilities: either you're correct in a (dis)belief you discern on Merlin's part OR he's in a snarky mood these days. But surely these don't begin to exhaust the options; nor are they mutually exclusive (the answer could be both); (an additional complexity is that I don't think the first option is well enough stated to discern its meaning, although Merlin might have intuited what you meant). Thus in effect you're attributing Merlin's possible appearance of disagreement with you to snarky-moodedness.

Specifically re your remarks about Bob K: You've said a whole lot else about him besides calling him "lonely." You might want to look back through your exchanges with him yourself some day for some choice ascriptions of motivation.

Ellen

___

[Ellen Stuttle]

William,

First, thanks for your attempts "to understand where the discussions with Ellen have lapsed into intimidation."

Second, although you proceeded to do an admirable job of trying to bring clarity to the divergences of viewpoint, I think that two circumstances which aren't identical are being entwined (due to their often having been entwined in discussions thus far). You wrote:

I wonder which definitions are at issue and how they pertain to altruism/duty to rescue laws . . .

[....]

As I understand Ellen, she believes that this support is the responsibility only of parents and guardians. If such guardians fail, she believes that there is and there should be no legal obligation on anyone but the guardians. She finds any duty to rescue law leads to a slippery slope . . .

What do you think, Michael? Your personal take seems clear -- a child in dire need may be taken care of by government, in the absence of any other option:

I am not suggesting a stranger need do anything more than get a child out of an emergency (if he does not endanger himself) and handed over to the authorities, legal guardians or parents. Obviously we are talking about very short term and very little effort and very little cost. I have no problem at all with such an obligation being a condition of citizenship or even a condition of being a guest of the country. I also have no problem at all with government orphanages when private ones are not available.

Now, maybe I misunderstand you, Merlin, Ellen, Laure and everyone here with regard to the obligation. It seems to me that there is practical reality and there is Objectivist ethics. In reality, such a child becomes a state ward if parents and guardians are incapable or absent. In Randland, the invisible hand of consistent classic-Enlightenment (CCE) rights theory would presumably ensure a greater successful crop of new humans . . . and there would be no wards.

[....]

Laure puts up an interesting question: If you look at it pragmatically for a minute, though, do the children and helpless people of the world really fare better in societies that are based on the positive rights model?

-- this question can probably be answered more or less objectively by comparing jurisdictions that impose a duty to rescue against those that do not (chiefly European countries versus common-law countries). Do the standard indices of child health, mortality, etc favour the European or the US?

Of course, one can contrast all of these states with those who have little or no governmental aid to infants, where there is a minimum of state-support for families, children, public prenatal care, vaccination regimes, etcetera . . . in this case, where is the 'leftover' that finds its way to the child in need?

It seems to me that nations in of the western model provide a bigger, healthier crop of youngsters. Is this due to a de facto right to life for children, underwritten by the state?

I will look for some statistics for child mortality and health that might answer some of these questions.

"Duty to rescue laws" and "governmental aid to infants," though related, aren't the same. "Duty to rescue," as I understand that, would apply to ANY person in an emergency where some passerby could offer assistance at hypothetically no (or very little) inconvenience or risk. It would apply to Dragonfly's example of a bleeding motorcyclist lying by the side of a nearly deserted road and seen by a passing motorist, as well as to the abandoned-child-in-the-wilderness of the original scene starting these disputes. "Governmental aid to infants," however, encompasses a whole host of social programs, like those you indicated, including government orphanages as per Michael's "also" in the quote above.

It is my opinion that "duty to rescue" law leads to a slippery slope; it's also my opinion that in the best possible world there would be little need for government orphanages. It's also my opinion, which I don't think I've said before explicitly, that the current state of affairs pertaining to children in the United States and I expect in other relatively wealthy countries, with the web of governmental aid, and care requirements, and mandatory education requirements -- the whole kit and kaboodle -- is far removed from being beneficial to children, that in effect children as a class have become prisoners of the state. I would like to see unweaving, dismantling of child-care-overseeing agencies, privatizing of education, etc.

On the question of whether or not, in the best-possible (IMO; some argue of course that such a world isn't possible) "CCE"-rights-theory world, any form of government child-care agency would be needed, I don't have a strong answer even in theory. My tentative belief is that certain minimal governmental agencies connected with the court function would always be needed (and would be fundable with voluntary funds). For instance, suppose a child is being physically abused and has to be removed from the care of the child's current legal guardian(s) (parental or otherwise), where is the child to be kept during legal procedures transferring the guardianship? That's one possibly unavoidable need I can think of for a government-care facility; I anticipate that I might think of others if I were to try to examine the nitty-grittys.

Ellen

___

[Ellen Stuttle]

[....] My reason for entering this discussion was only to see if there might be any exceptions to the negative rights views held by others. I wanted to see where people draw the line.

In my last post I asked if people would oppose the idea that a person who refused to report an abandoned babe in the wilderness should be charged with being a de facto accessory to the crime. If there is nothing that government can rightfully mandate that I must do, and if government should be limited to enforcing what people must not do, then am I correct in assuming that, in a purely negative rights-based legal system, I would not be considered an accessory to, say, a bank heist if I was discovered to have silently observed my friends planning and practicing for the heist, and that I watched them carry out the crime and I knew where they were going to stash the loot, but I neither took part in the robbery, assisted my friends in any way, nor reported what I knew to the authorities?

In a society based purely on negative rights, should there be any circumstances in which a person who has not initiated force against others would be held legally accountable if he refused to take the positive action of becoming an informant or witness against those he knew to have violated the rights of others?

J

I think, yes, there would be such circumstances, which would classify as willing complicity, a giving of consent to the rights violation through non-action. (There might of course be mitigating circumstances of the potential informant being under threat from the perpetrators.)

Whether that type of approach would do the job with the abandoned babe in the wilderness...? Maybe. My view of the original scene is that if such an unlikely circumstance really did happen, and if the passerby's "depraved indifference" were found out about, and if the locals didn't take the law into their own hands anyway and the incident came to trial and people were hot to see some form of punishment, then a law such as "accessory to the crime" (or Wolf's suggestion of a "right to petition") could be called in for use without any need of legislating specific "duty to rescue" laws in advance just to have something available in case of extreme circumstances.

A far more likely circumstance of someone not helping an abandoned child -- a type of circumstance which I imagine does happen -- is what if someone sees a newborn abandoned in a dumpster and doesn't report this? Are there either federal or state laws covering such situations? If so, on what basis are they worded? I don't know. I could see "accessory to the crime" as doing the job, although, if the infant died, a lot of use (none) that would be to the infant and...ideally, with full awareness of how far we are from this, I would like for some woman who gives birth to a child she doesn't want -- I think it would usually be a frightened teenager who hid her pregnancy from parental authorities -- to have the recourse of taking the child to a foundling home and renouncing the guardianship rights. (I'm not talking there of someone who has her baby in a home for unwed mothers, where often the child is given up for adoption; instead someone who's been avoiding, say, her own parents the whole time she was pregnant and didn't have funds for going to an unwed mothers' place.)

Ellen

___

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

You say, though, that none of the hypothesis I proposed is correct, which means that you agree with my belief that children would be best off in such a system.

Ellen,

This is the crux of the problem in my communication with you. I stated—more times than I care to count—as clearly as humanly possible—that I have suspended all beliefs until I reconstruct the concept. And what do you do? You not only ignore the beginning of the concept I am examining, you say things like "which means that you agree."

That does not mean I agree, as you claim. It means I have not gotten to that point yet in this re-examination the concept—a re-integration of it from the premises. And I will not be pushed, regardless of what your opinion of me is.

I don't know how to communicate the fact to you that I neither agree nor disagree other than say I neither agree nor disagree at this moment. I say it, but you keep acting as if that is not the case. I am examining a concept from the ground up. Where I am looking, you don't want to look. But you want to tell me what my conclusions are about something I have stated I am examining and have suspended my conclusions.

It's tough to communicate like that.

So long as we are going to be up front, I also have a very poor opinion of your rhetorical behavior. It started with that business about you claiming that Al Gore lied about his classromm experiences, which you had no way of knowing. Before then, my opinion of your rhetorical behavior was one (and very flattering). Since then, I have paid attention and I have seen you more than once stick to a point and argue it to death long after it became obvious you were wrong. I have a very poor opinion of that.

Other than that, though, I think you are quite intelligent and often (but not always) perceptive.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

You provide -- as an exhaustive and mutually exclusive either/or -- only two possibilities: either you're correct in a (dis)belief you discern on Merlin's part OR he's in a snarky mood these days. But surely these don't begin to exhaust the options; nor are they mutually exclusive (the answer could be both); (an additional complexity is that I don't think the first option is well enough stated to discern its meaning, although Merlin might have intuited what you meant). Thus in effect you're attributing Merlin's possible appearance of disagreement with you to snarky-moodedness.

Jesus H. Keeerist!

Are you taking lessons from Valliant? What does one have to do with the other? And how does one exhaust the options of the other?

I was asking Merlin if my interpretation of his refusal to look at my premise was correct. He has refused to look at it. So I was showing him the logical result of cutting a premise off from the concept. And the other quote was responding in kind to one of his charmy-smarmy insults.

If he wants to dish it out, he gets it back. It's tough, I know, but that's the way it is.

Try reading his previous posts in addition to mine. You might find more information to put into your analysis. You might even see a string of one-liner insults spread out over several posts coming from him.

Michael

[merjet]

I don't see much future in continuing this line of discussion.

I don't either.

I think the whole conflict is semantics, anyway.

I think most readers can recognize your convenient smoke screen.

Oops. I just couldn't constrain myself from another insulting one-liner. ;)