Altruism

[Ellen Stuttle]

Merlin, I think you're incorrect about due-process procedures and the obligations of parents to their own children being "positive" rights, but I haven't time to explain now. I have to leave for an appointment. Later.

Ellen

___

[merjet]

Are we reading the same boards? To answer your question ("Who do you know that holds rights as a premise of human nature?"), you, for instance, are one.

Did you read #193? No, I'm holding rights as a conclusion about human nature (an 'ought' pertaining to an 'is').

Then, in your view, is it safe to say that you do not think rights derive from human nature, but also from NIOF? If so, you are giving NIOF the same fundamental weight as human nature to the formation of the concept. (btw - As I understand it, the categorization into positive and negative is based on NIOF.)

No. NIOF and rights are both based on human nature. Both are normative. NIOF is a part of rights. Rights aren't derived from NIOF.

What do you do with your concept when both fundaments collide and prompt a contradiction? From what do you derive NIOF if not from human nature, anyway? If you give NIOF the same weight as human nature in rights for humans, are you not essentially basing human nature on it as some kind of metaphysical law?

What collision or contradiction?

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Merlin,

Does NIOF apply to a child who wants to run out into a busy highway and is restrained from doing so by force?

If not, is a child a human being? If he is a human being, how does NIOF derive from his human nature?

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Laure,

In Objectivist concept formation, all concepts are ultimately grounded in observation. They boil down at the bottom to what Rand called "ostensive definition," which is swinging her arm around and saying "I mean this" for the concepr of existence.

To discipline a priority of fundaments for concept formation, Rand made an ascending categorization of fundamentality: metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, politics, with metaphysics being the most fundamental for concept formation and politics the least.

If there is a conflict or contradiction between a metaphysical premise and an ethical one (or epistemological or political one), the metaphysical premise takes precedence. This is Objectivism 101.

That is what I am talking about when I say contradiction. Identification of human nature is a metaphysical-level concept (and even that is based on the identification of the nature of life). If the fundamental nature of human beings is found to be more than rational volition, but the extra part identified is excluded from ethics, what has to change in the concept? The metaphysics or the ethics?

Do you agree with Objectivist concept formation? If so, do you fully understand the concept of "rational animal" in Objectivst terms?

Michael

[merjet]

Merlin,

Does NIOF apply to a child who wants to run out into a busy highway and is restrained from doing so by force?

If not, is a child a human being? If he is a human being, how does NIOF derive from his human nature?

Michael

The context of NIOF is primarily the interaction of normal humans past some minimal age, and often between adults. Preventing a child from running onto a busy highway is the right to life trumping NIOF.

[Laure]

... If the fundamental nature of human beings is found to be more than rational volition, but the extra part identified is excluded from ethics, what has to change in the concept? The metaphysics or the ethics?

Do you agree with Objectivist concept formation?

Michael

Do I agree with Objectivist concept formation? I think so. I read ITOE, and it made perfect sense to me.

If you define the fundamental nature of human beings as entailing more than rational volition, then the "extra part" falls outside the purview of ethics, because ethics can only deal with matters of volition, matters in which we have a choice. Nothing needs to change. If I understand you correctly, it's like you're saying, we have this field of "nutrition" but I've discovered that man needs to breathe as well as eat! So, aha! There's something contradictory about our notion of "nutrition." No, there isn't.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Laure,

It is a little more complicated than that, but you are in the ballpark.

Does a child have volition? How much ethics applies without volition?

I am OK on a definitional level if someone declares that a child has no rights because a child is not a really a human being—only adults are human beings because they have volition. Thus ethics do not apply to children. I may not agree, but I will see no contradiction in his development of his concept of rights from his premises.

Any disagreement I will then have on a definitional level will be a disagreement over what a human being is, i.e., his premises. But I would not think his concept of rights is flawed by conflicting premises.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

The context of NIOF is primarily the interaction of normal humans past some minimal age, and often between adults. Preventing a child from running onto a busy highway is the right to life trumping NIOF.

Merlin,

My context and the context of this examination is defining human nature, not "interaction of normal humans past some minimal age, and often between adults."

It would be helpful if we could stay within the same context.

Michael

[Laure]

Michael, you keep saying your context is defining human nature, and I don't get what you mean. Are you trying to come up with a definition of human nature? Do you think there is something wrong with the idea of man being a "rational animal"? Isn't that fundamentally what we are? Does the fact that children are not yet fully developed really pose any sort of a logical problem? I don't see it.

And, what is Post 207? You're scolding Merlin for something, and I don't see why. His reply was reasonable.

Maybe you could state briefly what it is that you're trying to do, or what is the contradiction that you believe you have identified.

[merjet]

My context and the context of this examination is defining human nature, not "interaction of normal humans past some minimal age, and often between adults."

It would be helpful if we could stay within the same context.

If you want to stay in the context of defining human nature, then don't bring up rights.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Are you trying to come up with a definition of human nature?

Laure,

I have only been saying that for a gazillion posts. You are one of the few who oppose my arguments who has actually started seeing this.

For the time being, I agree with Rand's formulation that rights derive from human nature. I have not looked into Wolf's idea that rights might not be based on ethics very deeply yet. So within that context, I have been making an inquiry and checking premises. One of the premises—the main one—is the definition of human nature.

Do you think there is something wrong with the idea of man being a "rational animal"? Isn't that fundamentally what we are? Does the fact that children are not yet fully developed really pose any sort of a logical problem? I don't see it.

I will state once again, I find nothing wrong with the definition of human beings as "rational animal." I have not yet understood what Objectivists mean when they say "animal" (the genus), nor why that part gets left out of ethics.

You got into my ballpark when you said ethics applies only to volition. If that is the case and we do not have to include the animal part in choosing human values (i.e., establishing our code of values), then I see a real problem with defining a standard. By definition, we would have to restrict ethics to adults.

I have no problem with that, either. I strongly believe there are many ethical considerations that apply to adults that do not apply to children. I don't agree that the adult stage is the entire spectrum of human existence, though. So if ethics apply only to adults, then another code of values needs to be drawn up for guiding choices at other stages of human life.

I am against two things (on logical terms—I am actually against more):

1. Defining a child as a "rational animal" and then forgetting all about what that means during concept development and treating him as an adult.

2. Defining human beings as "rational animal" and leaving out animal things, like the growth cycle for one example (there are many others in earlier posts), out of the context of the values a human being chooses to be part of his code of values.

In both cases, the premise in the concept of ethics and rights is defined one way, but used as if it meant something else. That's a logical flaw.

And, what is Post 207? You're scolding Merlin for something, and I don't see why. His reply was reasonable.

I was not scolding. Sorry if that appeared that way.

I want to stay within the same context. Merlin was mixing them and treating them with cognitive equivalence. How should I tell him? I will be more than glad to say it in a different manner.

Maybe you could state briefly what it is that you're trying to do, or what is the contradiction that you believe you have identified.

sigh...

I don't mean to be snarky, but give me a breaK. I have only said this a gazillion times.

Please tell me exactly what you do not understand from my posts and I will be glad to answer you.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

If you want to stay in the context of defining human nature, then don't bring up rights.

Merlin,

You got it!

I am discussing the fundament underlying the concept of rights when I discuss human nature. Obviously there are no rights underlying the concept of rights. That would be a contradiction. (A would be A and not A at the same time.)

But there is human nature.

Michael

[Laure]

I am against two things (on logical terms—I am actually against more):

1. Defining a child as a "rational animal" and then forgetting all about what that means during concept development and treating him as an adult.

2. Defining human beings as "rational animal" and leaving out animal things, like the growth cycle for one example (there are many others in earlier posts), out of the context of the values a human being chooses to be part of his code of values.

In both cases, the premise in the concept of ethics and rights is defined one way, but used as if it meant something else. That's a logical flaw.

I know you've said it a gazillion times, but I still don't know what you are getting at. My mind does not work the way yours does. But I'm not alone. I don't think Merlin or Ellen really understand what you're getting at, either.

In the quote above, what do you mean by "the premise in the concept of ethics and rights is defined one way, but used as if it meant something else." Do you mean the premise that "man is a rational animal"? How is it defined (one way)? How is it used (as if it meant something else)? Why do you consider it a problem that some aspects of human nature are left out of ethics?

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Laure,

Man is a form of life, so the concept of human nature is not even a primary, although it is a fundamental premise for rights. Cognitively, though, the concept goes much deeper, down into birth, growth, death, survival and species. Reason is singled out as man's most fundamental characteristic because it is his form of survival (the rock-bottom of values for living things). This is repeated over and over in Objectivist literature.

Now look at children. Reason is not their form of survival at that stage of life. No matter how you twist it around, children are defined as needing care in order to survive. (Incidentally, this is a fundamental characteristic of all infant mammals.)

By claiming that children have a right to life and this is only a right to action, I decided to take the logical chain on down to the bottom to see why I was bothered by it. So here goes: the category of rights is based on ethics, which is based on man's nature, which has the fundamental characteristic of reason because that is his principal form of survival. This is based on the premise that an organism's main form of survival is its fundamental characteristic (and this is used especially for later normative concepts involving values).

A child simply falls outside this chain because reason is not his main form of survival. But reason will be over time.

Incredibly (for as much as I disagree with them, which I do in the strongest terms possible), I find the people who claim that children are property like cattle, without any right to life whatsoever until they become adults, to be more logically consistent than those who present the normal Objectivist and libertarian arguments.

So why am I doing this?

While Objectivists and libertarians write reams of discussions sidestepping this contradiction, pretending that it does not exist, using all kinds of rhetoric, and repeating the standard arguments where the contradiction is not dealt with over and over and over, etc., the collectivists cash in on it.

They know what to say down at the church on Sundays. They know what to tell adolescent kids who are trying to figure out what being human means so they can choose their values wisely. They convince the majority of people by default, simply because anyone with two eyes can see that an adult grows from a child and a child needs to be taken care of to produce an adult. Objectivists and libertarians do not rebut the collectivists on a fundamental level about human nature: they refuse to consider the issue down there.

That is one of the reasons I see holding individualism back in the world. This is the exact inverse of the situation Rand faced, when the collectivists at the time (especially Communists) refused to consider individual volition as part of human nature.

I decided to face it—look into it—and let logic and reality take me to where they take me. I am sure they will take me to a good place and once I get there, I know I will be right.

Michael

[Wolf DeVoon]

I think rights are a human invention that enables us to live in a society with other people in a peaceful manner. We have the concept of rights because most people want to live peacefully in a society with others.

It's David Friedman's position, that 'rights' are artificial, a result of negotiation (Schelling points). Subjectivist and pragmatic.

W.

Edited April 1, 2008 by Wolf DeVoon

[Wolf DeVoon]

Preventing a child from running onto a busy highway is the right to life trumping NIOF [non-initiation of force].

No offense, sir, but I doubt whether you have children. There is no way to prevent a toddler from harm. We build fences, they climb over and escape. We strap them in car seats, they undo the buckles. We kid-proof entire homes, they pick the locks. So finally the kid himself is responsible for his safety and his ability to discern signal from noise.

"Pleeeeease don't cross the road without looking for cars. You can get hurt very very bad, and cars can't always see you because you're little."

If the parent is loving and listens to the kid, if they have rapport and mutual trust, the kid is open (a little) to caution. Screaming and spanking are once-in-a-lifetime emergency measures to get a toddler's attention immediately upon doing something extremely dangerous like running into the street. But look who's 'right to life' is being defended. Not the child's. It's the parent's life and pursuit of happiness at stake, distraught at a clear and present threat to the parent's value (the child's welfare).

Sigh. There is no right to life. I'll post a fuller explanation later.

W.

[Wolf DeVoon]

I am OK on a definitional level if someone declares that a child has no rights because a child is not a really a human being—only adults are human beings because they have volition. Thus ethics do not apply to children.

And this adulthood commences when?

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

And this adulthood commences when?

Wolf,

Good question. The answer is probably provided by those who posit this (and these people actually exist—I have read some really weird stuff written in all due sincerity).

In libertarian circles, the definition of when adulthood arrives is normally discussed in another context: age of consent.

Michael

[Laure]

Wolf, your post 214 seems to be dismissive of my statement. Do you think "rights are a human invention that enables us to live in a society with other people in a peaceful manner" is true or false? Your calling it subjectivist and pragmatic seems to be aimed at hurting my Objectivist Feelings , but it doesn't address whether the statement is true or false, and why.

I like your post 215. Kids certainly do have volition. And, I don't see my job as parent as being one of initiating force against my son until he reaches the age of 18! I think children do have volition, and they do have rights, and they are "rational animals", at least from the age of about 3 and up. Their "negative rights" are not sufficient to keep them alive - at least not in the manner to which they are accustomed! - and they know that. That's why, even though they grumble about having to do their chores, they stick around until they feel capable of supporting themselves. Not sure what you mean by "There is no right to life." Will wait for your explanation.

[tjohnson]

As I mentioned before you have to differentiate between the statement of rights and the practice of rights. Animals will exhibit a recognition of rights like when wolves mark their territory but they do not write them down and discuss them in a language. It seems clear that as long as one animal keeps up his "markings" his territory will be respected by others but if he becomes old or sick and slacks off his territory will be taken over ie. he loses his rights. In human society we have tried to elevate this to a higher standard and allow individuals to keep some rights even when they cannot physically protect them and we have recorded these "rights" in the form of laws, etc. and they are enforced ultimately by police and the justice system. Without all this we simply fall back to the animal way of doing things - might is right.

[Wolf DeVoon]

Wolf, your post 214 seems to be dismissive of my statement. Your calling it subjectivist and pragmatic seems to be aimed at hurting my Objectivist Feelings , but it doesn't address whether the statement is true or false, and why.

Laure, I very sincerely admire you. Sorry I was abrupt. I was getting my kid ready for school.

I want to acknowledge that there has been some ambiguity in my published writing and in the evolution of my thought. It took me a very long time to discern what I consider to be an error in Rand's theory of Man's Rights. It boils down to this:

A moral principle never reaches beyond itself. Its ethical arms are too short, extending no farther than one man's soul, one man's purpose and lifespan. We have to look elsewhere for political guidance, because the thing at issue is "a nation of laws and not of men." Principles of Internet Law

As far as I'm concerned, liberty is non-negotiable and I am not susceptible to universal moral principles, utilitarian or otherwise. I view morality as a personal matter, in the context of my unique situation, inquiring What shall I do? (not what must all men and women in all circumstances do). To me it seems plain that women and men have contrary moral purposes. NAP This!

Fair's fair. I could be accused of subjectivist tendancies, too, claiming that morality is a personal matter. I'm on firmer ground, I think, when I say that women and men have contrary moral purposes. Certainly children as a class (that's a provisional concept to be qualified presently) are morally limited by their innocence. We could assert their ignorance as well, but I don't like to characterize anyone as ignorant of their will or existential circumstances.

It is a peculiar and indefensible aspect of U.S. history that Indians and negroes were regarded as children and/or property:

They [indians] occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian. They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great father. CHEROKEE NATION v. STATE OF GEORGIA, 30 U.S. 1 (1831)

It is difficult at this day to realize the state of public opinion in relation to that unfortunate race [negroes], which prevailed in the civilized and enlightened portions of the world at the time of the Declaration of Independence, and when the Constitution of the United States was framed and adopted. But the public history of every European nation displays it in a manner too plain to be mistaken. They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it. This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race. It was regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics, which no one thought of disputing, or supposed to be open to dispute; and men in every grade and position in society daily and habitually acted upon it in their private pursuits, as well as in matters of public concern, without doubting for a moment the correctness of this opinion. DRED SCOTT v SANFORD, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)

It's a small leap of political imagination to say that Iraqis are children in a state of pupilage and protection; that Afghanis and Talabanis are beings of an inferior order; that Palestinian refugees have no right of citizenship in the land from which they were driven. "It's earlier than we think." -- A.R.

Of the six billion, only a small minority enjoy approximately equal legal rights as free men, women and children. At age 16, kids can work, save, and spend. At 18 they can drink and vote in some states. Do all children automatically become adults when they turn 16, 18, or 21? Probably not. Do all kids everywhere have the same opportunity, strength of character, support system, nutrition, health care, and genetic predisposition? Absolutely not.

Leaving aside the question of rights for the moment, I conclude that each individual from birth is a new life on life's terms, more or less unique, unless born with a profound deformity. Each new wayfarer in life will blunder, stretch, differentiate, retreat, evolve, and navigate in ways that often frustrate everyone else, especially parents and warlords. We can beat them into submission. We can flatter them with praise. But there are not two alike except dead or imprisoned.

W.

The Meaning of Liberty

The 51% Solution

Edited April 1, 2008 by Wolf DeVoon

[Ellen Stuttle]

People,

I might title this post "I've gotta get out of here." I have neither time nor health for becoming enmeshed in yet another rights debate. I spent about a year and a half of my existence (approximately November 1999ff) being enmeshed in raging rights debates on Old Atlantis. I thought I'd seen about every wrinkle there was thrashing out problems until Michael began with his thesis of a "contradiction" somewhere near...what, A is A?

Michael, please forgive the facetiousness of the question, but seriously I do not understand what "contradiction" it is you believe you're seeing. As I said in my post #198, I'm not getting any clear image of where you see the -- obviously, in your view, large -- contradication as lying. Near as I can tell, it's a perceived contradiction between the child's "right to life" and the child's incapacity to exercise full adult powers of judgment.

I think that one source of your perceiving such a contradiction is the usage "right to life." I agree with Wolf -- if I understand Wolf correctly -- in finding that usage a BIG source of trouble. It's possibly the most unfortunate usage I can think of in the whole of the Western philosophic tradition. It immediately evokes images of "positive" rights, that is, rights which are demands on others to provide FOR one. I agree with AR that the very idea of such "rights" opens the door immediately to a horde of vultures. This is possibly the one insight of Rand's with which I completely agree.

Since I must "get out of here," I'll content myself with only addressing two comments from Merlin.

P.S. I believe there are legitimate positive rights, which are quite limited in scope. The U.S. Constitution includes a positive right to a fair trial, which has been extended to legal representation. An infant has a positive right to being cared for by its parents or other caretakers who have taken on the obligation. The scope is not as broad as rights owed by anyone or society.

I think you're incorrect in viewing either as a case of "positive" rights. The fair trial requirement seems to me an obvious case of attempting to safeguard negative rights. In regard to "parents or other caretakers who have taken on the obligation," I think that this is correctly viewed as (implicitly) delegated negative rights. Parents as guardians are rights-surrogates on whom is vested the decision-making and subsistence-acquiring powers which the child can't exercise, gradually relinquishing these powers as the child grows progressively capable of assuming them.

The context of NIOF is primarily the interaction of normal humans past some minimal age, and often between adults. Preventing a child from running onto a busy highway is the right to life trumping NIOF.

Again, I think that that way of stating the issue is incorrect -- both because of the usage "right to life" and because of your implied meaning of "force." "Force" in non-initiation of "force" doesn't mean "force" as in straightforward physical interference. If it did, for example, then wouldn't it be "IOF" when one person takes measures to prevent someone in the throes of an epileptic seizure from inadvertent injury (the epileptic's control of voluntary muscles being inoperative during the seizure)? Stopping a child who isn't old enough to well understand the danger of running in front of a car, etc., is legitimate protection of the child, not IOF -- just as holding out a restraining arm instead of taking the possibly fatality-producing time of relying on a verbal warning to an adult stepping into the street without noticing an approaching car wouldn't be IOF.

Ellen

___

[Wolf DeVoon]

holding out a restraining arm instead of taking the possibly fatality-producing time of relying on a verbal warning to an adult stepping into the street without noticing an approaching car wouldn't be IOF.

My life was saved by a passerby in just those circustances in Australia in 1982. Traffic ran backwards on the wrong side of the street and a girl grabbed hold and yanked me out of the path of an enormous bus going 40 mph. I certainly would have been killed had she not saved me by sudden, heroic force.

Ellen, I posted some gumph on rights in the Politics forum.

Edited April 1, 2008 by Wolf DeVoon

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen,

Matters are improving. At least you are now saying you don't understand what I mean before telling me what I think.

Here's a hint about what I am discussing. I am looking at human nature as a premise of ethics and consequently rights. You jump over human nature and replace that premise directly with rights as a primary.

I don't want the following to sound as an attempt to insult, so please do not take it with that intent. Your last post is a perfect example of what I was talking about when I said Objectivists and libertarians play right into the hands of the collectivists by refusing to acknowledge the issue. Collectivists convince oodles of people while you don't (nor others who use your line of reasoning on this). I don't think you are being dishonest by ignoring the issue of the nature of children as compared to adults, or human nature in general, and I do not want to insinuate that, but you always leave it out. So I can only conclude that it is a huge blind spot when you discuss my musings.

I get the distinct impression that you don't think human nature has any bearing on rights, not from what you say, but from what you refuse to acknowledge.

Michael

[merjet]

P.S. I believe there are legitimate positive rights, which are quite limited in scope. The U.S. Constitution includes a positive right to a fair trial, which has been extended to legal representation. An infant has a positive right to being cared for by its parents or other caretakers who have taken on the obligation. The scope is not as broad as rights owed by anyone or society.

I think you're incorrect in viewing either as a case of "positive" rights. The fair trial requirement seems to me an obvious case of attempting to safeguard negative rights. In regard to "parents or other caretakers who have taken on the obligation," I think that this is correctly viewed as (implicitly) delegated negative rights. Parents as guardians are rights-surrogates on whom is vested the decision-making and subsistence-acquiring powers which the child can't exercise, gradually relinquishing these powers as the child grows progressively capable of assuming them.

My casting these as "positive rights" may be unconventional, but here is why I did. A "negative right" is a rule about not doing something. For example, respecting X's right to life means Y must refrain from murdering X. On the other hand, if X is the accused, some Y's have to do something in order to afford X a fair trial. It is not simply refraining from doing something. Similar for the infant. The parents or other caretakers must do something to care for the infant, not simply refrain. In A Life of One's Own David Kelley said positive rights "impose on others positive obligations to which they did not consent and which cannot be traced to any voluntary act." The case of parents and child can be traced to a voluntary act, so my use of "positive rights" differed from Kelley's. It's not so clear how Kelley's "voluntary act" stipulation applies in affording a fair trial.

The context of NIOF is primarily the interaction of normal humans past some minimal age, and often between adults. Preventing a child from running onto a busy highway is the right to life trumping NIOF.

Again, I think that that way of stating the issue is incorrect -- both because of the usage "right to life" and because of your implied meaning of "force." "Force" in non-initiation of "force" doesn't mean "force" as in straightforward physical interference. If it did, for example, then wouldn't it be "IOF" when one person takes measures to prevent someone in the throes of an epileptic seizure from inadvertent injury (the epileptic's control of voluntary muscles being inoperative during the seizure)? Stopping a child who isn't old enough to well understand the danger of running in front of a car, etc., is legitimate protection of the child, not IOF -- just as holding out a restraining arm instead of taking the possibly fatality-producing time of relying on a verbal warning to an adult stepping into the street without noticing an approaching car wouldn't be IOF.

In retrospect "right to life" wasn't a good choice of words. "Saving the child's life" is better. You say saving the child's life is not IOF. Why not? It seems you are trying to confine "force" to "malicious physical force" or similar, whereas I meant simply "physical force". Saving the child's life is initiating physical force.