Two Kinds of "Induction": Important similarities and trivial differences

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

They had just a wrong theory. Other people did have the correct theory.

Dragonfly,

You mean to say that "other people did have the correct theory" at the same time as "early Mesopotamian thought," etc.? I am not a history buff, but your statement sounds like some righteous time travel to me.

Michael

[Dragonfly]

Nevertheless, the flat-earth theory, according to our best evidence today, has been falsified -- which means it never was correct.

There is the simple fact that the way the flat-earth theory was falsified today was impossible to do back then.

No it was not. Simple observation could falsify it, as the ancient examples of Aristoteles and Erathostenes show.

[Dragonfly]

They had just a wrong theory. Other people did have the correct theory.

You mean to say that "other people did have the correct theory" at the same time as "early Mesopotamian thought," etc.? I am not a history buff, but your statement sounds like some righteous time travel to me.

No need for time travel. They had the same means to discover the correct theory as the ancient Greeks who did find it.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Simple observation could falsify it, as the ancient examples of Aristoteles and Erathostenes show.

Dragonfly,

Eratosthenes - 276-194 BC

Aristoteles - 384-322 BC

Earliest Mesopotamian writings - starting about 4000 BC

I guess some 3000 years (give or take a few) is a mere detail in your idea of "simple observation" for falsifying something.

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

Mike:

Eratosthenes - 276-194 BC

Aristoteles - 384-322 BC

Earliest Mesopotamian writings - starting about 4000 BC

I guess some 3000 years (give or take a few) is a mere detail in your idea of "simple observation" for falsifying something.

Why worry? As far as the contextual theory goes all versions - flat, round, supported by turtles, etc - are "absolutely true" in the context of their knowledge at the time.

Gotta love that "contextual" theory of truth!

[Dragonfly]

Simple observation could falsify it, as the ancient examples of Aristoteles and Erathostenes show.

I guess some 3000 years (give or take a few) is a mere detail in your idea of "simple observation" for falsifying something.

For simple observation they are indeed not relevant. There may have been cultural factors that determined the way people thought and formed a world view, but they did have the means to falsify the flat-earth hypothesis. Really, false theories do and did exist.

[Dragonfly]

Why worry? As far as the contextual theory goes all versions - flat, round, supported by turtles, etc - are "absolutely true" in the context of their knowledge at the time.

LOL! Especially the absolutely true turtle theory...

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Daniel,

Ain't that the way deductive logic works? A proposition can be true although the premises are false?

Gotta love that deductive logic... It is soooooooo superior as knowledge that it obliterates all else.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Let me flesh this idea out a bit more. According to the deductive-logic-only-experts, here is a pristine example of "truth" by syllogism:

All cows fly.

Only creatures with wings can fly.

Therefore all cows have wings.

Now THAT is considered "truth" according to the deductive-logic-only-experts. I have no idea how they would ever use that knowledge.

But when ancients thought the earth was flat as their truth within their rules of processing knowledge and USED THAT INFORMATION FOR PRODUCTION AND TRAVEL, that is patently absurd according to the deductive-logic-only-experts.

Nice... Great thinking...

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

Let me flesh this idea out a bit more. According to the deductive-logic-only-experts, here is a pristine example of "truth" by syllogism:

All cows fly.

Only creatures with wings can fly.

Therefore all cows have wings.

No; All God's chilun' got wings.

Now THAT is considered "truth" according to the deductive-logic-only-experts. I have no idea how they would ever use that knowledge.

But when ancients thought the earth was flat as their truth within their rules of processing knowledge and USED THAT INFORMATION FOR PRODUCTION AND TRAVEL, that is patently absurd according to the deductive-logic-only-experts.

Nice... Great thinking...

You have the most extraordinary talent for interpreting people as saying what they aren't saying and then getting all worked up in indignation. No one is saying that you can't get around just fine for multiple practical purposes with the belief that the earth is flat. All that's being said is that the earth isn't flat, though it appears to be locally.

Look, Sir Isaac Newton's theory of gravity is in error. This is not to discredit Sir Isaac Newton as a great physicist; he's a serious contender for having been the greatest physicist who ever lived; it was his work which fully birthed modern science. He is justifiably revered. His theory of gravity is nevertheless in error. Please try to separate out the morals issue that you're mixing up with that of the truth or falsity of a theory.

What people are saying is "patently absurd" isn't people's having believed something which was found to be incorrect but instead your insistence that the belief was correct.

One could describe science as an excellent method for weeding out errors. Discarding failed theories is how we learn. (And we never know that the theory we've currently arrived at is correct.) There is no insult in saying a theory is mistaken. You're mounting a defense against charges that haven't been made.

Ellen

___

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen,

You are not understanding, or at least glossing over, the fundamental issue (irrespective of the recent mockery, which is nothing more than BS used to sidestep the issue). The main issue is that induction exists and is a valid means of obtaining knowledge—scientific knowledge—and works in harmony with deduction. There is only one path to denying this: closing one's eyes to it.

All I am trying to do is show that the same standard that is used for criticizing induction works just as well against deduction, and the same limitations that are allowed to deduction should be given to induction, but they are not by those who think Rand was out to lunch. When you say the following:

What people are saying is "patently absurd" isn't people's having believed something which was found to be incorrect but instead your insistence that the belief was correct.

you show that you have not understood my words or are mischaracterizing them by removing context (and that is just one phrase). Either way is wrong. My insistence that the "belief was correct" pertained to a specific instance of knowledge and measurement limitations and was made from an epistemological angle. I do not believe it is correct metaphysically (which uses an omniscient epistemological standard) or from the perspective of present-day knowledge. (I believe I have mentioned this more than once, yet for some reason you don't find that interesting enough to include when you mischaracterize.)

And you are the one saying that I am talking past the issue. I am not the one mocking with smarmy comments (and neither are you, to be fair, being one of God's chillun and all). Do you honestly think that I believe the world is flat? Think about it. I mean that. Think about it. Do you really think I believe the world is flat and you are seriously holding a conversation with a present-day savage about this matter trying to convince me that it is round? If you don't, then isn't it a good idea to try to understand what I am talking about instead of pretending I believe the world is flat? What is to be gained by pretending that?

I obviously think incorrect theories should be discarded. We are having one hell of a time communicating exactly what "incorrect theory" means. I do not think correct knowledge should be discarded with incorrect theories, thus, by logical conclusion, I do think that correct knowledge is included in them when they are productive. This is about as obvious as 2+2=4 to me and this is what Objectivist concept formation is all about—keeping the correct and discarding the incorrect.

From the arguments I have been reading recently, there is no provision for how to keep correct knowledge with the falsification thing, which, as argued here on OL, throws the baby out with the bath water (although I do believe Popper covered how to retain and build on correct knowledge when a theory is falsified—he had to, it just needs to be found). Even you are positing "science as an excellent method for weeding out errors" instead of an excellent method for building on previous knowledge. Epistemologically, this implies that we already know everything, but are merely mistaken. I know you couldn't possibly beleive that.

I am going to go back to a previous observation. My intent is to align the best of Rand with the best of Popper (or anybody) and discard the incorrect. My intent is not to debunk Popper, Kant, Walt Disney or anybody else and engage in silly competitions. The craving to compete and debunk is where I think a major obstacle to understanding lies.

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

Reason uses deduction and induction, it is the application of logic to facts, at least ultimately. Falsification of a theory--a theory must at least be falsifiable to be valid--is part of the scientific method. Flights of imagination are all alright as an aid to inquiry and understanding though they verify nothing.

What in the hell are you people talking about? If you aren't proposing to improve the scientific method what are you proposing?

--Brant

[Dragonfly]

Let me flesh this idea out a bit more. According to the deductive-logic-only-experts, here is a pristine example of "truth" by syllogism:

All cows fly.

Only creatures with wings can fly.

Therefore all cows have wings.

Now THAT is considered "truth" according to the deductive-logic-only-experts. I have no idea how they would ever use that knowledge.

Right. That is a perfect illustration of the fact that analytic statements give no information about reality, in contrast to synthetic statements, confirming the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Right. That is a perfect illustration of the fact that analytic statements give no information about reality, in contrast to synthetic statements, confirming the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements.

Dragonfly,

And your statement just now proves that, according to this view, truth has no relationship to reality.

So why knock flat earth as untrue?

Michael

[tjohnson]

From the arguments I have been reading recently, there is no provision for how to keep correct knowledge with the falsification thing, which, as argued here on OL, throws the baby out with the bath water (although I do believe Popper covered how to retain and build on correct knowledge when a theory is falsified—he had to, it just needs to be found). Even you are positing "science as an excellent method for weeding out errors" instead of an excellent method for building on previous knowledge.

I would say science is an excellent way of refining the structure of knowledge, which would of course include weeding out misconceptions, erroneous assumptions, etc.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

GS,

Do you mean that ancient Greeks already knew how to fly to the moon, but simply needed to refine their knowledge to get there?

Michael

[tjohnson]

Do you mean that ancient Greeks already knew how to fly to the moon, but simply needed to refine their knowledge to get there?

This question makes no sense to me.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

This question makes no sense to me.

GS,

Me neither.

Michael

[BaalChatzaf]

Right. That is a perfect illustration of the fact that analytic statements give no information about reality, in contrast to synthetic statements, confirming the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements.

Dragonfly,

And your statement just now proves that, according to this view, truth has no relationship to reality.

So why knock flat earth as untrue?

Michael

Analytic statements are tautologically true. Statements such as snow is snow, for example, are analytic. This last statement conveys no particular information about snow. It conveys exactly the same information as the statement wood is wood or water is water. It is of absolutely no use in skiing, carpentry or swimming.

Since analytic statements are true in every possible world they tell you nothing about this -particular- world, the one we happen to be living in.

On the other hand synthetic statements (so-called, by Kant) better known as particular a posteriori judgments (so called by everyone else) can be either true or false, and if true actually assert something that is the case in this particular world, the one in which we all live. Such statements can actually be used to know about something or to -do- something. All engineering is grounded on a posteriori true judgments.

Hume divided propositions into two classes: those asserting a relationship of ideas and those asserting matters of fact. In the former class you will find geometry and mathematics and some varieties of philosophy. In the latter class you will find particular statements derived as predictions from a core scientific theory (some of whose statements are in the first class). Any other kind of utterance or expression, Hume considered to be nonsense. Somewhat like LP's speculative statements. In a sense, Hume divided he world of statements into axioms (or their logical derivatives) and facts.

So, of what use are analytic statements? They serve a guardians, of a sort. If a statement logically implies the denial of an analytic statement, we know that it is either a logical contradiction (if analytic) or a false statement if a posteriori (or synthetic). So analytic propositions serve as lighthouse and markers for detecting contradictions or falsehoods.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Dragonfly]

And your statement just now proves that, according to this view, truth has no relationship to reality.

Read better. An analytic truth has no relationship to reality. However, saying that the earth is flat is not an analytic statement but a synthetic statement, which is about reality. Perhaps you've forgotten it, but there has been a little discussion about this on this forum before.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

So you guys are saying that there is more than one kind of truth and that each kind is limited?

Then why the derision for contextual limitations on truth in Objectivist concept formation? Why suddenly is there a need for ONE KIND OF TRUTH ONLY?

That is a double standard if I ever saw one. The only thing Kant's analytical-synthetic division has going for it is age. "Old" seems to make it OK for a double standard to be used.

Michael

[Dragonfly]

So you guys are saying that there is more than one kind of truth and that each kind is limited?

Then why the derision for contextual limitations on truth in Objectivist concept formation? Why suddenly is there a need for ONE KIND OF TRUTH ONLY?

That is a double standard if I ever saw one. The only thing Kant's analytical-synthetic division has going for it is age. "Old" seems to make it OK for a double standard to be used.

Michael

You're confused. The usefulness of the analytic-synthetic division has nothing to do with its age, it is so useful while it enables us to see clearly which statements tell us something about reality (as in physics) and which statements do not (as in abstract mathematics). The so-called "contextual truth" is just a confusing weasel term to avoid admitting that all our knowledge about reality is tentative, and I don't like weasel terms.

[BaalChatzaf]

And your statement just now proves that, according to this view, truth has no relationship to reality.

Read better. An analytic truth has no relationship to reality. However, saying that the earth is flat is not an analytic statement but a synthetic statement, which is about reality. Perhaps you've forgotten it, but there has been a little discussion about this on this forum before.

Not quite. Any a posteriori statement that logically implies the denial of an analytic statement is false.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[tjohnson]

Not quite. Any a posteriori statement that logically implies the denial of an analytic statement is false.

In other words, any statement that is not self-contradictory is possible, however unlikely.

[BaalChatzaf]

Not quite. Any a posteriori statement that logically implies the denial of an analytic statement is false.

In other words, any statement that is not self-contradictory is possible, however unlikely.

No. I said any statement that logically implies a contradiction is false.

Ba'al Chatzaf