Why Rand has no theory of Rights

[George H. Smith]

To say, as you did, that a genus "has to refer to the units being referred to by the concept" and that it must "identify the units" is as wrong as it is possible to get. If this is what you really believe, then you do not know how to properly form definitions. So cut the crap about my supposedly not reading you carefully.

Again, your method is clear: when you don't comprehend, it's all the other person's fault, and never yours. I'm sure this is an occupational hazard of being superior in most ways to most of the people you deal with. I forgive the fault, but I'm not going to let you get away with it with me.

If you totally misunderstand what a "genus" is, as used in definitions, then the problem is your fault. This has nothing to do with superiority; it has to do with your failure to understand a basic point that is taught in first-semester courses on logic.

If you were to claim that 4+4=5 and I were to correct you, I suppose you wouldn't let me "get away" with that, either. Instead, you could claim that I fail to "comprehend" your peculiar mathematical skills.

As for your definition, "A right is a human action that does not interfere with the non-interfering actions of other human beings." this is absolutely wrong. A right is not an action. "Action" is not the proper genus for "rights." A right is a moral principle that pertains to human actions. It is a normative standard by which we assess the justice of certain actions, namely, those that occur in a social context.

That's not the question George. I don't ask you if it is a good definition. I am asking you whether it IS a definition.

It has the verbal form of a definition, but, no, it is not a definition. It is no more of a definition than to say that "man" is a being from Neptune who likes grapes.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

If that wasn't Rand's definition of rights then she never defined them.

--Brant

[sjw]

It has the verbal form of a definition, but, no, it is not a definition. It is no more of a definition than to say that "man" is a being from Neptune who likes grapes.

Ghs

Saying that there are two important classes of human action, those which interfere with the non-interfering actions of others, and those that don't, (which is in one sense just a reference to the principle of non-aggression) is like saying that man is a being from Neptune who likes grapes? Please.

I don't question your intelligence. But I can see that your heart isn't in this.

You've written a lot of fantastic stuff over the years and deserve to be admired for it, and I do. Right now I'm reading through your "Atheism, Ayn Rand, and other Heresies" and enjoying it. Like I said elsewhere, I wish you'd collect all your essays into a volume someone might purchase.

Shayne

[sjw]

If that wasn't Rand's definition of rights then she never defined them.

--Brant

Which is not evidence that she regarded it as a definition. There is no rule that says that in every essay Rand wrote about something, that she included a definition. Yes, the proposition resembles a definition. There are no rules that one must not write a proposition that resembles a definition.

Everything in my definition Rand referred to elsewhere. She said that a right "pertains only to action." She identified the non-initiation of force principle. It is a relatively small step to say that a right does not merely pertain, but is, action. Such as the right to build a home -- an action. The right to express myself -- an action. The right to gain and keep property -- an action. Rand already observed that all rights are in some sense an expression of action, I merely point out that all rights in fact ARE actions. Which certainly does not contradict the idea that rights are a moral concept, or a legal concept, etc.

Shayne

[George H. Smith]

A human right is a moral and legal concept. Without an enforcing, legal agency, it is only moral. I still have the right to act in self defense in both contexts. If I don't have such a right why does someone else have the right to do whatever he wants to do respecting my person? If I do, the same question obtains. If there simply are no rights, who's to complain if I shoot down a man with a gun trying to kill me? That I have no right to do so? If I have no right then someone else has a right for the idea of "no right" has to come from "right." This is the same thing as saying the idea of non-existence comes from the idea of existence. Existence has always existed because non-existence cannot. There cannot be nothing. There has to be something. Rights cannot be this much reduced, of course, for they aren't axiomatic.

--Brant

Rights are certainly a moral concept. That does not mean that "moral concept" has a place in the definition.

Now I would add my own pet theory and reverse course a bit here. Suppose Rand's "definition" was not actually intended by her as being a definition. Did she actually ever claim that what is attributed to her by Objectivists as a definition actually was her formal definition of rights? As a proposition about rights, there is nothing wildly wrong about it. It is certainly true that rights are a moral concept, and that this moral concept identifies a relation between men. This is a true proposition. That something is a true proposition does not make it a definition.

So I put this forth as a challenge: prove that Rand actually intended this proposition to be taken as the definition of rights.

Shayne

I also raised the question in an earlier post about whether Rand was offering a definition of "a right." Regardless of her intent, however, it is a good, if highly compressed, definition. Here is the line:

A "right" is a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man's freedom of action in a social context.

Rand correctly identifies "a right" as a species within the genus of moral principles. Her differentia is a compound one.

Rights define man's freedom of action in the sense that they delimit the range of actions that we may rightfully take. (The implicit qualifier here is the notion of equal rights; there is no "right" to violate the rights of other people.)

Rights sanction man's freedom of action in the sense that they provide a moral justification for taking any actions that fall within the specified range. For example, I don't need to explain to other people in detail why I wish to purchase a certain book. I need only assert my right to do so. This is the only "sanction" that I need.

It could be argued that "in a social context" is somewhat redundant, insofar as "freedom of action" already implies social interaction. But the term "freedom" is used in so many different ways that this reminder was probably a good idea.

Ghs

[9thdoctor]

To say, as you did, that a genus "has to refer to the units being referred to by the concept" and that it must "identify the units" is as wrong as it is possible to get. If this is what you really believe, then you do not know how to properly form definitions. So cut the crap about my supposedly not reading you carefully.

The title of the thread serves as adequate warning that Shayne can’t express himself in writing. Add the ample evidence that he lacks skill at reading comprehension and it becomes a mystery why you waste your time. You must know that he’ll get around to calling you an idiot, hypocrite, and chronic liar eventually. You can never predict what will set him off.

[George H. Smith]

Everything in my definition Rand referred to elsewhere. She said that a right "pertains only to action." She identified the non-initiation of force principle. It is a relatively small step to say that a right does not merely pertain, but is, action. Such as the right to build a home -- an action. The right to express myself -- an action. The right to gain and keep property -- an action. Rand already observed that all rights are in some sense an expression of action, I merely point out that all rights in fact ARE actions. Which certainly does not contradict the idea that rights are a moral concept, or a legal concept, etc.

Stand on the edge of cliff and take the "relatively small step" off the edge. The difference is one of life and death.

In your case, the relatively small step is the difference between coherence and incoherence.

Tell people to take the actions of walking, running, sitting down, etc., and they will know what you mean. But not if you tell them to take an action known as "a right." Building a house is an action, but the right to build a house is not. In building a house you can be said to be exercising a right, i.e., doing something that you have a moral warrant to do, but, again, the right itself is not an action. It is a moral principle.

If the right to express yourself is itself an action, then what would it even mean to say that you have a right to express yourself? That you have an action to an action?

Ghs

[sjw]

To say, as you did, that a genus "has to refer to the units being referred to by the concept" and that it must "identify the units" is as wrong as it is possible to get. If this is what you really believe, then you do not know how to properly form definitions. So cut the crap about my supposedly not reading you carefully.

The title of the thread serves as adequate warning that Shayne can’t express himself in writing. Add the ample evidence that he lacks skill at reading comprehension and it becomes a mystery why you waste your time. You must know that he’ll get around to calling you an idiot, hypocrite, and chronic liar eventually. You can never predict what will set him off.

George is a man of character. It is virtually impossible for him to act in such a way that I would want to call him those things.

Shayne

[sjw]

Stand on the edge of cliff and take the "relatively small step" off the edge. The difference is one of life and death.

In your case, the relatively small step is the difference between coherence and incoherence.

Tell people to take the actions of walking, running, sitting down, etc., and they will know what you mean. But not if you tell them to take an action known as "a right." Building a house is an action, but the right to build a house is not. In building a house you can be said to be exercising a right, i.e., doing something that you have a moral warrant to do, but, again, the right itself is not an action. It is a moral principle.

If the right to express yourself is itself an action, then what would it even mean to say that you have a right to express yourself? That you have an action to an action?

Ghs

People say "Expressing oneself is a right." or "It is a right to express oneself." So yes, it's quite meaningful to say "Expressing oneself is an action" or "It is an action to express oneself."

But you raise excellent points. The position I take on this in my book is that there are two senses of "right" -- two actual concepts being referred to by one word. So Ninth is right on one thing, that I'm not expressing myself here as well as I have done elsewhere. I could have said this originally, that there are two senses of "right" that I refer to by the word. Which is why I found writing the book difficult, there was lots of iteration. If that makes me a stupid person, fine, that's just my intellectual limit, I can't do better. I make mistakes. I don't see Ninth contributing anything of any intellectual depth here or in any other thread, so it's easy for him to throw stones and post his silly Youtube videos.

So, to help correct my mistake above: I think there are two important senses of the word, right qua action and right qua moral prerogative. Regarding the second sense, I would define it as: "A right [second sense] is a moral prerogative to take any and all actions that do not interfere with the rights [first sense] of another." You can see this starting on page 27 of my book. Sorry for the confusion in this thread.

Edit: And given all the above, I think I should have defined both senses together, in the book I only define the first sense in Chapter 1, and then in Chapter 2 I refer to the second sense without actually defining it as I just did. Which again indicates my limitations.

Shayne

Edited October 2, 2010 by sjw

[Xray]

Everything in my definition Rand referred to elsewhere.

I have no doubt that she did. But the question is whether trying to apply Rand's (flawed imo) theory of concepts to the realm of ethics will hold any water.

Even if her theory of concepts had no flaws, imo any attempt to mix epistemology with ethics will result in an indigestible cocktail because the ingredients don't match. Among the weakest parts in ITOE are the sections where Rand lets her personal moral views slip into her epistemology, like for example on pages 34/35.

She said that a right "pertains only to action."

To put it in context, if you would please provide the complete quote plus the source.

Edited October 2, 2010 by Xray

[sjw]

So, to help correct my mistake above: I think there are two important senses of the word, right qua action and right qua moral prerogative. Regarding the second sense, I would define it as: "A right [second sense] is a moral prerogative to take any and all actions that do not interfere with the rights [first sense] of another." You can see this starting on page 27 of my book. Sorry for the confusion in this thread.

This other sense is obviously the one most related to Rand's definition (and yes, I screwed up in not recognizing it earlier in this thread, sorry). I prefer mine because:

1. I think "moral prerogative" emphasizes the important element here, that you have a right to do it.

2. I think again the "any and all actions that do not interfere" emphasizes the important element pertaining to sovereign individualism, as against Rand's emphasis which sounds too much like permission from society.

Shayne

[sjw]

I see this thread as a microcosm of why mankind tends to get divided into camps. Here's a metaphor: when you are atop of one hill looking down, things look a bit different than if you are in the valley below, or atop a different hill. One's perspective influences one's thinking. To get the whole picture, you have to be patient enough to integrate all the perspectives. But if you're happy sitting atop your hill, or residing in your village, you might not have a lot of motive to see things from different viewpoints. It's easy to be lazy.

How this applies here is that both perspectives are true: a right is a "moral principle" (I say prerogative but for sake of argument let's say these are the same), and it is an action, depending on which way you look at it. (I do put forth one as more fundamental than the other which is a separate argument.)

This kind of thing gets really bad in political contexts, which is why we have leftists and rightists. Each has a certain perspective, or stance, which colors everything they see. Objectivists have the same kind of problem (I have listed the example elsewhere in how they back cable companies in spite of government favoritism for the cable companies precluding you or me from competing, which is implicit fascism). This isn't short-sightedness, and it isn't necessarily dishonest, its "single-perspectiveness".

I gave an example in a different thread of a cylinder. From one perspective it looks like a circle. From another, a rectangle. There are a multiplicity of perspectives that all look different. We must integrate them all to get to the truth. Which is not to say that some perspectives aren't just flat out wrong, but most perspectives probably have some element of truth to be pulled out of them. Another example came up with Thomas Paine's Agrarian Justice. I think Paine was seeing a real truth from a certain perspective, but just didn't get to the whole truth.

Shayne

[BaalChatzaf]

Another example came up with Thomas Paine's Agrarian Justice. I think Paine was seeing a real truth from a certain perspective, but just didn't get to the whole truth.

Shayne

Who does?

Ba'al Chatzaf

[sjw]

Another example came up with Thomas Paine's Agrarian Justice. I think Paine was seeing a real truth from a certain perspective, but just didn't get to the whole truth.

Shayne

Who does?

Ba'al Chatzaf

Issac Newton.

It all depends on what you mean by "whole truth." We never know everything. But we can take what we do know and integrate all of it comprehensively, systematically, without contradiction. That's what Newton essentially did, even if he might have made a small error here or there. This is all that is humanly possible. This is what we must try to do.

Instead of doing this, people like to laze around in their own little village. Like you do, in your skeptic village, right? And you like to hang out with people from other villages and make fun of them for doing what you do, right?

Shayne

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

George,

I have something else I want to throw in the fire-bin warming this discussion: power.

I am currently reading A Patriot's History of the United States by Larry Schweikart and Michael Allen. I know Jeff Riggenbach is going to hate me for saying this, but he--through his endorsement--is the one who pushed me over the edge to read it. He really dislikes some of the conclusions in it, but stated that it is factually correct and well documented. And I'm glad I'm reading it.

Thanks for the recommendation, Jeff...

One of the things that I find rather funny is the behavior of the Founding Fathers at the beginning of the formal USA government. They took a great deal of care to slice and dice power so that no one would be able to wield enough to become a tyrant. This--the doctrine of checks and balances and the clever way they busted power up into a bunch of competing pieces--is one of their greatest achievements, in my humble opinion.

But now the funny part. After the power structure was in place, by Washington's second term, they--our brave and wise Founding Fathers--then went for each others throats--literally scheming, defaming, rabble-rousing, lying, etc.--trying to get their hands on it.

I swear, some of the things I am reading makes SLOP look like a... like a... er... well, maybe that was not the best example, but you know what I mean.

Here is a quote I found funny. It is about John Jay's treaty with Britain during George Washington's administration. Some people thought he had appeased too much and they spewed out their hatred over and over. The quote is from p. 144:

Jay was not unaware of such vitriol, observing in 1794 that he could travel from New York to Boston by the light of his own burning effigies (a line repeated by several politicians at later dates).

The image has a nice dramatic flair that appeals to my darker side.

Anyway, I wonder if limitation on power should be included in a definition of rights. The reason I say this is that if rights are seen as "things" people possess, "things" granted by God, I might add, it's an easy step to make rights "things" that are granted by the government. A passage in Patriot's History discussing the Bill of Rights really highlighted this for me, (p. 126):

These ten clear statements were intended by the framers as absolute limitations on the power of government, not on the rights of individuals. In retrospect, they more accurately should be known as the Bill of Limitations on government to avoid the perception that rights were granted by government in the first place.

I never did like the term "negative rights." It sounds clunky and almost contradictory, almost like a double negative. I much prefer the form of restriction on what government (or anybody) can do. In other words, a restriction on what power one human being can exercise over another.

The idea of power is broader than force and I am thinking long and hard about it right now. I admit that I find "restriction on power" far more attractive than "noninitiation of force" as grounds--using my starting point of two or more individuals--in defining rights.

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

The problem with the idea of "negative rights" is it grants legitimacy to "positive rights"--i.e., rights to get stuff from love to chickens--and debases the whole discussion because there is no such thing as a positive right.

--Brant

Edited October 3, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[sjw]

It is interesting to look up "right" in the dictionary, because there are so many definitions and senses. Here there are 62: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/right . Here are some that are relevant to this discussion:

18. a just claim or title, whether legal, prescriptive, or moral: You have a right to say what you please.

22. a moral, ethical, or legal principle considered as an underlying cause of truth, justice, morality, or ethics.

26. that which is in accord with fact, reason, propriety, the correct way of thinking, etc.

Number 18 is similar to my "second sense" above. 22 is similar to Rand's definition. 26 is similar to my "first sense", though not as close as the other two to their respective senses.

With all three senses, one might logically say: One has a right [second sense] to exercise his rights [first sense] because of the principles of rights [Rand's sense]. Reducing these through their genus: One has a prerogative to exercise certain actions because of certain principles. Or: principles assign the prerogative to actions. Which is to say that: rights assign the right to rights -- a confusing statement if you don't know what sense is meant at each place in the sentence, but perfectly clear if you do see each sense.

All of this emphasizes that the central arguments in this thread have been misguided, but also that they have been constructive to the purpose of clarity.

I had wanted to emphasize very strictly and as the highest possible priority the "first sense" of rights, namely that they refer to human action. Why? Because this is heart of our existence. We are our actions, we are nothing less, and nothing more. And I think that's a fine reason to put this sense of right on the pedestal, but I should not have fixated on it as I did.

Shayne

Edited October 3, 2010 by sjw

[Xray]

Why did Rand make this mistake? It looks like she had only countable "real-world" objects like e. g. tables and chairs in her mind when she wrote that "every word we use stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind", and forgot about the rest.

In addition, she obviously was only thinking of nouns when she wrote "every word we use".

For how can a word like e. g. "although" stand for an unlimited number of concretes? Makes no sense, does it.

The mistake is yours, Word Nazi.

Parroting Selene's words won't help you, Merlin. For it is the quality of arguments alone which counts, therefore let's take look at yours:

Your assertion is clearly false. In ITOE she addressed adverbs, adjectives, prepositions, and conjunctions.

I know she addresses adverbs, adjectives etc. in ITOE, but the question is whether her statement "every word we use stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind" is applicable to them.

It works well with countable conrete nouns.

Example: the word table is an audiovisual symbol which stands for an unlimited number of concretes (i. e. objects) having in common certain similarities.

So it is not the word, which is "the concrete", the concrete is what the word refers to.

What I want to know from you is what unlimited number of concretes e. g. the "word" (= the audiovisual symbol) "although" stands for.

And while we're at it, if you would please name the "units" subsumed under the concept represented by the audiovisual symbol "although"

"Although" is a conjunction. Nearly every time it is used, it is as a "concrete", except to the Word Nazi.

See above. You completely missed the point. Rand explicitly called a word a symbol, and a symbol represents something - it stands for something.

Rand's elaborations leave no doubt that it is not the word, the visual-auditory symbol, which is "the concrete" - the concrete is what the symbol stands for.

[Xray]: If Rand had written instead: "Many nouns we use are symbols standing for an umlimited number of concretes of a certain kind", she would have avoided the "angel fallacy" and other misunderstandings.

Your alternative is woefully inadequate. It says nothing about adverbs, adjectives, prepositions, or conjunctions.

Indeed it says nothing about adverbs, adjectives, prepositions, or conjunctions because Rand's "every word we use stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind" (ITOE, p. 10)is not applicable. That was my point.

Edited October 3, 2010 by Xray

[Xray]

I had wanted to emphasize very strictly and as the highest possible priority the "first sense" of rights, namely that they refer to human action.

Rights are human creations to regulate human action. Which is why an individual can't have any 'innate' rights. Do you agree?

Trying to apply Rand's theory of concepts to her moral views can't work imo.

Per Rand, a concept has to involve two or more similar members ("units").

"A unit is an existent regarded as a separate member of a group of two or more similar members" (ITOE, p. 6).

This may work with concrete countable objects like e. g. "table", but when you try to apply it to an abstract concept like "right", you will see the limitations. For what are the "two or more similar members ("units") necessary to form the concept "right"?

Edited October 3, 2010 by Xray

[Brant Gaede]

I had wanted to emphasize very strictly and as the highest possible priority the "first sense" of rights, namely that they refer to human action.

Rights are human creations to regulate human action. Which is why an individual can't have any 'innate' rights. Do you agree?

"Regulate" kinda implies rule. I just don't like this word applied to rights. It is strongly connotative of economic activity, production and trade, and brushes right up against fascism.

In the second sentence you are implying rights are arbitrary. If you think they are say so so I can say it ain't so--so?

--Brant

[sjw]

I had wanted to emphasize very strictly and as the highest possible priority the "first sense" of rights, namely that they refer to human action.

Rights are human creations to regulate human action. Which is why an individual can't have any 'innate' rights. Do you agree?

Look at my "sense 1" definition. That is a metaphysical/biological-teleological distinction. It's a real event when one organism initiates interference with another, interfering with the victim's preferred action, the action that would have existed but for the interference.

Rights are as real as the actions your fingers take while you deny them.

Shayne

[George H. Smith]

The problem with the idea of "negative rights" is it grants legitimacy to "positive rights"--i.e., rights to get stuff from love to chickens--and debases the whole discussion because there is no such thing as a positive right.

--Brant

There are no natural positive rights -- i.e., natural rights that impose positive obligations -- but positive rights can be acquired in one of two ways: via contract and via aggression. A voluntary agreement, when formalized as a contract, can invest each party with positive rights vis-à-vis the other party. And a victim of aggression can acquire positive rights (e.g., to restitution) vis-à-vis the aggressor.

The distinction between negative and positive rights has been around for a long time, both in philosophy and in legal theory. It is a very useful distinction, and I have no problem with it.

Rand understood that negative rights have a positive aspect to them. As she wrote in "Man's Rights":

Thus, for every individual, a right is the moral sanction of a positive—of his freedom to act on his own judgment, for his own goals, by his own voluntary, uncoerced choice. As to his neighbors, his rights impose no obligations on them except of a negative kind: to abstain from violating his rights.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

The problem with the idea of "negative rights" is it grants legitimacy to "positive rights"--i.e., rights to get stuff from love to chickens--and debases the whole discussion because there is no such thing as a positive right.

--Brant

There are no natural positive rights -- i.e., natural rights that impose positive obligations -- but positive rights can be acquired in one of two ways: via contract and via aggression. A voluntary agreement, when formalized as a contract, can invest each party with positive rights vis-à-vis the other party. And a victim of aggression can acquire positive rights (e.g., to restitution) vis-à-vis the aggressor.

The distinction between negative and positive rights has been around for a long time, both in philosophy and in legal theory. It is a very useful distinction, and I have no problem with it.

Rand understood that negative rights have a positive aspect to them. As she wrote in "Man's Rights":

Thus, for every individual, a right is the moral sanction of a positive—of his freedom to act on his own judgment, for his own goals, by his own voluntary, uncoerced choice. As to his neighbors, his rights impose no obligations on them except of a negative kind: to abstain from violating his rights.

Ghs

In the context of government enforcement it properly enforces the negative so people can act postively. As it supports the positive qua rights it has negative impact on people's ability to act positively.

--Brant

[Mikee]

"Positive" rights are mafia rights, the power to steal from one group to bribe another and keep the difference.

[Selene]

"Positive" rights are mafia rights, the power to steal from one group to bribe another and keep the difference.

Mikee:

"mafia rights" let's see, I assume you are referring to organized crime rights...so for example Jewish crime families like the Brighten Beach crime families, or the Chinese Tong crime families, or the Irish crime families like the Westy Boys, or the Jamaican crime families or maybe the German crime families like the Dutch Schultz crime families.

Surely, you did not mean to assert that crime families are restricted to Sicilians because that would be so not accurate.

Adam