Why Rand has no theory of Rights

[sjw]

One way to see an Objectivist get their panties into a bunch is offer the definition of man as a volitional animal.

Perhaps "man the rational animal" is wishful thinking, and "man the conceptual animal" would be nearer to the actual mark. Virtually all are actually conceptual, relatively few are actually rational. This observation also might get their panties in a bunch.

OK I am only semi-serious in the above, you can now unbunch your panties.

Shayne

[rodney203]

I just had this crazy thought, and it's only a crazy thought, but the idea popped into my head that maybe what we call a "concept" is actually, in our brain's working, a new "entity" or "existent" that the brain simply constructed, to be treated, or related to, in a certain way. I would have no idea what the brain might have used as the genus or speci for that though. This is only to give a crazy example of some mechanism by which what we call a concept is made.

Recall that the theory of Objectivism (or any good philosophy for that matter) says that nothing happens hocus pocus or supernaturally, but rather that everything has a mechanism by which it happens.

Edited October 2, 2010 by rodney203

[rodney203]

Shayne:

Perhaps "man the rational animal" is wishful thinking, and "man the conceptual animal" would be nearer to the actual mark. Virtually all are actually conceptual, relatively few are actually rational.

I agree with your musing completely. When you are right I will say you are right.

[sjw]

Shayne:

Perhaps "man the rational animal" is wishful thinking, and "man the conceptual animal" would be nearer to the actual mark. Virtually all are actually conceptual, relatively few are actually rational.

I agree with your musing completely. When you are right I will say you are right.

The trouble is that if you actually promote that argument then some Objectivist claims that the Nazis defined man in such a manner and voila you're now Hitler. The other trouble is that it leads to a Nockean view of mankind which is kind of depressing, though I admit it takes a certain pigheaded stubbornness to cling to the Jeffersonian view of man. Nevertheless, that's my view. Until and unless I'm lucky enough to reach Brant's age. Then I'm switching to the Nockean view, it's easier on the blood pressure.

Shayne

[Brant Gaede]

Nevertheless, that's my view. Until and unless I'm lucky enough to reach Brant's age. Then I'm switching to the Nockean view, it's easier on the blood pressure.

I'm 66. Mom will be 96 on the 25th. My surviving uncle is 92. Another died at 93. Dad died at 83 but he smoked like a chimney and drank like a fish. My maternal grand-parents died at 90-91. Etc. (I have two uncles who died as babies in a streetcar accident in Defiance, Ohio around 1902 which almost killed my grandmother and did kill her sister: somehow the streetcar got hit by a train.)

--Brant

I'm worried, though. I have little hair upstairs but all those relatives had a lot

lucky to be here--just like everybody

"GENES FOR SALE! GENES FOR SALE!" (high IQ genes, too, in spite of me: I offer regression to the high gression--you have to pay for the Viagara)

Edited October 2, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[Xray]

[To MSK]: Do you doubt that Xray's intent was to hijack what Rand said to mean angels existed in a non-imaginary way?

In # 116, I was merely following Rand's own advice and checked premises by putting hers to the test.

Rand stated that every word we use (except proper names) is a symbol standing for an inlimited number of concretes of a certain kind.

We also have her statement that "abstractions are merely man's epistemological method of perceiving that which exists, and that which exists is concrete." (AR)

From these two premises it logically follows that e. g. angels (or gremlins, elves etc) exist.

Why did Rand make this mistake? It looks like she had only countable "real-world" objects like e. g. tables and chairs in her mind when she wrote that "every word we use stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind", and forgot about the rest.

In addition, she obviously was only thinking of nouns when she wrote "every word we use".

For how can a word like e. g. "although" stand for an unlimited number of concretes? Makes no sense, does it.

If Rand had written instead: "Many nouns we use are symbols standing for an umlimited number of concretes of a certain kind", she would have avoided the "angel fallacy" and other misunderstandings.

[To sjw]:

You won't find me in the least hostile to fair criticisms of Rand's theory of rights. Indeed, one of my first substantive pieces on philosophy (published in Invictus c. 1972) was a very lengthy two-part article titled "Ayn Rand and the Right to Life: A Critical Evaluation." I no longer have copies of this zine, and it is very difficult to find, but some paragraphs were quoted by Lou Rollins in his monograph, The Myth of Natural Rights.

Here is a link to an article dealing with L. Rollins's essay: http://www.la-articles.org.uk/FL-4-4-6.pdf

Rand has no theory. Which is part of why I wrote "For Individual Rights": http://www.amazon.com/Individual-Rights-Treatise-Human-Relations/dp/0984587004/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1278694389&sr=8-1 .

Shayne

Edit: I created unnecessary confusion in this thread by not emphasizing the difference between a formal theory and as an informal theory. I hold that that informal theories are a dime a dozen, Rand had no formal theory she had an informal theory, and that her informal theory is rich with important and deep insights. We can appreciate these insights in spite of her lack of systematic approach, but we must also recognize the value of a systematic approach.

Whether the approach to the question is systematic or not - in case you should claim that man is born with natural rights, such claim would be based on a false premise.

To put it buntly: Just because we are born with a stomach does not include the natural right to have it filled.

Rights are human creations, they can be declared, bestowed upon etc. - but one is not born with any natural rights. There exists no "ought" from "is".

Edited October 2, 2010 by Xray

[BaalChatzaf]

How about: Man, the moral animal?

--Brant

the rational robot

If the genus includes the property "moral" how do you account for immoral men?

Ba'al Chatzaf

[merjet]

Why did Rand make this mistake? It looks like she had only countable "real-world" objects like e. g. tables and chairs in her mind when she wrote that "every word we use stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind", and forgot about the rest.

In addition, she obviously was only thinking of nouns when she wrote "every word we use".

For how can a word like e. g. "although" stand for an unlimited number of concretes? Makes no sense, does it.

The mistake is yours, Word Nazi. Your assertion is clearly false. In ITOE she addressed adverbs, adjectives, prepositions, and conjunctions. "Although" is a conjunction. Nearly every time it is used, it is as a "concrete", except to the Word Nazi.

If Rand had written instead: "Many nouns we use are symbols standing for an umlimited number of concretes of a certain kind", she would have avoided the "angel fallacy" and other misunderstandings.

Your alternative is woefully inadequate. It says nothing about adverbs, adjectives, prepositions, or conjunctions. The so-called "angel fallacy" is your misunderstanding. Check your premises.

[George H. Smith]

A right is a concept, and all concepts, qua abstractions, exist only "in one's head." So what? "Chair" and "table" are also concepts that exist only in one's head. There is no universal chair or table that exists outside the mind. The point is that most concepts, including the concept of a "right," have referents that exist outside the mind.

You're missing the point. If we follow Rand's approach to defining rights for tables, we would end up with something like this: "A table is a utilitarian concept defining an entity that supports man's food." Whereas we should define it as something like this: "A table is a piece of furniture with a flat raised area such that it can be used to put things within the reach of a person's hands."

I cannot imagine how you arrived at this this conclusion.

The units of a concept are what the definition must refer to, one doesn't refer to the purpose of coining the concept.

Rand's definition of rights says nothing about the purpose for which the concept was formed.

Rights are a normative classification of human actions, and in this sense can be called a type of human action. There is no one fixed genus in such matters. With some exceptions (such as "existence") all genera are themselves subsets of broader genera.

Rand was quite correct to identify the proximate genus of rights as "moral principles." (Rights are enforceable moral claims.) And moral principles, in turn, belong to the broader genus of value judgments, which in turn are a species of the broader genus of judgments, and so on.

You're very wrong George. Never seen you be this wrong before. No one fixed genus in "such matters"? What such matters? Why all the sudden can we violate rules of definition, such that the genus no longer has to refer to the units being referred to by the concept? I don't say a genus has to be "fixed", I say it must function properly. It must identify the units.

You need to read an elementary text on logic. A genus does not "refer to the units being referred to by the concept." A genus specifies a broader class to which the definiendum (the term being defined) belongs. (The so called "proximate genus" is the one normally used in definitions.) In the definition "man is a rational animal," the genus is "animal." The concept "man" obviously does not subsume the units contained within this genus. The concept "man" does not refer to all animals.

For a brief treatment of definitions, one that summarizes the standard approach, see my article "How to define your terms" . (Scroll down to page 5.)

In Rand's definition of rights, the genus is "moral principles." Rights are a subset of the broader class of moral principles. Rand then identifies the differentia of "rights," i.e., those specific and essential characteristics that distinguish rights from other moral principles. This is a perfectly correct procedure -- standard logic 101.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

No, this is a moral distinction. It pertains to teleology insofar as moral distinctions apply to purposeful actions, but to call it a biological distinction is very weird.

My definition of rights is oriented around biology as understood teleologically. Human action is goal-oriented, interference with that action includes not only concrete interference but interference with long-range goal-oriented action. The purpose of the definition is certainly to make a moral distinction. You, like Rand, are confusing the purpose of the concept with the concept.

It's difficult to comment on remarks that are this confusing. One can violate rights by means of coercive interference, but even here the term "interference," when standing alone without qualification, is way too broad.

Rights are a moral concept, so of course they will be defined in moral terms. In the very nature of the case, one cannot give a purely descriptive account of rights.

Again, to be precise: The purpose of the concept of rights is to make a moral distinction. Your understanding is confusing the purpose of the concept with the concept.

My remarks have nothing to do with the purpose of the concept "rights." To say that rights are a moral concept is to identify a type (or species) of concepts. It is to say that rights are normative rather than purely descriptive. Concepts like "iron" and "car" are descriptive rather than normative. The concept "rights" can also be purely descriptive, as when we speak of legal rights. To speak of a legal right to, say, a minimum wage merely describes a feature of a given legal system; it does not necessarily mean that the right in question is good or bad, when judged from a moral point of view. One can consistently say that people in the U.S. have the legal right to a minimum wage while also claiming that this legal right should not exist.

This is not the case with natural rights, however. These are specifically moral concepts. Such concepts are inherently normative.

Ghs

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

But do you believe Xray interpreted Rand to mean "concrete" in that sense in post #116? Do you doubt that Xray's intent was to hijack what Rand said to mean angels existed in a non-imaginary way?

Merlin,

I actually think Xray would prefer concrete to be poured out of a mixing truck and nothing more.

Michael

[George H. Smith]

(Rights are enforceable moral claims.)

George,

I agree with this. But enforceable by whom?

I can't see anything other than the social organization.

If you want to nitpick, you can say, "enforceable by anyone willing to use force," and that actually is one of the conceptual referents, but I believe it is is too broad. Without social organization, enforcement of anything when a heated disagreement arises is merely a brawl.

That's why I believe social organization must be included in the genus along with moral principles.

Michael

The enforcement of rights has been treated in two different ways in the social contract tradition, which is the tradition to which Rand belongs.

(1) According to Samuel Pufendorf and others in his tradition, enforcement is an emergent social right, not an individual right. Although individuals have a right to immediate self-defense in this approach, they do not have the right, qua individuals, to punish. In other words, a victim could not try an aggressor, pronounce him guilty, and then exact punishment, such as restitution. Enforcement rights emerge only after a government is established, and they need not be delegated or transferred by individuals.

(2) John Locke's approach is much more radical. He argues that enforcement is an individual right and that a government can claim this right only if it is delegated, via a process of consent, by individuals to a government. I call this a "reductionist" theory of rights, because it claims that all rights claimed by government must, in principle, be reducible to the rights of individuals.

Locke discusses various "inconveniences" in a state of nature that would lead rational people to delegate their enforcement rights to a government. I address this issue in some detail in "Justice Entrepreneurship in a Free Market."

Rand's position on this controversy is interesting. She expressly says that all rights are individual rights and that a government cannot claim rights over and above the rights of individuals. This clearly puts her in the reductionist camp. Yet, depending on how you read Rand, she also hints at the emergence theory, according to which no one except a government can or could have the right of enforcement.

I have argued with Objectivists, including a very prominent one, who claim that even the right of self-defense emerges only with a government. In a formal debate on Atlantis over a decade ago, I was told that someone who does not recognize the legitimacy of a government would literally be a rightless being. Anyone could kill him without violating his rights and without fear of punishment. I was also told that no rights would exist in a state of nature without government.

These outrageous claims clearly conflict with Rand's theory, despite the hint of emergence theory that we find her writings. Nevertheless, some form of emergence theory is the only plausible approach for minarchists, even though it will wreak havoc with Rand's reductionist claim that all rights are ultimately the rights of individuals.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

Michael,

Here is part of my discussion of political reductionism from "Thinking About War."

Closely related to the state of nature model was a way of looking at rights that I call political reductionism. This is the doctrine that all rights are ultimately the rights of individuals, and that all rights and powers claimed by a government must be reducible, in principle, to the rights and powers of individuals. As Locke put it, "no Body can transfer to another more power than he has in himself."25

Statements of political reductionism abound in the 17th century. Algernon Sidney, a hero to Thomas Jefferson and other revolutionary Americans, wrote that "whatsoever is done by delegated powers, must be referred to the principals; for none can give to any a power which they have not in themselves."26 According to Gershom Carmichael (a seminal figure in the early Scottish Enlightenment who brought a Lockean perspective to his commentaries on Pufendorf), "civil power is in fact nothing but the right which belonged to individuals in the state of nature to claim what was their own or what was due to them, and which has been conferred upon the same ruler for the sake of civil peace."27 And Thomas Jefferson affirmed political reductionism in no uncertain terms when he said that "the rights of the whole can be no more than the sum of the rights of individuals."28 Hence when Ayn Rand stated that a "group can have no rights other than the rights of its individual members," and that "the expression 'individual rights' is a redundancy," she placed herself in a long and venerable tradition of political reductionism.29

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

How about: Man, the moral animal?

--Brant

the rational robot

If the genus includes the property "moral" how do you account for immoral men?

"Moral" is the primary category and moral, ammoral and immoral are subsumed. This is to say that for purposes of this discussion "moral" has two definitions, which one used depends on where it is in the hierarchy.

--Brant

Edited October 2, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

George,

I need to read more. Sorry for my slowness, but I have to go by baby-steps because of time (and the fact that I have not mastered speed-reading yet, although I piddled with several methods and have what I think is an excellent course just waiting for me to get the time and serenity: Reading Genius by Ed Strachar).

I am having a real hard time trying to understand how rights "emerge." I can understand how specific rights emerge, but not how the concept of rights per se emerges.

To me, it's like saying that values as a whole "emerge."

In my understanding, you can identify values as part of what an organism needs, you can choose less drastic values at whim, but you don't wait for some condition to be fulfilled before values spring from nothing and start existing--unless you consider being alive a condition to be fulfilled.

In my current thinking, I stand a bit outside the dichotomy you presented (emergent rights from government versus metaphysical individual rights).

I do not consider an individual right to have any meaning unless there are at least two individuals near each other. It's not that the right is wiped out or emerges. It's that in my view of human nature, we are not only individuals, but also members of an identifiable species. I cannot imagine a human being who is not a member of the human species, and I cannot imagine a human species without individual human beings.

So I see some values as purely individual, and some as being tied to individual+species. I consider rights to be in the latter category on a cognitive level. In other words, this has to be part of the genus or differentia. You need two (or more) to tango. No two, no tango. So in my view, rights by definition includes a relationship between individuals.

I have heard people argue that a sole survivor on a desert island has rights. This does not make any sense to me. Maybe as an abstract idea when considering an alternate reality, but not anything that refers to the actual existence of this individual in that condition. Cognitively, the potential for rights is there since the individual is also a member of the human species, but until another actual member of the human race appears, rights are not values that he can pursue.

On a normative level, I'm fine with unilateral basic individual rights and see no need to consider species (until we get to reproduction, but that's a more advanced concept than where I am thinking right now).

I think that the concept of rights still needs a full elaboration on a human nature level--or maybe I still need to discover who wrote one. (That would be great if that is the case.) I'm still mulling this over...

One of the things I find most confusing when discussing rights is the lack of precision of the term. I still don't know where you are at on a definition of rights, but I always see you try to figure out what someone means. So I have never seen you do like so many do: I often see people yelling at each other over rights, but each means something different by the term. Then they merge all kinds of tangential issues with their arguments and off they go, each with different premises, and each accusing the other of being evil.

That can be entertaining but it's not very informative.

Michael

EDIT: My post crossed with yours. I guess I would fall into the rights being reducible to individuals category, with one caveat. I hold that all rights are reducible to individuals in a relationship with other individuals. Excluding this last part, to me, is like a discussion of a form that has a top without a bottom. You need both for correct identification.

[Brant Gaede]

A human right is a moral and legal concept. Without an enforcing, legal agency, it is only moral. I still have the right to act in self defense in both contexts. If I don't have such a right why does someone else have the right to do whatever he wants to do respecting my person? If I do, the same question obtains. If there simply are no rights, who's to complain if I shoot down a man with a gun trying to kill me? That I have no right to do so? If I have no right then someone else has a right for the idea of "no right" has to come from "right." This is the same thing as saying the idea of non-existence comes from the idea of existence. Existence has always existed because non-existence cannot. There cannot be nothing. There has to be something. Rights cannot be this much reduced, of course, for they aren't axiomatic.

--Brant

[Brant Gaede]

We have to accept that Rand's definition of a right has a hollowness to it: a moral concept that does X in Y context. I always thought a definition needed more oomph to it. So we have this definition which is like a bucket we then need to fill up.

--Brant

"I shall remind you that 'rights' are a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man's freedom of action in a social context, that they are derived from man's nature as a rational being and represent a necessary condition of his particular mode of survival." (CTUI, 1966, hb, p.10.)

Edited October 2, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[George H. Smith]

I don't know how old you are, but when I was younger I had the good sense to listen to the advice of people who had been around this movement for a while. Although I didn't always take their advice, I always considered it seriously. You, in contrast, seem immune to advice, even when I offer it with the best of intentions.

If you wish to be taken seriously on the subject of rights, I could easily offer several specific pieces of advice, some of which are quite simple, that have served me well over the many years that I dealt with highly credentialed academics -- while being taken seriously by them -- without having so much as a high school diploma myself. But you know everything already, so what's the point?

I would always take your advice seriously George, and would appreciate hearing it. No, I don't know everything, particularly as relates to scholarly work such as you are expert in, nor am I closed to constructive feedback in areas where I think I do know something. I don't know why you are mistaking my stance of knowing a limited set of things for thinking that I know everything.

Shayne

In 1973, as I was finishing up ATCAG, I had a conversation with Roy Childs that had a tremendous impact on me. At one point Roy said, "George, you are great in philosophy, but you are tabula rasa in history."

This was an exaggeration, of course -- I had taken many history courses in college -- but I took Roy's advice in the spirit in which it was intended. His point was that a study of the history of an issue or problem, such as rights, will greatly enhance one's appreciation and understanding of its philosophical implications.

I decided to devote the next five years to the study of history, with a special focus on the history of ideas. My five year plan turned in a ten year plan. During those ten years I read little else except history, and I spent most of my time reading about the history of political thought.

It is difficult adequately to express how this program changed my attitude towards the theory of natural rights. I went from being essentially a skeptic (based on the usual stuff one learns in college) to being a fervent advocate of natural rights. Much of this change came about as I learned to view political theories as problem-solving devices, in effect. I became convinced that a natural rights approach was by far the best solution to the traditional problems addressed by political theory, from the time of the ancient Greeks to the present day.

The last few decades have seen a veritable revolution in how natural rights theory has been treated by historians. A tradition which was once treated with contempt by most historians as an outdated and simplistic belief is now treated with great respect. This shift owes a great deal to the "Cambridge School" of political history, whose acknowledged leader is Quentin Skinner.

There are now many excellent books that deal with the history of natural rights thinking. I am going to present a minimal list of books that every O'ist and libertarian with a serious interest in natural rights should own and study.

In the first group are general histories of modern political thought that contain a good deal on natural rights thinking, its relationship to the rights of resistance and revolution, etc.

1) Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought (Cambridge, 1978). Vol 1, The Renaissance; Vol 2, The Age of Reformation. This brilliant overview is indispensable.

2) The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450-1700, ed. J. H. Burns (Cambridge, 1991). This 800 page book contains a valuable collection of articles, some of which were written by members of the Cambridge School, such as Richard Tuck and James Tully.

The second group of books -- and, again, this is a scaled down list -- deals specifically with the subject of rights.

3) Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (Cambridge, 1979). A pioneering study.

4) Stephen Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property: Grotius to Hume (Oxford, 1991). A brilliant study that comes closer to my own historical interpretations than any other book.

5) Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law, and Church Law, 1150-1625 (William B. Eerdmans Pub., 1997). The great Catholic scholar Tierney traces the idea of natural rights to the High Middle Ages.

6) Michael P. Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism (Princeton, 1994). A detailed study of natural rights thinking during the 17th century. Zuckert's libertarian sympathies are evident.

So here is my first piece of advice: Obtain all of these books and read them carefully. This might be accomplished in a year, possibly two, depending on how much time you have.

Ghs

[sjw]

Thanks for the list George. As it happens, I have the Tierney book.

Scholarly books like this have their place of course, but I wanted a book like mine to exist that dealt with rights as the author saw them in a comprehensive, systematic, and concise manner. But I do understand that the more familiar I am with what has come before, there more opportunity there is for clear and objective communication. On the other hand, natural rights are something that one can understand without reference to anything but everyday reality and logic. I think the single most important factor why it took so long to come up with natural rights is that they fly in the face of authority. It can be dangerous to talk about rights. I think many a man in history could have identified them and probably even did, but didn't dare express it.

Shayne

[sjw]

You need to read an elementary text on logic. A genus does not "refer to the units being referred to by the concept." A genus specifies a broader class to which the definiendum (the term being defined) belongs. (The so called "proximate genus" is the one normally used in definitions.) In the definition "man is a rational animal," the genus is "animal." The concept "man" obviously does not subsume the units contained within this genus. The concept "man" does not refer to all animals.

For a brief treatment of definitions, one that summarizes the standard approach, see my article "How to define your terms" . (Scroll down to page 5.)

In Rand's definition of rights, the genus is "moral principles." Rights are a subset of the broader class of moral principles. Rand then identifies the differentia of "rights," i.e., those specific and essential characteristics that distinguish rights from other moral principles. This is a perfectly correct procedure -- standard logic 101.

Ghs

Your misapprehension of my view does not constitute a lack of knowledge on my part. It may constitute poor communication on my part. I certainly understand how to properly form definitions. In any case, you have completely and totally misunderstood what I am criticizing Rand of. I certainly am not saying that the general form of the definition is wrong in the sense that she doesn't have a genus and a differentia, nor that they don't relate to each other the way they should. That is a complete and total failure to communicate, either because of you or me or both. I lean to thinking that you just aren't reading carefully.

By way of clarification, would you say that "human action" can't function as a proper genus, that trying to use it as a genus is tantamount to not following logic 101? I ask because you accuse me of not following logic 101, so I am wondering whether you think "A right is a human action that does not interfere with the non-interfering actions of other human beings" is an inherent violation of logic 101, and if so, why?

Shayne

[sjw]

My definition of rights is oriented around biology as understood teleologically. Human action is goal-oriented, interference with that action includes not only concrete interference but interference with long-range goal-oriented action. The purpose of the definition is certainly to make a moral distinction. You, like Rand, are confusing the purpose of the concept with the concept.

It's difficult to comment on remarks that are this confusing. One can violate rights by means of coercive interference, but even here the term "interference," when standing alone without qualification, is way too broad.

That you are confused does not imply that the remarks are confusing.

It is true that the term is very broad, it is also true that a definition should be as specific as logically possible. The definition is as specific as I was able to make it. Perhaps you might improve it. But like all definitions, it must be understood in context. The context here is human action, which is only properly understood as goal-oriented. So we aren't merely talking about concrete actions here. So your objection regarding stealing TV's is illogical. Further, your implication that it is vague because it requires context to be understood is illogical. Every definition requires context in order to be properly understood. All definitions are "vague" in the sense that if you don't have the required context you are not going to grasp the definition.

My remarks have nothing to do with the purpose of the concept "rights." To say that rights are a moral concept is to identify a type (or species) of concepts. It is to say that rights are normative rather than purely descriptive. Concepts like "iron" and "car" are descriptive rather than normative. The concept "rights" can also be purely descriptive, as when we speak of legal rights. To speak of a legal right to, say, a minimum wage merely describes a feature of a given legal system; it does not necessarily mean that the right in question is good or bad, when judged from a moral point of view. One can consistently say that people in the U.S. have the legal right to a minimum wage while also claiming that this legal right should not exist.

This is not the case with natural rights, however. These are specifically moral concepts. Such concepts are inherently normative.

Ghs

Rights are certainly moral/normative concepts. Absolutely. Nothing I said ever contradicted that. Not only are they normative concepts, it is a normative purpose for which we create the concept in the first place. So by all means, yes, morality is integral to the context here. It is just not integral to the definition.

Shayne

[sjw]

(2) John Locke's approach is much more radical. He argues that enforcement is an individual right and that a government can claim this right only if it is delegated, via a process of consent, by individuals to a government. I call this a "reductionist" theory of rights, because it claims that all rights claimed by government must, in principle, be reducible to the rights of individuals.

Locke discusses various "inconveniences" in a state of nature that would lead rational people to delegate their enforcement rights to a government. I address this issue in some detail in "Justice Entrepreneurship in a Free Market."

Rand's position on this controversy is interesting. She expressly says that all rights are individual rights and that a government cannot claim rights over and above the rights of individuals. This clearly puts her in the reductionist camp. Yet, depending on how you read Rand, she also hints at the emergence theory, according to which no one except a government can or could have the right of enforcement.

I have argued with Objectivists, including a very prominent one, who claim that even the right of self-defense emerges only with a government. In a formal debate on Atlantis over a decade ago, I was told that someone who does not recognize the legitimacy of a government would literally be a rightless being. Anyone could kill him without violating his rights and without fear of punishment. I was also told that no rights would exist in a state of nature without government.

These outrageous claims clearly conflict with Rand's theory, despite the hint of emergence theory that we find her writings. Nevertheless, some form of emergence theory is the only plausible approach for minarchists, even though it will wreak havoc with Rand's reductionist claim that all rights are ultimately the rights of individuals.

Ghs

George and I are on exactly the same page here. And for the record I'm in the reductionist school, I embody this in what I call the "Law of Conservation of Rights: Right originate in the individual and can neither be created nor destroyed, but only transferred to others through the individual's right of consent."

I further am just shocked and appalled by Rand and the rest of the Objectivists who think it could be any other way than this. It completely defies logic and ethics and individualism. As George says in what has lately become my most favorite quote of his: "I defend anarchism, or society without the State, because I believe that innocent people cannot be forced to surrender any of their natural rights. Those who wish to delegate some of their rights to a government are free to do so, provided they do not violate the rights of dissenters who choose not to endorse their government."

If there's not a big fat stinking elephant in the room on this issue, then what? George, can you make any sense of this? You've been arguing for years on this, how in the hell do people have this kind of cognitive dissonance?

Shayne

[sjw]

A human right is a moral and legal concept. Without an enforcing, legal agency, it is only moral. I still have the right to act in self defense in both contexts. If I don't have such a right why does someone else have the right to do whatever he wants to do respecting my person? If I do, the same question obtains. If there simply are no rights, who's to complain if I shoot down a man with a gun trying to kill me? That I have no right to do so? If I have no right then someone else has a right for the idea of "no right" has to come from "right." This is the same thing as saying the idea of non-existence comes from the idea of existence. Existence has always existed because non-existence cannot. There cannot be nothing. There has to be something. Rights cannot be this much reduced, of course, for they aren't axiomatic.

--Brant

Rights are certainly a moral concept. That does not mean that "moral concept" has a place in the definition.

Now I would add my own pet theory and reverse course a bit here. Suppose Rand's "definition" was not actually intended by her as being a definition. Did she actually ever claim that what is attributed to her by Objectivists as a definition actually was her formal definition of rights? As a proposition about rights, there is nothing wildly wrong about it. It is certainly true that rights are a moral concept, and that this moral concept identifies a relation between men. This is a true proposition. That something is a true proposition does not make it a definition.

So I put this forth as a challenge: prove that Rand actually intended this proposition to be taken as the definition of rights.

Shayne

[George H. Smith]

You need to read an elementary text on logic. A genus does not "refer to the units being referred to by the concept." A genus specifies a broader class to which the definiendum (the term being defined) belongs. (The so called "proximate genus" is the one normally used in definitions.) In the definition "man is a rational animal," the genus is "animal." The concept "man" obviously does not subsume the units contained within this genus. The concept "man" does not refer to all animals.

For a brief treatment of definitions, one that summarizes the standard approach, see my article "How to define your terms" . (Scroll down to page 5.)

In Rand's definition of rights, the genus is "moral principles." Rights are a subset of the broader class of moral principles. Rand then identifies the differentia of "rights," i.e., those specific and essential characteristics that distinguish rights from other moral principles. This is a perfectly correct procedure -- standard logic 101.

Ghs

Your misapprehension of my view does not constitute a lack of knowledge on my part. It may constitute poor communication on my part. I certainly understand how to properly form definitions. In any case, you have completely and totally misunderstood what I am criticizing Rand of. I certainly am not saying that the general form of the definition is wrong in the sense that she doesn't have a genus and a differentia, nor that they don't relate to each other the way they should. That is a complete and total failure to communicate, either because of you or me or both. I lean to thinking that you just aren't reading carefully.

By way of clarification, would you say that "human action" can't function as a proper genus, that trying to use it as a genus is tantamount to not following logic 101? I ask because you accuse me of not following logic 101, so I am wondering whether you think "A right is a human action that does not interfere with the non-interfering actions of other human beings" is an inherent violation of logic 101, and if so, why?

Shayne

To say, as you did, that a genus "has to refer to the units being referred to by the concept" and that it must "identify the units" is as wrong as it is possible to get. If this is what you really believe, then you do not know how to properly form definitions. So cut the crap about my supposedly not reading you carefully.

As for your definition, "A right is a human action that does not interfere with the non-interfering actions of other human beings." this is absolutely wrong. A right is not an action. "Action" is not the proper genus for "rights." A right is a moral principle that pertains to human actions. It is a normative standard by which we assess the justice of certain actions, namely, those that occur in a social context.

When we say that a person has or possesses a right, we manifestly do not mean that he has or possesses an action of some kind. This would amount to gibberish. When we say that a person has a right, we mean that he has a moral warrant to take certain actions, and that he would be morally justified in using force if others use coercion (or the threat of coercion) to prevent him from taking those actions.

Ghs

[sjw]

To say, as you did, that a genus "has to refer to the units being referred to by the concept" and that it must "identify the units" is as wrong as it is possible to get. If this is what you really believe, then you do not know how to properly form definitions. So cut the crap about my supposedly not reading you carefully.

Again, your method is clear: when you don't comprehend, it's all the other person's fault, and never yours. I'm sure this is an occupational hazard of being superior in most ways to most of the people you deal with. I forgive the fault, but I'm not going to let you get away with it with me.

As for your definition, "A right is a human action that does not interfere with the non-interfering actions of other human beings." this is absolutely wrong. A right is not an action. "Action" is not the proper genus for "rights." A right is a moral principle that pertains to human actions. It is a normative standard by which we assess the justice of certain actions, namely, those that occur in a social context.

That's not the question George. I don't ask you if it is a good definition. I am asking you whether it IS a definition.

Shayne