Why Rand has no theory of Rights

[9thdoctor]

I knew a tiny dwarf. A tiny dwarf was my friend. You are no tiny dwarf.

Common knowledge: The atom will never be split.

Nor will we ever determine the cosmic speed limit. 186,282 miles per second, Pshaw!

Or a lowest possible temperature. −273.15°C, harrumph!

Most obvious of all, no lower limit on the size of particles. Try putting that one past Shayne and you’ll be called an idiot, hypocrite, and a chronic liar.

Edited September 30, 2010 by Ninth Doctor

[rodney203]

Brant, are you willing go go back and re-read my post and your last reply, and keep re-reading them until you see that that little word "all" is kind of irrational and a misrepresentation of my posting? Are you willing to do that?

[sjw]

http://arc-tv.com/individual-rights-a-revolutionary-idea/

A video from the Ayn Rand Center for Individual Rights

I could only get through ten minutes of this:

- we are lucky to be Americans

- because Americans have freedom

- because we have the US constitution backed by the Declaration

- individual rights are at the foundation of America

- then says Americans don't understand this and lists actual policies that are contrary to rights (!)

- what makes a government legitimate? when can it be overthrown?

- blah blah

Before skipping to this:

- A "state of nature" means I should bash other people over the head and not respect their natural rights

ARI is utterly pathetic and hopeless.

Shayne

[Brant Gaede]

Brant, are you willing go go back and re-read my post and your last reply, and keep re-reading them until you see that that little word "all" is kind of irrational and a misrepresentation of my posting? Are you willing to do that?

It would seem you think I am a "swine" or stupid. Since I quoted you too anyone who wants to can go back and reread it until they get it.

--Brant

I did reread it--does someone else want to ask me this question?

[BaalChatzaf]

Common knowledge: The atom will never be split.

--Brant

Believed prior to the time that J. J. Thompson demonstrated experimentally that atoms have parts. Anything that has parts, could in principle be split. Prior to Thompson's experimental discoveries atoms were believed to be solid, rigid indivisible objects. Thompson's work undid that view.

By the way, it was NOT common knowledge that atoms could not be split. In fact many scientists did not believe in the literal existence of atoms. As late as 1915, just prior to his death, Ernst Mach still believed that atoms were mental or theoretical concepts that could organize observed data coherently. He never really took atoms literally and throughout the late 19th century there were scientists who shared Mach's view. The matter was finally decided with the publication of Einstein's paper on Brownian Motion, which is Einstein's most quoted paper (not his papers on Electrodynamics and General Relativity)

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Shayne,

Genus is the messiest part of Rand's theory of concepts.

I can only make sense out of it on a sliding scale. For instance, "rational animal" is how she defined man, with "animal" being the genus. How about "rational primate" when a more precise definition is needed?

Rand actually talked about this in the Workshops, if I remember correctly, totally dissing the idea that "primate" could be the genus. Her argument did not convince me because, if I adopt her argument, I then can't detect the essence of what a genus is.

On a sliding scale (my way), it is a pre-qualified group from which you distinguish the the existent that contains the differentia. This genus grouping can be pre-qualified according to different standards of precision. That is something I can understand, and it even provides one of the reasons there is often more than one definition for a word (or concept in this case).

On an absolute basis, the genus kind of just is and you have to find it out by reading Rand or by getting it from someone who says the genus is xxxxx and that's all there is to it.. I'm never comfortable with that kind of standard.

But your statement that the genus of Rand's concept of rights is "moral principles" gave me food for thought.

What is the differentia to you?

I'm not so sure I agree with you about the genus, albeit the concept of "moral principles" is one of the components. Since Rand claimed that rights were moral principles taken to the social level, I see "social organization" or something like that just as fit to be included in the genus. Also, there's government, but I am content to include that under "social organization" (or whatever term you want to use for that).

I'm going to do some thinking on this.

Michael

[Selene]

Shayne,

Genus is the messiest part of Rand's theory of concepts.

I can only make sense out of it on a sliding scale. For instance, "rational animal" is how she defined man, with "animal" being the genus. How about "rational primate" when a more precise definition is needed?

Rand actually talked about this in the Workshops, if I remember correctly, totally dissing the idea that "primate" could be the genus. Her argument did not convince me because, if I adopt her argument, I then can't detect the essence of what a genus is.

On a sliding scale (my way), it is a pre-qualified group from which you distinguish the the existent that contains the differentia. This genus grouping can be pre-qualified according to different standards of precision. That is something I can understand, and it even provides one of the reasons there is often more than one definition for a word (or concept in this case).

On an absolute basis, the genus kind of just is and you have to find it out by reading Rand or by getting it from someone who says the genus is xxxxx and that's all there is to it.. I'm never comfortable with that kind of standard.

But your statement that the genus of Rand's concept of rights is "moral principles" gave me food for thought.

What is the differentia to you?

I'm not so sure I agree with you about the genus, albeit the concept of "moral principles" is one of the components. Since Rand claimed that rights were moral principles taken to the social level, I see "social organization" or something like that just as fit to be included in the genus. Also, there's government, but I am content to include that under "social organization" (or whatever term you want to use for that).

I'm going to do some thinking on this.

Michael

Michael, since this is a thread that I am very interested in and since I have not used this classification in too long a time, is this what you are referring to, it seems to me that it is- just want to be sure:

genus–differentia definition From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search "Differentia" redirects here. For the Japanese anime episode, see Differentia (Eureka Seven episode). The introduction to this article provides insufficient context for those unfamiliar with the subject. Please help improve the article with a good introductory style. (October 2009) Part of a series on Aristotle Aristotelianism[show] Peripatetic school

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genus-differentia definition Influences & Followers[show] Plato

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Pseudo-Aristotle Philosophy portal v • d • e The hierarchy of biological classification's eight major taxonomic ranks, which is an example of definition by genus and differentia. Intermediate minor rankings are not shown. A genus-differentia definition is one in which a word or concept that indicates a species—a specific type of item, not necessarily a biological category—is described first by a broader category, the genus, then distinguished from other items in that category by a differentia. The differentiae of a species are those properties which other species of the same genus do not have. In short, the genus is the broad category, the species is a type within that category, and the differentiae are the distinguishing characteristics of the species. This is a type of intensional definition.

In other words, a new definition can be composed by two parts:

1. a genus (or family): An existing definition that serves as a portion of the new definition; all definitions with the same genus are considered members of that genus, and a definition can be composed of multiple genera (more than one genus).
2. the differentia: The portion of the new definition that is not provided by the genera.

For example, consider these two definitions:

• a triangle: A plane figure bounded by 3 straight sides.
• a quadrilateral: A plane figure bounded by 4 straight sides.

Those definitions can be expressed as a genus and 2 differentiae:

1. a genus: A plane figure.
2. 2 differentiae:
   • the differentia for a triangle: bounded by 3 straight sides.
   • the differentia for a quadrilateral: bounded by 4 straight sides.

Continuing the process of differentiation:

• a rectangle: a quadrilateral with 4 right angles.
• a rhombus: a quadrilateral with all 4 sides having the same length.

Importantly, differentiae can include genera. For instance, consider the following:

• a square: a rectangle where all 4 sides are the same length.

This definition could be recast as follows:

• a square: a rectangle that is a rhombus.
• a square: a rhombus that is a rectangle.
• a square: a quadrilateral that is both a rectangle and a rhombus.
• a square: both a rectangle and a rhombus.

In other words, a genus of a definition provides a means by which to specify an is-a relationship, and the non-genus portions of the differentia of a definition provides a means by which to specify a has-a relationship.
When a system of definitions is constructed with genera and differentiae, the definitions can be thought of as nodes forming a hierarchy or—more generally—a directed acyclic graph; a node that has no predecessors is a most general definition; each node along a directed path is more differentiated (or more derived) than its predecessors, and a node with no successors is a most differentiated (or a most derived) definition. When a definition, S, is the tail of all of its successors (that is, S has at least one successor and all of the direct successors of S are most differentiated definitions), then S is often called a species and each of its direct successors is often called an individual or an entity; the differentia of an individual is called an identity. For instance:

• [the] Mfwitten: a Wikipedia user with the account name 'Mfwitten'.

The identity itself (or some part of it) is often used to refer to the entire individual, a phenomenon that is known in linguistics as a pars pro toto synechdoche.

Under the "genus" and "species" description, this sort of definition is used to categorize different plants, animals and other things into biological categories. See also genus and species and Linnaean taxonomy.

This can be clarified with a hackneyed example. Suppose we wanted to define the phrase human being. Following the ancient Greeks (Socrates and his successors) and modern biologists, we say that human being is a species and that each individual person is a member of the species human being. So we ask what the genus, or general category, of the species is; the Greeks (but not the biologists) would say that the genus is animal. What is the differentia of the species, that is, the distinguishing characteristic of human being that other animals do not have? The Greeks said it is rationality; thus, Aristotle said, A human being is a rational animal.^[1]

However, the use of the genus-differentia definition is by no means restricted to science. Rather, it is the natural thing to do if you are to explain the meaning of a particular word to someone. With this, the "classical" type of definition (Definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specificam.), you use the copula (is, are) after the definiendum (just as if you were using an equals sign in a mathematical equation) and then go on to explain the definiendum by using the appropriate generic term plus those characteristics specific to the thing you are describing which consecutively narrow down the meaning until the definiendum can no longer be confused with anything else.

Some examples from everyday life:

• A paperweight is a small, heavy object which is placed on papers to prevent them from being scattered.

paperweight -- definiendumobject -- generic termsmall but heavy, placed on papers, reason why -- differentiae specificae

• Homesickness is the feeling of unhappiness you may experience when you are away from home and miss your home and your family very much.

• Subtitles are the printed translation that you can read at the bottom of the screen when you are watching a foreign film.

• In film and broadcasting, a soundbite is a very short piece of footage taken from a longer speech or interview in which someone with authority says something which is considered by those who edit the speech or interview to be a most important point.

• A mosque is a building, often with high towers and domes, where Muslims go to worship.

[sjw]

I don't know how old you are, but when I was younger I had the good sense to listen to the advice of people who had been around this movement for a while. Although I didn't always take their advice, I always considered it seriously. You, in contrast, seem immune to advice, even when I offer it with the best of intentions.

If you wish to be taken seriously on the subject of rights, I could easily offer several specific pieces of advice, some of which are quite simple, that have served me well over the many years that I dealt with highly credentialed academics -- while being taken seriously by them -- without having so much as a high school diploma myself. But you know everything already, so what's the point?

I would always take your advice seriously George, and would appreciate hearing it. No, I don't know everything, particularly as relates to scholarly work such as you are expert in, nor am I closed to constructive feedback in areas where I think I do know something. I don't know why you are mistaking my stance of knowing a limited set of things for thinking that I know everything.

Shayne

[sjw]

Shayne,

Genus is the messiest part of Rand's theory of concepts.

I can only make sense out of it on a sliding scale. For instance, "rational animal" is how she defined man, with "animal" being the genus. How about "rational primate" when a more precise definition is needed?

Rand actually talked about this in the Workshops, if I remember correctly, totally dissing the idea that "primate" could be the genus. Her argument did not convince me because, if I adopt her argument, I then can't detect the essence of what a genus is.

I don't know that I have a problem with her general theory, I have a problem in how she applied it to rights.

I would be interested in a page reference to the workshop, but my answer is that there is no fixed genus that is right for all time and in all contexts, so long as it is selected according to the proper rules of definition within that context. I would also say that definitions have optional elements, there is no one "right" definition, the important thing is that it serve its cognitive purpose to efficiently alert you to the units being referred to by the concept. The genus alerts you to the broad category being referred to; the differentia alerts you to the narrower category within that broader category. It is like a microscope zooming in at a higher resolution on something. If you zoom all the way out then you can grasp the whole field; if you start out only looking narrowly then it is disorienting. You need that wider field to set the mental context and know what you are referring to.

On a sliding scale (my way), it is a pre-qualified group from which you distinguish the the existent that contains the differentia. This genus grouping can be pre-qualified according to different standards of precision. That is something I can understand, and it even provides one of the reasons there is often more than one definition for a word (or concept in this case).

On an absolute basis, the genus kind of just is and you have to find it out by reading Rand or by getting it from someone who says the genus is xxxxx and that's all there is to it.. I'm never comfortable with that kind of standard.

But your statement that the genus of Rand's concept of rights is "moral principles" gave me food for thought.

What is the differentia to you?

The genus and differentia are relative -- one definition's genus is another's differentia. Both identify a certain set of units. A chain of definitions telescopes from broad to narrow classifications. From narrow to broad: Man is a rational animal; animal is a living entity that moves; a living entity is one that engages in goal-oriented action. (Not putting these forth as ideal definitions just as an example).

I'm not so sure I agree with you about the genus, albeit the concept of "moral principles" is one of the components. Since Rand claimed that rights were moral principles taken to the social level, I see "social organization" or something like that just as fit to be included in the genus. Also, there's government, but I am content to include that under "social organization" (or whatever term you want to use for that).

The definition needs to point to the units. That is a basic requirement. If we telescope Rand's genus toward broader classifications, it goes: moral principle, principle, thought, attribute/action of man's mind. That broadly construes a right as being in one's head. This is completely wrong. The right way is, in my opinion, to identify the genus for rights as a type of human action. I divide all human action into two broad categories: the kinds of action that initiate interference, and the kinds of action that do not -- Natural Crimes vs. Natural Rights. Note that this is a biological/teleological distinction. Note that we can apply this differentia to all living organisms. We can always make the judgement -- this organism interfered with that one, and we can do so for all kinds of life, not just man. But the genus is human action only, because only human beings can comprehend the teleology (what another person's goals are as they relate to their concrete actions), so only they can respect rights, so this definition is only meaningful for humans, and thus only they have rights.

Why did she get the definition wrong? I suspect it was because Rand liked moralizing a bit too much. So she inserted morality into the definition when it didn't belong there. I like moralizing too, but you can't let it mess up your logic. I also do not like her differentia "sanctioning man's freedom of action" -- I do not like the idea of someone else giving me permission, i.e., "sanction" to act. I have a prerogative to act however the hell I want, anyone's sanction or no, so long as I do not interfere with their actions. I am not saying she meant otherwise, I am simply analyzing her definition for what it actually is.

Shayne

[George H. Smith]

If we telescope Rand's genus toward broader classifications, it goes: moral principle, principle, thought, attribute/action of man's mind. That broadly construes a right as being in one's head. This is completely wrong.

A right is a concept, and all concepts, qua abstractions, exist only "in one's head." So what? "Chair" and "table" are also concepts that exist only in one's head. There is no universal chair or table that exists outside the mind. The point is that most concepts, including the concept of a "right," have referents that exist outside the mind.

The right way is, in my opinion, to identify the genus for rights as a type of human action.

Rights are a normative classification of human actions, and in this sense can be called a type of human action. There is no one fixed genus in such matters. With some exceptions (such as "existence") all genera are themselves subsets of broader genera.

Rand was quite correct to identify the proximate genus of rights as "moral principles." (Rights are enforceable moral claims.) And moral principles, in turn, belong to the broader genus of value judgments, which in turn are a species of the broader genus of judgments, and so on.

I divide all human action into two broad categories: the kinds of action that initiate interference, and the kinds of action that do not -- Natural Crimes vs. Natural Rights.

"Interference" is a wholly inadequate term here. If I offer unsolicited advice to a friend in the hope of dissuading him from taking an unwise course of action, I may be said to be initiating interference with his plans. So what?

Moreover, even if we construe "interference" to mean forcible interference, in contrast to voluntary interference, this distinction usually cannot be made without reference to the moral principle of property rights.

Consider this scenario: A man walks into a house, picks up a television set, and walks out with it. Has this man "interfered" with anyone? Well, we don't know, because we don't know whose house it is and who owns the television. If it is the man's house and television, then he hasn't interfered with anyone; he has a perfect right to do whatever he likes with his own property. Our assessment will be far different, however, if the man is a burglar.

Suppose I encounter a burglar as he is taking my television from my house, and suppose I use force to stop him. Have I not "interfered" with his action? Moreover, if I am the first person to use physical force, I can also be said to have "initiated" force against him. Only with a well-defined theory of property rights can we accurately assess the moral implications of such actions. Without a theory of property rights, as I said, we could not distinguish between the initiation and non-initiation of force in many situations.

Note that this is a biological/teleological distinction.

No, this is a moral distinction. It pertains to teleology insofar as moral distinctions apply to purposeful actions, but to call it a biological distinction is very weird.

Why did she get the definition wrong? I suspect it was because Rand liked moralizing a bit too much. So she inserted morality into the definition when it didn't belong there.

Rights are a moral concept, so of course they will be defined in moral terms. In the very nature of the case, one cannot give a purely descriptive account of rights.

I am not entirely happy with Rand's "definition" of rights (assuming she meant it as a formal definition, which isn't at all clear), but the problems with it are nothing like your criticism.

Ghs

[sjw]

A right is a concept, and all concepts, qua abstractions, exist only "in one's head." So what? "Chair" and "table" are also concepts that exist only in one's head. There is no universal chair or table that exists outside the mind. The point is that most concepts, including the concept of a "right," have referents that exist outside the mind.

You're missing the point. If we follow Rand's approach to defining rights for tables, we would end up with something like this: "A table is a utilitarian concept defining an entity that supports man's food." Whereas we should define it as something like this: "A table is a piece of furniture with a flat raised area such that it can be used to put things within the reach of a person's hands."

The units of a concept are what the definition must refer to, one doesn't refer to the purpose of coining the concept. I don't object to talking about this purpose. Sure, the purpose of the concept of rights is along the lines Rand describes. Although her description grates on me a bit, I don't have a major objection to it qua description of the purpose of the concept of rights. But it is not a definition of rights.

Rights are a normative classification of human actions, and in this sense can be called a type of human action. There is no one fixed genus in such matters. With some exceptions (such as "existence") all genera are themselves subsets of broader genera.

Rand was quite correct to identify the proximate genus of rights as "moral principles." (Rights are enforceable moral claims.) And moral principles, in turn, belong to the broader genus of value judgments, which in turn are a species of the broader genus of judgments, and so on.

You're very wrong George. Never seen you be this wrong before. No one fixed genus in "such matters"? What such matters? Why all the sudden can we violate rules of definition, such that the genus no longer has to refer to the units being referred to by the concept? I don't say a genus has to be "fixed", I say it must function properly. It must identify the units.

"Interference" is a wholly inadequate term here. If I offer unsolicited advice to a friend in the hope of dissuading him from taking an unwise course of action, I may be said to be initiating interference with his plans. So what?

Moreover, even if we construe "interference" to mean forcible interference, in contrast to voluntary interference, this distinction usually cannot be made without reference to the moral principle of property rights.

Consider this scenario: A man walks into a house, picks up a television set, and walks out with it. Has this man "interfered" with anyone? Well, we don't know, because we don't know whose house it is and who owns the television. If it is the man's house and television, then he hasn't interfered with anyone; he has a perfect right to do whatever he likes with his own property. Our assessment will be far different, however, if the man is a burglar.

Suppose I encounter a burglar as he is taking my television from my house, and suppose I use force to stop him. Have I not "interfered" with his action? Moreover, if I am the first person to use physical force, I can also be said to have "initiated" force against him. Only with a well-defined theory of property rights can we accurately assess the moral implications of such actions. Without a theory of property rights, as I said, we could not distinguish between the initiation and non-initiation of force in many situations.

Human action, properly understood, is goal-oriented. When you steal a TV, you are interfering with the man's goal-oriented action. So "interference" is exactly the right word if you properly understand human action. Besides, the fundamental issue here isn't whether you like my definition, it's the epistemological issue of what constitutes a proper genus, and whether Rand's genus fits the standard.

Note that this is a biological/teleological distinction.

No, this is a moral distinction. It pertains to teleology insofar as moral distinctions apply to purposeful actions, but to call it a biological distinction is very weird.

My definition of rights is oriented around biology as understood teleologically. Human action is goal-oriented, interference with that action includes not only concrete interference but interference with long-range goal-oriented action. The purpose of the definition is certainly to make a moral distinction. You, like Rand, are confusing the purpose of the concept with the concept.

Why did she get the definition wrong? I suspect it was because Rand liked moralizing a bit too much. So she inserted morality into the definition when it didn't belong there.

Rights are a moral concept, so of course they will be defined in moral terms. In the very nature of the case, one cannot give a purely descriptive account of rights.

Again, to be precise: The purpose of the concept of rights is to make a moral distinction. Your understanding is confusing the purpose of the concept with the concept.

A definition can only carry so many things and do so many things. Although human action must be understood teleologically in order to understand my definition, I choose not to include that idea in my definition, for a few reasons. First, it is logically unnecessary. Your interpretation of human action above regarding stealing a TV is illogical. My action is not merely me moving my arm, it is me living in my house and enjoying my property over time. Abstract, goal-oriented action is still action. Second, if I include everything one needs to know in order to properly understand a definition, then it ceases to be a definition. One also needs to know why we coin the definition. I don't deny that we need to understand that it is a moral purpose. Of course we need to know that. But I'm not going to jam it into the definition.

A definition must refer to a concept's units. It must neither do more nor less than that.

Shayne

Edited October 1, 2010 by sjw

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

(Rights are enforceable moral claims.)

George,

I agree with this. But enforceable by whom?

I can't see anything other than the social organization.

If you want to nitpick, you can say, "enforceable by anyone willing to use force," and that actually is one of the conceptual referents, but I believe it is is too broad. Without social organization, enforcement of anything when a heated disagreement arises is merely a brawl.

That's why I believe social organization must be included in the genus along with moral principles.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Adam (Selene).

The genus-differentia thing comes in Chapter 5, "Definitions," of ITOE. To understand what Rand means by genus you have to understand what she calls a "Conceptual Common Denominator" (basically, the standard of measurement--but that's whole other can of worms). Here's a quote from Chapter 5:

The rules of correct definition are derived from the process of concept-formation. The units of a concept were differentiated—by means of a distinguishing characteristic(s)—from other existents possessing a commensurable characteristic, a "Conceptual Common Denominator." A definition follows the same principle: it specifies the distinguishing characteristic(s) of the units, and indicates the category of existents from which they were differentiated.

The distinguishing characteristic(s) of the units becomes the differentia of the concept's definition; the existents possessing a "Conceptual Common Denominator" become the genus.

Thus a definition complies with the two essential functions of consciousness: differentiation and integration. The differentia isolates the units of a concept from all other existents; the genus indicates their connection to a wider group of existents.

For instance, in the definition of table ("An item of furniture, consisting of a flat, level surface and supports, intended to support other, smaller objects"), the specified shape is the differentia, which distinguishes tables from the other entities belonging to the same genus: furniture. In the definition of man ("A rational animal"), "rational" is the differentia, "animal" is the genus.

Just as a concept becomes a unit when integrated with others into a wider concept, so a genus becomes a single unit, a species, when integrated with others into a wider genus. For instance, "table" is a species of the genus "furniture," which is a species of the genus "household goods," which is a species of the genus "man-made objects." "Man" is a species of the genus "animal," which is a species of the genus "organism," which is a species of the genus "entity."

Here is the part from the Workshops I mentioned (ITOE, pp 234-235):

Prof. E: I was wondering whether you would agree with the following, which is my understanding of why the genus of man for a general definition would remain "animal."

Definitions and conceptualization always have to take into account the cognitive context. The normal adult does not deal with subdivisions like "primate." And, therefore, for a general literate adult, "rational animal" would be appropriate, even if for a more specialized degree of knowledge you need the further subdivision.

I can give this parallel: suppose a normal adult were defining "amnesia." I think a valid definition would have as its genus something like "mental illness" or "mental disorder" (with the differentia indicating loss of memory). Whereas the psychiatrist, who subclassifies mental ailments, could say its genus was something narrower, I think they call it a "dissociative reaction" or something of the sort. But that would not affect the validity of the genus "mental disorder" for a generally educated adult.

AR: Yes, that is correct. I would add one thing of a more general nature. Philosophical problems have to be solved on a level of knowledge available to a normal adult at any period of human development; so that philosophical concepts are really not dependent on the development of individual sciences. And "primate" or "mammal" would be a very specialized subdivision of a concept according to a particular science.

Prof. A: Then would it be wrong for a biologist to define man as "a rational primate," or would that be correct in his context?

AR: It would be correct in his context, if he remembers that he is speaking here from a professional context. And, as you know, they subdivide even further. Any subdivision within a given science is proper provided it is not substituted for the basic philosophical definition which is valid for all men in all stages of knowledge.

I see that my memory was faulty and that Rand's words are basically in agreement with my understanding.

As I reread that passage, I remembered what I objected to in her words: "... if he remembers that he is speaking here from a professional context." My objection: I think it is quite reasonable to define man as a "rational primate" to the population at large and not just within "a professional context."

Do Rand's stipulations, "normal adult at any period of human development" and "all stages of knowledge," mean that you must know what an animal is, but may not know what a primate is?

Really?

What about the differentia?

Does this mean that an adult who can define some terms, and who has a minimal understanding of "animal" but not "primate," is expected to know what "rational" is?

I can't imagine such a person, not even at the extremes of ignorance within a society: in a primitive tribe, in the backwoods or in a modern city ghetto.

To be clear, I cannot imagine a person who understands what rational is, but does not know what primate is. And on the other end, I cannot imagine a person who does not know what primate is but understands what rational is. (There is an exception: I can imagine this last in olden times when the idea of "primate" had not yet been developed. But not in today's world.)

Now, as I reread the passage, I have a far deeper objection. How does one set a standard for "men in all stages of knowledge"? Rand implies here (and elsewhere) that philosophy, to be philosophy and not science, must be understandable by men without any specialized knowledge,

I think some guidelines about minimum knowledge requirements would be very useful before adopting this standard outright.

Michael

[Selene]

Michael:

Thanks a lot. I remember that I had problems with her exposition back then and it has been too many years since I have stopped and worked my way through Ayn's original work in this area.

So now I will delve in once again and re-read her non-fiction and the subsequent interpretations as they exist. A large task, but long overdue. This whole thread that Shayne kindly started at my prodding/request illustrates how important it is to define your terms and then argue.

Thanks again.

Adam

[sjw]

Rand on definitions:

"A definition is a statement that identifies the nature of the units subsumed under a concept.

It is often said that definitions state the meaning of words. This is true, but it is not exact. A word is merely a visual-auditory symbol used to represent a concept; a word has no meaning other than that of the concept it symbolizes, and the meaning of a concept consists of its units. It is not words, but concepts that man defines—by specifying their referents.

The purpose of a definition is to distinguish a concept from all other concepts and thus to keep its units differentiated from all other existents."

I take issue with some of her statements above. I cannot fully endorse her definition of definitions. But the one I do not take issue with is: "the meaning of a concept consists of its units. It is not words, but concepts that man defines—by specifying their referents."

There is a crucial cognitive purpose, and the root of it is the method by which a rational person forms all his mental content, whether concepts, principles, or definitions. And that is that all of this content must be rooted in real things. The most broad abstractions must be very clearly connected to the particular things they refer to. Harry Binswanger put it brilliantly (quoting from memory): "Concretization is not an aid to thinking, it *is* the thinking." Even if this is not exactly true it emphasizes something absolutely crucial about how rational people should use their minds.

The purpose of a definition is to identify the units being referred to by a given concept. It is to say "I mean *this*." It is not to evaluate or to identify the nature of the referents (although we must identify some of its nature in order to isolate the referents). Borrowing from Rand, I would define definitions thusly: A definition is a statement that identifies the units subsumed under a concept. Whatever is required to accomplish this (such as referring to some aspect of the units' nature) is subordinate to the purpose of putting one's mind in firm contact with the specific referents of a concept. It is by putting one's mind in contact with the referents that one then can study the referents and complete one's knowledge about them.

A definition fulfills the cognitive purpose that experience with reality gives us: awareness of the particulars of reality. How we judge whatever particulars there are, or how we expand on their nature and the principles that govern their behavior, is a wholly different issue from the issue of definitions.

Shayne

Edited October 1, 2010 by sjw

[Xray]

Shayne,

Genus is the messiest part of Rand's theory of concepts.

I can only make sense out of it on a sliding scale. For instance, "rational animal" is how she defined man, with "animal" being the genus. How about "rational primate" when a more precise definition is needed?

Rand actually talked about this in the Workshops, if I remember correctly, totally dissing the idea that "primate" could be the genus. Her argument did not convince me because, if I adopt her argument, I then can't detect the essence of what a genus is.

The reason why no essence of a genus can be detected is that there exists no essence of what a genus is. For the possibilities of forming categories and subcategories are virtually limitless.

For example, "man" could as well be categorized as "living organism" being the genus, and "living organism being able to write" the differentia.

On an absolute basis, the genus kind of just is and you have to find it out by reading Rand or by getting it from someone who says the genus is xxxxx and that's all there is to it.. I'm never comfortable with that kind of standard.

Your being uncomfortable is well justified because standards are created by humans, from which it follows that a genus not "kind of just is".

I cannot fully endorse her definition of definitions. But the one I do not take issue with is: "the meaning of a concept consists of its units. It is not words, but concepts that man defines—by specifying their referents."

The point is that most concepts, including the concept of a "right," have referents that exist outside the mind.

Rand was of the opinion that every word (proper names excluded) denotes a concept standing for an umlimited number of "concretes of a certain kind".

When putting Rand's theory of concepts to the test, one gets the surprising result that e. g. angels exist!

Here goes: (bolding mine)

Rand, ITOE, p. 10: "Every word we use (with the exception of proper names) is a symbol that denotes a concept, i.e. that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind." (Rand)

Now let's look at her definition of concrete:

"Abstractions as such do not exist: they are merely man’s epistemological method of perceiving that which exists — and that which exists is concrete." (Rand) http://aynrandlexico..._concretes.html

Okay then:

Premise 1: Every word is a symbol that stands for an unlimited number of concretes.

Premise 2: A concrete is that which exists.

Conclusion: From these premises it follows that the word "angel" is a symbol referring to an unlimited number of concretes, and a concrete is that which exists.

Ergo: angels exist. Who would have thought of anything written in ITOE being a "theist's delight", but that sure is one.

Edited October 1, 2010 by Xray

[merjet]

When putting Rand's theory of concepts to the test, one gets the surprising result that e. g. angels exist!

Here goes: (bolding mine)

Rand, ITOE, p. 10: "Every word we use (with the exception of proper names) is a symbol that denotes a concept, i.e. that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind." (Rand)

Now let's look at her definition of concrete:

"Abstractions as such do not exist: they are merely man’s epistemological method of perceiving that which exists — and that which exists is concrete." (Rand) http://aynrandlexico..._concretes.html

Okay then:

Premise 1: Every word is a symbol that stands for an unlimited number of concretes.

Premise 2: A concrete is that which exists.

Conclusion: From these premises it follows that the word "angel" is a symbol referring to an unlimited number of concretes, and a concrete is that which exists.

Ergo: angels exist. Who would have thought of anything written ITOE being a "theist's delight", but that sure is one.

The word Nazi strikes again. She imposes her own meaning on Ayn Rand's words.

Regardless, concrete angels do exist. Here is one.

[Selene]

Word Nazi....

Soup Nazi....

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J02RdkvI6zo

continuing...

What's the differentia!!!

Sorry, I just could not resist.

Merlin: that is a beautiful picture, where is it from?

Adam

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Regardless, concrete angels do exist. Here is one.

Merlin,

Imaginary Angels exist, also.

Just because they only exist as a belief in someone's head, they still exist in that form.

I never have understood the arguments that claim that everything exists except what's in human minds...

Michael

[merjet]

Regardless, concrete angels do exist. Here is one.

Merlin,

Imaginary Angels exist, also.

Just because they only exist as a belief in someone's head, they still exist in that form.

I never have understood the arguments that claim that everything exists except what's in human minds...

Well, of course. But do you believe Xray interpreted Rand to mean "concrete" in that sense in post #116? Do you doubt that Xray's intent was to hijack what Rand said to mean angels existed in a non-imaginary way?

Edited October 2, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[rodney203]

Not following this topic closely I did not read all the material lately. I will just put my 2 cents on a little I did read from Michael, only because I think I can respond intelligently, in my opinion anyway.

Michael, I have read a lot of the non-fiction material which is available and I too have thought some about the task of definitions, though I certainly avoid getting myself "bogged down" in the issue. I think the genus-speci notion of how we define things reflects an aspect of how our brains DO work, i.e., recognizing similarities and differences. What I have read says that there is some flexibility in definitions with the general rule being what clearly works best. "Rational Animal" seems to be the best definition. "Rational Living Thing" would be silly, as there isn't likely to be any rational trees found around here any time soon.

On the other hand, "Rational Primate", or "Rational Mammal", or "Rational Vertebrate" begin to feel too arbitrary. So Rand might have picked "animal" to just cover all the bases.

Secondly, the process of clearly naming the genus and speci of entities is very straight forward. Next up the scale, however, defining existents that are not entities, such as "feeling", "consciousness", "thought", "sight", "hearing" is much less obvious. Lastly, pure concepts such as "rights" may not even be subject to the genus-speci method. There may be some other, as yet to be determined, method that our brains "know" these things. After all, the fact that there can be such wide disagreement among people on concepts might seem to indicate that a more complex process is going on in "knowing" pure concepts than simple genus-speci.

Recall, it was made clear in the Objectivist literature that the genus-speci method is not a parlor game we play, but a reflection of how we believe our brains actually do their thinking. I don't know if anyone can honestly say he has observed (by introspection) that his brain "knows" concepts by genus-speci.

In other words, if genus-speci is how our brains "know" entities, that is no guarantee that that is how our brains "know" concepts. I don't think we know everything there is to know on how our brains do what they do. I think one fault of how many people practice Objectivism is the demand for understanding and certainty on every and all topics. I think this may be a stalling mechanism to avoid actually practicing Objectivism.

My specialty is applying the Objectivist ideas and principles correctly to everyday situations. To do this properly I don't need to know the genus and speci of "rights". By self-reflection I seem to know clearly what rights are without fully understanding how my brain accomplished the feat.

[Selene]

Rodney:

In other words, if genus-speci is how our brains "know" entities, that is no guarantee that that is how our brains "know" concepts. I don't think we know everything there is to know on how our brains do what they do. I think one fault of how many people practice Objectivism is the demand for understanding and certainty on every and all topics. I think this may be a stalling mechanism to avoid actually practicing Objectivism.

Interesting take.

Instinct? Subconscious intuition? Induction...OMG never!

Adam

[Brant Gaede]

Rational animal

Rational man

Conceptual animal

Rational primate

Etc.

How about: Man, the moral animal?

--Brant

the rational robot

[rodney203]

How about: Man, the moral animal?

-Brant

the rational robot

How about "Brant, the dude that doesn't get it"

[Brant Gaede]

How about: Man, the moral animal?

-Brant

the rational robot

How about "Brant, the dude that doesn't get it"

Well, I didn't get shot, but it was close.

--Brant