Settling the debate on Altruism

[Rich Engle]

P1: A 'sacrifice' is (defined by Rand) the exchange of a greater value for a lesser value.

P2: Sacrifices are immoral.

P1. Yes. Ask any chess player. And that includes a pure sacrifice, where no lesser piece is taken at all; done only for (assumed) positional advantage.

P2. Not if you take their Queen several moves later. Nor if you thought you could, but miscalculated.

I just think she didn't like the general connotation of the word itself. "Shameless self-sacrifice," and how it is encouraged by various entities (usually for their own purposes, whether they believe their own b.s., or not).

Edited April 7, 2010 by Rich Engle

[imurray]

OK, guys, the commentary around this has become muddled, when the situation is clearcut. So let's break it down. Here's Rand:

"The word that has destroyed you is 'sacrifice'...If you wish to save the last of your dignity, do not call your best actions a 'sacrifice': that term brands you as immoral. If a mother buys food for her hungry child rather than a hat for herself, it is not a sacrifice: she values the child higher than the hat; but it is a sacrifice to the kind of mother whose higher value is the hat, who would prefer her child to starve and feeds him only from a sense of duty."- Ayn Rand, "Atlas Shrugged"

Now let's put what she's saying into a logical form:

P1: A 'sacrifice' is (defined by Rand) the exchange of a greater value for a lesser value.

P2: Sacrifices are immoral.

P3: A mother sacrifices buying the hat for feeding the child.

C: The mother is immoral to do so.

There is no point trying to deny it: this is the clear logical implication of this passage as Rand wrote it. It's nothing to do with any supposed "interpretation" of it.

AFAICS there are two main possibilities, as I wrote in my original post, if anyone cares to look:

1) Rand meant it - and she does go on about how much she "means it" when she says outrageous things.

2) Rand didn't meant it - she has got herself all befuddled, the passage is a blunder.

I opt for 2). Rand is confused.

This is also consistent with my primary premise in dealing with Rand: that she often writes in vague, inconsistent, and confused fashion, just like other philosophers.

Daniel, I address this in my last post. Yes it's immoral to feed the child instead of buying the hat - yes because it's a sacrifice, but also because the mother does not value her child more than the hat, which would be the rational value to hold. So it is only immoral according to the mother's hierarchy of values - which is inherently wrong anyway! You're refusing to see or understand the non-consequentialist's concept of morality. Read some Aristotle, seriously - it will help you understand where this is coming from and why they don't hold a strict Utilitarian view of morality.

Here's a snip from my last post:

Judged according to Rand's philosophy (talking of the second mother who'd rather buy the hat):

buy hat = immoral because it's not a rational value, i.e., her obligation is to a value that is not rational.

feed child = immoral because it's done out of duty, i.e., not done out of obligation to a rational value (which she ought to have).

The mother basically has two levels of obligation: one is to act rationally according to her values (micro-level) and the other is to hold rational values (macro-level), that is, to be rational (which to Rand is synonymous to "being human"). She's acting morally if she's true to both obligations. So it's easy to see why she herself would be acting immorally no matter what she did. Do you really think a moral or ethical person would feed a child just because they had to and not because they wanted to? What a pitiful state to be in to not value and enjoy your own child.

The mother's point of view is WRONG because she's not thinking rationally so it really doesn't matter. It just looks good to put "moral" next to buying the hat because it makes Rand's philosophy look shocking, but it's a parlor trick because it wouldn't be congruent with Rand's ethics - it's the ethics of a crazy mom made to look like it's representing Rand and therefore it's worthless as an argument.

----

Would someone please at least acknowledge this position when they reply (rebuttal is totally fine and I welcome it - I do not mean that one must agree) - I feel that this takes us in a different direction. I've been hearing the same argument over and over and over again and it is weak. Please give Rand and her "followers" some credit when reading that example - if it was as simple as you all make it out to be someone would have noticed it a long time ago and it would have been worked out.

The crux of Rand's argument and philosophy is that a person acting morally WOULD NOT NEED TO SACRIFICE because they would rationally choose the right/moral value hierarchy to begin with.

Edited April 7, 2010 by Panoptic

[imurray]

Here's the potential 'problem' with a more Utilitarian view:

So the mom buys the hat instead of feeding her daughter - another woman notices this and calls the department of social services and the child is taken away and is eventually placed in a loving home where she is very happy. According to the Utilitarian view, buying the hat could have been a moral act because as a consequence of that act the child went to a better home and is happy. In other words: a moral end justifies or trumps the immoral means.

Philosopher's like Rand and Aristotle would basically say: "Wait a minute! That doesn't sound quite right. Her intent wasn't moral - the eventual moral consequence of her action was a result of sheer luck and a product of immoral means."

Do you see the possible ethical dilemma here? And why Rand might conceive that rational motives are important to integrate into an ethical or moral judgment? And furthermore, why the concept of luck is taboo in her thought? In this case, a rational person doesn't need luck to achieve a moral end nor would they resort to immoral means.

Edited April 7, 2010 by Panoptic

[Brant Gaede]

If you guys don't settle this "debate on altruism" before the 1000th post, I'm going to eat the baby and burn the hat and that will be that!

--Brant

baked, boiled or fried

[Rich Engle]

Yeah, Brant beat me on that...44 pages of unsettlement. This might not be a record but it is getting up there.

But it's an O-discussion, and everything has to be "just so!"

rde

Tearing out pages of his "just so" books and flinging them about desk area.

[imurray]

If you guys don't settle this "debate on altruism" before the 1000th post, I'm going to eat the baby and burn the hat and that will be that!

--Brant

baked, boiled or fried

Hmm, let's see.

Eating the baby would be immoral in the sense that it's an irrational value, however, what you want to accomplish is to end this debate - which is more valuable to you than the baby. So if you don't eat the baby you're sacrificing a higher value for a lower value. So I guess the only logical conclusion would be that you have to eat the baby in order to be moral. Oy vey.

--Ian

poached

Edited April 7, 2010 by Panoptic

[Rich Engle]

Eating the baby would be immoral in the sense that it's an irrational value, however, what you want to accomplish is to end this debate - which is more valuable to you than the baby. So if you don't eat the baby you're sacrificing a higher value for a lower value. So I guess the only logical conclusion would be that you have to eat the baby in order to be moral. Oy vey.

And they say pragmatism is dead... ;)

[Daniel Barnes]

Daniel, I address this in my last post. Yes it's immoral to feed the child instead of buying the hat - yes because it's a sacrifice, but also because the mother does not value her child more than the hat, which would be the rational value to hold.

Hi Panoptic,

The obvious rebuttal seems to be that this a petitio error?

regards

Daniel

[imurray]

Daniel, I address this in my last post. Yes it's immoral to feed the child instead of buying the hat - yes because it's a sacrifice, but also because the mother does not value her child more than the hat, which would be the rational value to hold.

Hi Panoptic,

The obvious rebuttal seems to be that this a petitio error?

regards

Daniel

Daniel,

Read the rest. We're looking at two different perspectives here: 1. From the mother's value hierarchy and 2. from a rational value hierarchy.

From perspective one buying the hat would appear to moral. From perspective two buying the hat is immoral. It follows that since the mother's value hierarchy isn't rational, buying the hat would be judged immoral and that would be the reality because it was judged rationally from a rational perspective and not the mother's irrational perspective. It is not a petitio error.

Only a person not thinking rationally would come to the conclusion that it was moral to buy the hat. You have to look at this as a rational person. This philosophy hinges on the idea of an objective rational mind - if it didn't then values and morals would be relative and not grounded in reality, which they cannot be in Rand's system.

Go back and read Aristotle's N.Ethics.

You're missing a HUGE part.

Edited April 7, 2010 by Panoptic

[Daniel Barnes]

Your P3 omits a very key phrase -- feeding the child only from a sense of duty. Your alleged analysis also ignores the first part of Rand's sentence -- the mother who feeds her child rather than buying a hat (but not purely from a sense of duty).

I don't believe Rand picked a great example to illustrate her meaning of sacrifice. Neither is your primary example of "sacrifice" giving up a piece in a game of chess.

Hi Merlin

You tell me about these supposedly important omissions, of which I am perfectly aware, but it would be helpful if you explained how these impact on the problem. I am of the view that they do not, but you can always put me straight.

In fact I get the sense that you agree with me that this example is basically flawed.

However where we no doubt differ is that you will probably view this as simply an infelicitous example. Whereas I think it is symptomatic of a fundamental befuddlement.

[imurray]

Your P3 omits a very key phrase -- feeding the child only from a sense of duty. Your alleged analysis also ignores the first part of Rand's sentence -- the mother who feeds her child rather than buying a hat (but not purely from a sense of duty).

I don't believe Rand picked a great example to illustrate her meaning of sacrifice. Neither is your primary example of "sacrifice" giving up a piece in a game of chess.

Hi Merlin

You tell me about these supposedly important omissions, of which I am perfectly aware, but it would be helpful if you explained how these impact on the problem. I am of the view that they do not, but you can always put me straight.

In fact I get the sense that you agree with me that this example is basically flawed.

However where we no doubt differ is that you will probably view this as simply an infelicitous example. Whereas I think it is symptomatic of a fundamental befuddlement.

This example is good because there is only ONE OBVIOUS rational/moral choice. I can imagine other examples that would be less extreme, but in all probability there will be more than one rational choice which would make for a confusing example.

[Dragonfly]

Your P3 omits a very key phrase -- feeding the child only from a sense of duty.

In Objectivism "duty" means "what Objectivists disapprove of", just like "rational" there means "what Objectivists approve of". Suppose someone would prefer to be lazy and lead a parasitic or even criminal life. But someone has convinced him to read some books about Objectivism and now he feels guilty about his desires, so he feels he has the duty to be productive and independent and lead a life according to Objectivist principles. The essence of "duty" is a moral obligation that overrules personal preferences, it doesn't say what kind of moral obligation that is.

Your alleged analysis also ignores the first part of Rand's sentence -- the mother who feeds her child rather than buying a hat (but not purely from a sense of duty).

But what is a sense of duty? Should she love her child? Perhaps she doesn't like it or even hates it. Such things are out of her control, she cannot force herself to love it, neither can she force herself not to prefer the new hat over the life of her child. But does that mean that it would be immoral to feed the child and not buy the hat she desires so much, because she thinks it his her duty to protect that child, even if she hates it? In my opinion such a judgment is absurd. As is the idea that it would be "rational" to prefer the child over the hat, terms like "rational" do not apply to feelings you cannot control, only to choices you can make.

The whole problem lies in Rand's definition of sacrifice as giving up a higher value for a lower value, that inevitably leads to such absurd conclusions that are so tenaciously defended against better judgment. The essence of sacrifice is giving up a significant value to gain a greater value. The sacrifice in chess is a perfect example. You give up a valuable piece to gain a value that is larger, namely winning the game. Without the gain it would not be a sacrifice, but just a blunder (that such a sacrifice may misfire is not relevant, the player may have thought it was a sacrifice while it turned out to be a blunder).

[Brant Gaede]

Your P3 omits a very key phrase -- feeding the child only from a sense of duty.

In Objectivism "duty" means "what Objectivists disapprove of", just like "rational" there means "what Objectivists approve of". Suppose someone would prefer to be lazy and lead a parasitic or even criminal life. But someone has convinced him to read some books about Objectivism and now he feels guilty about his desires, so he feels he has the duty to be productive and independent and lead a life according to Objectivist principles. The essence of "duty" is a moral obligation that overrules personal preferences, it doesn't say what kind of moral obligation that is.

Your alleged analysis also ignores the first part of Rand's sentence -- the mother who feeds her child rather than buying a hat (but not purely from a sense of duty).

But what is a sense of duty? Should she love her child? Perhaps she doesn't like it or even hates it. Such things are out of her control, she cannot force herself to love it, neither can she force herself not to prefer the new hat over the life of her child. But does that mean that it would be immoral to feed the child and not buy the hat she desires so much, because she thinks it his her duty to protect that child, even if she hates it? In my opinion such a judgment is absurd. As is the idea that it would be "rational" to prefer the child over the hat, terms like "rational" do not apply to feelings you cannot control, only to choices you can make.

The whole problem lies in Rand's definition of sacrifice as giving up a higher value for a lower value, that inevitably leads to such absurd conclusions that are so tenaciously defended against better judgment. The essence of sacrifice is giving up a significant value to gain a greater value. The sacrifice in chess is a perfect example. You give up a valuable piece to gain a value that is larger, namely winning the game. Without the gain it would not be a sacrifice, but just a blunder (that such a sacrifice may misfire is not relevant, the player may have thought it was a sacrifice while it turned out to be a blunder).

But that's just a non-sacrificial sacrifice. A real organic, objective sacrifice is when someone puts a gun to your head and tells you to sacrifice your queen--or else! It's imposed on you. What's also imposed is the doctrine of such sacrifice: for the good of others and the state itself. This can be done by purely propagandistic or ideological means and it can even be so subtle that the word "sacrifice" in regard to your actions isn't even used, as in some cults--even the cult of Ayn Rand--when it's your true individuality that's tossed into the crapper.

--Brant

[merjet]

But someone has convinced him to read some books about Objectivism and now he feels guilty about his desires, so he feels he has the duty to be productive and independent and lead a life according to Objectivist principles.

Why couldn't he desire to do so without regarding it as a duty?

The whole problem lies in Rand's definition of sacrifice as giving up a higher value for a lower value, that inevitably leads to such absurd conclusions that are so tenaciously defended against better judgment. The essence of sacrifice is giving up a significant value to gain a greater value. The sacrifice in chess is a perfect example.

In my opinion Rand's definition is less problematic than yours. Suppose I were to buy a luxury car for $60,000. The $60,000 is a significant value and the car the higher value. That is not a sacrifice in my book.

[imurray]

But someone has convinced him to read some books about Objectivism and now he feels guilty about his desires, so he feels he has the duty to be productive and independent and lead a life according to Objectivist principles.

Why couldn't he desire to do so without regarding it as a duty?

The whole problem lies in Rand's definition of sacrifice as giving up a higher value for a lower value, that inevitably leads to such absurd conclusions that are so tenaciously defended against better judgment. The essence of sacrifice is giving up a significant value to gain a greater value. The sacrifice in chess is a perfect example.

In my opinion Rand's definition is less problematic than yours. Suppose I were to buy a luxury car for $60,000. The $60,000 is a significant value and the car the higher value. That is not a sacrifice in my book.

Is anyone even reading my posts? You just keep going around and around in circles. If I'm wrong - show me how. Any reason nobody is taking my argument on?

[merjet]

Is anyone even reading my posts? You just keep going around and around in circles. If I'm wrong - show me how. Any reason nobody is taking my argument on?

I read and agreed with your post #884. Are you happier now?

[Dragonfly]

But that's just a non-sacrificial sacrifice. A real organic, objective sacrifice is when someone puts a gun to your head and tells you to sacrifice your queen--or else! It's imposed on you.

No, it just becomes a different kind of sacrifice, as remaining alive is to you an even much greater value than that queen or winning the chess game.

What's also imposed is the doctrine of such sacrifice: for the good of others and the state itself. This can be done by purely propagandistic or ideological means and it can even be so subtle that the word "sacrifice" in regard to your actions isn't even used, as in some cults--even the cult of Ayn Rand--when it's your true individuality that's tossed into the crapper.

No, that's just the Objectivist twist to the meaning of sacrifice. But Rand's own example of the mother and child shows that there are also sacrifices that have nothing to do with the state. Now in that case you might say that the good of the child is an example of "good of others", but then you imply that sacrificing the purchase the hat for the well-being of the child is immoral, as your true individuality is tossed into the crapper.

[Dragonfly]

But someone has convinced him to read some books about Objectivism and now he feels guilty about his desires, so he feels he has the duty to be productive and independent and lead a life according to Objectivist principles.

Why couldn't he desire to do so without regarding it as a duty?

I can ask the same question about the person who desires to give his money away to the poor people in Africa, why couldn't he desire to do so without regarding it as a duty? You seem to imply that following Objectivist principles can only be done if you desire it, but following altruist principles can only be done if you consider it a duty.

In my opinion Rand's definition is less problematic than yours. Suppose I were to buy a luxury car for $60,000. The $60,000 is a significant value and the car the higher value. That is not a sacrifice in my book.

That depends on the question whether $60,000 is a significant value to you. If you're a millionaire it won't be a sacrifice, but if it means contracting a loan you cannot easily afford and you have to deny yourself all kinds of other things to be able to make the payments, yes, then it is a sacrifice. It would definitely be a sacrifice to me if I would value the possession of such a car high enough to buy it (which I don't).

[merjet]

That depends on the question whether $60,000 is a significant value to you. If you're a millionaire it won't be a sacrifice, but if it means contracting a loan you cannot easily afford and you have to deny yourself all kinds of other things to be able to make the payments, yes, then it is a sacrifice. It would definitely be a sacrifice to me if I would value the possession of such a car high enough to buy it (which I don't).

Oh, I get it now. It's fine for you to use words like "significant" that are ambiguous to others or don't apply the same way in every case, but not okay for Rand to use words like "duty" or "rational" which are ambiguous to you or don't apply the same way in every case.

Edited April 8, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[imurray]

Is anyone even reading my posts? You just keep going around and around in circles. If I'm wrong - show me how. Any reason nobody is taking my argument on?

I read and agreed with your post #884. Are you happier now?

Haha - you're not the one I'm trying to convince! But thanks for acknowledging it.

[Peter]

Merlin Jetton wrote:

Oh, I get it now. It's fine for you to use words like "significant" that are ambiguous to you or don't apply the same way in every case, but not okay for Rand to use words like "duty" or "rational" which are ambiguous to you or don't apply the same way in every case.

End quote

I am astounded at the quality of these posts. Greetings Merlin. Remember me?

I don’t know if these ideas have been presented yet, on the Altruism debate. I found this old letter by searching the letters JR (Oh, Junior, there is no cure for stupid, but I digress.)

Where’s George? Interesting. Has he burned out on the topic? George? Yo, George? Can you hear me? I have your next book and it might be a best seller. Write some philosophy. Do what this “Altruism” thread has done. Dissect the ideas of Rand. Improve them. Make them one hundred percent . . . . (logical??? fill in the blank)

George H. Smith, you are the man for the job. No need to thank me.

Thank you.

Semper cogitans fidele,

Peter Taylor

From: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

Reply-To: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

To: "*Atlantis" <atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: Re: Two Cents

Date: Sat, 11 Aug 2001 00:04:46 -0500

R. Christian Ross wrote:

"What fact of the matter did [Rand] misrepresent [in FTNI]?

"I really don't understand how or why anyone can call this work "embarrassingly bad"--what ever generalities are present, what ever stylistic dramatics and exaggerations exist--I don't see any facts being incorrectly stated."

I know Christian's post wasn't addressed to be, but since I seconded JR's comments, I would like to respond. Here are two examples of misrepresentations, selected more or less at random:

Rand wrote (p. 30):

(1) "[Empiricists] claimed that man obtains his knowledge from experience, which was held to mean: by direct perception of immediate facts, with no recourse to concepts...."

Many empiricists -- such as John Locke, who is widely regarded as the founder of modern empiricism -- were conceptualists who stressed the crucial role of concepts in the acquisition and verification of knowledge. Much of Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* is devoted to this very subject; in it, Locke discusses the formation of concepts, and their importance, in considerable detail.

(2) Rand wrote (p. 31):

"Kant's expressly stated purpose was to save the morality of self-abnegation and self-sacrifice."

No, Kant's purpose was to derive an ethics solely from man's reason and moral autonomy. He did not regard the issue of beneficiaries – whether it be oneself or others -- as an essential element of a rational ethics. He did not condemn self-interested motives and actions per se; rather, he regarded these as emanating from the hypothetical imperatives of prudential maxims rather than from the categorical imperatives of universal moral principles. For Kant, moral rules are imperatives of reason. (Note that I am *not* expressing my agreement with Kant; that is another issue.)

Ghs

[Daniel Barnes]

Go back and read Aristotle's N.Ethics.

You're missing a HUGE part.

To which I reply: go and read your:

We're looking at two different perspectives here: 1. From the mother's value hierarchy and 2. from a rational value hierarchy.

Then consider this: Isn't 2. what Rand is seeking to establish with her various ethical assertions, including the one under discussion?

Hence you can't introduce another "rational value hierarchy" ad hoc as a assumption in order to save Rand from absurd consequences of those assertions. That seems to be the upshot of your "two perspectives" argument AFAICS.

The situation is basically incoherent, which is unfortunately where you often get to with Rand when you drill down. (I think, for example, of her truly amazing garbling of Antisthenes' famous "horseness" remark in the ITOE, a passage that deserves a mini-essay in itself). I think a more detailed layout of the convolutions of this child-hat passage would be helpful, as there is plenty that people could get wrong, me included, and I will do that when I get a clear moment. Unless anyone else feels like doing it!

Edited April 8, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Peter]

I recently wrote about the advisability of George H. Smith writing a book that improved on Rand, especially in the logic department. She combined artistry with philosophy to advance her ideas, but (controversially,) that may not have always been as precise as needed.

I honestly think a book that improved Objectivism, as George did with Ayn’s theory of *Contextualism* in his book, “Why Atheism,” would be a best seller, especially in these BEGINNING Tea Party years.

Some suggestions to improve the potential for huge sales. Drop the words “Atheism” and “Anarchy” from any title. *WE* want your book to be proudly in front of the book case or coffee table in case Grandma comes over for dinner.

Not to spin a doodle on Peter Reidy’s “Wright and Rand,” but a good title could be (W)”Righting Rand.” Or some variation, but Rand needs to be in the title.

Oh Oh. American Idiot is back on. Got to go.

Semper cogitans fidele,

Peter Taylor

[Daniel Barnes]

I recently wrote about the advisability of George H. Smith writing a book that improved on Rand, especially in the logic department. She combined artistry with philosophy to advance her ideas, but (controversially,) that may not have always been as precise as needed.

From what I've seen he'd be the man for the job.

[imurray]

Go back and read Aristotle's N.Ethics.

You're missing a HUGE part.

To which I reply: go and read your:

We're looking at two different perspectives here: 1. From the mother's value hierarchy and 2. from a rational value hierarchy.

Then consider this: Isn't 2. what Rand is seeking to establish with her various ethical assertions, including the one under discussion?

Hence you can't introduce another "rational value hierarchy" ad hoc as a assumption in order to save Rand from absurd consequences of those assertions. That seems to be the upshot of your "two perspectives" argument AFAICS.

The situation is basically incoherent, which is unfortunately where you often get to with Rand when you drill down. (I think, for example, of her truly amazing garbling of Antisthenes' famous "horseness" remark in the ITOE, a passage that deserves a mini-essay in itself). I think a more detailed layout of the convolutions of this child-hat passage would be helpful, as there is plenty that people could get wrong, me included, and I will do that when I get a clear moment. Unless anyone else feels like doing it!

There is only one rational hierarchy in the example (the mother's is obviously not rational) so I'm not introducing anything or fixing anything. In this example there is only one rational choice, but don't confuse that with Rand being prescriptive. In most other situations there will be more than on rational choice. That's what makes this a good example - imagine if she used an example with numerous rational choices that weren't all as obvious as this one. OK I'm done - choose not to understand this and go back to spinning in circles.