Settling the debate on Altruism

[George H. Smith]

Now this, George, begs the question of what is "gradual." Relative to what? Some species evolve quickly relative to others. Sharks haven't really changed very much for the last 200 million years, but humans sure have over three million.

--Brant

let's call evolution a consequence of adaptation

I simply quoted a definition from The American Heritage Dictionary. Your issue may be relevant to another discussion, but I don't see its relevance to my issue, viz: Should we speak of evolution as a "cause." However one deals with your problem, my problem remains.

Ghs

[tjohnson]

No, I'm not saying that at all.

My "for X substitute Y" gimmick obviously wasn't clear, so I apologize for the confusion, and let's forget it.

The relevant point was what I perceived as your condescending manner. That has annoyed me from nearly the first post you addressed to me, when you said something to the effect that Korzybski regarded philosophy as bunk, while clearly indicating your agreement with him. I therefore suggest that you pay closer attention to how you word such comments. Words and statements have connotations as well as denotations.

There are many ways to insult people without doing so explicitly. My thin is about as thick as it gets in matters like this -- you need to grow a thick skin if you are a high-school dropout who has pursued what is essentially an academic career -- so don't attribute my reaction to over-sensitivity.

I am very familiar with how the game of Oneupmanship is played. I've played it with the best, including David Friedman (in three public debates), a Nobel prize-winning economist, and university professors galore (including a number of public debates about Rand's ethics). And though I haven't always won, I've never done worse than a draw.

(For the record, this is not some kind of argument from authority, nor am I trying to impress. I am simply calling attention to the fact that I am not some kind of hyper-sensitive soul who routinely overreacts. I do overreact on occasion, but not very often.)

Btw, I would appreciate it if you would answer my earlier question: What have you read by Rand?

Ghs

Well, I am impressed by your arguing skills. I have no wish to argue with you, I am interested in coming to agreement with people - that's the gs way. I have only read bits and pieces of Rand, most of my understanding of objectivism has come from participating on this forum.

[George H. Smith]

Well, I am impressed by your arguing skills. I have no wish to argue with you, I am interested in coming to agreement with people - that's the gs way. I have only read bits and pieces of Rand, most of my understanding of objectivism has come from participating on this forum.

Okay. Fair enough.

Ghs

[Peter]

I want to thank George for his defense of Objectivism.

Peter

George H. Smith wrote or was he paraphrasing Rand:

"Man's survival qua man" means the terms, methods, conditions and goals required for the survival of a rational being through the whole of his lifespan—in all those aspects of existence which are open to his choice."

Then George wrote:

Of course, this confirms what I said above. The terms, methods, conditions, and goals are not specified. Rand, of course, argues for her own terms, methods, conditions, and goals, but that is what ethical theory is all about. In doing this, she is simply doing moral philosophy, but you seem to think that she doesn't leave it "open" to the reader to evaluate the soundness of her arguments. That is of course absurd. Over and over again, Rand stresses the importance of intellectual independence.

End quote

Bill Dwyer expanded on man qua man ethics:

Very little if any mention is ever made on this list of Objectivism’s values and virtues, so I thought they might be worth a brief discussion for those who are not especially familiar with them. There are three cardinal values and seven cardinal virtues in the Objectivist ethics.

The values are: reason (as one's only means of knowledge), purpose (as the choice to pursue happiness), and self-esteem, (as the belief that one is able to achieve happiness and worthy of achieving it).

The virtues are understood as the principled _means_ of gaining and keeping these values. As Rand puts it, "'Value' is that which one acts to gain and keep, 'virtue' is the action by which one gains and keeps it." [FNI, 147' pb 121] "Virtue," she says, "is not an end in itself. Virtue is not its own reward... [Rather] _Life_ is the reward of virtue -- and happiness is the goal and the reward of life." [FNI, 156, pb 128]

For Rand, virtues involve a relationship between existence and consciousness and therefore entail the recognition of certain facts. Accordingly, Objectivism's virtues are:

1) Rationality, which is the recognition that existence exists and that nothing can take precedence over the act of perceiving it;

2) Independence, which is the recognition that you must think independently and not subordinate your judgment to that of others;

3) Integrity, which is the recognition that you must remain true to your convictions;

4) Honesty, which is the recognition that the real is (and the) unreal can have no value and, moreover, that respect for truth is not a social duty but a selfish virtue.

5) Justice, which is the recognition that you must judge other people as conscientiously as you judge inanimate objects, condemning their vices and praising their virtues;

6) Productiveness, which is the recognition that productive work is the process by which your consciousness controls your existence, and that you must choose a line of work that is commensurate with your abilities;

and

7) Pride, which is the recognition that you are your own highest value, that a virtuous character has to be earned, and that the result of earning it is self-esteem.

The difference between pride and self-esteem may not always be clear and is admittedly a subtle one, but for Objectivism, pride consists of recognizing the importance of a good character and what it takes to earn it. When someone says, "Take pride in your job," he is saying, consider it important enough to do well. By the same token, when someone says, "Take pride in yourself or in your character," he is saying, consider a good character important enough to be worth acquiring. Self-esteem, on the other hand, is the _consequence_ of earning a good character; it is the experience of efficacy and self-worth that comes from having earned it.

Of course, these virtues offer a very general guide for living one's life; they don't give a detailed blue-print, but they do provide an indispensable foundation for "gaining and keeping" Objectivism's cardinal values of reason, of purpose (defined as one's own happiness) and of self-esteem (defined as a sense of personal efficacy and self-worth).

It should be noted that Rand gives a more elaborate definition of these virtues in _For the New Intellectual_, starting on page 157; pb, p. 128).

End quote

[dan2100]

Do you have any notion, even an inkling, of how profoundly condescending these remarks are?

I never intended any condescension, I wonder how many others on the forum feel that it is condescending?

I believe your comments can be reasonably read as condescending. In other words, I agree with George on this.

I'm not sure how this could be construed as condescending - unless giving an overview of the goal of general semantics, as GS understands it, is considered condescending?

He basically says that GS is a system that was designed to help people think about words and symbols so they are better prepared to take in the language of philosophy - what's the problem and how is that condescending? You either agree or disagree, but I don't see how you get offended. He specifically stated that not everybody who reads philosophy becomes insane - so presumably those who aren't taken in are already competent (whatever that entails). I don't know enough about GS to say that it holds the answers, but I will say that I believe that people are sometimes tricked by language - take a Christian for example

No offense Dan, but you have butted into numerous conversations to defend George without really understanding what is going on.

No offense, but my intention in my post was not to defend George, but to state how I read GS's post. I believe, as I stated, it could be interpreted as condescending.

Also, I didn't say I was offended.

As regards whether I'm butting in here, that's part of the nature of this sort of conversation: you post something and others can and most likely will butt in. This is not like a private conversation, in which case you could tell others to stay out. Of course, why you'd post to a public online forum -- one that's even open for non-members to read -- and want others to stay out is interesting it itself.

As regards actual general semantics, while I haven't studied it to any great degree -- though I've read about it and about Korzybski -- GS's way of using it here seems akin to that of many anti-philosophical or "end of philosophy" notions throughout history -- and seems to suffer the same weakness of all such notions. (Also, I suspect, but am not sure, that some of this is based on a caricature of philosophy. This is not to say GS is intentionally doing this or that he's got a monopoly on caricature.)

[Brant Gaede]

Now this, George, begs the question of what is "gradual." Relative to what? Some species evolve quickly relative to others. Sharks haven't really changed very much for the last 200 million years, but humans sure have over three million.

--Brant

let's call evolution a consequence of adaptation

I simply quoted a definition from The American Heritage Dictionary. Your issue may be relevant to another discussion, but I don't see its relevance to my issue, viz: Should we speak of evolution as a "cause." However one deals with your problem, my problem remains.

Ghs

Sorry about that. I don't see evolution causing anything at all. It is simply a broad conceptual roof over poorly understood biological processes.

--Brant

[dan2100]

I must have missed something. What do you mean by serious philosopher? And what do you mean by Rand supporter?

In my mind, people can take both Rand and philosophy seriously -- in fact, take Rand as a serious philosopher or her views as philosophically serious. But I'd like to see what you mean here to see just how you and I are disagreeing.

The ideas, concepts and topics Rand addressed are serious philosophically. Rand is simply not considered by academia as a serious philosopher. This might not mean anything, in other words, this means nothing on it's own, but it remains a fact.

Some in the academy have and do take Rand seriously. I think we can start with John Hospers and Robert Nozick, who both wrote on her ideas. Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl put together a collection of essays in 1984 called The Philosophic Thought of Ayn Rand which featured essays on Rand's philosophy by academics who were not Randians or Objectivists, such as Antony Flew and Eric Mack.

You might also look up The Journal of Ayn Rand studies -- http://www.aynrandst.../jars/index.asp -- edited by Chris M. Sciabarra. That journal has essays on Objectivism and Ayn Rand from people all across the academic field. E.g., see:

http://www.aynrandst.../10_2bio.asp#sh

Note that four of the writers listed hold academic posts.

This is not to say, of course, that Rand is accepted among all academics as a serious thinker or philosopher. But such a difference of opinion should invite investigation not dismissal, don't you think?

Also, I'm not sure what academic acceptance is supposed to mean here. Academics are people too. Sadly, sometimes they suffer extreme biases against thinkers they don't like -- often because they don't understand the thinkers -- and there's political infighting amongst them. So, acceptance or rejection of someone or some idea by one, some, most, or all academics doesn't necessarily mean the person or idea should be, respectively, accepted or rejected. It might only reflect a certain faddishness among academics. (One need only look, in our time, to the rejection of Austrian economics by many in the economics profession -- the same people, in fact, who were completely taken unawares by the recent financial downturn, despite the many, loud warnings over the last several years about an impending downturn.)

I have drawn my own conclusions regarding my distaste for Rand, but here's a post from another forum from a more mainstream academic type.. But these are not my arguments.

"People don't consider Rand a serious philosopher given what she writes is rhetoric and not philosophy. My grandma can ask philosophical questions, but whether my grandmother can do serious philosophical work is separate issue.

Not only has Rand said many erroneous things about other philosophers, she never had a solid grasp on the basic issues any undergraduate should be able to tackle. For instance, with the issue of universals, one can defend either a one-tiered ontology or a two-tiered ontology. There is no intermediate position; either universals exist or they don't. Rand also called herself a "rationalist" but contradicted three properties ascribed to Reason --the formation of a priori concepts, the intuiting of necessary and universal connections between properties, and the power of drawing inferences from premisses. One certainly can deny a priori knowledge in logic, mathematics, and in ethics, but subsequently calling oneself a follower of "Reason" is demented.

The spectacle degenerates further when we get to Rand's economic and political philosophy. Rand believed capitalism is a direct result of the behavior "rational" individuals, as if market forces function only in the presence of rationalistic ubermen. In reality, capitalism is superior to command economies because it addreses human ignorance by systemically coordinating dispersed, limited knowledge. The profit system, as writers like von Mises have noted, makes men prosper that satisfy the wants of their customers in the best possible and cheapest way. Misunderstanding the nature and logic of capitalist enterprise, Howard Roark would be a bum in this world. People succeed economically by producing the customer's B, not by sticking with your A. Consumer sovereignty is the very raison d'etre of capitalism.

Lastly, Rand never dealt with the problems with Egoism. Both deontological and teleological variants have severe problems. Philosophers don't merely state positions, they defend them. If one is a fan of virtue ethics, self-indulgence, vanity, irascibility, and so forth, are excesses for Rand's supposedly esteemed Aristotle. Rand's ethical ideal ends up being South Park's Eric Cartman, which certainly is not mine. "

I don't know who wrote this, but she or he seems woefully ignorant of Rand's actual writings -- not to mention the writings that have followed up on her work. (It might be the writer merely read Atlas Shrugged very quickly and with an eye toward bashing Rand and didn't bother to read her non-fiction much less mull over her ideas. Of course, this can be done with any thinker: one can quickly skim just about anyone, pretend one has a sense of the ideas, and burp out some sort of negative review like the above.) Just to take one example, from my readings Rand's ethics would not celebrate Eric Cartman of South Park fame. She was quite clear to distinguish her view of egoism from other varieties, including the other-sacrificing sort exemplified by that cartoon character.

[Rich Engle]

Yeah, what is that stuff--did I miss a citation?

The spectacle degenerates further when we get to Rand's economic and political philosophy. Rand believed capitalism is a direct result of the behavior "rational" individuals, as if market forces function only in the presence of rationalistic ubermen. In reality, capitalism is superior to command economies because it addreses human ignorance by systemically coordinating dispersed, limited knowledge.

WTF? George? Anyone?

rde

Almost Burned Out The Wiring Panel Reading That One

Edited March 30, 2010 by Rich Engle

[dan2100]

Now this, George, begs the question of what is "gradual." Relative to what? Some species evolve quickly relative to others. Sharks haven't really changed very much for the last 200 million years, but humans sure have over three million.

--Brant

let's call evolution a consequence of adaptation

I simply quoted a definition from The American Heritage Dictionary. Your issue may be relevant to another discussion, but I don't see its relevance to my issue, viz: Should we speak of evolution as a "cause." However one deals with your problem, my problem remains.

Ghs

Sorry about that. I don't see evolution causing anything at all. It is simply a broad conceptual roof over poorly understood biological processes.

--Brant

Yeah, I basically agree here. Evolution is a sort of broad category of What, while evolutionary theories or hypotheses propose specific mechanisms of How for either all of evolution or for some specific believed evolution (such as the evolution of anolis lizards in the Caribbean or of land plants).

I put "believed" in there because some evolutionary studies must propose a path the changes (or lack of changes) took. Given the nature of the science, a big problem here is often working from scant and unambiguous data. One need only think of the changes in theories about hominin evolution over the last two decades to see how much speculation rests on a tiny amount of data. (Of course, this isn't just a problem for evolutionary biology, but I think it's a much bigger one because it's the sort of science where history intersects to a large degree.) A good recent book on this particular problem -- though one that's a big partisan in the debate -- is Clive Finlayson's The Humans Who Went Extinct: Why Neanderthals Died Out and We Survived. This work might give some of the flavor of just how much the theory is really conjecture and how the evidence is unclear in many ways -- even if one rejects Finlayson's specific views of hominin evolution.

Looking forward to this being seen not as me agreeing with some ideas George put forth but as defending him -- as if he and I were close friends and I stuck up for him no matter what he wrote or said.

[dan2100]

Yeah, what is that stuff--did I miss a citation?

The spectacle degenerates further when we get to Rand's economic and political philosophy. Rand believed capitalism is a direct result of the behavior "rational" individuals, as if market forces function only in the presence of rationalistic ubermen. In reality, capitalism is superior to command economies because it addreses human ignorance by systemically coordinating dispersed, limited knowledge.

WTF? George? Anyone?

rde

Almost Burned out The Wiring Panel on That One

I believe that comes from reading a secondary source with a huge axe to grind -- rather than closely reading Rand's actual writings on economics and politics.

[imurray]

The spectacle degenerates further when we get to Rand's economic and political philosophy. Rand believed capitalism is a direct result of the behavior "rational" individuals, as if market forces function only in the presence of rationalistic ubermen. In reality, capitalism is superior to command economies because it addreses human ignorance by systemically coordinating dispersed, limited knowledge.

I'm not expert, but I know "dispersed knowledge" is a buzzword among Austrian School economists. Dan may know more as I've seen him reference the Austrian school several times.

From my limited understanding the concept basically denies that an agent can make a rational decision because the agent does not and cannot have access to the necessary knowledge without having already depreciated its value. Instead the agent only has information, which is rendered practically useless as a direct result of it becoming known (that is, once information gets out it is no longer as profitable as it was when it was unknown). A confusing scenario, I know.

[Rich Engle]

I'm not expert, but I know "dispersed knowledge" is a buzzword among Austrian School economists. Dan may know more as I've seen him reference the Austrian school several times.

From my limited understanding the concept basically denies that an agent can make a rational decision because the agent does not and cannot have access to the necessary knowledge without having already depreciated its value. Instead the agent only has information, which is rendered practically useless as a direct result of it becoming known (that is, once information gets out it is no longer as profitable as it was when it was unknown). A confusing scenario, I know.

Ah. Yeah, I was guessing Von Mises or some Austrian base. Which might prove itself of its own if you think about what just happened. Plus, it appears to have been diluted or rearranged, or paraphrased or whatnot. Looks that way, at least.

[dan2100]

I'm not expert, but I know "dispersed knowledge" is a buzzword among Austrian School economists. Dan may know more as I've seen him reference the Austrian school several times.

From my limited understanding the concept basically denies that an agent can make a rational decision because the agent does not and cannot have access to the necessary knowledge without having already depreciated its value. Instead the agent only has information, which is rendered practically useless as a direct result of it becoming known (that is, once information gets out it is no longer as profitable as it was when it was unknown). A confusing scenario, I know.

Ah. Yeah, I was guessing Von Mises or some Austrian base. Which might prove itself of its own if you think about what just happened. Plus, it appears to have been diluted or rearranged, or paraphrased or whatnot. Looks that way, at least.

Dispersed (and tacit) knowledge is generally associated with Hayek -- not von Mises -- though, like many Austrians, I don't see this as conflicting with the latter's views. (Of course, Rand had some bad things to say about Hayek, but I don't recall them being on this particular issue.)

Also, what Panoptic is also getting at borders on what's called bounded rationality -- where agents don't have the time or other conditions to make a fully informed decision so they adopt heuristics and the like. Bounded rationality, however, is not irrational and doesn't seem to conflict with Rand's views of markets or of societies, in my view. (Of course, by the time the idea caught on, I think Rand's thought was already "mature" in this area.)

[bmacwilliam]

The "man qua man" approach does not , by itself, specify what the relevant characteristics are; it merely says that we need to take these fundamental characteristics, whatever they are, into account when developing an ethical theory.

Yeah, right. Rand leaves this open to the reader? Are you drunk?

Right now, I wish I were.

In a passage I've quoted before, Rand wrote:

"Man's survival qua man" means the terms, methods, conditions and goals required for the survival of a rational being through the whole of his lifespan—in all those aspects of existence which are open to his choice."

Of course, this confirms what I said above. The terms, methods, conditions, and goals are not specified. Rand, of course, argues for her own terms, methods, conditions, and goals, but that is what ethical theory is all about. In doing this, she is simply doing moral philosophy, but you seem to think that she doesn't leave it "open" to the reader to evaluate the soundness of her arguments.

Ghs

Well, golly gee, we don't even disagree that much.

"her own terms, methods, conditions, and goals,"

Simply reflected a naive and incomplete view of man IMHO. In other words, wrong.

"but you seem to think that she doesn't leave it "open" to the reader to evaluate the soundness of her arguments."

No, I meant she didn't leave her "terms, methods, conditions, and goals" as a debatable or "substitutable" variable, which of course, they are.

Bob

[George H. Smith]

Well, golly gee, we don't even disagree that much.

"her own terms, methods, conditions, and goals,"

Simply reflected a naive and incomplete view of man IMHO. In other words, wrong.

"but you seem to think that she doesn't leave it "open" to the reader to evaluate the soundness of her arguments."

No, I meant she didn't leave her "terms, methods, conditions, and goals" as a debatable or "substitutable" variable, which of course, they are.

Whatever you say, Bob. Go pester someone else.

Ghs

[Xray]

Xray:

"Life is end in itself" Rand says, and therefore one "ought to" choose it as a "standard of value".

No, this is not what Rand says. It's not even close.

If you claim error on my part here, please point it out. (I suppose you don't mean by error my accidentally leaving out the "an" before "end").

So where do you think what I wrote contradicts Rand's ideological position? For even if she did not phrase it that way, it doesn't necessarily imply that this is not where she stood.

Xray: Also, there exists no "ought to from is" in nature. To say that a hungry tiger "ought to" to hunt for survival is nonsense. The tiger must hunt. To say that we "ought to" breathe for survival is nonsense. We must breathe.

GHS: Rand would agree. So your point is...?

My point is where and how she gets the idea of deriving an "ought to" from an "is" at all.

And didn't she quote examples from nature as alleged evidence of a relationship "ought to from is"?

Xray: "Existence exists" - what please is the epistemological "bombshell" quality contained in there?

GHS: Whoever said anything about a bombshell quality? Rand didn't even consider that tautological proposition to be an epistemological primary. So, again, your point about Rand is...?

At least you don't deny that it is a tautological proposition (we have had discussions here where this has been denied by some Rand advocates), so we can spare us going into that again.

Let's also disregard for the moment the semantic/syntactic problematic of phrasing it like that. For it is like saying "love loves", "hunger hungers", "hatred hates" etc.

"Epistemological primary" or not, "Existence exists" was important enough for Rand to point it out time and again as fundamental to her philosophy.

Rand: "Existence exists. (This, incidentally, is a way of of translating into the form of a proposition, and thus into the form of an axiom, the primary fact which is existence.")

So per Rand, "existence" is a "primary fact" which she then puts in the form of an axiom?

Again: against whom is her claiming "existence to be a primary fact" directed? Against the obscure subjectivists (as described in AS) whose position seems to be "We can't know if we exist since we can't prove it?" Is that it? Is her contempt and anger directed at this group?

On another thread, you mentioned you have never been a big fan of her novels: http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=8330&st=160, (# 178)

Imo Rand's portrayal of those 'subjectivists' is among the weakest parts in AS. They are so ridiculous and unvconvincing that their 'strawman' nature is hard to miss even for Objectvists imo. As ideological adversaries, they are downright comical.

GHS: Is there no end to this shadowboxing by Rand's critics? What's next? Objections to Rand's "arguments" for the existence of unicorns, gremlins, and ghosts?

There is no shadow boxing. Instead doors are being opened on the way leading to the truth of an issue. The issue being whether the premises on which Rand based her philosopy stand up to scrutiny.

Your comments about my post # 709 re NB's essay "Isn't Everyone Selfish":

You managed to bypass a key paragraph in Branden's essay, viz:

"Obviously, in order to act, one has to be moved by some personal motive; one has to want, in some sense, to perform the action. The issue of an action's selfishness or unselfishness depends, not on whether or not one wants to perform it, but on why one wants to perform it. By what standard was the action chosen? To achieve what good?"

What Branden ignores about the "personal motive" issue: what motivates the human actions IS actually self-interest, even if he refuses to recognize it as such.

Instead he becomes morally normative at once, labeling the actions in terms of whether they qualify as "selfish" or "unselfish" according to the hierarchical value catalog by Rand.

Example from this value catalog:

If [people] place such things as friendship and family ties above their own productive work, yes, then they are immoral. Friendship, family life and human relationships are not primary in a man’s life. A man who places others first, above his own creative work, is an emotional parasite.”

http://exiledonline.com/atlas-shrieked-why-ayn-rands-right-wing-followers-are-scarier-than-the-manson-family-and-the-gruesome-story-of-the-serial-killer-who-stole-ayn-rands-heart/

This is what we are dealing with: prescriptive moralizing, claiming to know what is primary in man's life.

Is it a surprise then that Rand disciple NB, being in this Procrustes bed of Rand's personal values, would fail to see the self-interest motivating people who do choose family or whatever else over their "productive work"?

My position is that self-interest motivates all our actions because it is biologically hardwired.

(Empathy can factor in as well, but empathy is a special case, having nothing to do with any "you ought to serve others" mandate).

For example, can you name one single character in Rand's AS or TF not motivated by self-interest? Is Jim Taggart "unselfish"? Or Keating? Not even in her fiction, Rand managed to present an "unselfish" character, not even among the heroes' adversaries.

Do the test and run through the choices you make in one day. Whether it is mundane things like choosing what shirt to wear, or life-changing decisions, it can be traced back to self-interest.

Since it is my position that self-interest motivates all our actions, the burden of proof is on me. So feel free to challenge this position by providing examples which you think will refute it.

Many of the other things that Branden has to say, and which you so cavalierly dismiss, are explanations and elaborations of this theme.

The theme being him approving or disapproving of the choices people make. In short, prescriptive morality.

I find it hard to believe that you made a serious effort to understand Branden's basic points, since you don't seem to have a clue what they are.

Branden's "basic points" are as easy to understand as any prescriptive moral code. But understanding where someone is coming from does not imply agreement.

It's as if you read one paragraph, decided that it doesn't solve the problem, read another paragraph, decided that it doesn't solve the problem -- and so on, without making an effort to put the paragraphs together.

The limited space of a forum post restricts the scope of elaborations.

Actually I was going to suggest to you in my # 709 post that the NB article is short enough to be analyzed in detail in an extra thread.

Interested? If yes, we can open a separate thread on it here in the Ethics section and go through it sentence per sentence.

Edited March 30, 2010 by Xray

[George H. Smith]

Xray:

"Life is end in itself" Rand says, and therefore one "ought to" choose it as a "standard of value".

No, this is not what Rand says. It's not even close.

If you claim error on my part here, please point it out. (I suppose you don't mean by error my accidentally leaving out the "an" before "end").

I'm not going to spend time writing a primer on Rand's metaethics. Read "The Objectivist Ethics," and then you show me where she makes the argument that you attribute to her.

GHS: Whoever said anything about a bombshell quality? Rand didn't even consider that tautological proposition to be an epistemological primary. So, again, your point about Rand is...?

At least you don't deny that it is a tautological proposition...

Neither did Rand. In Chapter Six of ITOE ("Axiomatic Concepts"), Rand writes:

"This underscoring of primary facts is one of the crucial epistemological functions of axiomatic concepts. It is also the reason why they can be translated into a statement only in the form of a repetition (as a base and a reminder): Existence exists...." (My emphasis.)

"Epistemological primary" or not, "Existence exists" was important enough for Rand to point it out time and again as fundamental to her philosophy.

Again quoting Rand from Chapter 6:

"Axioms are usually considered to be propositions identifying a fundamental, self-evident truth. But explicit propositions as such are not primaries: they are made of concepts. The base of man's knowledge—of all other concepts, all axioms, propositions and thought—consists of axiomatic concepts." (Again, my emphasis.)

Rand was usually very careful in her use of words, especially in her technical expositions, and she needs to be read carefully.

Ghs

[dan2100]

Xray:

"Life is end in itself" Rand says, and therefore one "ought to" choose it as a "standard of value".

No, this is not what Rand says. It's not even close.

If you claim error on my part here, please point it out. (I suppose you don't mean by error my accidentally leaving out the "an" before "end").

I'm not going to spend time writing a primer on Rand's metaethics. Read "The Objectivist Ethics," and then you show me where she makes the argument that you attribute to her.

GHS: Whoever said anything about a bombshell quality? Rand didn't even consider that tautological proposition to be an epistemological primary. So, again, your point about Rand is...?

At least you don't deny that it is a tautological proposition...

Neither did Rand. In Chapter Six of ITOE ("Axiomatic Concepts"), Rand writes:

"This underscoring of primary facts is one of the crucial epistemological functions of axiomatic concepts. It is also the reason why they can be translated into a statement only in the form of a repetition (as a base and a reminder): Existence exists...." (My emphasis.)

"Epistemological primary" or not, "Existence exists" was important enough for Rand to point it out time and again as fundamental to her philosophy.

Again quoting Rand from Chapter 6:

"Axioms are usually considered to be propositions identifying a fundamental, self-evident truth. But explicit propositions as such are not primaries: they are made of concepts. The base of man's knowledge—of all other concepts, all axioms, propositions and thought—consists of axiomatic concepts." (Again, my emphasis.)

Rand was usually very careful in her use of words, especially in her technical expositions, and she needs to be read carefully.

Ghs

Elsewhere on OL, Tibor Machan was mentioned. I think reading Rand on this along with Machan's essay "Evidence of Necessary Existence" -- online at:

http://genius.ucsd.edu/~john/p/libuniv_dir/Machan_dir/Machan.Exist

might broaden and deepen the discussion. I mean, specifically, George's interlocutors should read Rand and Machan here.

[George H. Smith]

Actually I was going to suggest to you in my # 709 post that the NB article is short enough to be analyzed in detail in an extra thread.

Interested? If yes, we can open a separate thread on it here in the Ethics section and go through it sentence per sentence.

Thanks, but I have my fingers in too many OL pies already. I usually like to discuss topics from which I can learn something, even if that is only how to express my own ideas more clearly, and I don't regard psychological egoism as a worthy topic. It rests on little more than a misuse of words. Maybe later.

If someone says that people are always motivated by their own desires (as opposed to what? -- the desires of other people?), then I agree, even though the claim is trivial.

But if someone says that people always put their own interests above the interests of others, then that is simply and obviously wrong, as even a moment of reflection will reveal. People sacrifice their lives all the time (e.g., in war), after which there is no longer any "self" remaining which can have interests.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

But if someone says that people always put their own interests above the interests of others, then that is simply and obviously wrong, as even a moment of reflection will reveal. People sacrifice their lives all the time (e.g., in war), after which there is no longer any "self" remaining which can have interests.

To avoid confusion among those who have not wasted their lives studying philosophy, I should point out that psychological egoism differs from psychological hedonism.

According to the latter, our primary motivations are always the desire to attain pleasure or avoid pain. Thomas Hobbes is perhaps the best known defender of this position, though there have been others.

Ironically perhaps, ancient "hedonists," such as Epicurus, did not necessarily subscribe to this view. Their basic position was that happiness consists of nothing more than a sum of pleasures. This theory stands in contrast to the eudaemonism of Aristotle, according to whom happiness consists of more than a sum of pleasures, even though pleasures are relevant to happiness.

Analyzing psychological hedonism is a bit trickier than analyzing psychological egoism -- but, as with the latter, the former (which has been formulated and defended in various ways) often boils down to confusion in the use and meaning of words.

One last thing about Branden's article, "Isn't Everyone Selfish." I have long regarded this article as a masterpiece of clear and concise exposition. Although Branden's basic argument had been stated many times before, he expressed it with remarkable lucidity and brevity. If you want a model of how to write succinct mini-essays on philosophy, study that article carefully, even if you don't agree with the arguments.

Ghs

[imurray]

My position is that self-interest motivates all our actions because it is biologically hardwired.

(Empathy can factor in as well, but empathy is a special case, having nothing to do with any "you ought to serve others" mandate).

Xray,

Dan, are you ready for this? I have to agree with George on this one - this "hardwired" stuff doesn't work for me.

I think it's pretty easy to disprove:

First: What exactly is biologically hard-wired? I'm assuming you're talking about the same genetic 'predisposition' possessed by unrational animals, which is to insure the continuation of one's genetic code through procreation. This drive to reproduce and perpetuate the species/life is the primary motivator for animal behavior.

If this is indeed what you mean then survival and procreation must be at the top of any hierarchy. So in George's example of risking one's life by volunteering to serve in war, even for a good cause, violates or stands in opposition to the primal or hard-wired disposition I spoke about above.

When you argue that a person chooses to risk their life in war because they view the cause to be of higher value than their own life you are no longer in the realm of primal unrational biological hard-wiring, you are in the realm of values. If you are arguing that values are biologically hard-wired then it must follow that all people would choose to fight in war over their own life.

I don't think there's any question about this - unless you think there is a gene that forces us to choose that which is most beneficial to us and concomitantly allows a person to choose to die - which doesn't make sense.

This is because man is a rational animal and can choose to subordinate his biological drives wheras unrational animals cannot.

Earlier I said that people can rationally choose to smoke and purposely do harm to themselves as an example of how humans can subordinate their biologically determined 'behavior'. You argued that would be an irrational choice and you are correct, however to act irrationally is to deny rationality. The word I've used above, unrational, is the privative word and implies a complete absence of rationality without denial.

Edited March 31, 2010 by Panoptic

[Peter]

Dan wrote”

As regards whether I'm butting in here, that's part of the nature of this sort of conversation: you post something and others can and most likely will butt in. This is not like a private conversation, in which case you could tell others to stay out. Of course, why you'd post to a public online forum -- one that's even open for non-members to read -- and want others to stay out is interesting it itself.

End quote

OK, butt, people in general may not know GS isn’t George Smith, he's the General. We get it, Danny und, sorry, for my previous harshness.

On to something different.

Evolution.

Women in close proximity, as in a college dorms, synchronize their menstrual cycles.

For now, we explain by *Volition.* More needs to be known. Just how much of an animal are we hu-mons?

Semper cogitans fidele,

Peter Taylor

[George H. Smith]

Your comments about my post # 709 re NB's essay "Isn't Everyone Selfish":

You managed to bypass a key paragraph in Branden's essay, viz:

"Obviously, in order to act, one has to be moved by some personal motive; one has to want, in some sense, to perform the action. The issue of an action's selfishness or unselfishness depends, not on whether or not one wants to perform it, but on why one wants to perform it. By what standard was the action chosen? To achieve what good?"

What Branden ignores about the "personal motive" issue: what motivates the human actions IS actually self-interest, even if he refuses to recognize it as such.

You are pushing my patience to its limits, but I will try one last time to address this issue without lapsing into a polemical frenzy.

No, Branden does not ignore the "personal motive" issue. Much of his article is concerned with this very issue; indeed, it is key to his basic objection to psychological egoism. Given that I took the time to explain Branden's fundamental argument, it is rude to reply by curtly dismissing it as you did.

Let me put the basic argument another way, one that is more similar to the way Joseph Butler (often known as Bishop Butler) did in the 18th century, in the most famous and influential analysis of psychological egoism ever written. Butler goes into far more detail than I shall. (His analysis is lengthy and detailed.) Moreover, I haven't read Butler's discussion for many years (decades, actually), so my remarks are only a rough approximation expressed in my own words.

It is correct to say that all purposeful actions are interested . (Henceforth I shall use the word "action" to mean "purposeful action.") Why? Well, if we didn't have an "interest" in the object of our action (its goal, or purpose), we would not be motivated to act in pursuit of that goal. We wouldn't act at all.

Even though we have an "interest" in the goal of every action we take, it incorrect to say that every action we take is self-interested. The specific term "self" qualifies "interest"; it specifies a type of interest, not a goal of our actions per se.

If all motives, by definition, are self-interested, then there is no reason to use the qualifier "self" at all, for there is nothing to contrast it with. We should simply say instead that all our motives involve an "interest" of some kind. To call all such interests self interest would be redundant.

As Butler pointed out, we are often motivated by "particular affections" (I believe that's the term he used, so I will stick with this antiquated but useful expression) rather than by the more general motive of self-interest. For example, as I write this post I am listening to some music by the jazz pianist Sonny Clark, one of my favorites. When I was deliberating whether to listen to Clark or some other jazz artist -- say, pianist Bill Evans (another favorite)-- I didn't think to myself: "Gee, it serves my self-interest more to listen to Clark than to Evans, so I will listen to Clark"

Rather, I decided to listen to Clark because I had a particular affection for his music at that time, and it was this affection, not self-interest, that motivated me to listen to him rather than to Evans.

I know what your're thinking now. You're thinking, "But wasn't it in your self-interest to listen to Clark rather than Evans?" To which I answer: No, considerations of self-interest had nothing to do with my choice. In fact, if I had taken self-interest into account during my very brief deliberation, I probably wouldn't have listened to any music at all. Instead, I would have shut the music off and gotten back to work on my writing deadline instead of writing this stupid post.

In other words, I chose Clark because I was "interested" in him more than I was in Evans at the time I made my decision. (This is simply another way of saying that I preferred Clark over Evans at the time.) Thus my action was obviously motivated by an "interest" of my "self," but this is not the same thing as calling my motive "self-interested." I never took my self-interest in account when deciding whom to listen to, and it would be rather absurd to say that I thought that listening to Clark was more in my self-interest than listening to Evans.

According to Butler, particular affections (I don't recall whether he said "some" or "all") are neither self-regarding nor other-regarding. We don't pursue such actions because they are self-interested. Such actions occupy a vast middle ground between egoistic and altruistic motives. They are neither egoistic nor altruistic; they are indifferent so far as these motives are concerned. (Btw, Rand's failure to explore the category of indifferent actions is, I think, a serious weakness in her approach.)

There are a lot of variations here, many of which Butler discusses, that I can't go into now, so I will need to simplify a lot.

It is possible that my decision to listen to Clark could have been a self-interested action. Suppose that I would have preferred to listen to Evans, but that I was writing a review of Clark's album that is due tomorrow. In that case I would have thought to myself: "I would rather not listen to Clark -- I would rather listen to Evans -- but I need to get that review in so I can get paid, so it is my self-interest to listen to Clark instead.

It is also possible for my decision to have been other-regarding. Suppose a friend desperately needed some money, but that I couldn't send her any unless I met my deadline and had the payment sent to her. In that case, I would have thought to myself: "I would prefer to listen to Evans, but I want to help my friend, so I need to listen to Clark in order to write the review."

I had better stop here for now. There is a lot more to this issue, and I may expand and clarify some of my thoughts at a later time. Butler's distinctions are remarkably subtle and show an astonishing insight into human motivations; and, after looking over the above summary, I feel as if I used a meat cleaver in place of Butler's scalpel.

At bottom, Butler's analysis of psychological egoism is similar to Branden's, though it is much more complex and nuanced. The basic point, to repeat, is this: An "interest" of the "self" is what ultimately motivates us to act, but this interest can be egoistic, altruistic, or indifferent.

I have written this little piece at breakneck speed -- even now, I am annoyed at not having put some things differently, and I'm sure it contains lots of typos and other careless errors --so I ask that you read it with a sympathetic eye. Reflect on the fundamental distinctions, even if I have expressed some of them in a clumsy manner. I swear to a nonexistent God that if you reply with one of your dismissive remarks, or if you focus on some ill-expressed formulation of mine, I will.....well, I'm not sure how I will respond,, but you won't like it.

Ghs

[dan2100]

To avoid confusion among those who have not wasted their lives studying philosophy, I should point out that psychological egoism differs from psychological hedonism.

According to the latter, our primary motivations are always the desire to attain pleasure or avoid pain. Thomas Hobbes is perhaps the best known defender of this position, though there have been others.

Ironically perhaps, ancient "hedonists," such as Epicurus, did not necessarily subscribe to this view. Their basic position was that happiness consists of nothing more than a sum of pleasures. This theory stands in contrast to the eudaemonism of Aristotle, according to whom happiness consists of more than a sum of pleasures, even though pleasures are relevant to happiness.

Not an incredibly important point, but if I've read them or about them correctly, Epicurus and his ancient followers actually aimed at a sort of peaceful state -- a harmonization or quieting of desires -- rather than at trying to pursue each momentary desire.

Edited March 31, 2010 by Dan Ust

[imurray]

Even though we have an "interest" in the goal of every action we take, it [is] incorrect to say that every action we take is self-interested. The specific term "self" qualifies "interest"; it specifies a type of interest, not a goal of our actions per se.

If all motives, by definition, are self-interested, then there is no reason to use the qualifier "self" at all, for there is nothing to contrast it with. We should simply say instead that all our motives involve an "interest" of some kind. To call all such interests self interest would be redundant.

I'm not arguing with George here. I enjoyed this write up as I was unfamiliar with Butler's analysis and can understand why it is so important to this discussion and others.

Technically speaking, I think it's safe to say that all interests are self-interests provided we are discussing the act of "taking an interest". Our interests are our own; whether we choose to "take an interest" on our own or are motivated to "take an interest" by something external, we rationalize the interest within our "self".

When we are discussing the goal of a particular interest we may say that our action is taken for the benefit of the "self" or the "other".

This distinction makes it possible to say that one may act altruistically. It is impossible to avoid the fact that the action of "taking an interest" is an internal, rational, action - that seem obvious and not worth discussing. It is how the interest manifest externally, i.e., the goal associated with acting on an interest, which we are discussing when we speak of an altruistic act.

For example: If I choose to become interested in doing charity work, the rationale for becoming interested is my own (or I have at least made it my own). The action(s) I may be said to be in the interest of others, that is, the goal of my action(s) may be to help others. Subsequently the action(s) I take may make me feel good. Simply becoming interested in charity does not make one feel good - one must first act on the interest which in this case makes "feeling good" a byproduct of the action. It is true that in this situation one may imagine that taking action is going to make them feel good and that may be part of the rationale for taking the interest in the first place, but one cannot know for sure or have the feeling until after the external action is taken.

It is clear in the example that merely calling and interest a "self-interest" does not benefit this conversation on altruism. What's important is the goal of the action and how one defines a "successful" action.

In the above case and in light of this distinction one can make another important distinction between one who is said to be acting egoistically and one who is said to be acting altruistically:

For the egoist the happiness (or whatever feeling) may come as a result of performing the action, that is, doing the act would make them feel good (or whatever) about themselves. (If they performed the action poorly they may feel bad).

For the altruist the happiness would come as a result of performing the action AND would be dependent on how they perceive the response of others to the action, that is, they will only be happy if the action made "others" happy. This is why there is a problem with acting altruistically - one is dependent on others for their own happiness.

Edited March 31, 2010 by Panoptic